A16-2034

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-2012
A16-2034

Earthsoils, Inc.,
Appellant,

vs.

Jeffrey S. Ptacek, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed July 3, 2017
Reversed and remanded
Larkin, Judge

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-CV-16-401

Paul A. Sortland, Sortland Law Office, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

J. Poage Anderson, David H. Re dden, Fabian May & Anderson, PLLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s award of summary judg ment for
respondents on appellant’s creditor’s bill action . The district court based its summary -
2
judgment determination on Minn. Stat. § 550.366 (2016) , which limits the time for
execution of a judgment for the unpaid balance of a debt on agricultural property owned
by a farm debtor. Appellant argues that the statute is unconstitutional and that the district
court erred in applying it. We reject appellant’s constitutional arguments. But because the
district court erred by concluding that relief is entirely unavailable under section 550.366,
we reverse and remand.
FACTS
Respondents Lavern Ptacek and Jeffrey Ptacek are a father and son who operate a
hog and grain farm in Steele County. In March 2008, the Ptaceks sued appellant Earthsoils
Inc., asserting claims for breach of contract, consumer misrepresentation, negligence, and
breach of express warranty, warranty of merchantability, and warranty of fitness. The
Ptaceks alleged that Earthsoils “fail[ed] to provide nitrogen fertilizer of a quality and
quantity in 2007 sufficient to grow a corn yield of 180 -200 bu/ac of corn ,” after
representing to the Ptaceks that the nitrogen fertilizer Earthsoil s recommended and sold
them was sufficient to do so. In April 2008, Earthsoils counterclaimed against the Ptaceks,
alleging that they owed Earthsoils “approximately $90,449.21, plus interest thereon” for
the products that Earthsoils provided the Ptaceks in 2007.
The district court granted Earthsoils’ motion for summary judgment on the Ptaceks’
negligence cl aim, reasoning that it was barred under the common -law economic -loss
doctrine. The district court denied Earthsoils’ motion for summary judgment on the
Ptaceks’ other claims. Before trial, the Ptaceks requested that the district court “instruct
[Earthsoils] not to allude or refer to, directly or indirectly, or question any witnesses
3
regarding [the Ptaceks’] crop insurance claims” during trial. The district court denied the
motion, and the Ptaceks’ insurance forms were admitted into evidence at the ensuing jury
trial in February 2013.
The jury returned a special verdict finding that Earthsoils (1) did not breach its
contract with the Ptaceks, (2) did not breach its w arranty to the Ptaceks, and (3) did not
provide false information to the Ptaceks in the course of selling goods or services.
However, t he jury found that the Ptaceks breached their contract with Earthsoils and
awarded Earthsoils damages of $40,449.21. The district court adopted the jury’s findings.
In March 2013, the Ptaceks moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on
Earthsoils’ counterclaim, arguing that Earthsoils’ exclusive remedy was under Minnesota’s
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The Ptaceks also moved for a new trial on their claims
against Earthsoils, arguing that the district court erred by admitting evidence regarding the
Ptaceks’ crop-insurance claims. On March 20, the district court entered judgment against
the Ptaceks. On April 10, the district court stayed enforcement of the judgment pending
resolution of the Ptaceks’ JMOL and new -trial motions. On April 22, the district court
amended the judgment to add pre -verdict and post -verdict interest totaling $44,605.08.
On June 6, 2013, the district court denied the Ptaceks’ JMOL and new-trial motions
and vacated the order staying enforcement of the judgment. On June 10, Earthsoils
obtained a writ of execution on the judgment. In July, the Steele County Sheriff’s Office
returned the writ of execution after failing to identify bank accounts that could satisfy the
judgment.
