In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: J. L. and D. A., Parents

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1879

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: J. L. and D. A., Parents

Filed April 17, 2017
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge

Wilkin County District Court
File No. 84-JV-15-324

Carl A. Thunem, Wilkin County Attorney, Breckenridge, Minnesota (for respondent
Wilkin County)

Matthew P. Franzese, Wheaton, Minnesota (for appellant J.L. and D.A.)

Dawn Krump, Tintah, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Peterson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
PETERSON, Judge
In this appeal from an order that terminates their parental rights to two children,
appellants argue that there is not clear and convincing evidence to show that conditions
existing at the time of the hearing supported termination. We affirm.

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FACTS
Appellants J.L. (mother) and D.A. (father) are the parents of two children, J.A., born
in 2009, and R.L., born in 2015. The family came to the attention of the Otter Tail County
Department of Human Services in July 2014 when the county was notified that mother was
“pregnant and using methamphetamine, liquid heroine and pain medications” ; J.A., then
five years old, was “runn[ing] around town alone” ; and appellants’ Rothsay home lacked
water and flooring.
After law-enforcement officers and the county were unable to contact the family
and the county received a second report that appellants’ home still lacked water, a county
worker interviewed J.A. at school in September 2014. During the interview, J.A. stated
that he had witnessed, and at times was in the middle of, domestic violence situations, and
he spoke at length about such occurrences, including one during which his father
brandished a knife and threatened to kill his mother.
Law-enforcement officers went to the home, found it unfit for living, and removed
J.A. J.A. was returned to his mother’s care within two weeks “on the condition that
[mother] reside with her mother, complete a Rule 25 chemical dependency evaluation and
not allow [ father] in the home.” J.A. was adjudicated a child in need of protection or
services (CHIPS) on November 25, 2014, after mother admitted to the petition.
R.L. was born on January 6, 2015 , and, at birth, tested positive for
methamphetamine, THC, and amphetamines. Before discharging mother and R.L. from
the hospital, a nurse noted that R.L. had slight tremors and difficulty feeding.
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Wilkin County1 social workers met with mother at her Breckenridge apartment in
mid-January 2015 and observed “no safety concerns.” They told mother that no court
action would be initiated unless she failed to follow family -service-agency
recommendations, which “included attending WIC as needed, participat[ing] in the Family
Footprints program o ut of St. Francis Healthcare, participating in Healthy Families of
America out of Wilkin County Public Health, and completing a chemical dependency
assessment.” The chemical-dependency assessment resulted in recommendations that
mother abstain from all mood-altering drugs, begin outpatient treatment, and participate in
weekly drug screenings, among others.
Mother did not contact, r eply to, or complete the family -service programs offered
to her, and she did not participate in urinalysis testing from Febru ary 18, 2015 , through
April 15, 2015, although she was asked to do so on numerous occasions. On April 16, two
social workers discovered that, contrary to a court order, father was living in mother’s
apartment and mother had left R.L. in father’s care while she drove J.A. to school. J.A.
and R.L. were placed in foster care the next day . R.L. was adjudicated to be in need of
protection on May 19, 2015.
The county continued to offer mother services, which she consistently avoided,
including mandatory outpatient chemical-dependency treatment. Mother eventually began
outpatient treatment but was discharged for “non-compliance with treatment expectations.”

