State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-2007

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

A. A. S.,
Appellant.

Filed August 28, 2017
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-CR-08-1837

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)

Patrick C. Nwaneri, Nwaneri Law Firm, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Ross, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
A.A.S. appeals from the district court’s order denying her expungement petition .
She argues that the district court improperly conditioned its inherent expungement
authority over judicial records on her eligibility for statutory expungement and that the
district court made inadequate findings. Because the district court properly recognized its
2
inherent authority to expunge judicial records and because the district court’s findings
support its decision, we affirm.
FACTS
A.A.S. was accused of bludgeoning and then cutting a woman with a glass bottle in
2008. She pleaded guilty to felony third -degree assault in violation of Minnesota Statutes
section 609.223, subdivision 1 (2008). The district court placed her on three years’
supervised probation, which she successfully completed.
A.A.S. petitioned the district court in March 2016 to expunge the records of her
crime, claiming that the records lessened her emplo yability. She argued that the benefit to
her outweighed any potential detriment to the public . At the October 2016 hearing on her
petition, A.A.S. clarified that she was limiting her request only to expungement of judicial
records, not executive records. She argued that, in addition to creating employability
difficulties, the existence of the records also made it difficult for her to obtain rental
housing.
The district court expressed its doubt that expunging only the judicial records would
solve either of the two issues (employment and housing) that drove A.A.S.’s petition. The
district court speculated, “If this is just for the Court records, most of the background
studies are done through the BCA and their record will remain intact.” A.A.S. argued that
criminal background checks might begin and end with court records, but that , even if an
inquirer went further than a courthouse search and found the executive records, expunging
the judicial records would afford some benefit because the inquirer could balance the
3
existence of executive records against the lack of judicial records. The state argued against
the petition by emphasizing the serious and violent nature of A.A.S.’s crime.
The district court denied A.A.S.’s petition . Although A .A.S. had abandoned her
request to expunge executive branch records, the district court found that she did not
qualify for statutory expungement under Minnesota Statutes section 609A.02 (201 6). It
also rejected the request as to judicial records, balancing the request against the need for
public safety:
The benefits to [A.A.S.] are not greater than the
disadvantage to the public and public safety. Since only
judicial records can be sealed in this proceeding, employers
and landlords still have access to exec utive records showing
[A.A.S.’s] criminal history, greatly limiting the benefit to
[A.A.S.] of expunging judicial records.