4
The Ptaceks appealed the judgment, challenging only the district court’s grant of
summary judgment for Earthsoils on their negligence claim and the district court’s denial
of their new-trial motion regarding their claims against Earthsoils. In August 2013, while
the appeal was pending, Earthsoils served interrogatories and requests for production of
documents on the Ptaceks related to execution of the June 6 judgment . In January 2014,
Earthsoils sent a letter to the Ptaceks noting that it had not received any responses to those
discovery requests. In February, Earthsoils requested a writ of execution.
In March 2014, t his court affirmed the district court’s admiss ion of the crop -
insurance evidence at trial. Ptacek v. Earthsoils, Inc., 844 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. App.
2014). However, this court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the
Ptaceks’ negligence claim and remanded, holding that the di strict court erred in applying
the common-law economic-loss doctrine. Id.
In June 2015, Earthsoils obtained a nother writ of execution. In November, the
Ptaceks’ negligence claim was tried to a jury on remand. The jury returned a special verdict
finding that Earthsoils was negligent but that Earthsoils’ negligence was not a direct cause
of the damage to the Ptaceks’ corn crop. The district court adopted the jury’s findings.
After t he trial, Earthsoils sent the Ptaceks letters instructing them to respond to their
original discovery requests and answer supplemental interrogatories.
On January 12, 2016, the district court entered judgment against the Ptaceks. The
judgment incorporated the “[p]revious judgment through No vember 17, 2015” of
$193,805.91 and included Earthsoils’ costs and fees in the amount of $4,819.21, which
were incurred during the remand proceedings on the Ptaceks’ negligence claim.
5
In February 2016, Earthsoils commenced a creditor’s bill action to void certain real-
property transfers that the Ptaceks had made to a trust, alleging that the Ptaceks transferred
the property to “make collection actions against them more difficult.” Earthsoils alleged
that it had a claim against the Ptaceks “for an unpaid judgment totaling $198,625.12 . . . as
of January 12, 2016.”
In July 2016, the parties moved for summary judgment. The district court noted
that the Ptaceks asserted “a statute of limitations defense that moots E arthsoils’ case if
granted” and granted the Ptaceks’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that
Earthsoils’ judgment against the Ptaceks had expired under the three -year time limit for
enforcement of judgments on agricultural debt under Minn. Stat. § 550 .366. The district
court found that the three-year time limit ran from June 6, 2013, the date the district court
vacated the stay on Earthsoils’ judgment on its counterclaim. The district court concluded
that Earthsoils’ action to void the property transfer in an attempt to execute its judgment
was “barred” because the time for execution of the judgment had expired. The district
court rejected Earthsoils’ constitutional challenges to section 550.366.
The district court vacated the judgment entered for Earthsoils “on March 20, 2013
or June 6, 2013 and any Lis Pendens against [the] Ptaceks’ homestead property.” The
district court entered summary judgment in both the district court file on the voidable-
transfer claim ( Steele County District Court file number 74-CV-16-401) and the district
6
court file on the Ptaceks’ original lawsuit ( Steele County District Court file number 74 -
CV-08-3731). Earthsoils appeals.1
D E C I S I O N
“A motion for summary judgment shall be granted when the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993). The district
court’s decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Martin v. Spirit
Mountain Recreation Area Auth., 566 N.W.2d 719, 721 (Minn. 1997).
Minn. Stat. § 550.366, subd. 2 , is at the heart of this appeal. The statute provides
that “[a] judgment for the unpaid balance of a debt on agricultural property owned by a
farm debtor may not be executed upon real or personal property after three years f rom the
date the judgment was entered.” Minn. Stat. § 550.366, subd. 2. Earthsoils seeks reversal
on two grounds. It contends that Minn. Stat. § 550.366 is unconstitutional. It also contends
that the district court erred in applying the statute. We address each contention in turn.
I.
Earthsoils contends that Minn. Stat. § 550.366 violates its constitutional rights to
due process, to a remedy, and to contract. The constitutionality of a statute is a question
of law which this court reviews de novo. Schatz v. Interfaith Care Ctr., 811 N.W.2d 643,

1 In appeal A16 -2012, Earthsoils seeks review of the judgment in Steele County District
Court file number 74 -CV-16-401. In appeal A16 -2034, Earthsoils seeks review of the
judgment in Steele County District Court file number 74 -CV-08-3731. This court
consolidated Earthsoils’ appeals.
