State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1888

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Michael Lavale Powell,
Appellant.

Filed September 18, 2017
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-10065

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal -Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
PETERSON, Judge
In this appeal from his conviction of felony domestic assault, appellant argues that
the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant was his family or

2
household member and that the district court abused its discretion in admitting certain
relationship evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
On the night of April 11, 2016, E.G. and appellant Michael Lavale Powell, whom
E.G. called her boyfriend, were spending time together at E.G.’s apartment. E.G.
confronted Powell about some hick eys on his neck and told him, “ I’m done. ” Powell
“seemed upset” by this, and, when E.G. walked into the bathroom, Powell “cornered” her
there and began to choke her, saying, “B-tch, I’ll kill you.” Powell let E.G. go but followed
her into the bedroom and choked her again in front of her six-year-old grandchild. Powell
then took E.G.’s phone from her and refused to return it for several hours. Powell also
threw small household items at E.G., pushed and dragged her around the apartment, and
kicked her. Powell left the apartment for a while and took E.G.’s car without her
permission, but he later returned.
The next morning, E.G. called 911 and reported the assault. E.G. told the
responding police officer that Powell choked her, and the officer photographed some
scratch marks that he saw on E.G.’s neck. A police detective interviewed E.G. by telephone
later that day, and E.G. told him that Powell choked her. Respondent State of Minnesota
charged Powell with domestic assault (fear/harm), which was charged as a felony based on

3
an allegation that Powell had two previous qualified domestic violence -related offense
convictions.1
At Powell’s jury trial, the state presented E.G.’s inculpatory testimony;
corroborating police testimony; a photograph of E.G.’s injuries; and testimony by Powell’s
former girlfriend , J.K., about her domestic abuse by Powell , which was introduced as
relationship evidence over Powell’s objection . Before thi s relationship evidence was
presented, the district court gave a cautionary instruction. The cautionary instruction was
repeated at the close of trial. The jury found Powell guil ty.2 This appeal followed
sentencing.
D E C I S I O N
I.
To convict a defendant of domestic assault, the state must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the victim was the defendant’s family or household member at the
time of the assault. See Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1 (providing that domestic assault is
assault committed “against a family or household member as defined in [Minnesota
Statutes] section 518B.01, subdivision 2 ”); State v. Struzyk, 869 N.W.2d 280, 289 (Minn.
2015) (“It is axiomatic that it is the State’ s burden to prove every element of the charged

1 Domestic assault is a felony if it is committed “within ten years of the first of any
combination of two or more previous qualified domestic violence -related offe nse
convictions.” Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subds. 1, 4 (2014).

2 Because Powell stipulated that he had two previous qualified domestic violence -related
offense convictions, the jury was not asked to consider that element of felony domestic
assault.

4
offense.”). The definition of “family or household members” includes “persons involved
in a significant romantic or sexu al relationship.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(b) (7)
(2014).
In determining whether persons are or have been involved in a
significant romantic or sexual relationship . . . , the court shall
consider the length of time of the relationship; type of
relationship; frequency of interaction between the parties; and,
if the relationship has terminated, length of time since the
termination.

Id., subd. 2(b) (2014).
Powell argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he and E.G. were involved in a significant romantic or sexual relationship because the
evidence (1) shows that Powell and E.G.’s relationship was brief, (2) does not show that
Powell and E.G. had “declared their love for one another or that they had developed
feelings deep enough to qualify as love or romance,” (3) does not show “how often [E.G.]
and Powell saw each other . . . or how often they had sexual intercourse,” and (4) does not
show that “the[] relationship was an exclusive one, that [Powell and E.G.] often spent the
night at each other’s homes, that they kept personal belongings at each other’s homes, or
that they had introduced each other to their family and or friends.”
Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited “to ascertaining whether the
jury, giving due regard to the presumption of innocence and to the state’s burden of proving
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably have found the appellant guilty.” State
v. Webster, 894 N.W.2d 782, 785 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). We “adopt the view
of the evidence most favorable to the state ” and assume that “the jury believed the state’s

