State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1914

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Kartaris Lashawn Harris,
Respondent.

Filed April 17, 2017
Reversed and remanded
Kirk, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62SU-CR-15-7850

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald H. Batty, Maplewood City Attorney, Martin H.R. Norder, Sabrina M. Spangler,
Assistant City Attorneys, Kelly & Lemmons, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Charles F. Clippert, Clippert Law Firm, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KIRK, Judge
Appellant State of Minnesota challenges the district court’s order granting
respondent Kartaris Lashawn Harris’s motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the
complaint, arguing that the district court erroneously concluded that the police officer

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lacked a r easonable, articulable suspicion to justify stopping respondent’s vehicle. We
reverse and remand for further findings.
FACTS
On December 28, 2015, the state charged respondent with second-degree DWI-test
refusal and second -degree DWI. Respondent moved to suppress all evidence obtained
from the traffic stop and dismiss the complaint, arguing that Maplewood Police Officer
Maria Mulvihill lacked a legal basis to initiate a traffic stop.
At the omnibus hearing, Officer Mulvihill testified that, on December 26, 2015, at
approximately 10:40 p.m., she was on routine patrol when she began following
respondent’s vehicle after it pulled away from an intersection. She testified that she saw
respondent cross the road’s centerline twice. Officer Mulvihill stated that the first instance
occurred at a sharp curve in the road, and she did not provide any detail regarding the
second instance. She further explained that she did not immediately stop respondent after
observing a traffic violation because stopping at a curve in the road would have presented
a danger. Because Officer Mulvihill waited to initiate the stop, her squad video —which
begins recording 30 seconds prior to activating the squad’s emergency lights—does not
show respondent commit any traffic violations. Respondent also testified at the omnibus
hearing. He denied crossing the centerline and stated that Officer Mulvihill informed him
that he was pulled over for failing to come to a complete stop at a stop sign.
The district court granted respondent’s motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the
complaint. In granting the motion, t he district court did not make a factual finding
regarding whether respondent crossed the centerline, nor did it make a credibility

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determination regarding Officer Mulvihill and respondent’s conflicting testimony. Instead,
the district court explained:
While [respondent] contends that the officer is not credible
because she gave him a different reason for stopping him, and
the video from her squad shows no traffic violations, the court
need not pass judgment on this issue. Officer Mulvihill’s
testimony fails to persuade the court that she had reasonable
suspicion to stop [respondent]. . . . She offered no testimony
explaining why crossing the centerline on a sharp curve (which
would have been to [respondent’s] left) gives rise to any
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.

The state’s appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
When appealing a pretrial suppression order, the state must cle arly and
unequivocally demonstrate that (1) the order will have a critical impact on the state’s ability
to successfully prosecute the defendant and (2) the order was erroneous. State v. Scott, 584
N.W.2d 412, 416 (Minn. 1998). “Dismissal of a complaint satisfies the critical impact
requirement.” State v. Trei , 624 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Minn. App. 2001) , review dismissed
(Minn. June 22, 2001). Accordingly, the question before this court is whether the district
court’s order was erroneous.
This court reviews a district court’s conclusion regarding reasonable, articulable
suspicion de novo and reviews its findings of fact for clear error. State v. Burbach , 706
N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 2005). We defer to the district court’s assessment of witness
credibility. State v. Miller, 659 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn.
July 15, 2003). The district court’s findings of fact in support of its suppression ruling

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must be sufficiently detailed to permit us to ascertain the basis for its ruling. State v.
Rainey, 303 Minn. 550, 550, 226 N.W.2d 919, 921 (1975).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee the right to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. am end. IV; Minn. Const. art. I,
§ 10. “The temporary detent ion of an individual during a traffic stop is a seizure.” State
v. Thiel, 846 N.W.2d 605, 610 (Minn. App. 2014) , review denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2014) .
To justify a traffic stop, police must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Heien
v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014); State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825
(Minn. 2001). “The reasonable -suspicion standard is not high.” State v. Diede , 795
N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). Police must only show that the stop
was based on more than “an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” State v.
Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). “An offi cer’s
observation of a traffic violation, however insignificant, provides the officer with an
objective basis for conducting a stop.” State v. Doebel, 790 N.W.2d 707, 709 (Minn. App.
2010) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Jan. 26, 2011).
The state argues that the traffic stop was lawful because Officer Mulvihill observed
respondent cross the centerline in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(a) (2014),
which provides that “[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a
single lane.” Respondent counters that the statute includes the phrase “as nearly as
practicable,” which “allows for flexibility so that a person may cross a lane marker when
there is [a] curve in the road or other circumstance where driving entirely wi thin the lane
is not practicable.” Respondent also continues to deny crossing the centerline.

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While respondent is correct in asserting that the language “as nearly as practicable”
implies a degree of flexibility, he offers no legal authority to support his interpretation that
a driver may cross the centerline simply because the road curves. Contrary to respondent’s
assertion, this court has previously stated that “[c]rossing the centerline is a violation of
the traffic laws and will usually provide the officer with an objective, reasonable suspicion
to conduct an investigatory stop.” State v. Wagner , 637 N.W.2d 330, 336 (Minn. App.
2001); see Doebel, 790 N.W.2d at 709 (“An officer’s observation of a traffic violation,
however insignificant, provides the officer with an objective basis for conducting a stop.”
(quotation omitted)).
Here, Officer Mulvihill testified that she observed respondent cross the centerline
twice, and there is no indication that other factors—such as inclement weather or a vehicle
stopped on the shoulder —may have caused respondent to cross the centerline. Despite
Officer Mulvihill’s testimony, and without finding that her testimony lacked credibility,
the district court concluded that she failed to articulate a reasonable, articulable suspicion
of criminal activity. The district court’s analysis and conclusion on this point directly
conflict with this court’s observation in Wagner: “When there is credible testimony that
the driver actually crossed the centerline, this court and the supreme court have uniformly
found investigatory stops valid.” 637 N.W.2d at 33 5 (citing State v. Richardson , 622
N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001) (finding reasonable suspicion when vehicle crossed fog
line and there was an anonymous tip); State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105, 106, 109 (Minn.
1983) (holding objective basis for stop when vehicle did not display license plate, had
object hanging from rearview mirror, and made wide turn and crossed centerline); State v.

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Bunde, 556 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Minn. App. 1996) ( finding reasonable suspicion when
vehicle turned without signaling and crossed centerline); Shull v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety ,
398 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Minn. App. 1986) (finding reasonable suspicion when driver drove
slower than necessary and crossed centerline)).
Therefore, because Minnesota appellate courts have uniformly upheld traffic stops
where an officer credibly testifies that a defendant crossed the centerline, the district court’s
conclusion that Officer Mulvihill did not articulate a sufficient basis to justify the stop was
erroneous absent a determination that her testimony lacked credibility. The district court
did not make this necessary de termination. Its order does not include a finding regarding
whether respondent crossed the centerline and states that the district court “need not pass
judgment” on the credibility of Officer Mulvihill’s testimony. As a result, we are unable
to properly consider whether the traffic stop was supported by a reasonable, articulable
suspicion. See State v. Kvam, 336 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn. 1983) (“In some cases we have
concluded that a remand for findings is necessary before we will decide the validity of the
lower court’s order.”); Miller, 659 N.W.2d at 279 (“Because the weight and believability
of witness testimony is an issue for the district court, we defer to that court’s credibility
determinations.”). Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order and remand for further
findings.
Reversed and remanded.