State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-2051

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

R. P. C.,
Appellant.

Filed July 17, 2017
Reversed and remanded
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-13-21397

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Corrine Heine, Minnetonka City Attorney, Anna Krause Crabb, Assistant City Attorney,
Minnetonka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Christopher A. Grove, The Grove Law Firm, Burnsville, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s denial of his petition for expungement of a 2013
underage-drinking-and-driving conviction, appellant argues that the district court’s factual
findings are un supported by the record and that he met his burden to establish that the
benefit of the expungement outweighed the corresponding disadvantages to public safety.
Because the district court’s analysis in its order improperly focused on driving -while-
impaired offenses rather than the offense sought to be expunged and included inconsistent
legal conclusions, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
On July 5, 2013, appellant R.P.C. received a citation for misdemeanor underage
drinking and driving in Minnetonka. He was 19 years old. Appellant pleaded guilty to the
offense in August, received a stayed sentence , and was placed on probation . Appellant
indicates he successfully completed probation in August 2014, but respondent State of
Minnesota co ntends he was not officially discharged until October 2014 and appellant
included October 29, 2014 as the date of discharge on his petition for expungement.
Appellant filed the petition in the spring of 2016.1
Since his offense, appellant has graduated from college and received an offer to
begin work at Deloitte in Washington, D.C. as a federal business analyst. He indicated he

1 The timeliness of appellant’s petition was not raised below, and we therefore do not reach
the issue. See Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3(a)(3) (2014) (requiring that a petitioner “has
not been convicted of a new crime for at least two years since discharge of the sentence”
for the crime sought to be expunged).
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sought expungement because his position would likely involve background checks,
because he is seeking housing, and “for travel purposes.” The district court conducted a
hearing in September 2016. The city attorney’s office filed a letter with the judge opposing
expungement on the grounds that the offense was recent and relevant to insurers,
investigators, and government background checks.
The district court issued an order denying appellant’s petition for expungement in
October 2016.2 The district court concluded that appellant had not met his burden to show
the benefit to him resulting from expungement would be commensurate with the resulting
disadvantages to the public and public safety. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
We review a district court’s denial of a petition for expungement for an abuse of
discretion. State v. N.G.K. , 770 N.W.2d 177, 180 (Minn. App. 2009) . We will only set
aside a district court’s findings of fact for clear error. State v. H.A., 716 N.W.2d 360, 363
(Minn. App. 2006). “Clearly erroneous means manifestly contrary to the weight of the
evidence or not supported by the evidence as a whole.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The relevant expungement statute provides that expungement
is an extraordinary remedy to be granted only upon clear and
convincing evidence that it would yield a benefit to the
petitioner commensurate with the disadvantages to the public
and public safety of:
(1) sealing the record; and

2 A referee conducted the expungement hearing and recommended an order, which became
effective “when countersigned by a judge.” Minn. Stat. § 480.70, subd. 7 (2016). “The
findings of a referee, to the extent adopted by the court, shall be considered as the findings
of the court.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.
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(2) burdening the court and public authorities to issue,
enforce, and monitor an expungement order.

Minn. Stat. § 609A.03, subd. 5(a) (201 4). The same statute provides 12 factors for the
district court’s consideration in determining whether to grant a petition for expungement ,
including the following relevant factors:
(1) the nature and severity of the underlying crime, the record
of which would be sealed;
(2) the risk, if any, the petitio ner poses to individuals or
society;
(3) the length of time since the crime occurred;
(4) the steps taken by the petitioner toward rehabilitation
following the crime;
(5) aggravating or mitigating factors relating to the
underlying crime, including the pet itioner’s level of
participation and context and circumstances of the underlying
crime;
(6) the reasons for the expungement, including the
petitioner’s attempts to obtain employment, housing, or other
necessities;
(7) the petitioner’s criminal record;
(8) the petitioner’s record of employment and community
involvement; [and]
(9) the recommendations of interested law enforcement,
prosecutorial, and corrections officials . . . .

Id., subd. 5(c) (2014) (emphasis added). And
[w]hen determining whether the benefit to a petitioner of
expungement is commensurate with the disadvantages to the
public, a district court should consider five factors: (a) the
extent that a petitioner has demonstrated difficulties in
securing employment or housing as a result of the records
sought to be expunged; (b) the seriousness and nature of the
offense; (c) the potential risk that the petitioner poses and how
this affects the public’s right to access the records; (d) any
additional offenses or rehabilitative efforts since the offense[;]
and (e) other objective evidence of hardship under the
circumstances.