5
witnesses and disbelieved any contradictory evidence.” Id. (quotations omitted); see also
State v. Vasko , 889 N.W.2d 551, 558 (Minn. 2017) (“We must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict.”).
E.G. testified that Powell was her “boyfriend” for “[f]ive months ” and that the
relationship was both romantic and sexual in nature. According to E.G., she ended the
relationship on the night of the assault by telling Powell that she was “done,” after she saw
hickeys on his neck, and Powell “seemed upset ” by this. E.G.’s testimony also showed
that Powell had a t least one change of clothing at E.G.’s apartment on the night of the
assault and that, on at least two different nights, she and Powell spent time together in her
apartment while her young grandchild was there.
The responding police officer testified that E.G. told him that she and Powell were
“boyfriend/girlfriend” and that Powell “occasionally lived at [E.G.]’s apartment.” The
police detective who interviewed E.G. also testified that E.G. referred to Powell as “ her
boyfriend.” The jury heard a recording of that interview, during which E.G. explained that
Powell assaulted her because she asked him about “hickeys” or “love marks” that she saw
on his neck. The detective also testified that, during his inter view of Powell, Powell told
him that E.G. “used to be his girlfriend.”
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, Vasko, 889 N.W.2d at 558, the
evidence presented at trial provided a reasonable basis for the jury’s determination that
Powell and E.G. were involved in a significant romantic or sexual relationship at the time
of the assault . We, therefore, conclude that sufficient evidence supports Powell’s
conviction of felony domestic assault.

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II.

“Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). Such
evidence, commonly known as Spreigl evidence, may be admitted “for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident,” but only if , among other things, “the prosecutor clearly
indicates what the evidence will be offered to prove ” and “the probative value of the
evidence is not outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant.” Id.
Notwithstanding Minn. R. Evid. 404(b), Minnesota Statutes provide:
Evidence of domestic conduct by the accused against
the victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or
household members, is admissible unless the probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.

Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2014); see State v. Word, 755 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Minn. App. 2008)
(stating that “the stringent procedural requirements of rule 404(b) do not apply to section
634.20 evidence” and that “the statute allows much more latitude than the rule in admitting
relationship evidence ”). Such ev idence is commonly known as relationship evidence.
State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 549 (Minn. 2010).
Evidence of “domestic conduct” includes evidence of domestic abuse. Minn. Stat.
§ 634.20. “Domestic abuse” includes assault (fear/harm) and interfere nce with an
emergency call when committed against a family or household member, which includes
any person with whom the defendant has a child in common and any person with whom

7
the defendant presently resides or with whom he resided in the past . Minn. Sta t.
§§ 518B.01, subd. 2(a), (b)(5), 634.20.
“[E]vidence of domestic conduct by the accused against family or household
members other than the victim may be admitted pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20 . . . .”
State v. Fraga, 864 N.W.2d 615, 627 (Minn. 2015). Appellate courts review the admission
of relationship evidence for abuse of discretion. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d at 553; see also
State v. Bell , 719 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. 2006) (“Evidentiary rulings rest within the
discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.”).
Over Powell’s objection, t he district court allowed the state to introduce as
relationship evidence the testimony of J.K., who lived with Powell during their four -year
romantic and sexual relation ship and with whom Powell has two children. J.K. testified
about two domestic-abuse incidents: (1) an incident in February 2013, when Powell
pushed J.K. to the ground in a nightclub parking lot; and (2) a relationship-ending incident
in January 2014, when Powell pushed J.K. around their home, punched and choked her,
took her phone and broke it in half, threatened to hurt her so badly that she would have to
go to the hospital, took her car without her permission and drove around until she got into
the car with their baby, and drove recklessly with her and their baby in the car. J.K. also
testified that Powell pleaded guilty to domestic assault for the February 2013 incident and
pleaded guilty to domestic assault and interference with an emergency call for the January
2014 incident.
Powell first argues that the chal lenged relationship evidence has “little, if any,
probative value to the question o f whether [he] assaulted [E.G.]. ” He contends that

8
relationship evidence is no more than nonprobative character or propensity evidence unless
the state demonstrates a need to provide context for or to fill in pieces missing from its
theory of the case. But the supreme court has expressly declined “to require that trial courts
engage in an independent analysis of the state’s need for section 634.20 evidence before it
is admitted,” Bell, 719 N.W.2d at 639, and this court has stated that “ evidence showing
how a defendant treats his family or household members, such as his former spouses or
other girlfriends, sheds light on how the defendant interacts with those close to him, which
in turn suggests how the defendant may interact with the victim .” State v. Valentine, 787
N.W.2d 630, 637 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010); see also State
v. Ware, 856 N.W.2d 719, 729 (Minn. App. 2014) (stating that “[t]his court has observed
that the probative value of relationship evidence involving a fam ily or household member
is high”).
Powell next argues that the “minimal probative value, if any, the relat ionship
evidence had was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, ” because
“not only did the jury hear about the prior assaults, it also heard that . . . Powell was charged
with, and pleaded guilty to, the exact same crime charged in thi s case.” Powell contends
that “[w]hen [he] was trying to decide whether to stipulate to his prior convictions to
enhance the domestic assault charge to a felony, the district court explained to him that he
could choose to stipulate so that the jury did not have to hear about them,” but “the benefit
he gained from not having the jury hear this highly prejudicial information . . . was
obliterated when the state introduced that very evidence through [J.K.]” as relationship
evidence.

