State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1913

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jose Luis Ramirez,
Appellant.

Filed December 18, 2017
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Freeborn County District Court
File No. 24-CR-14-1628

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Edwin W. Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David J. Walker, Freeborn County Attorney, Albert Lea, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kate M. Baxter-Kauf, Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P., Special Assistant Public
Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Schellhas,
Judge.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
A state trooper found 24 pounds of cocaine hidden in the front bumper of Jose
Ramirez’s car during a traffic stop after Ramirez gave his consent to search the car and the
trooper’s drug-detecting dog alerted on the bumper. We reject Ramirez’s contention that
the trooper viola ted his Fourth Amendment search -and-seizure rights and aff irm his
conviction of first-degree controlled substance crime because the trooper’s stop,
questioning, and request for consent to search were supported by reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity.
FACTS
Minnesota State Trooper Douglas Rauenhorst was waiting at the junction of
Interstates 35 and 90 for a recreational vehicle reportedly carrying drugs just after midnight
in September 2014. The trooper said he became bored and decided to “stop some cars” in
the meantime. He positioned his squad car in the median of Interstate 35 and watched for
the “first violation.” The trooper noticed that a car merging from the cloverleaf ramp had
a license-plate light that was not illuminated. He initiated a traffic stop.
The trooper walked to the rear of the car and cupped his hand under the license-
plate light to verify that it was not functioning. He then told the driver, Rogelio Rocha, that
the license-plate light was out and asked him for his driver’s license. Rocha asked if he
could step out to see the light, and he exited the car. The car had other occupants, all of
whom remained inside. Standing with Rocha at the rear of the car, Trooper Rauenhorst saw
that Rocha had an Arizona driver’s license while the car had a Minnesota license plate. The
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trooper asked Rocha who owned the car. Rocha said that his uncle, who was in Arizona,
owned it. The trooper asked if Rocha’s uncle lived in Minnesota, and Rocha said that he
did.
The trooper then asked Rocha the purpose of his trip, and Rocha said, “I came, I
came up here in a plane, and then we were in ‘See-ox.’” Trooper Rauenhorst figured that
Rocha was referring to “Sioux Falls” and that he did not know how to pronounce “Sioux.”
The trooper went to the rear passenger window and asked the passengers, “Whose car is
this?” Backseat passenger Jose Ramirez answered, saying that the car was his. The trooper
asked Ramirez if he lived in Minnesota, and Ramirez answered that he did not. Trooper
Rauenhorst returned to his squad car. By then, Ramirez’s car had been stopped for fewer
than five minutes.
Trooper Rauenhorst later testified that several factors aroused his suspicion during
the stop. Among other things, he pointed to the discrepancy between Rocha’s Arizona
license and the car’s Minnesota plate; conflicting answers as to who the owner was and
where the owner lived; Rocha’s mispronunciation of the word “Sioux” and omission of the
word “Falls”; Rocha’s hesitation in answering simple questions; the twitching of Rocha’s
lip and his evasive glancing; one of the passenger’s lengthy pinkie fingernail; a single key
in the ignition; and three cell phones in plain sight.
While Trooper Rauenhorst sat in his squad car, he contacted the El Paso Information
Center to determine if Ramirez’s car had recently been in Arizona, which the trooper
believed to be a launching point for narcotics trafficking. He learned that the car had been
in Arizona two-and-a-half weeks earlier. The trooper drafted a warning for the equipment
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violation and approached Ramirez’s car again. He asked Ramirez if the car had ever been
in Arizona. Ramirez answered, “No.” He asked Ramirez for permission to search the car,
and Ramirez consented. The trooper brought his drug-detection canine, Diesel, around the
car, and Diesel sniffed intensely and scratched at the front bumper, indicating narcotics.
The trooper searched the bumper and discovered 24.04 pounds of cocaine.
The state charged Ramirez with first-degree controlled substance crime. Ramirez
moved the district court to suppress evidence of the cocaine, arguing that the stop and
search violated his constitutional rights. The district court denied the motion. Ramirez
waived his right to a jury trial and stipulated to the state’s case under Minnesota Rule of
Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 2 (2016). The district court found Ramirez guilty
and sentenced him to 80 months in prison.
Ramirez appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Ramirez contends that Trooper Rauenhorst violated his constitutional rights when
he stopped his car and expanded the duration and scope of the stop. The United States and
Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend.
IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A police officer may stop a car without violating this
prohibition if the officer can identify specific and articulable facts that create a reasonable
suspicion of illegal activity. State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000). We review
de novo a district court’s reasonable-suspicion determination. State v. Morse, 878 N.W.2d
499, 502 (Minn. 2016).
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Ramirez contends that Trooper Rauenhorst’s statement that he was bored and
therefore decided to “stop some cars” means that the stop was motivated by whim rather
than reasonable suspicion of a violation. While the reasonable-suspicion standard is “not
high,” id., a stop may not be “the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” Marben
v. State, Dept. of Pub. Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn. 1980) (quotation omitted); see
also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). Fairly construed, the trooper’s testimony does
not suggest that he stopped Ramirez’s car merely because he was bored; it establishes