7
653 (Minn. 2012). “Minnesota statutes are presumed constitutional, and [a court’s] power
to declare a statute unconstitutional should be exercised with extreme caution and only
when absolutely necessary.” In re Haggerty , 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1989). “The
challenger of the constitutional validity of a statute must meet the very heavy burden of
demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstit utional.” Assoc.
Builders & Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Minn. 2000).
A.
Earthsoils argues that Minn. Stat. § 550.366 “violates the Due Process Clauses under
both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions ,” which provide that no perso n shall
be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1; Min n. Const. art. I , § 7. The due -process protection provided under the
Minnesota Constitution is identical to the protection guaranteed under t he U.S.
Constitution. Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp. , 432 N.W.2d 448, 453 (Minn. 1988).
Earthsoils appears to argue that Minn. Stat. § 5 50.366 violates its substantive-due-
process rights. 2 “When analyzing whether legislation violates substantive due process
rights, [appellate courts] apply the rational basis test unless a fundamental right is
involved.” In re Individual 35W Bridge Litig. , 806 N.W.2d 820, 830 (Minn. 2011). “In
attacking a statute . . . on due process grounds, one bears a heavy burden; the statute . . .

2 Earthsoils does not specify whether its challenge is based on substantive or procedural
due process. Nor does it set forth or analyze the standard for evaluating either type of
challenge. Instead, Earthsoils summarily com plains that Minn. Stat. § 550.366 “treats
debts of farmers arising out of failure to pay for agricultural products differently than for
other persons in similar situations.” We construe Earthsoils’ due -process challenge as
substantive.
8
need only bear some rational relation to the accomplishment of a legitimate public purpose
to be sustainable.” Mfg. Hous. Inst. v. Pettersen, 347 N.W.2d 238, 243 (Minn. 1984).
This court has previously described the purpose of Minn. Stat. § 550.366 as
“encourag[ing] Minnesotans to pursue farming as a profession, despite the financial risks
involved.” Glacial Plains Coop. v. Hughes, 705 N.W.2d 195, 198 (Minn. App. 2005). The
state has a legitimate interest in encouraging farming because of the benefits that
agriculture has for the public at large. Limiting the time that creditors may execute
judgments for unpaid debts on agricultural properties owed by farm debtors is ratio nally
related to that interest because it decreases the financial risks associated with farming.
Earthsoils has not met its heavy burden to show that Minn. Stat. § 550.366 fails the rational-
basis test and therefore violates substantive-due process.
B.
Earthsoils argues that Minn. Stat. § 550.366 violates the Remedies Clause of the
Minnesota Constitution. Specifically, Earthsoils argues that the statute deprives a seller of
the seller’s remedies expected under the law because “it appears that the judgme nts
[covered by Minn. Stat. § 550.366] cannot be renewed, as is the case in every other
instance.”3
Article I, section 8 of the Minnesota Constitution provides that “[e]very person is
entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs w hich he may receive to

3 Because Earthso ils did not ask the district court to renew the judgment on its
counterclaim, we do not consider whether a judgment subject to Minn. Stat. § 550.366 is
renewable.
9
his person, property or character, and to obtain justice freely and without purchase,
completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformable to the laws.” The
purpose of the Remedies Clause is “to protect common law rights and remedies for which
the legislature has not provided a reasonable substitute.” Hickman v. Grp. Health Plan,
Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Minn. 1986).
Minn. Stat. § 550.366 does not deprive creditors of a remedy for unpaid debts on
agricultural property. It merely limits the time for execution of judgments for such debts.
Earthsoils nonetheless “questions Minn. Stat. § 550.366, as being unconstitutional.”
