State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-2037

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

James Alan Hanson,
Appellant.

Filed October 23, 2017
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CR-15-656

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhle r, Assistant County Attorney,
Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; R odenberg, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant James Alan Hanson appeals his conviction of possessing a controlled
substance within a prohibited zone under Mi nn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 2(a)(6) (2016),

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arguing that the state failed to prove bey ond a reasonable doubt that he possessed
methamphetamine. We affirm.
FACTS
Beginning in 2014, appellant and his then -girlfriend, Barbara Hart, resided at a
residence in Fosston, with their friends Chad Norberg and M.E. As a result of another
criminal case involving appellant and Norber g, in early April 2015, Norberg and M.E.
moved out of the residence. Only appellant and Hart lived at the residence as of April 17,
2015, occupying the first-floor bedroom. They denied othe rs entry to that bedroom,
including Norberg’s mother who had come to collect his property.
On April 17, 2017, Polk County Sheriff De puty Zachary Folkert went to the Fosston
residence after a new tenant, who was supposed to be moving into the residence, called law
enforcement to complain that there were still people living in the house. When contacted
by law enforcement, Norberg’s mother also expressed concern over the presence of drugs
in and vehicles coming and going from the residence. When Deputy Folkert arrived, Hart
opened the front door and appellant invited Deputy Folkert into the house to look around.
At the time, appellant was subject to cond itions of release on bail, including random
searches based on reasonable suspicion and urine and breath testing for intoxicants.
Appellant mentioned to Deputy Folkert that there were things in the house that could
get him in trouble. Once inside the residenc e, Deputy Folkert noticed that water was still
running in the bathroom toilet. Upon searching the toilet tank, Deputy Folkert found a red
case containing drug paraphernalia. Further, during a search of the first-floor bedroom,

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officers found methamphetamine residue on a gl ass plate on a nightstand next to the bed,
along with other drug paraphernalia.
Appellant was arrested and taken to a correctional facility in Crookston. Corrections
Officer Donovan Hoffman asked appellant to pr ovide a urine sample. Appellant refused,
stating that he was already in enough troubl e and that he had been trying to quit using
drugs. Appellant also asked Officer Hoffman to tell Hart that he was sorry that he had
gotten her into trouble. Appellant was char ged with one count of possessing a controlled
substance within a prohibited zone, near a sc hool, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.023,
subd. 2(a)(6) (2014). After a court trial, appellant was found guilty and sentenced to 27
months in prison.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the record contains insufficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he possessed the methamphe tamine residue found in his residence.
In order to prove possession of methamphetamine in a prohibited zone, the state must prove
(1) that the defendant knowingly possessed methamphetamine; (2) that the defendant knew
or believed that the substance possessed was methamphetamine; (3) that the possession
occurred in a school, park, public housing, or drug treatment zone; and (4) that the
defendant’s possession was unlawful. 10A Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 20.22 (2015).
The district court found that the stat e proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
methamphetamine residue was found at the Fo sston residence and that the residence was
located within one city block of a school. The district court also found that the state proved

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beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant possessed the methamphetamine based on Hart’s
trial testimony that she and appellant had injected methamphetamine in the residence using
the drug paraphernalia found on the nightstand in the first-floor bedroom, and that other
physical evidence supported Hart’s testimony. On appeal, appellant challenges only the
district court’s finding that he possessed the methamphetamine.
In considering whether the record evidence is sufficient, we thoroughly review “to
determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction,
was sufficient to permit th e jurors to reach the ve rdict that they did.” State v. Webb, 440
N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). “We will not disturb the verdict if the [factfinder], acting
with due regard for the presumption of innoc ence and for the necessity of overcoming it
by proof beyond a reas onable doubt, could reas onably conclude that [the] defendant was
proven guilty of the offense charged.” Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn.
2004) (quotation omitted). “[Appellate courts] use the same standard of review in bench
trials and in jury trials in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Palmer, 803
N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011).
Possession can be proven by direct or circ umstantial evidence. “Direct evidence is
[e]vidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a
fact without inference or presumption.” Bernhardt, 684 N.W.2d at 477 n.11 (quotation
omitted). Such evidence can be provided in the form of testimony by a person who
perceived the fact through her senses or physical evidence of the fact itself. State v.
Williams, 337 N.W.2d 387, 389 (Minn. 1983). In contrast, ci rcumstantial evidence is