1 In February 2015, venue of the case was transferred to Wilkin County.
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At a review hearing on May 19, 2015, mother refused to provide a sample for urinalysis
testing, and father admitted that “he would test dirty for methamphetamines.”
Neither parent came to a May 27, 2015 comprehensive review of their case plan; at
the meeting, the plan was updated to include, among other items, a requirement that each
parent update their chemical-dependency a ssessments and attend outpatient treatment.
Mother began inpatient treatment on June 30, 2015, and while out of the treatment facility
on a doctor’s pass on August 5, mother was seen with father. She was discharged on
August 10 for “ noncompliance with the rules and regulations of the treatment facility.”
Mother tested positive for methamphetamine on September 3, 2015. The county was
unable to contact mother on four dates in September; she would not answer her door on the
14th, even t hough noises could be heard from inside her apartment. In summarizing
mother’s conduct from June 2014 through December 2015, a district court dispositional
review order states that mother “routinely minimized her drug use, avoided testing, failed
drug tests, missed appointments and failed treatment.”
After father was arrested in July 2015 for driving after his license was revoked, he
completed a chemical-dependency assessment on July 23, 2015. It was recommended that
father immediately begin a “high intensity in-patient treatment program .” Father began
“Project Turnabout” on August 11, 2015, but “[u]pon arrival, he tested positive for opiates
and methamphetamine and had to be placed in detox.” He quit the program on August 27.
The county filed a petition for termination of parental rights on September 25, 2015.
Appellants entered denials, and the district court set an adjudicatory hearing for December
18, 2015. On that date, appellants entered into a stipulation voluntarily consenting to a
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permanency placement order for the children being issued by the court, but the order would
be stayed for 90 days. If a qualified relative could be identified and approved, the stayed
order would be for a permanent relative placement. But, if a relative placemen t was not
available, the order would be for the term ination of parental rights. The stipulation also
provided that the stay was contingent upon each parent abstaining from all alcohol and
non-prescribed mood-altering substances and following the case plan ; a failed drug test
would be sufficient cause for the court to vacate the stay, and any refusal to test would be
considered a positive test and result in vacating the stay. The district court accepted the
parents’ stipulation and ordered that “[a]t the end of 90 days, the Court [would] issue an
order consistent with the stipulation . . . as to permanency or continued effor ts relating to
reunification.”
By late March 2016, both parents successfully completed inpatient chemical -
dependency treatment programs. A guardian ad litem recommended that the parents slowly
reintegrate with J.A. because J.A. suffered from post-traumatic stress while living with his
parents and could not be in his father’s presence without becoming upset. A May 31, 2016
guardian ad litem report indicated normal development for R.L. but state d that J.A. had
outbursts in school, participated in an individualized education plan , and his school had
applied to place him in a day treatment program , but the application was denied . Father
moved in with mother on August 1, and the children began trial home visits in August
2016. In September, the guardian ad litem report ed that the children “transitioned
successfully back into their mother and father’s home,” “[t]he parents have tried very hard
to comply with all the tasks in their case plan,” and the parents “remained sober and have
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had no negative [drug test results].” The guardian ad litem recommended that the CHIPS
petition be dismissed in 90 days. A court report filed on September 12, 2016, for a review
hearing on September 13, 2016, stated that Wilkin County Family Services Agency
anticipated full family reunification within one year.
On September 29, 2016, appellants encountered their former drug dealer at a truck
stop and obtained methamphetamine, which they immediately consumed. They then drove
to father’s parents’ home in Rothsay to pick up their children, drove to Breckenridge where
they attended a court -ordered parenting class. After the class, they drove home and
consumed more methamphetamine that night and the next morning.
On September 30, a former foster parent reported to a social worker that she found
a pill that was later identified as Oxycodone in her driveway , and mother was the only
visitor she had that day. Two social workers went to mother’s apartment to have her submit
to urinalysis testing. They found mother’s car in the parking lot, and when they knocked
on the apartment door, they heard shuffling inside. They called mother’s phone, and they
could hear ringin g coming from inside the apartment. They knocked for five minutes
before going back outside. They called the appellants’ employer, and the person who
answered the phone told them that father had called in sick that day and mother was not
scheduled to work. They waited outside the building, and after about five minutes, father
and R.L. walked out the side door. One of the social workers walked up to father and saw
“that his eyes were glossy and his pupils were dilated. ” Father admitted that he had been
using and that he was high. At that point, mother called father’s cell phone, and when
father handed the phone to the social worker, mother hung up.
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The social worker stepped away to call the police, and, when he turned back, he saw
the other social worker holding R.L., and father was walking away. He called out father’s
name and asked him to stop, but father took off running. Father was apprehended about
ten minutes later, and he told the social worker that he “messed up” and did not “know why
he got hi gh.” Police obtained a search warrant and discovered methamphetamine,
marijuana, and drug paraphernalia in the apartment. Mother admitted that both she and
father had been using methamphetamine for fourteen years.
The district court held a permanency hearing on October 28, 2016. A social worker,
the children’s guardian ad litem, and appellants appeared at the hearing, and “the matter
was submitted to the court on stipulated facts through [the] stipulation signed and approved
by all parties on October 28, 2016.” That stipulation states, in part:
On December 18, 2015, [appellants] entered into a
stipulation whereby their voluntary consent to a permanency
placement order for [J.A. and R.L.] was stayed for a period of
ninety (90) days on the condition that they abstain from the use
of controlled substances. Between December 18 th and
September 19th, 2016, [appellants] established stable housing
at Park Manor, obtained employment at Jiffy Lube in
Wahpeton and maintained sobriety. [Appellants] successfully
completed in -patient chemical dependency treatment and
followed their recommendations for care and after-care. They
also completed the Nurtured Heart parenting class and couples’
counseling. [ Father] completed anger management classes.
[Appellants] inte racted appropriately with [J.A. and R.L.]
during supervised visitation and were actively engaged in
planning for reunification during the spring and summer of
2016. As of September 29 th, they were participating in
Narcotics Anonymous, received in -home fam ily therapy and
were attending Love and Logic classes. [J.A.] was receiving
Zones of Regulation Training through Wilkin County Family
Services and was enrolled in the Breckenridge Elementary
School.
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. . . .