In a one -paragraph memorandum, the district court expressed that it was “very
sympathetic to [A.A.S.’s] plight” but nonetheless den ied the expungement request. It
opined that, without expungement of executive records, expungement of judicial records
would be “essentially meaningless” as it bears on A.A.S.’s employment and housing
concerns. It reiterated that the disadvantage to the pu blic outweighed “the negligible
benefit” to A.A.S.
A.A.S. appeals.
D E C I S I O N
A.A.S. asks us to reverse and remand for the district court to order expungement.
She argues first that the district court erroneously conditioned the exercise of its inherent
authority on her eligibility for statutory expungement . She argues second that the district
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court failed to make factual findings required by the 12-factor analysis under Minnesota
Statutes section 609A.03, subdivision 5(c) (2016). The arguments fail.
I
A.A.S. argues that the district court erred as a matter of law by improperly
conditioning its inherent authority to expunge judicial records on A.A.S.’s eligibility for
statutory expungement. We review the district court’s expungement decision f or an abuse
of discretion. State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Minn. 2013). Questions involving the
scope of the district court’s inherent expungement authority are questions of law. See id.
A.A.S.’s argument that the district court improperly condition ed its inherent
authority on A.A.S.’s eligibility for statutory expungement rests on a misunderstanding of
the district court’s reasoning. The district court may order criminal records expunged based
on statutory authority or inherent judicial authority. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 279. The
district court’s inherent expungement authority is typically limited to expung ing judicial
records, except in circumstances implicating constitutional rights or where expungement
is necessary to the performance of a core judic ial function. See M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at
280–81, 284; State v. S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d 271, 277–78 (Minn. 2008); State v. Ambaye, 616
N.W.2d 256, 258 (Minn. 2000); State v. H.A., 716 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Minn. App. 2006).
And s tatutory expungement is available only in limited circumstances . See Minn. Stat.
§ 609A.02.
Contrary to A.A.S.’s premise, t he district court exp ressly recognized that district
courts have independent authority to expunge records. And it recognized that this authority
was limited in A.A.S.’s case to the expungement of judicial records . The district court’s
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determination that the b enefits A.A.S. identified were diminished in the absence of
statutory expungement was not a condition on the district court’s inherent authority; it was
part of the dis trict court’s reasoning as to whether to grant the expungement request.
Nothing in the district court’s explanation suggests that it misunderstood its inherent
authority.
II
We are not persuaded by A.A.S.’s contention that the district court failed to make
factual findings required by law. Generally, the district court must weigh any expungement
benefits to the petitioner against the expungement disadvantages to the public and the
burden on the court. See Minn. Stat. § 609A.03, subd. 5(a) –(b) (2016); Ambaye, 616
N.W.2d at 258. The district court determined that the potential benefits of expungement to
A.A.S. did not outweigh the countervailing interests. A.A.S.’s argument that the district
court failed to make findings under the 12 -factor analysis directed by Minnesota Statutes
section 609A.03, subdivision 5(c), raises two issues. The first is whether the district court
was required to apply the 12-factor statutory analysis to its inherent-authority expungement
decision. The second is whether t he district court made sufficient findings under the
appropriate analysis.
A. Applicability of the Statutory 12-Factor Analysis
We reject A.A.S.’s argument that the district court must analyze the 12 statutory
factors to decide whether to exercise its inherent authority to expunge judicial records. We
review de novo statutory interpretation issues related to expungement. See State v. S.A.M.,
891 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Minn. 2017). The relevant statute describes two circumstances for
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statutory expungement. Neither is implicated here. Generally, a petitioner must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the benefit of expungement outweighs the
countervailing interests. Minn. Stat. § 609A.03, subd. 5(a). But on certain grounds, the
petitioner is presumptively entitled to expungement and the burden falls on the responding
party to rebut the presumption. Id., subd. 5(b). Regardless of whether paragraph (a) or (b)
applies, paragraph (c) requires the district court, “[i]n making a determination under this
subdivision,” to consider 12 enumerated factors. Minn. Stat. § 609A.03, subdivision 5(c)
(emphasis added) (providing factors addressing offense, risk, timing, rehabilitation,
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, reasons for expungement, criminal records,
record of employment and community involvement, relevant recommendations,
restitution, and other relevant factors) . The legislature added these 12 factors in a 2014
amendment. Compare 2014 Minn. Laws ch. 246, § 10 , at 815–16 (codified at Minn. Stat.
§ 609A.03, subd. 5(c)), with Minn. Stat. § 609A.03, subd. 5 (2012).
A.A.S. contends that the district court must consider the 12 factors provided in
paragraph (c) for all contested expungement requests. In essence, her position is that
subdivision 5, including par agraph (c ), applies to statutory and inherent-authority
expungements. A close statutory reading defeats her argument. Section 609A.02 provides
the “grounds” for a statutory expungement order. Whether the standard in section 609A.03,
subdivision 5(b) applies unquestionably depends on whether those grounds have been met.
We have said that paragraphs (a) and (b) “are complementary and must be read together.”
State v. L.W.J. , 717 N.W.2d 451, 456 (Minn. App. 2006). That is, w hen one paragraph
relates to the grounds set forth in section 609A.02, the other paragraph must relate to those
7
grounds. A.A.S. did not satisfy any ground under section 609A.02, so paragraph (c)’s
directive to consider the 12 factors “in making a determination under [section 609A.03,
subdivision 5]” was not implicated. We also observe that this distinction is consistent with
the separation of powers emphasized in Minnesota caselaw distinguishing statutory
expungements from inherent-authority expungements. See S.L.H. , 755 N.W.2d at 279
(“Because inherent judicial authority is derived from the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers and is grounded in judicial self -preservation, it can be neither
augmented nor diminished by legislative acts.” (quotation omitted)). The district court was
not required to assess the 12 statutory factors to decide whether to exercise its inherent
authority to expunge the judicial records of A.A.S.’s assault.
B. Sufficiency of the Findings
A.A.S. implied ly challenges the sufficiency of the district court’s findings and
analysis. The challenge fails. When findings are inadequate so as to preclude our review of
the district court’s order, we may reverse and remand for additional findings. See State v.
A.S.E., 835 N.W.2d 513, 517 (Minn. App. 2013) . A.A.S. argu es that the district court
“made only a one sentence finding or analysis,” referencing the district court’s expression
that it was “very sympathetic to [A.A.S.’s] plight.” The referenced statement came in the
district court’s one-paragraph memorandum, but A.A.S. overlooks the fact that the order
itself made findings concerning her charge, the conviction, the inapplicability of statutory
expungement, the possible benefits of expungement, and A.A.S.’s reported difficulties
finding a job and housing.
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The distr ict court must generally consider “whether expungement will yield a
benefit to the petitioner commensurate with the disadvantages to the public from the
elimination of the record and the burden on the court in issuing, enforcing and monitoring
an expungement order.” Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d at 258, 261. The district court’s order and
memorandum were short, but they reveal that the court indeed contemplated A.A.S.’s
conviction, her stated interests and circumstances, and the diminished benefit to her in the
absence of complete expungement. It is true that the district court seems merely to have
speculated that employers and landlords would focus their searches on the executive branch
records in the absence of judicial branch records, making any expungement benefit to
A.A.S. illusory. But this was in response to A.A.S.’s equally speculative assertion that they
tend to look no further than judicial branch records. Given the arguments and their minimal
factual support, we are confident that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
concluding that the diminished benefit of expungement did not outweigh the public’s
interest and the burden to the court.
Affirmed.