Robert Jon Myhran, II, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-2029

Robert Jon Myhran, II, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed September 11, 2017
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-16-1544

Robert M. Christensen, Robert M. Christ ensen, P.L.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Dominic J. Haik, Jamie Rein Schmidt, Assistant
Attorneys General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presid ing Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Stauber,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues in this implied-consen t appeal that he was seized without
reasonable, articulable suspicion. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent Commissioner of Public Safety revoked appellant Robert Jon Myhran’s
driving privileges after a traffic stop in March 2016 resulted in his arrest for driving while
impaired. Appellant filed a petition for judicial review, claiming that the stop was unlawful
because the Lino Lakes police officer who initiated the stop lacked reasonable, articulable
suspicion. The district court held an implied-consent hearing on appellant’s claim.
The officer testified that on March 4, 2016, he was observing traffic using a
stationary radar device while parked in a lot adjacent to the roadway. At 1:41 a.m., the
officer observed appellant’s vehicle traveli ng eastbound in an area where the speed limit
changes from 50 miles per hour (mph) to 40 mph. The officer testif ied that, upon initial
observation, he believed that appellant’s vehicle was traveling faster than the 40-mph speed
limit based on the officer’s training and 17 year s of experience as a police officer. The
officer’s radar device reported that the vehicle was traveling at 51 mph in the 40-mph zone.
The officer then drove out of the parking lot and stopped appe llant. The officer arrested
appellant as a result of the stop.
Appellant testified to the following: On the night of March 4, he drank four beers at
a bar, but his recollection of the events was not affected by the alcohol he consumed. He
had previously driven this particular stretch of roadway “100 times.” Appellant was aware
3
of his speed on March 4 becaus e he knew of the high police pr esence on that roadway.
When he entered the 40-mph zone he slow ed down from 50 mph and began driving
between 40 and 42 mph.
The district court denied appellant’s petition, crediting the officer’s testimony, and
sustained the revocation of appellant’s driving privileges. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that he was unlawfully stopped because the officer had no basis to
suspect that appellant was driving over the speed limit where there was no reasonable way
for the officer to have known whether appellant had entered the 40-mph speed zone. We
disagree.
This court reviews de novo questions of law relating to reasonable suspicion to
initiate a traffic stop. Wilkes v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 777 N.W.2d 239, 242-43 (Minn.
App. 2010). We review the district court’s findings of fact supporting an order sustaining
a license revocation for clear error. Jasper v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 642 N.W.2d 435,
440 (Minn. 2002). Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when they are “manifestly
contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a
whole.” Schulz v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 760 N.W.2d 331, 333 (Minn. App. 2009)
(quotation omitted). We will de fer to the district court’s credibility determinations and
ability to weigh the evidence. Constans v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 835 N.W.2d 518, 523
(Minn. App. 2013).
The Fourth Amendment to the United St ates Constitution and Article I of the
Minnesota Constitution protect citizens from unr easonable searches and seizures. U.S.
4
Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Prior to condu cting an investigatory stop, a
police officer “must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.” State v.
Hunter, 857 N.W.2d 537, 543 (Minn. App. 2014). The standard for reasonable, articulable
suspicion is not high. State v. Diede , 795 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn. 2011) (quotation
omitted). Reasonable, articulabl e suspicion exists if the po lice officer can “articulate a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
activity.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
“Generally, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how
insignificant the traffic law, that observati on forms the requisite particularized and
objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.” Wilkes, 777 N.W.2d at 243 (quotation
omitted). Driving at a speed greater than the posted speed limit is unlawful and a basis for
a police officer to initiate a stop. Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2 (2016); see also Sazenski
v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 368 N.W.2d 408, 409 (Minn. App. 1985).
Here, the district court implicitly found th e officer’s testimony that appellant was
traveling faster than the posted speed in the 40-mph zone more credible than appellant’s
claim that he had not yet entered the 40-mph zone. The district court also determined that
the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion that appellant was speeding in the 40-mph
zone based on the officer’s visual observations and radar-device reading. The officer stated
that he had tested the radar device at the beginning of his shift, and it was working properly.
Appellant does not challenge the condition of the radar device or its results.
At oral argument, appellant’s attorney asserted that Schulberg v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety, 387 N.W.2d 225 (Minn. App. 1986), is controlling. In Schulberg, this court
5
affirmed the trial court’s determination that there was an insufficient basis for a traffic stop
where the officer was driving at night and visually observed an approaching vehicle which
the officer believed to be speed ing. 387 N.W.2d at 227. Shulberg is distinguishable
because, here, the officer was parked and, in addition to his visual observation, used his
radar device to determine appellant’s speed. Further, in Schulberg, we limited the holding
to the facts on the record as we had previo usly concluded that a visual observation by a
stationary officer who “had received formal training in the estimation of traffic speed” was
sufficient to form the basis of the officer’s reasonable, articulable suspicion. Sazenski, 368
N.W.2d at 409.
Deferring to the district court’s credibility determinations, the record reflects that
the officer had reasonable, artic ulable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop based on his
visual observation and on the radar device reporting that appellant was speeding in the 40-
mph zone. Therefore, the district court did not err in determining that the officer had
reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop appellant.
Affirmed.