Earthsoils’ skepticism does not meet its heavy burden to show that Minn. Stat. § 550.366
violates the Remedies Clause of the Minnesota Constitution.
C.
Earthsoils argues that “Minn. Stat. § 550.366 is unconstitutional as it impairs
contracts.” Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides that no state
shall pass any “Law i mpairing the Obligation of Contracts.” Article I, section 11 of the
Minnesota Constitution similarly prohibits the passage of “any law impairing the
obligation of contracts.”
A judgment is not a contract within the meaning of the Contracts Clause. Morley v.
Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 146 U.S. 162, 169, 13 S. Ct. 54, 57 (1892); Olson v. Dahl, 99
Minn. 433, 437, 109 N.W. 1001, 1002 (1906). Impairment of a judgment therefore does
not violate the Contracts Clause. Olson, 99 Minn. at 437, 109 N.W. at 1 002; see also
Morley, 146 U.S. at 169-70, 13 S. Ct. at 57. Minn. Stat. § 550.366 regulates the execution
of judgments and not the obligations of contracts. Earthsoils had the opportunity to enforce
10
the Ptaceks’ contractual obligation to Earthsoils. Earthsoils obtained a judgment against
the Ptaceks based on a jury determination that the Ptaceks breached their contract ual
obligation. Minn. Stat. § 550.366 merely impose d a time limit on the execution of that
judgment. Once again, Earthsoils does not meet its heavy burden to show that Minn. Stat.
§ 550.366 is unconstitutional.
II.
We now turn to Earthsoils’ arguments regarding the district court’s application of
Minn. Stat. § 550.366, which was the basis for summary judgment. We review an award
of summary judgment based on the application of a statute to undisputed facts de novo.
Weston v. McWilliams & Assocs., 716 N.W.2d 634, 638 (Minn. 2006). Because the parties
do not dispute the material facts in this case , we review the district court’s award of
summary judgment de novo.
“If the language of the statute is clear and free of all ambiguity, we apply the plain
meaning of the statute. ” State v. Garcia -Gutierrez, 844 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. 2014).
No further construction is necessary or appropriate. Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357,
363 (Minn. 2010). Neither party contends that Minn. Stat. § 550.366 is ambiguous or that
statutory construction is appropriate. Because we discern no ambiguity, we apply the plain
meaning of Minn. Stat. § 550.366 when considering Earthsoils’ arguments regarding the
district court’s application of the statute.
A.
Earthsoils does not dispute that Minn. Stat. § 550.366 governs the execution of the
judgment on its count erclaim. Instead, Earthsoils argues that “[w]hen a judgment is the
11
result of a second trial upon remand, the three years to execute upon a farmer pursuant to
Minn. Stat. § 550.366 runs from the date of the final judgment.” Specifically, Earthsoils
argues that, “[f]or purposes of Minn. Stat. § 550.366, the judgment must run from the last
day the judgment was entered, January 12, 2016.” However, the plain language of Minn.
Stat. § 550.366 merely refers to entry of judgment. We cannot add language to a statute
that the legislature has omitted intentionally or inadvertently. Premier Bank v. Becker
Dev., LLC, 785 N.W.2d 753, 760 (Minn. 2010). Earthsoils does not explain why this court
should read the word “final” into the unambiguous language of section 55 0.366, and we
decline to do so.
Earthsoils also argues that this court reversed the entire case in the first appeal,
including the judgment on Earthsoils’ counterclaim, and that the district court erred in
concluding otherwise. Earthsoils is wrong: this court did not reverse the judgment on
Earthsoils’ counterclaim in the first appeal. The judgment on Earthsoils’ counterclaim was
not challenged by the Ptaceks or considered by this court. In fact, this court’s opinion does
not mention Earthsoils’ counterclaim. Ptacek, 844 N.W.2d at 535-41. Instead, this court
specifically “ reverse[d] the grant of summary judgment on the negligence claim and
remand[ed].” Id. at 540.