In addition to the facts set forth above, th e parties
further stipulate that the Complaint of [Police] Chief Kris
Karlgaard in Court File #84 -CR-16-349 and the Court Report
of [the social worker] filed on October 6, 2016 in Court File
#84-JV-16-86 are admissible and may be treated by the court
as an accurate summary of what Chief Karlgaard’s and [the
social worker’s] testimony would be concerning the events of
September 29th and 30th.

Following the hearing, the district court terminated appellants’ pare ntal rights to
J.A. and R .L. The court found that there was clear and convincing evidence of three
statutory grounds for termination under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (2016): clause
(2) (refusal or neglect to comply with the duties of the parent-and-child relationship);
clause (4) (palpable unfitness to be a party to the parent-and-child relationship); and clause
(5) (following child’s placement out of the home, reasonable efforts under the direction of
the court failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s placement) . The district
court also found that termination is in the children’s best interests.2 This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
An appellate court “gives deference to a trial court’s decision to terminate parental
rights but closely inquires into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it was
clear and convincing.” In re Children of T.A.A. , 702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2005).
“Termination of parental rights will be affirmed as long as at least one statutory ground for

2 Appellants do not challenge the district court’s finding that termination is in the children’s
best interests.
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termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence and termination is in the child’s
best interests.” In re Welfare of Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004).
The district court’s findings of fact will not be overturned unless they are clearly
erroneous. In re Welfare of Child of T.C.M., 758 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Minn. App. 2008). To
successfully challenge the district court’s findings of fact , “ the party challenging the
findings must show that despite viewing [the] evidence in the light most favorable to the
trial court’s findings . . . the record still requires the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake was made.” Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 474 (Minn. App. 2000).
Evidence to support termination of a parent’s rights “must address conditions that
exist at the time of the hearing.” In re Welfare of Chosa , 290 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn.
1980); see In re Welfare of P.R.L. , 622 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Minn. 2001) (stating that
evidence to support termination “must relate to conditions that exist at the time of
termination”). Appellants argue that the district court’s order was not based on evidence
of conditions that existed at the time of the termination hearing and, instead, focused on
the past.
The district court based its termination decision on three statutory grounds under
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b). Under one of those statutory grounds, parental rights
may be terminated if the court finds:
that following the child ’s placement out of the home,
reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed
to correct the conditions leading to the child’s placement. It is
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presumed that reasonable efforts under this clause have
failed[3] upon a showing that:
(i) a child has resided out of the parental home under
court order for a cumulative period of 12 months within the
preceding 22 months. In the case of a child under age eight at
the time the petition was filed alleging the child to be in need
of protection or services, the presumption arises when the child
has resided out of the parental home under court order for six
months unless the par ent has maintained regular contact with
the child and the parent is complying with the out -of-home
placement plan;
(ii) the court has approved the out -of-home placement
plan required under section 260C.212 and filed with the court
under section 260C.178;
(iii) conditions leading to the out -of-home placement
have not been corrected. It is presumed that conditions leading
to a child ’s out -of-home placement have not been corrected
upon a showing that the parent or parents have not substantially
complied with the court ’s orders and a reasonable case plan;
and
(iv) reasonable efforts have been made by the social
services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the
family.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5).
The district court determined that the presumption that reasonable efforts have failed
to correct the conditions leading to the child ’s placement arose because both children are
under age eight; “JA has resided out of the parental home for 16½ of the past 18½ months”;