9
“[U]nfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by illegitimate means, giving one
party an unfair advantage.” Bell, 719 N.W.2d at 641 (quotation omitted). Powell stipulated
to his two qualified domestic violence-related offense convictions in order to keep the jury
from hearing evidence about those convictions. The prosecutor nevertheless elicited J.K.’s
testimony that Powell was charged with and pleaded guilty to the crimes that resulted in
the stipulated convictions, which reduced the benefit of the stipulation. While we do not
endorse the prosecutor’s actions , the state correctly notes that Powell ’s attorney reduced
the danger of unfair prejudice from J.K.’s testimony about the prior charges and guilty
pleas by arguing in closing:
Yeah, [J.K.] was assaulted by Michael Powell . . . .
Twice she was assaulted. Twice Mr. Powell walked into a
court and said, “I did it.” Twice he walked into a court and he
pled guilty. And one of the first things the Judge told you here
today is that he has pled not guilty to this charge. He’s owned
up to when he’s done it before. He did a bad thing. He did an
inexcusable thing, and he did a thing that he regrets. But that
was then. There is no evidence to show that . . . he did it again.

With regard to J.K.’s testimony about the January 2014 incident, Powell claims that
“[l]ittle could inflame the jury’s passions or undermine [the] presumption of innocence
more than hearing about . . . [him] assaulting [J.K.] in the presence of their baby. ” But
Powell fails to explain how J.K.’s description of her physical assault by Powell in the
presence of their baby was more inflammatory than E.G.’s description of her physical
assault by Powell in the prese nce of her six -year-old grandchild. Cf. State v. Beane, 840
N.W.2d 848, 852 (Minn. App. 2013) (“It is difficult for us to determine how evidence that
[defendant] choked [victim] in March could have inflamed the jury’s passions against him

10
any more than what he did a month later, on the night he was a rrested.”), review denied
(Minn. Mar. 18, 2014). In any event, the danger of unfair prejudice was reduced by the
cautionary instruction that the jury heard both before and after J.K.’s testimony , which
included the following:
Mr. Powell is not being tried for and may not be convicted of
any offense other than the charged offense in this case. You
are not to convict Mr. Powell on the basis of any other conduct
you believe he may have engaged in. To do so might result in
unjust double punishments and quite simply it would be
wrong.

See State v. Andersen, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2017 WL 2837154, at *3 (Minn. App. July
3, 2017) (stating that “cautionary instructions lessened any probability that the jury would
rely improperly on relationship evidence”).
We recognize that J.K.’s testimony about the January 2014 incident mirror s the
story that E.G. told on the stand: a romantic or sexual relationship, a physical assault that
included pushing and choking, a verbal threat of extreme violence, taking or disabling the
victim’s phone, and taking the victim’s vehicle without her permission. But, as stated by
the supreme court, “unfair prejudice is not merely damaging evidence, even severely
damaging evidence.” Bell, 719 N.W.2d at 641 (quotation omitted). To the extent that the
challenged relationship evidence shed light on how Powell interact ed with a former
household member, and thereby bolstered E.G.’s credibility, the evidence—though
damaging—served its intended statutory purpose. See V alentine, 787 N.W.2d at 6 37
(“[T]he rationale for admitting relationship evidence under section 634.20 is to illuminate
the relationship between the defendant and the alleged victim and to put the alleged crime

11
in the context of that relationship. Obviously, evidence showing how a defendant treats
his family or household members, such as his former spouses or other girlfriends, sheds
light on how the defendant interacts with those close to him, which in turn suggests how
the defendant may interact with the victim.” (citation omitted)).
Finally, our research has revealed no case in which the supreme court concluded
that the probative value of relationship evidence was substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, and the sole published opinion in which this court reached that
conclusion is inapposite. See State v. O’ Meara, 755 N.W.2d 29, 34 (Minn. App. 2008)
(holding that evidence of domestic conduct “is so unfairly prejudicial that it inherently
violates the probative/p rejudicial balancing test” when defendant ha s been tried and
acquitted of charges arising from that domestic conduct). Accordingly, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged relationship
evidence.
Affirmed.