“An appeal may be taken from a part of a final order or judgment if the part whereby
the appellant is aggrieved is so far distinct and independent that it may be adjudicated on
appeal without bringing up for review the entire order or judgment. ” St. Paul Tr. Co. v.
Kittson, 84 Minn. 493, 493, 87 N.W. 1012, 1012 (1901). Earthsoils’ argument that this
court reversed the entire judgment in the first appeal ignores this principle. Moreover, any
12
objection to the Ptaceks appealing only part of the June 2013 j udgment should have been
raised at the time of appeal. See Hall v. McCormick, 31 Minn. 280, 281-82, 17 N.W. 620,
620 (1883) (denying motion to dismiss appeal after rejecting argument that an appeal was
“taken from a part of the judgment which is connected with and dependent upon another
portion thereof, the benefit of which [appellant] accept[ed]”).
Because the Ptaceks did not appeal the judgment on Earthsoils’ counterclaim, that
part of the judgment was not affected by this court’s decision in the first appeal. See
Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 212, 221-22 (Minn. 2007)
(stating that a portion of the district court’s judgment that was not reversed on appeal was
final for res judicata purposes); accord Gonzales v. R.J. Novick Constr. Co., 575 P.2d 1190,
1194 (Cal. 1978) (“Ordinarily an appeal from a specific portion of a judgment would leave
the parts not appealed from unaffected[.]” (quotation omitted)).
Ironically, even though Earthsoils argues that this cour t reversed the entire June
2013 judgment in the first appeal, it also states that the “district court correctly incorporated
the first judgment into the second judgment.” A judgment is in full force and effect from
the time of its rendition until it is reversed. Carl v. DeToffol, 223 Minn. 24, 30, 25 N.W.2d
479, 482 -83 (1946). Earthsoils does not explain how the district court could have
“correctly” incorporated a judgment that was purportedly reversed—and therefore of no
force and effect—into the subsequent judgment on remand.
Moreover, if, as Earthsoils argues, the entire judgment was reversed and all claims
remanded in the first appeal, Earthsoils would have had the burden to prove its breach -of-
contract counterclaim on remand. See D.H. Blattner & Sons, Inc. v. Firemen’s Ins. Co. of
13
Newark, N.J., 535 N.W.2d 671, 675 (Minn. App. 1995) (stating that a party bringing a
breach-of-contract claim has the burden of proof regarding that claim) , review denied
(Minn. Oct. 18, 1995); cf. Michaels v. First USA Title, LLC, 844 N.W.2d 528, 531 (Minn.
App. 2014) (noting that a party seeking a default judgment must still present evidence to
prove the allegations of the complaint). It made no attempt to do so. Thus, if Earthsoils’
argument regarding the effect of the first appeal were taken to its logical conclusion, there
currently would be no judgment in full force and effect on Earthsoils’ breach-of-contract
counterclaim.
In sum, the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 550.366 is not limited to “final”
judgments, the judgment on Earthsoils’ counterclaim was not reversed by this court in the
first appeal, and the district court did not err by using June 6, 2013 as the start date for the
three-year limit on execution of that judgment under section 550.366.
B.
Earthsoils next argues that “[a] party may not execute on a judgment, after a case
has been reversed and remanded, before a second trial.” Earthsoils notes that the Ptaceks’
remanded negligence claim “could have affected the entirety of the original verdict and, at
the very least, offset the gains by Earthsoils in the original verdict.” Thus, Earthsoils
contends that because “the first judgment was subject to change, based upon the reversal
by the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the time from that remand, thr ough the second trial
and judgment, should, at least, not be considered in [the] three year time period under
Minn. Stat. § 550.366.”