3 Appellants argue that, to find that reasonable efforts have failed to correct the conditions
leading to the children’s placement, “[t]he district court could use as evidence a parent’s
failure to complete a chemical dependency treatment program on two or more occasions
and the parent’s continued abuse of chemicals. But that did not occur here. ” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5), describes two sets of circumstances under which it is presumed
that reasonable efforts have failed. The district court relied on the first set of circumstances,
which are described in Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5)(i)-(iv); appellants’ argument
is based on the second set of circumstances, which are described in Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(5)(A)-(E).
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“RL has resided outside the home for 17 of the past 18½ months”; and , although mother
and father have maintained contact with the children during the last year, “both parents
have failed to comply with the out-of-home placement plan by failing to attend or missing
parenting classes, in -home counseling and AA/NA meetings; failing to set up daycare
options; and failing to abstain from the use of controlled substances.” The district court
also found that an out -of-home placement pla n was filed under section 260C.17 8, the
conditions leading to the out -of-home placement had not been corrected, and reasonable
efforts have been made by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite
the family.
Appellants contend that the record shows that from Septemb er 3, 2015, through
September 30, 2016, neither of them used any drugs or engaged in any acts of domestic
violence, and they both fully complied with their case plan. They also note that they had
their children living with them on a trial home visit for a month and a half before their
“slip-up” and argue that “[i]t is obvious that the District Court and Wilkin County focused
solely on [their] past, not the present.”
In the memorandum attached to its termination order, the district court specifically
acknowledged that the evidence supporting termination “must relate to conditions that exist
at the time of termination and it must appear that the conditions giving rise to the
termination will continue for a prolonged, indeterm inate period.” P.R.L., 622 N.W.2d at
543. The district court then stated, “[mother] and [father] have argued to this court that
their recent relapse was a “one-time” mistake. But in light of the long history of drug abuse
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and the relatively short time that [mother] and [father] were clean, it is reasonable to assume
that their abuse will continue.” The court also noted that appellants
made some positive progress in the summer of 2016.
However, just days after appearing in court and being
commended for the improvement, they both made the decision
to use methamphetamine. They had only had the full -time
responsibility for caring for their children for six weeks when
they relapsed. More troubling is the fact that they endangered
their children by driving (or permitting driving) while h igh on
drugs with the children in the vehicle. They then attend[ed] a
parenting class while high, returned home and continued to use
drugs the following day. They endangered the children by
storing drugs in the home, potentially for over a year.

Appellants’ argument that the district court focused solely on the past ignores the
fact that appellants’ use of methamphetamine on September 29 and 30, 2016, occurred less
than one month before the hearing; it was not something from the distant past. And the
district court rejected appellants’ characterization of the events on September 29 and 30 as
a “one-time” mistake. The district court, instead, considered these events in the context of
appellants’ conduct over a period of years and found that they were a continuation of a
pattern of past behavior.
Although there is evidence that a ppellants made progress in their effort to stop the
drug abuse that led to the placement of their children out of the home, their relapse in
September was clear and convincing evidence that this condition had not been corrected.
Appellants’ progress is admirable, but, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the district court’s findings, the record does not require a definite and firm conviction that
the district court made a mistake. Because the record supports termination of appellants’
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parental rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5), we will not address the other
statutory grounds that the district court found were proved.
Affirmed.