Carlos Orlando Olivas-Varela, petitioner, Appellant,
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Riley v. State 819 N.W.2d 162
- Sanchez-Diaz v. State 758 N.W.2d 843
- State v. Stephenson 760 N.W.2d 22
- State v. Carter 569 N.W.2d 169
- State v. Tungland 281 N.W.2d 646
Opinion text
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1957
Carlos Orlando Olivas-Varela, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
Filed September 5, 2017
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge
Wright County District Court
File No. 86-CR-13-4095
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Thomas N. Kelly, Wright Coun ty Attorney, Greg T. Kryzer, Assistant County Attorney,
Buffalo, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
On appeal from the denial of postconviction relief following his conviction of first-
degree controlled-substance crime, appellant Carlos Olivas-Varela argues that the
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postconviction court erred in concluding that the district court properly denied his motion
to suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless vehicle search. Because the postconviction
court correctly concluded that Olivas-Varel a did not have a leg itimate expectation of
privacy in the vehicle and that the warran tless search therefore did not violate his
constitutional rights, we affirm.
FACTS
On July 18, 2013, shortly after 11:00 a. m., Sergeant David Nystuen of the Wright
County Sheriff’s Office responded to a report of suspicious circumstances at an auto-parts
store in Cokato, Minnesota. The store’s manager informed Sergeant Nystuen that a young
adult male, who was later identified as Olivas-Varela, had visited the store with two other
individuals to purchase an air f ilter for the car that Olivas-Var ela had driven to the store.
The manager further stated that, after one of the other individuals said something that
appeared to startle Olivas-Varela, Olivas-Varela ran out of the store and left the car in the
parking lot. In looking at the car, Sergeant Nystuen noticed that it was left unlocked with
the key in the ignition.
Later that day, at approximately 2:40 p.m., Wright County Deputy Todd Jorgenson
arrived at the auto-parts store to investig ate the car, which rema ined unlocked in the
parking lot with the key in the ignition. De puty Jorgenson was informed that the car was
running when Olivas-Varela fl ed the store and had since been turned off. Deputy
Jorgenson looked through the car’s window a nd saw a clear plastic wrapper containing
what appeared to be marijuan a on the inside of the driver-s ide door. Depu ty Jorgenson
then opened the door, confirmed that the substance was ma rijuana, and decided to search
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the car for more controlled substances and information regarding the car’s owner. The key
left in the ignition did not unlock the car’s trunk, but Deputy Jorgenson was able to access
the trunk by adjusting the rea r-passenger seat. In the trun k, Deputy Jorgenson found a
black fabric case designed to hold compact discs. When Deputy Jorgenson picked up the
case, its contents made a noise that led him to suspect that it contained a rock-like material.
Inside the case, he found a plastic container containing large crystals, which field-tested
positive for methamphetamine.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Ol ivas-Varela with two counts of first-
degree controlled-substance crime, both of wh ich related to the methamphetamine that
Deputy Jorgenson discovered in the trunk. Olivas-Varela filed a motion to suppress
evidence, challenging Deputy Jorgenson’s warrantless search. The district court denied
Olivas-Varela’s motion. Follo wing a jury trial, Olivas-Var ela was found guilty of both
counts of first-degree controlled-substance crime. The district court entered a judgment of
conviction on one count of first-degree controlled-substance crime and sentenced Olivas-
Varela to 86 months in prison. Olivas-Varela did not file a direct appeal.
Olivas-Varela filed a petition for postconv iction relief, arguing that the search was
unconstitutional because he had an expectation of privacy in the car and the noncriminal
amount of marijuana observed by Deputy Jorgenson did not provide probable cause for the
search. The postconviction court denied the petition after concluding that Olivas-Varela’s
“own conduct effectively waived any legitimate expectation of privacy that he may have
had in the vehicle.” Because the postconviction court concluded that Olivas-Varela lacked
a legitimate expectation of privacy, the court did not address his probable-cause argument.
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Olivas-Varela appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Olivas-Varela argues that the postconvictio n court erroneously concluded that he
did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car. We disagree.
Generally, we review a denial of a petition for postconviction relief under an abuse-
of-discretion standard. Riley v. State , 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). “A
postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view
of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Id. (quotation omitted). We apply
a de novo standard when reviewing a po stconviction court’s legal conclusions. Sanchez-
Diaz v. State, 758 N.W.2d 843, 846 (Minn. 2008).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “But a search does not violate
a person’s constitutional rights unless he or she has a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the area or items searched.” State v. Stephenson, 760 N.W.2d 22, 24 (Minn. App. 2009).
“To establish a protected interest, a defe ndant must demonstrate (1) ‘a subjective
expectation of privacy’ and (2 ) that this expectation ‘was reasonable in light of
longstanding social customs that serve functions recognized as valuable by society.’” Id.
at 25 (quoting State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn. 1997), rev’d on other grounds,
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 119 S. Ct. 469 (1998)).
Olivas-Varela’s argument is contradi cted by the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
decision in State v. Tungland, 281 N.W.2d 646 (Minn. 1979). In that case, the appellant
challenged the district court’s denial of hi s motion to suppress evid ence, arguing that a
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police officer’s search of the appellant’s vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Id.
at 648-49. The supreme court concluded that the appellant’s conduct—parking the vehicle
on private land without permission, leaving an open liquor bo ttle lying on the vehicle’s
front seat in plain view, leavin g the vehicle’s keys in the ig nition, and failing to lock the
vehicle’s doors—waived any legitimate privacy interest he may have ordinarily held in the
vehicle. Id. at 650. As a result, the supreme court held that the officer’s search of the
vehicle did not violate the appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id.
The facts presented in this case are strikingly similar. When Olivas-Varela fled the
auto-parts store, he left the car running and unlocked in the store’s parking lot. The car
remained in the parking lot for approximately four hours before Deputy Jorgenson arrived
and saw marijuana in plain view on the inside of the driver-side door. In addition, even
though the trunk was locked when Olivas-Varela fled, the trunk was accessible by adjusting
the rear-passenger seat. We further note that that Olivas-Varela’s expectation-of-privacy
argument is weaker than the one advanced in Tungland because Olivas-Varela left the car
running as opposed to merely leaving its key in the ignition.
Accordingly, in light of the supreme court’s Tungland decision, the postconviction
court did not err by concluding that Oliv as-Varela’s conduct waived any legitimate
expectation of privacy that he otherwise ma y have had in the car. Therefore, because
Olivas-Varela lacked a protected interest in the car under the Fourth Amendment, we need
not consider his probable-cause argument.
Affirmed.