14
Once again, a judgment is in full force and effect from the time of its rendition until
it is reversed. Carl, 223 Minn. at 30, 25 N.W.2d at 482 -83. This principle is reflected in
the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, which provide that generally, “an appeal
from a judgment . . . does not stay enforcement of the judgment . . . in the trial court” unless
the court orders “ a stay of enforcement of the judgment . . . pending appeal.” Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 108.01, subd. 1, .02, subd. 1(a). “[Although] the [district] court’s jurisdiction
to modify or set aside its order on the merits is suspended pending appeal, it retains
jurisdiction over collateral matters, such as enforcement.” David N. Volkmann Constr.,
Inc. v. Isaacs , 428 N.W.2d 875, 876-77 (Minn. App. 1988); see Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
108.01, subd. 2 (noting that the district court retains jurisdiction on appeal “as to matters
independent of, supplemental to, or collateral to the order or judgment appealed from”).
As noted in the previous section, the judgment on Earthsoils’ counterclaim was
neither appealed nor reversed. Moreover, the Ptaceks did not ask the district court to stay
the judgment pending the first appeal or the trial on remand. There being no stay, Earthsoils
attempted to execute the judgment after the first appeal. For example, Earthsoils obtained
a writ of execution in June 2015.
In sum, Earthsoils’ argument that operation of Minn. Stat. § 550.366 should have
been tolled because Earthsoils could not execute the judgment on its counterclaim after the
first appeal is inconsistent with law. It also rings hollow when, in fact, Earthsoils attempted
to execute the judgment after the first appeal.
15
C.
Earthsoils argues that , because it initiated its voidable -transfer action within three
years of entry of judgment on its counterclaim, the “judgment [was] not voided by virtue
of Minn. Stat. § 550.366.” Earthsoils asserts that “a lawsuit brought within three years for
a voidable transfer is good and should be allowed to proceed,” relying on Amica Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Wartman, 841 N.W.2d 637, 640 (Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. Mar. 18,
2014).
In Amica, this court held that a district court properly granted summary judgment in
a veil-piercing action brought for the express purpose of satisfying a judgment where the
judgment had expired by operation of law and there was, therefore, no judgment upon
which to collect. 841 N.W.2d at 643. Thus, the relevant issue in this case is not whether
Earthsoils’ voidable-transfer action was timely; it appears that it was. The re levant issue
is whether Earthsoils would be able to execute the judgment on its counterclaim on the
property underlying its voidable-transfer action. If Earthsoils could not do so because the
time for execution had expired, the district court properly awarded summary judgment for
the Ptaceks. See id.
An action by a creditor to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of property legally
liable to execution is a type of creditor’s bill. Lind v. O.N. Johnson Co., 204 Minn. 30, 36,
282 N.W. 661, 665-66 (1938). “[A] creditor’s bill does not operate to extend the life of a
judgment.” Amica, 841 N.W.2d at 642. “[A]n action in the nature of a creditors’ bill to
enforce a judgment against property alleged to have been fraudulently transferred does not
continue the [judgment] in force beyond the period fixed by . . . statute.” Reed v. Siddall,
16
94 Minn. 216, 218, 102 N.W. 453, 454 (1905) . A creditor’s bill action does not renew
judgment because “nothing but a renewal within the life of the judgment will continue the
lien of the judgment.” Newell v. Dart, 28 Minn. 248, 250, 9 N.W. 732, 733 (1881) . This
caselaw clearly establishes that Earthsoils’ filing of a timely voidable-transfer action prior
to expiration of the three-year time limit on execution under Minn. Stat. § 550.366 did not
extend the time limit for execution.
D.
Earthsoils argues that “the district court could not properly vacate the entire
judgment from the second trial, including the statutory judgments earned by Earthsoils, ”
referring to the costs incurred for the negligence trial on remand.4 The Ptaceks counter that
the district court “properly vacated the [2013] judgment and all matters ancillary thereto,”
including the “ancillary awards for taxable costs and disbursements ” stemming from the
negligence trial on remand.