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“evidence from which the factfinde r can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did
not exist.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
“Possession may be either actual or constructive.” State v. Barker, 888 N.W.2d 348,
353 (Minn. App. 2016). An item may be possessed jointly with another person. Harris,
895 N.W.2d at 601 (citing State v. Lee, 683 N.W.2d 309, 317 n.7 (Minn. 2004)). The state
must prove that appellant possessed the me thamphetamine itself, rather than simply
possessing the location where it was found. State v. Hunter , 857 N.W.2d 537, 542-43
(Minn. App. 2014). Actual possession “involves direct physical control.” Barker, 888
N.W.2d at 353 (quoting Jacobsen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 233 Minn. 383, 388, 46 N.W.2d
868, 871 (1951)). “The mere fact that an item is not in a defendant’s physical possession
at the time of apprehension does not pr eclude prosecution for actual possession of
contraband.” Id. at 354. In contrast, constructive possession involves an item being “in a
place under appellant’s exclusive control to which other people do not normally have
access, or that there is a strong probability th at appellant was, at the time of discovery,
consciously exercising dominion a nd control over” that item. State v. Sam, 859 N.W.2d
825, 833 (Minn. App. 2015).
The district court found that Hart’s tria l testimony was direct evidence that appellant
actually possessed the methamphetamine residue. Specifically, the district court credited
Hart’s testimony that she and appellant resided in the first-floor bedroom at the residence
through April 17, 2015; that Norberg and M.E. were no longer residing at the residence
after Norberg and appellant were arrested in early April 2015; and that Hart and appellant

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had used the drug paraphernalia found on the first-floor be droom nightstand to use and
inject methamphetamine, the residue of which was seized by police.
Appellant argues that Hart was an accomplice to the methamphetamine possession,
that her testimony requires independent co rroboration, and that her testimony is
insufficiently corrobor ated. The state argues that Ha rt’s testimony did not require
corroboration because she was an alternative perpetrator rather than an accomplice.
Assuming without deciding that Hart was an accomplice to appellant’s
methamphetamine possession, we conclude that the district court did not err in finding that
Hart’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated.
We review the sufficiency of the evidence tending to corroborate an accomplice’s
testimony “in the light most fa vorable to the verdict.” State v. Chavarria-Cruz , 839
N.W.2d 515, 519 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). Corroborating evidence may be direct
or circumstantial and “need not establish a prima facie case of the defendant’s guilt, [but]
it must point to [the] defendant’s guilt in some substantial way.” State v. Johnson , 616
N.W.2d 720, 727 (Minn. 2000 ). “Corroborating evidence is sufficient if it ‘restores
confidence in the accomplice’s testimony, confirming its truth and pointing to the
defendant’s guilt in some substantial degree.’” State v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 225 (Minn.
1995) (quoting State v. Scruggs, 421 N.W.2d 707, 713 (Minn. 1988)).
The district court found that Hart’s testimony was corroborate d by: (1) the drug
paraphernalia found in the first-floor bedroom; (2) appellant and Hart’s possession of the
first-floor bedroom; (3) the drug paraphernalia found in the bathroom right after appellant
used the bathroom; (4) appellant’s protective behavior over the first-floor bedroom; and

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(5) appellant’s statements that there were th ings in the apartment that could get him in
trouble, that he refused to provide a urin e sample because he was “already in enough
trouble” and was “trying to quit using drugs,” and that he asked Officer Hoffman to tell
Hart he was sorry he got her in trouble. Wh en viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict, this evidence is sufficient to corroborate Hart’s direct testimony that appellant used
methamphetamine with her in the first-floor bedroom and was actually in possession of the
residue that was discovered. The district c ourt found that Hart’s testimony, serving as
direct evidence of appellant’s possession of the methamphetamine, was credible. We defer
to the district court’ s credibility findings. State v. Miller , 659 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Minn.
App. 2003), review denied (Minn. July 15, 2003). Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence
in the record to support the district court’s finding that the state proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that appellant actually possessed the methamphetamine residue.
The district court also found, in the a lternative, that the circumstantial evidence
proved that appellant had joint constructiv e possession of the methamphetamine residue
beyond a reasonable doubt, even if Hart’s testimony were entirely disregarded. The record,
to our view of it, supports the district court’s finding that the circumstantial evidence was
sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant exercised dominion and
control over the methamphetamine residue, and therefore constructively possessed it. See
State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598-99 (Minn. 2013) (“[I]n determining circumstances
proved, we consider only those circumstances that are consistent with the verdict.”). But
thorough analysis of the suffi ciency of the circumstantial evidence is unnecessary here

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because the record supports the district c ourt’s finding that the state proved its case by
direct evidence.
Affirmed.