In the Matter of the Estate of: Prince Rogers Nelson, Decedent.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-2042

In the Matter of the Estate of:
Prince Rogers Nelson, Decedent.

Filed September 11, 2017
Affirmed
Toussaint, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-PR-16-46

Alexander N. Loftus (pro hac vice), Stoltmann Law Offices, PC, Chicago, Illinois; Kenneth
R. White, Law Office of Kenneth R. White, P.C., Mankato, Minnesota; and Jennifer Santini,
Sykora & Santini, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants Brianna Nelson and
Jeannine Halloran)

Joseph J. Cassioppi, Mark W. Greiner, Sarah M. Olson, Emily A. Unger, Fredrikson & Byron,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Comerica Bank and Trust N.A.)

Randall W. Sayers, Nathaniel A. Dahl, Adam J. Rohne, Hansen, Dordell, Bradt, Odlaug &
Bradt, PLLP, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents Norrine Nelson, Sharon Nelson, and John
Nelson)

Steven H. Silton, Thomas P. Kane, Armeen F. Mistry, Cozen O’Connor, Minneapolis,
Minnesota; and Dexter R. Hamilton (pro hac vice), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (for
respondents Omarr Baker and Tyka Nelson)

Justin A. Bruntjen, JAB Legal LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Nicholas Granath, Seham,
Seham, Meltz & Petersen, LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Alfred Jackson)

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn.
Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
Paul F. Shoemaker , Shoemaker & Shoemaker, Bloomington, Minnesota (for respondent
Carlin Williams)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Toussaint,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
TOUSSAINT, Judge
Decedent died without a will. Appell ants, who do not claim to be genetically related
to decedent, sought to inherit from decedent under In re Estate of Palmer , 658 N.W.2d 197
(Minn. 2003). The district court ruled that, as a matter of law, appellants were excluded from
those who could inherit from decedent. On appeal, a ppellants argue that the district court
misread Palmer and misunderstood the impact of the 2010 amendments of the probat e code
on Palmer. This court, in a related case, recently ruled that the relevant portion of Palmer
was rendered stale by the 2010 amendments of the probate code. In re Estate of Nelson, ___
N.W.2d ___, ___ , No. A16 -1545, A16 -1546, slip. op. at 10 (Minn. App. Sept. 5, 2017).
Therefore, we affirm the district court in this appeal.
D E C I S I O N
Because the parties’ arguments require this court to construe Palmer and the probate
code, this court’s review of the district court’s decision is de novo. See, e.g., Zurich American
Ins. Co. v. Bjelland, 710 N.W.2d 64, 68 (Minn. 2006) (stating that “[appellate courts] interpret
statutes and case law de novo”).
This court recently noted:
In Palmer, the supreme court held that the parentage act is not the
exclusive means of establishing paternity, emphasizing that

3
[when Palmer was decided, the relevant provision of the probate
code] provided that a “parent and child relationship may be
established under the Parentage Act,” and that the word “may”
was permissive and allowed a claimant to establish a parent-child
relationship by clear -and-convincing evidence [outside the
parentage act]. 658 N.W.2d at 198-200 (emphasis added).

Nelson, slip op. at 9. Here, appellants argue that, under Palmer, “Minnesota law provides for
and recognizes parent -child relationships that are not genetic or established as a matter of
law[,]” and that the district court erred in reading Palmer as being “limited to only those
parties seeking to show the existence of a biological/genetic parent-child relationship.”1
We doubt that Palmer addressed recognition of “parent-child relationships that are not
genetic or established as a matter of law [,]” as alleged by appellants. The supreme court’s
Palmer opinion does not mention that point. It appears that , in Palmer, the existence of a
genetic connection between the claimant and decedent was undisputed: This court’s opinion
states that “[a]ppellant Marie Palmer married [decedent] in 1948. They had no children, but
in 1957, [decedent] and Beverly Smith had a son, [the claimant.]” In re Estate of Palmer, 647
N.W.2d 13, 14 (Minn. App. 2002), aff’d, 658 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 2003) . Because the
existence of a genetic relationship was undi sputed in Palmer, any inference that Palmer
addressed situations without a genetic relationship would be contrary to caselaw:
Opinions must be read in light of the issue presented for decision.
Skelly Oil Co. v. Comm’r of Taxation , 269 Minn. 351, 371, 131
N.W.2d 632, 645 (1964). And assumptions underlying an opinion
that are not the subject of a court’s analysis are not precedential
on the point that is assumed. See Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn.
279, 288, 41 N.W.2d 438, 443 (1950) (stating that an opinion
deciding an appeal based on the assumption that appellate

1 The district court’s analysis, as well as the parties’ arguments, show that their discussions
are limited to the context of intestate succession.

4
jurisdiction existed is not precedential regarding the existence of
appellate jurisdiction where the existence of appellate jurisdiction
was not addressed by the court).

In re Rollins, 738 N.W.2d 798, 802 (Minn. App. 2007); see Peterson v. Holiday Recreational
Indus., Inc., 726 N.W.2d 499, 504 n.1 (Minn. App. 2007) (same), review denied (Minn. Feb.
28, 2007).
Further, as set out in Nelson, the relevant portion of Palmer was based on provisions
in the then-existing probate code which were removed when the code was revised in 2010.
See Nelson, slip op. at 9-10. As a result, Nelson held:
Because Palmer’s holding that the parentage act is not the
exclusive means of establishing paternity for the purposes of
intestate succession is based on the permissive word “may” in the
paternity presumption reference in the pre-amendment version of
[the relevant probate code provision], that holding does not apply
to the current version of the probate code.

Id. at 10 (citations omitted). Thus, regardless of how Palmer is read, the relevant portion of
Palmer was rendered stale by the 2010 amendment of the probate code .2 Therefore, the
district court did not err in rejecting appellants’ attempts to inherit from decedent under
Palmer.
Affirmed.

2 Appellants assert that this court, in an unpublished opinion, recognized that Palmer remained
good law after the 2010 amendments of the probate code. Unpublished opinions, however,
are not precedential. Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3(c) (2016); Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis. v.
Wozniak Travel, Inc. , 762 N.W.2d 572, 5 75 n.2 (Minn. 2009). Further, the unpublished
opinion does not mention the 2010 amendments of the probate code . Therefore, the impact
of those amendments on Palmer was not at issue in that case, and not only can the opinion
not be read to address the impact of those amendments on Palmer, but any inference drawn
from the unpublished opinion about the impact of those amendments runs afoul of principles
summarized in Rollins, quoted above.