Earthsoils’ complaint alleged that Earthsoils had a claim against the Ptaceks for an
“unpaid judgment totaling $198,625.12 . . . as of January 12, 2016.” This total includes
both the outstanding balan ce of the June 2013 judgment on Earthsoils’ counterclaim, as

4 In its reply brief, Earthsoils asserts that “[i]t was reversible error for the district cou rt to
vacate the judgment altogether,” noting that “there is nothing in [Minn. Stat. § 550.366
that] permits a district court to vacate the judgment.” We do not consider whether the
district court erred by vacating any part of the judgment because Earthso ils did not raise
this issue in its principal brief. See McIntire v. State , 458 N.W.2d 714, 717 n.2 (Minn.
App. 1990) (explaining that claims not raised in an appellant’s principal brief were waived
and could not be revived by addressing them in the appel lant’s reply brief), review denied
(Minn. Sept. 28, 1990). Moreover, neither party adequately briefed this issue. See State,
Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997)
(declining to reach an issue in absence of adequate briefing).
17
well as the costs it incurred during the proceedings on the Ptaceks’ negligence claim on
remand. In sum, Earthsoils’ voidable-transfer claim is based on the entire judgment.
In its order for summa ry judgment, the district court stated that “[t]he judgment
entered for Earthsoils in Steele County file 74 -CV-08-3731 on March 20, 2013 or June 6,
2013 and any Lis Pendens against [the] Ptaceks’ homestead property is vacated. This order
shall also be filed in Steele County file 74-CV-08-3731.” In its supporting memorandum,
the district court described the additional $4,819.21 in costs from the negligence
proceedings on remand, which were included in the January 2016 judgment , as taxable
costs that were m erely ancillary to “the underlying claim .” The district court’s
characterization of the additional costs on remand as ancillary suggests that the district
court concluded that Earthsoils could no t execute the judgment for those co sts after
expiration of the three -year time limit . Moreover, the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on Earthsoils’ voidable-transfer claim in its entirety indicates that the dis trict
court concluded that no part of the judgment may be executed. We view the circumstances
differently.
Because the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the Ptaceks’ negligence
claim was reversed on appeal, that part of the 2013 judgment was no longer in full force
and effect. See Carl, 223 Minn. at 30, 25 N.W.2d at 482-83 (stating that a judgment “was
in full force and effect from the time of its rend ition until it was reversed”). A new
judgment on the negligence clai m was entered in January 2016. Any time limit on
execution of the judgment on the Ptaceks’ remanded negligence claim did not begin to run
18
until the judgment was entered on that claim in January 2016.5 There is no indication that
execution of the judgment on the Ptaceks’ remanded negligence claim would be untimely.
The district court therefore erred by c oncluding that Earthsoils’ entire voidable-transfer
claim is barred under Minn. Stat. § 550.366. As to the judgment on the remanded
negligence claim, Earthsoils’ voidable-transfer claim is not barred.
Conclusion
The district court correctly determined that under Minn. Stat. § 550.366, the three-
year time limit on execution of Earthsoils’ June 2013 judgment on its counterclaim against
the Ptaceks had expired at the time of the July 2016 summary-judgment proceedings. After
expiration of the time for execution, Earthsoils’ voidable -transfer action was, in part, an
impossible attempt to execute the judgment on its counterclaim. However, it was possible
for Earthsoils to execute its judgment on the Ptaceks’ remanded negl igence claim.
Summary judgment on Earthsoils ’ entire voidable -transfer action was therefore
inappropriate.
We reverse summary judgment on Earthsoils’ voidable -transfer action and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because the time for execution of the
judgment on Earthsoils’ counterclaim has expired , Earthsoils’ attempt to set aside any
property transfer for the purpose of executing th at judgment shall not be allowed on
remand. However, Earthsoils may proceed with its voidable -transfer action to the extent
that it seeks to set aside property transfers sufficient to allow execution of the judgment on

5 We are not asked to consider, and therefore do not determine, whether Minn. Stat.
§ 550.366 applies to the judgment on the Ptaceks’ negligence claim.
19
the Ptaceks’ remanded negligence claim, that is, the judgment for costs and fees incurred
during the previous remand proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.