A16-2022 Precedential Affirmed Processed

Oliver McCrary, Relator,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed July 3, 2017

Authorities cited

Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.

Opinion text

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-2022

Oliver McCrary,
Relator,

vs.

United Parcel Service, Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed July 3, 2017
Affirmed
Toussaint, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 35017295-3

Oliver McCrary, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Sarah B. Riskin, Nilan Johnson Lewis PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent United
Parcel Service, Inc.)

Lee B. Nelson, Keri Phillips, Department of Employment and Economic Development, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Cleary, Chief Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Toussaint,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
TOUSSAINT, Judge
Relator Oliver McCrary challenges the determination by an unemployment -law
judge (ULJ) that he quit his employment and is ineligible to receive unemployment
benefits. Relator argues that he quit due to ongoing racial harassment at work. Because
the evidence in the record substantially supports the ULJ’s findings and decision, we
affirm.
D E C I S I O N
When reviewing a ULJ’s unemployment-benefits decision, this court may affirm,
remand for further proceedings, or reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights
of the applicant may have been prejudiced because the decision was affected by error of
law, unsupported by substantial evidence, or arbitrary or capricious. Minn. Stat. § 268.105,
subd. 7(d)(4) -(6) (201 6). “[W]e will no t disturb the ULJ ’s factual findings when the
evidence substantially sustains them.” Rowan v. Dream It, Inc. , 812 N.W.2d 879, 882
(Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted). “Credibility determinations are the exclusive
province of the ULJ and will not be distu rbed on appeal.” Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721
N.W.2d 340
, 345 (Minn. App. 2006). This court reviews de novo the determination that
an exception to ineligibility was not satisfied. See Rowan, 812 N.W.2d at 883 (quotation
omitted). But the reason an emp loyee quit is a question of fact. See Posey v. Securitas
Security Servs. USA, Inc. , 879 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Minn. App. 2016 ) (noting reason for
employee’s separation from employment is fact question).

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There is no dispute that relator quit his employment with respondent United Parcel
Service, Inc. (UPS). An applicant who quits his or her employment is generally ineligible
for unemployment benefits. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1 (201 6). At the hearing, relator
asserted that he satisfied two of the exceptions to ineligibility: (1) quitting for a good reason
caused by his employer under Minn. S tat. § 268.095, subd. 1(1), and (2) quitting because
of a medical necessity under Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1(7). We address each exception
in turn.
An applicant may be eligible for unemployment benefits if he quit “because of a
good reason caused by the employer.” Id., subd. 1(1). A g ood reason caused by the
employer is a reason “(1) that is directly related to the employment and for which the
employer is responsible; ( 2) that is adverse to the worker; and (3) that would compel an
average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed rather than remaining in the
employment.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a) (2016). The third element requires that the
employee was compelled to quit by “extraneous and necessitous circumstances” and sets
an objective standard of reasonableness. Werner v. Med. Prof’ ls LLC, 782 N.W.2d 840,
843 (Minn. App. 2010) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Aug. 10, 2010). “The
test for whether there was good cause attributable to the employer for the termination is
whether the reason for quitting is compelling, real and not imaginary, substantial and not
trifling, reasonable and not whimsical and capricious.” Shanahan v. Dist. Mem’l Hosp. ,
495 N.W.2d 894, 896 (Minn. App. 1993). Additionally, if the reason for quitting is adverse
working conditions, an applicant must notify the employer of the adverse working

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condition and give the employer time to correct it in order to have a good reason to quit.
Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(c) (2016).
Relator argues that he quit because of racial harassment from other UPS employees.
Relator’s allegations of racial harassment are wide-ranging and date back to 2008. Relator
contends that , among other thin gs, the employees display ed plastic nooses near his
workstation, tampered with his car while he was at work and at home, and placed a paint
spill and a business card near his workstation with the intention of racially harassing him.
The ULJ found that relator’s allegations were unsubstantiated and that he did not
complain or notify UPS about a majority of them. The ULJ’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence. Furthermore, all of the conduct and evidence that relator relied on as
evidence of racial harassment does not satisfy the “objectively reasonable” test . We,
therefore, conclude that the alleged conduct relied upon by relator does not constitute a
good reason to quit attributable to UPS.
An applicant who quit his or her employment is not disqual ified from receiving
unemployment benefits if “the applicant quit the employment . . . because the applicant’s
serious illness or injury made it medically necessary that the applicant quit.” Minn. Stat.
§ 268.095, subd. 1(7). “This exception only applies i f the applicant informs the employer
of the medical problem and requests accommodation and no reasonable accommodation is
made available.” Id.
There is no evidence that relator’s quit was medically necessary, let alone that
relator notified UPS of his condition, requested an accommodation, or was denied such an
accommodation. Thus, relator does not qualify for the medical -necessity exception. See

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id.; cf. Madsen v. Adam Corp., 647 N.W.2d 35, 38-39 (Minn. App. 2002) (concluding that
medical-necessity ex ception applied when applicant notified employer of her medical
condition and requested transfer to position that would not aggravate it , but no reasonable
accommodation was made available). Accordingly, the evidence substantially sustains the
ULJ’s finding that relator voluntarily quit his employment and did not satisfy an exception
to ineligibility for unemployment benefits.
Affirmed.