Gary Leroy Reynolds, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-2020

Gary Leroy Reynolds, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed August 28, 2017
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Douglas County District Court
File No. 21-K5-05-000778

Gary Leroy Reynolds, Faribault, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Chad M. Larson, Douglas County Attorney, Alexandria, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Pres iding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Appellant Gary Lero y Reynolds challenges the denial of his petition for
postconviction relief following his first-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction.

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Because the postconviction cour t properly denied relief on the basis that appellant’s
postconviction petition was statutorily time-barred and procedurally barred, we affirm.
D E C I S I O N
Denial of a petition for postconviction relief is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Vang , 847 N.W.2d 248, 266 (M inn. 2014). The postconviction court’s factual
determinations are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard and will not be reversed
unless they lack factual support in the record. Id. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
Davis v. State, 784 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. 2010).
I.
Appellant’s postconviction petition is untimely under Mi nnesota Statutes section
590.01, which precludes the f iling of a petition for postconv iction relief “more than two
years after . . . an appellate court’s dispositi on of petitioner’s direct appeal.” Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4(a)(2) (2016). Appellant entered a plea of guilty to first-degree criminal
sexual conduct on November 17, 2006, we affirmed the conviction on June 17, 2008, and
the Minnesota Supreme Court denied fu rther review on August 19, 2008. State v.
Reynolds, No. A07-0718, 2008 WL 2415409 (Minn. Ap p. June 17, 2008, review denied
(Minn. Aug. 19, 2008). Appellant’s direct appeal became final 90 days later, in November
2008. See Berkovitz v. State, 826 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Minn. 2013) (“When an appellant does
not file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States following [the
Minnesota appellate court’s] decision on direct appeal, the appellant’s conviction becomes
‘final’ 90 days after [the cour t’s] decision for purposes of Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.
4(a)(2).”). Appellant’s postconviction petition, filed on August 15, 2016, is untimely under

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the two-year statutory deadline imposed by section 590.01, su bdivision 4(a), and there is
no error of law in the postconviction court’s dismissal of appellant’s petition as untimely.
II.
Minnesota recognizes certain exceptions to the two-year limitations period in
subdivision 4(a). Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b). A postconviction court may consider a
petition for postconviction relief outside of the two-year limitations period if the petitioner
establishes “that a physical disability or mental disease precluded a timely assertion of the
claim,” or if “the petitioner establishes to th e satisfaction of the court that the petition is
not frivolous and is in the interests of just ice.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(1), (5)
(2016). A petitioner seeking relie f under subdivision 4(b) must file the petition “within
two years of the date the claim arises.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c). “A claim arises
under subdivision 4(c) when the petitioner kne w or should have k nown that he had a
claim.” Hannon v. State , 889 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). A
postconviction court does not abuse its discretion by “summarily deny[ing] a petition that
invokes an exception to the statute of limitations when the claim underlying the exception
arises more than 2 years before the petition is filed.” Id.
Appellant claims that he suffered from a mental disability that prevented him from
understanding the charges filed against him or the consequences of the sentence imposed,
and that his trial counsel failed to adequately apprise the court of these disabilities at trial
or on appeal. The postconviction court re jected these arguments on the ground that
appellant admitted that a mental disability exis ted at the time of his conviction and direct

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appeal. We agree. Appellant has not demonstrated that a mental disability prevented him
from timely filing a petition for postconviction relief under subdivision 4(b)(1).
We likewise reject appellant’s claim that he is entitled to relief under the interests-
of-justice exception in subdivis ion 4(b)(5). This excepti on applies when the petitioner
establishes that “the petition is not frivolous and is in the interests of justice.” Brown v.
State, 863 N.W.2d 781, 788 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5)). It
is “triggered by an injustice that caused th e petitioner to miss the primary postconviction
deadline, not the substantive merits of the petition,” and is reserved “for exceptional cases”
only. Id. (emphasis omitted). This is not an excep tional case. Appellant claims that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel, that the district c ourt improperly admitted
evidence, and that the district court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on appellant’s
mental defect. But these issues were directly appealable after appellant’s conviction, and
he failed to raise them on appe al. Appellant has not demonstr ated that he is entitled to
relief under subdivision 4(b)(5).
III.
Appellant’s postconviction petition is also procedura lly barred under State v.
Knaffla, which provides that a postconviction court will not review successive petitions for
postconviction relief that assert the same issues that were raised or could have been raised
in a direct appeal or in a prior petition for postconviction relief. 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243
N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976). We agree with the postconviction cour t that “[e]very ground
raised by Petitioner to support his petition for postconviction relief could have been raised
on direct appeal.”

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Further, appellant has not established that an exception applies to the procedural
bar. Minnesota courts recognize the following two exceptions to an otherwise Knaffla-
barred claim: “if (1) the defendant presents a novel legal issue or (2) the interests of justice
require the court to co nsider the claim.” Hooper v. State , 838 N.W.2d 775, 787 (Minn.
2013) (quotation omitted). For a claim “[t]o be reviewed in the interests of justice, a claim
must have merit and must be asserted without deliberate or inexcusable delay.” Wright v.
State, 765 N.W.2d 85, 90 (Minn. 2009). “The second exception may be applied if fairness
requires it and the petitioner did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the issue on
direct appeal.” White v. State, 711 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).
Neither exception applies here. Appellant has not presented a novel argument, nor
has he established that the interests of fairness and justice warrant relief. Because appellant
could have asserted these arguments in his di rect appeal and failed to do so, and because
he has not asserted a Knaffla exception, his claims are barre d procedurally. The district
court did not abuse its discretion in determ ining that appellant’s postconviction petition
was procedurally barred.
Affirmed.