In the Matter of the Welfare of: A. G., Child

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1876

In the Matter of the Welfare of: A. G., Child

Filed June 19, 2017
Reversed and remanded
Randall, Judge*

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-JV-15-2146

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Daniel A. McIntosh, Steele County Attorney, Laura E. Isenor, Assistant County Attorney,
Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Randall, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RANDALL, Judge
On appeal from a restitution order requiring appellant, a juvenile, to pay $1,988.44
in restitution to the complainant after appellant was adjudicated guilty of fifth-degree
assault, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering her to pay

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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restitution for medical bills stemming from a roll-over car crash that occurred shortly after
the assault and, therefore, were not directly caused by appellant’s conduct. There is no
direct causal connection between appellant’s conduct and the concussion sustained by the
complainant that resulted from the car accident. We reverse and remand for a recalculation
of the proper amount of restitution to be awarded the complainant.
FACTS
On or about September 6, 2015, appellant A.G. was at a party where some party-goers
were consuming alcohol. Shortly after arriving at the party, A.G. saw her boyfriend in a
compromising sexual encounter with two girls, M.K. and M.R. Appellant then became upset
and punched both M.K. and M.R. When M.K. and M.R. decided to leave the party sometime
later, appellant followed the girls to M.K.’s vehicle and started “punching the window,”
prompting M.K. to drive away. At the time of the confrontation, M.K. and M.R. were ready
to leave the party ; appellant did not follow the girls after that confrontation. The vehicle
then crashed and “went through a low-speed rollover.”1 M.R., who was in the front passenger
seat and not wearing a seatbelt, was rendered unconscious as a result of the car accident, and
was taken to the emergency room for treatment.
A juvenile delinquency petition was filed charging appellant with two counts of fifth-
degree assault, one involving M.K. and one involving M.R.2 Appellant subsequently pleaded
guilty to the fifth-degree assault charge involving M.R., and the assault charge involving M.K.