instead that his boredom inspired him to look for the opportunity to stop cars. The
Constitution is generally not concerned with why an officer chose to look for cars to stop.
Because the officer’s subjective motivation is constitutionally irrelevant, our only question
is whether an objective justification supports the stop. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 812–13, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996); State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 374–75
(Minn. 2004) (Anderson, J., concurring specially) . And if an officer observes a violation
of any traffic law, however insignificant, he has reasonable suspicion to stop the violator.
State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). The relevant reason the trooper
stopped Ramirez’s car was the license-plate-light violation, not the trooper’s boredom.
Ramirez argues that we should set aside the district court’s finding that Trooper
Rauenhorst stopped the car after he saw that its rear plates were not illuminated. He asserts
that the squad-car video recording shows that the trooper could not have seen any
malfunction. We give the trial court’s findings of fact great deference, setting them aside
only if they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence. State v. Gomez, 721 N.W.2d 871,
883 (Minn. 2006). The district court found Trooper Rauenhorst’s tes timony about seeing
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the faulty light “specific and credible.” The squad-car video recorder was oriented directly
forward, and so it captured only the view through the squad car’s windshield. It does not
capture what Trooper Rauenhorst may have seen when Ramirez’s car passed behind or
beside him. The trooper said that he saw things not recorded on video, and Ramirez
identifies no evidence calling in serious doubt the trooper’s description. The district court
found that the video footage of Trooper Rauenhorst’s cup ping his hand under the
license-plate light to confirm his suspicion corroborated his credible testimony that he
suspected an equipment violation. That the trooper was not certain of the violation until
after the stop does not raise any concern; an officer can effect a traffic stop when he has a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting a violation. Berge v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety, 374 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Minn. 1985). Because reasonable evidence in the record
supports the district court’s finding that Trooper Rauenhorst reasonably suspected a
license-plate malfunction, we will not disturb the finding.
Ramirez argues that Trooper Rauenhorst lacked reasonable suspicion to expand the
duration and scope of the stop. “A traffic stop does not violate the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures as long as each incremental intrusion during a stop is
strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the stop
permissible.” State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012) (quotations omitted). An
intrusion that drifts from the circumstances justifying the stop must be supported by
reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity. Id. We must decide whether Trooper
Rauenhorst impermissibly expanded the stop.
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Ramirez does not pinpoint when Trooper Rauenhorst’s questioning of the driver and
passengers allegedly became unlawful. During any traffic stop, an officer may “ask for the
driver’s license and registration and ask the driver about his destination and reason for the
trip.” State v. Syhavong, 661 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn. App. 2003). We are the refore not
troubled by Trooper Rauenhorst’s asking Rocha who owned the car and where the group
had come from . The trooper reasonably sought to reconcile Rocha’s Arizona driver’s
license and the car’s Minnesota plates based on his reasonable, articulated concern that
stolen vehicles are not always immediately reported. Rocha’s answer that his uncle owned
the car an d lived in Minnesota but was currently in Arizona could be corroborated or
undermined by a records search and by speaking with the occupants. An officer may
question a car’s occupants to confirm the driver’s representations. United States v. Linkous,
285 F.3d 716, 719 (8th Cir. 2002). So we are also not troubled by the trooper’s asking the
occupants who owned the car.
Ramirez’s answer that he owned the car contradicted Rocha’s story, elevating
Trooper Rauenhorst’s suspicion and justifying his decision to conduct further investigation
from his squad car. And the approximately 15 minutes he took to learn that Ramirez’s car
had been in Arizona two-and- a-half weeks earlier was also reasonable under the
circumstances. After the trooper next asked Ramirez whether the car had ever been in
Arizona, and Ramirez falsely denied it, the trooper could be confident that Ramirez and
Rocha were attempting to deceive him. Based on this, he could reasonably infer that the
occupants may be concealing some type of criminal behavior.
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A snapshot of the extant circumstances from Trooper Rauenhorst ’s perspective
informs us that he had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to ask Ramirez to consent
to a vehicle search. We consider these circumstances with the understanding that police
officers have unique insight from their training and experience, allowing them to draw
inferences that may be unperceived by others . Smith, 814 N.W.2d at 352. An objectively
reasonable officer would find suspicious the occupants’ apparent dishonesty about who
owned the car and the trip’s origination point. And the trooper’s stated impression from his
experience informed him that drug users or traffickers often overgrow their pinkie
fingernails, transport drugs from Arizona, and maintain multiple cellular phones. It was
therefore not unreasonable to suspect th at the occupants’ dishonest responses conceal ed
drug trafficking. The trooper’s next step in the investigation—asking Ram irez whether he
would consent to a search—followed reasonably from these circumstances.
Because the stop, the investigation, and the request for consent to search were al l
based on reasonable suspicion and undertaken within a reasonable period, we affirm the
district court’s order denying Ramirez’s motion to suppress and we affirm his conviction.
Affirmed.