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N.G.K., 770 N.W.2d at 180 (quotation omitted).
Appellant contends that the district court clearly erred with regard to five specific
findings: (1) “There is no evidence in the record to support the notion that sealed records
are less accurate, more difficult to find or less organized. Such findings by the district
court are unremarkable and generalized and could be said about any expungement matter”;
(2) “Expungement of Appellant’s Criminal Record does not prevent the record from being
used by government agencies for subsequent criminal inve stigations and proceedings”;
(3) “There is no authority for the district court’s conclusion that the written objection by
the Minnetonka Ci ty Attorney constitutes ‘strongly oppos[ing]’”; (4) “The Minnesota
Legislature has determined that the actions of Appellant during the Criminal Incident shall
be charged as a misdemeanor. The district court’s attempt to elevate the status
misdemeanor char ge and equate it to a [driving-while-impaired (DWI) offense] has no
support in the record and is contrary to Minnesota Law”; and (5) “The district court cited
no legitimate disadvantages to the public or public safety of expunging Appellant’s
Criminal Record; its finding that sealing the record will be a substantial disadvantage to
the public is clearly erroneous.” He also suggests that the 12 statutory factors favor
expungement and that he has “established by clear and convincing evidence that the benefit
of expungement vastly exceeds the disadvantages to the public and public safety.” We
focus our analysis on appellant’s arguments regarding the district court’s focus on DWI
offenses and regarding whether appellant met his burden of proof.
First, appellant contends the district court improperly equated appellant’s offense to
a DWI offense. In its general analysis of the public interest in keeping the records sealed,
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the district court relied heavily on analogy to DWI convictions. It noted that “[r]ecords of
DWI convictions must b e retained permanently , setting such crimes apart from most
others,” and that such requirements “illustrate the significance of DWI convictions vis -à-
vis those for other crimes.” (Citation omitted). It went on to discuss the danger of alcohol
offenses, finding that:
This crime is an alcohol -related driving offense. In a large
sense DWI crimes are sui generis. No other crime is
responsible for the amount of death, injury and destruction that
results from mixing alcohol with dr iving. There is a
particularly acute public interest in driving conduct where
alcohol is a factor. Driving after using alcohol is dangerous,
and is a factor in many traffic accidents, injuries and deaths
each year.
DWI offenses are among the relatively few
misdemeanor crimes denominated as “targeted misdemeanor ”
per Minn. Stat. § 299C.10, subd. 1(e). They count as criminal
history units for purposes of the sentencing guidelines for ten
years following discharge from probation for the offense.
A history of alcohol related offenses is a particularly
crucial tool if the subject is accused of a subsequent crime.
DWI violations can be enhanced to become gross
misdemeanors and even felonies when a previous record exists.
In Ch. 169A Minnesota has establishe d and continues to
enhance a complex scheme which aims to protect those who
use our highways from the consequences of those who
repeatedly drink and drive. A key factor in identifying those
few is the maintenance of accurate and complete records of
such c onvictions. The entire record of offenses, even those
which may go back decades, comes into play upon a conviction
in the sentencing decision.
Thus the public interest in maintaining complete and
accurate records of alcohol related convictions is very high.

Despite the district court’s focus on DWI convictions in its analysis, appellant’s
conviction is not similar to a DWI conviction for the purposes of many of the enumerated
considerations: records of underage -drinking-and-driving convictions are not retained
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permanently pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 171.12, subd. 3(4) (201 4); the record contains no
information to indicate that this offense involved “traffic accidents, injuries and deaths”; it
is not a “targeted misdemeanor” pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 299C.10, subd. 1(e) (2014); and
it is not an enhanceable offense as delineated in Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.24, .25, .26, .27
(2014), which sections refer only to prior convictions pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.20
(2014) when considering enhanceability. Additionally, appellant would be unable to repeat
this particular offense —the status offense depends upon appellant’s age on the date of
offense. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.33 (2014) (“It is a crime for a person under the age of 21
years . . . .). We conclude that t he district court abused its discretion by relying on an
analogy to an enhanceable offense that our statutory scheme treats quite distinctly from
appellant’s actual conviction offense.
Next, appellant argues that the district court erred in determining that he had not
met his burden of proof. The district court concluded that appellant “ha[d] not shown a
hardship resulting from this conviction, only some measure of potential embarrassment,”
and noted that he had demonstrated “only speculativ e and intangible harm” in support of
his petition for expungement. But the district court also concluded that “the reasons for
the expungement, including the petitioner’s attempts to obtain employment, housing, or
other necessities” weighed in favor of ex pungement. Appellant’s very reasons for
requesting expungement included concerns relating to employment, housing, and travel to
see his family. It is difficult to discern how this factor could weigh in appellant’s favor
while still constituting “only speculative and intangible harm.” The district court’s findings
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are therefore inconsistent and require clarification on remand. In short, the district court
has to decide whether the factor weighs in favor of or against expungement.
Before concluding, we n ote that appellant’s arguments rely heavily on State v.
R.H.B., 821 N.W.2d 817 (Minn. 2012), to attack the district court’s findings as generalized
and unremarkable. R.H.B. concerned a petitioner who had been acquitted and who
therefore petitioned under a different subsection of the expungement statute. R.H.B., 821
N.W.2d at 820. In such cases, the respondent carries the burden of proof to show that
expungement should not be granted—the inverse of the burden at issue in this case. Minn.
Stat. § 609A.03, subd. 5(b) (2014). Appellant does not cite any authority requiring
application of R.H.B. to expungement petitions other than those made pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3(a)(1), 3(a)(2) (2014). But because we decide that the district court
erred for other reasons, we need not determine R.H.B.’s applicability to appellant’s case.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further findings and legal analysis
consistent with this opinion. In making its decision on expungement , the district court
cannot include in its analysis any comparison of the conviction to DWI cases and must
clearly decide whether factor six favors or disfavors expungement. Upon remand, the
district court may in its discretion reopen the record.
Reversed and remanded.