1 Details involving the exact time, place, and cause of the accident are not clear from our
record.
2 The record indicates that M.K. was charged in a separate complaint with criminal
vehicular operation.
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was dismissed. At the plea hearing, appellant admitted slapping M.R. on the face and then
punching her “three times.” Appellant also admitted that “as a result of the punches,” M.R.
sustained “some kind of an injury to her lip.” The district court then ordered a stay of
adjudication and required appellant to “pay restitution as established either through agreement
or through the results of a contested hearing.”
The state submitted an affidavit requesting $1,988.44 in restitution for medical bills
incurred by M.R. stemming from the assault. Appellant challenged the amount of restitution
requested, claiming that the amount “in no way stemmed from [her] offense,” and instead
included outstanding medical expenses resulting from the September 6, 2015 car accident for
which she is not responsible.
Following a contested restitution hearing, the district court found that as a result of the
events on September 6, 2015, M.R.’s “parents had to pay out of pocket for most of [M.R.’s]
medical costs, including the [emergency room] visit, CT scans of her head, face, and spine, a
follow up outpatient visit, and stitches for her mouth from the punches.” The district court
then found that the “main point of contention for causation is whether [appellant] should be
responsible for costs of the CT scans of [M.R.’s] head, face, and spine.” The court concluded
that the “evidence supports medical investigation of a possible concussion from the
assault . . ., making the head and face CT scans and emergency room visit likely and wise
regardless of intervening events.” The court also stated that “[f]urthermore, [M.R.] was
escaping [appellant’s] assault when the car accident happened. It is clear that [appellant]
started the chain of events that caused all of [M.R.’s family’s] medical expenses. The
subsequent accident resulted in concurrent medical evaluation, including the spine CT, which
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does not absolve [appellant’s] responsibility.” Accordingly, the district court awarded M.R.
$1,988.44 in restitution for the “emergency room visit, three CT scans, mouth stitches, and
follow up visit cost” because these were “all costs directly resultant of [appellant’s] actions.”
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
In juvenile cases, restitution is governed both by the general restitution statute and
the restitution provision of the juvenile delinquency statutes. In re Welfare of H.A.D., 764
N.W.2d 64, 66 (Minn. 2009); see Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1 (2016) (general restitution
statute); Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 1(5) (2016) (restitution provision of juvenile
delinquency statutes). “The record must provide the [district] court with a factual basis to
award restitution.” State v. Johnson, 851 N.W.2d 60, 65 (Minn. 2014). “The burden of
demonstrating the amount of loss sustained by a victim is on the prosecution.” Id. In
general, the district court has broad discretion in determining restitution awards and
imposing disposition in juvenile matters. State v. Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Minn.
2007); In re Welfare of J.L.Y. , 596 N.W.2d 692, 696 (Minn. App. 1999), review granted
(Minn. Sept. 28, 1999) and appeal dismissed (Feb. 15, 2000).
A district court may impose restitution and a wide range of other dispositions if it
deems them “necessary to the rehabilitation” of the juvenile. Minn. Stat. § 260B.198,
subd. 1. But “[t]he primary purpose of restitution is to restore crime victims to the same
financial position they were in before the crime.” Johnson, 851 N.W.2d at 65 (quotation
omitted). “[I]f restitution is in the form of money or property, the information must include
an itemization and description of the loss and reasons justifying the amounts claimed.”
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Hughes v. State, 815 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). “A dispute over
the proper amount of restitution must be resolved by the district court by a preponderance
of the evidence.” Johnson, 851 N.W.2d at 65. A district court abuses its discretion when
it awards restitution in an am ount that “far exceeds the loss attributable to the offense of
which [a defendant] was convicted.” State v. Ramsay, 789 N.W.2d 513, 518 (Minn. App.
2010).
In determining whether to order restitution, and the amount of restitution, the district
court is required to consider, among other things, “the amount of economic loss sustained
by the victim as a result of the offense.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a)(1) (2016); see
State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 685-86 (Minn. 2015) (defining “result” as a “result of the
offense”). “The district court should order restitution only for losses the defendant directly
caused by the conduct that led to his conviction.” State v. Miller, 842 N.W.2d 474, 477
(Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 2014); see also State
v. Maxwell, 802 N.W.2d 849, 853 (Minn. App. 2011) (stating that a recoverable economic
loss is “a reasonably foreseeable result of, and . . . directly caused by, [a defendant]’s
actions”). “It may not order restitution for conduct that is only tangentially related to the
criminal act that caused the loss.” Id. In fact, the supreme court has declined to adopt a
“but for” or cause-in-fact test for causation. Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d at 667. Instead, the
supreme court recognized that “the potential exists for a restitution claim to become so
attenuated in its cause that it cannot be said to result from the defendant’s criminal act.”
Id.
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Appellant argues that the district court awarded restitution for M.R.’s expenses that
were not actually and directly caused by appellant. We agree. It is undisputed that
appellant slapped M.R. on the face and then punched her “three times,” causing an injury
to her lip that required three stitches. As a result, appellant concedes that restitution was
proper for M.R.’s medical bills for “an office visit and the sutures” because they were the
direct result of her conduct.
However, there is no medical evidence whatsoever that establishes a causal
connection between appellant’s conduct and the concussion sustained by M.R. It is
undisputed that M.R. did not leave the party or otherwise seek medical attention
immediately after the assault. Instead, she left some time later, after the confrontation with
appellant at M.K.’s car. At the time of the confrontation, M. K. and M.R. were ready to
leave the party and appellant did not follow the girls after that confrontation. It is
undisputed that upon leaving the party, the vehicle, driven by M.K. “went through a low -
speed rollover,” and that M.R., who was a passenger in the vehicle and not wearing a
seatbelt, was found unconscious at the scene of the accident. This undisputed evidence
indicates that M.R.’s medical bills stemming from the night of the assault, inc luding the
C.T. scans for the head, face, and spine, are not the direct result of the assault to which
appellant pleaded guilty. Rather, M.R. incurred the bulk of her medical bills as a result of
the car accident that followed the assault. See Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d at 667 (declining to
adopt a “but for” or cause-in-fact test for causation). M.R.’s mother testified that M.R.
suffered a concussion as a result of being punched in the face by appellant. There is nothing
in the record to support her testimony, a fact noted by the district court.
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M.R. sustained the concussion as a result of the car accident, which required the
three C.T. scans and treatment. The bulk of M.R.’s medical bills were not directly caused
by appellant’s conduct. We reverse the district court’s inclusion in the restitution award of
the three CT scans, the emergency room visit, and the follow-up visit costs, and remand
for an order awarding restitution only for the costs associated with the stitches.
Reversed and remanded.