Kristi Jolly, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-2016

Kristi Jolly,
Relator,

vs.

Handyhelp LLC - Healing Home,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and
Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed August 14, 2017
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Department of Employment and
Economic Development
File No. 34753718-5

Kristi Jolly, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Handyhelp LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Lee B. Nelson, Department of Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
An unemployment -law judge determined that Kristi Jolly is ineligible for
unemployment benefits because she was discharged from her employment for misconduct.
We affirm.
FACTS
HandyHelp LLC provides services to individuals with mental disabilities, including
adult foster care, independent housing, and targeted case management (TCM). Jolly, a
registered nurse, worked for HandyHelp as a full-time nurse and case manager from
March 23, 2016, to June 1 7, 2016. When she was hired , HandyHelp provided her with a
copy of her job description. Her duties included, among other things, maintaining a
caseload of approximately 20 clients in HandyHelp’s relatively new TCM program,
administering injections to clients , and providing nursing supervision and oversight at
HandyHelp’s adult foster-care facilities. Jolly acted as a team leader for the TCM program
because she had relevant previous experience.
HandyHelp terminated Jolly’s employment on June 17, 2016, for 12 reasons, which
it summarized as a “combination of performance related reasons” and “concerns that [she]
lacked interest in continuing to work with our clients and for our company.” Jolly applied
for unemployment benefits. In July 2016, the department of employment and economic
development (DEED) made an initial determination that she is ineligible for unemployment
benefits because she was discharged for employment misconduct.
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Jolly pursued an administrative appeal of DEED’s determination. In August 2016,
an unemployment-law judge (ULJ) held an evidentiary hearing. HandyHelp presented the
testimony of Blythe Nelson, HandyHelp’s human-resources coordinator. Nelson testified
that, when Jolly was hired, a human-resources assistant informed Jolly that she needed to
complete 30 hours of training during the first 60 days of employment and that HandyHelp
would honor her previous training only if it had been completed in the prior year.
HandyHelp reviewed documents that Jolly provided concerning her prior training and
informed her that her prior training did not satisfy the company’s requirements because it
had not been completed in the prior year. The human -resources assistant and Jolly’s
supervisor informed her via text message and in a face -to-face meeting that she needed to
complete additional training, but Jolly did not satisfy the 30-hour requirement.
Nelson also testified that Jolly’s duties included following up on medication errors
and reviewing client-care plans at HandyHelp’s adult foster-care centers. HandyHelp’s
executive director asked Jolly to set a schedule for her visits to the foster-care centers. Jolly
did not do so. One adult foster-care center reported that Jolly had not visited since her fifth
day on the job. Jolly’s failure to make regular visits resulted in one adult foster-care client
being referred to a hospital because Jolly was not present to give him an injection.
Nelson testi fied further that, t hroughout her employment, Jolly made numerous
complaints about her co -workers, her caseload, and the company’s administrative
practices. Jolly expressed these complaints in an “unprofessional” manner. Jolly told
Nelson that certain st aff members were “incompetent” and that Jolly’s supervisor was
“stupid as sh-t.” Jolly’s team members complained to Jolly’s supervisor about her negative
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attitude. Jolly’s supervisor met with Jolly to discuss her negative attitude in May 2016 and
early June 2016. Even after those meetings, Nelson heard Jolly describe the company as
“messed up” and her colleagues as “incompetent.” Jolly was aware before her termination
that her job was in jeopardy due to her negative attitude and unprofessional comments.
Jolly testified on her own behalf and disputed HandyHelp’s evidence in numerous
ways. She testified that she had not been informed that she needed to complete 30 hours
of training within her first 60 days of employment. She believed that she satisfied
HandyHelp’s training requirements because she had completed state -mandated training.
She testified that she did not fail to oversee the adult foster-care centers. She agreed that
she had not visited one of the adult foster -care centers since the first week of her
employment, but she insisted that she frequently communicated with both foster-care
centers via e-mail, telephone, and text messages and that she was on-call “on a 24-7 basis.”
She testified that, i n her view, HandyHelp’s billing practices in the TCM program were
illegal. She testified that she made negative comments to co -workers only once and that
no one had spoken to her about a negative attitude.
In September 2016, the ULJ found that Jolly intentionally engaged in employment
misconduct in three ways: (1) by “making disrespectful, unprofessional comments about
the company and its proced ures,” (2) by refusing to complete the required training, and
(3) by failing to visit HandyHelp’s adult foster-care centers on a regular basis. Thus, the
ULJ determined that Jolly is ineligible for unemployment benefits. Jolly requested
reconsideration. In November 2016, the ULJ affirmed her earlier decision. Jolly appeals.
5
D E C I S I O N
Jolly argues that the ULJ erred by finding that she engag ed in employment
misconduct and by determining that she is ineligible for unemployment benefits.
This court reviews a ULJ ’s decision denying unemployment benefits to determine
whether the findings, inferences, conclusions, or decision are unlawful or in excess of the
ULJ’s authority, unsupported by substantial evidence, or arbitrary and capricious. Minn.
Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2016). We review the ULJ’s findings of fact “in the light most
favorable to the decision” to determine whether “there is evidence in the record that
reasonably tends to sustain them.” Stagg v. Vintage Place Inc. , 796 N.W.2d 312, 315
(Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). We apply a de novo standard of review to the question
whether an employee’s conduct “disqualifies the employee from unemployment benefits,”
which “is a mixed question of fact and law.” Id. (quotation omitted). “ Whether the
employee committed a particular act is a question of fact.” Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721
N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2006).
Unemployment benefits are intended to provide financial assistance to workers who
have been discharged from employment “through no fault of their own.” Stagg, 796
N.W.2d at 315 (quotation omitted). Accordingly, a worker who was discharged due to
“employment misconduct” is ineligible for unemployment benefits. Minn. Stat. § 268.095,
subd. 4 (2016); Stagg, 796 N.W.2d at 315-16. “Employment misconduct” is defined as
any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct, on the job or
off the job that displays clearly:

6
(1) a serious violation of the standards of behavior
the employer has the right to reasonably expect of the
employee; or

(2) a substantial lack of concern for the
employment.

Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a) (2016). This statutory definiti on is exclusive such that
“no other definition applies.” Id., subd. 6(e); see also Wilson v. Mortgage Resource Ctr.,
Inc., 888 N.W.2d 452, 456-60 (Minn. 2016).
In this case, the ULJ found that Jolly intentionally committed serious violations of
the standa rds of behavior that HandyHelp reasonably expects of its employees . Jolly
contends that the ULJ erred because, for six reasons, substantial evidence does not support
a finding that she engaged in misconduct.
First, Jolly contends that the agency record do es not contain substantial evidence
that she was negative and unprofessional. The ULJ’s finding that she made “disrespectful,
unprofessional comments about the company and its procedures” is supported by Nelson’s
testimony that she heard Jolly say that her supervisor was “stupid as sh -t” as well as
Nelson’s testimony that Jolly frequently commented to other human-resources personnel
and to other colleagues that the company was “messed up” and that its staff was
“incompetent.” Nelson also testified that Jolly’s colleagues did not appreciate her negative
attitude and that Jolly did not change even after her supervisor asked her to refrain from
making disrespectful comments. The ULJ credited Nelson’s testimony, and this court will
not disturb a ULJ’s credibility determination on appeal. See Bangston v. Allina Med. Grp.,
766 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Minn. App. 2009).
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Second, Jolly contends that the agency record does not contain substantial evidence
that she failed to complete HandyHelp’s training requirements. The ULJ’s finding is
supported by Nelson’s testimony that HandyHelp informed Jolly of its requirements , that
HandyHelp informed her that her prior training would not completely satisfy the
requirements, and that Jolly failed to complete 30 hours of training within her first 60 days
of employment. Again, the ULJ credited Nelson’s testimony, and this court will not disturb
a ULJ’s credibility determination on appeal. See id.
Third, Jolly contends that the agency record does not contain substantial evidence
that she failed to oversee the adult foster-care centers. The ULJ’s finding is supported by
Jolly’s job description, which was received into evidence as an exhibit and establishes that
Jolly was responsible for “[p]roviding nursing supervision and oversig ht to two Adult
Foster Cares.” In addition, Nelson testified that Jolly received a copy of the job description
when she was hired and that HandyHelp’s executive director asked Jolly to set a schedule
for her visits to the foster-care centers but that Jolly did not visit the foster-care centers on
a regular basis. Again, the ULJ credited Nelson’s testimony, and this court will not disturb
a ULJ’s credibility determination on appeal. See id.
Fourth, Jolly contends that the ULJ erred by not finding that she was terminated for
whistleblowing instead of employment misconduct . The ULJ considered Jolly’s theory
but found it to be implausible. The ULJ’s finding that Jolly was not terminated for
whistleblowing is supported by all the evidence that tends to prove that she was terminated
for misconduct. In addition, Nelson testified that HandyHelp started its TCM program on
January 1, 2016, shortly before Jolly was hired, and that Jolly was aware that HandyHelp’s
8
executive director was “working closely with the county” to ensure that the TCM program
complied with applicable law. This court reviews the ULJ’s findings of fact “in the light
most favorable to the decision,” Stagg, 796 N.W.2d at 315, and defers to the ULJ’s
credibility determinations, Bangston, 766 N.W.2d at 332. The record does not compel a
finding that HandyHelp discharged Jolly because of whistleblowing rather than for the
reasons stated by the company.
Fifth, Jolly contends that the agency record does not contain substantial evidence
that her employment misconduct was intentional. Contrary to the premise of Jolly’s
contention, a finding of intentional misconduct is not required. The unemployment statute
defines employment misconduct as “any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct , on
the job or off the job that displays clearly . . . a serious violation” of the employer’s
standards of behavior. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a)(1) (emphasis added). Jolly cites
Houston v. International Data Transf er Corp. , 645 N.W. 2d 144 (Minn. 2002), for the
proposition that an applicant is ineligible for unemployment benefits only if mis conduct
was intentional. But the Houston opinion was abrogated by a subsequent amendment to
the statutory definition of misconduct. See 2003 Minn. Laws. 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 3, art. 2
§ 13, at 1473 -74. The statutory definition of misconduct is exclusive . Minn. Stat.
§ 268.095, subd. 6(e). Thus, Jolly’s contention is incorrect as a matter of law.
Sixth and finally, Jolly contends that the ULJ erred by finding that she engaged in
misconduct because HandyHelp did not give her a formal reprimand before terminating
her employment. The unemployment statute does not preclude a finding of misconduct
merely because an emplo yer did not give an employee a formal reprimand before
9
terminating the employee. See Brown v. National Am. Univ., 686 N.W.2d 329, 333 (Minn.
App. 2004) (affirming ineligibility of relator who was orally informed of unwritten
company policy that she was found to have violated), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2004).
Thus, this contention also fails as a matter of law.
In sum, s ubstantial evidence in the agency record supports the ULJ’s finding that
Jolly engaged in employment misconduct. Therefore, the ULJ did not err by determining
that Jolly is ineligible for unemployment benefits.
Affirmed.