State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-2056

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Maurice Carter,
Appellant.

Filed January 8, 2018
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge
Concurring specially, Kirk, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-26238

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

A. L. Brown, Marcus L. Almon (of counsel), Capitol City Law Group, LLC, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges his first- and second-degree-assault (fear) convictions, arguing
that the district court improperly applied the doctrine of transferred intent. Appellant also

2
argues the district court erred by imposing a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for his
first-degree assault-of-a-peace-officer convictions because it improperly concluded that he
used deadly force against the officers. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Maurice Carter arrived in downtown Minneapolis at approximately 1:20
a.m., planning to spend the night with his friends at a club. When Carter was later walking
down a sidewalk, an acquaintance, D.D.-R., approached him and asked him whether any
of the people in his group had a problem with D.D. -R., or words to that effec t. Carter
clarified that there were no issues between them. They shook hands and went their
respective ways.
A shoot-out erupted in the middle of the block on 5th Street North at 2:34 a.m. when
one of Carter’s friend’s , M.H., confronted D.D. -R. and assumed a fighting stance . A
chaotic situation ensued. Carter witnessed M.H. and D.D.-R.’s exchange but turned around
and continued walking away from D.D. -R. in a westward direction 1 on 5th Street North .
D.D.-R. responded to M.H. ’s confrontation by firing his gun multiple times to the south
and southeast. D.D.-R.’s bullets traveled into a crowd of bystanders. The streets were full
of police officers patrolling the area and pedestrians, who upon hearing D.D.-R.’s gunshots,
frantically dispersed in every direction. D.G., one of Carter’s friends who was on the east
side of D.D. -R. before the shooting, fired his gun in D.D. -R.’s general direction while

1 As noted by the district court, 5th Street North actually runs northwest and southeast, but
much of the district court record and the Minneapolis Police Department describe the street
as running east and west. Because this directional language was used throughout the case,
we also refer to 5th Street North as running east and west.

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running away. Carter had first run away from D.D.-R., but he then returned to 5th Street
North. After D.D.-R. stopped shooting, Carter took a few steps toward D.D.-R., raised his
gun, and fired five bullets in D.D.-R.’s direction. D.D.-R. ran into an alleyway.
Carter fired his gun in the direction of a group of pedestrians and p olice officers
who were in the middle or near the eastern end of the block on 5th Street North. Officer
Yolanda Wilks and Officer Walter Alvarado testified that bullets were coming toward them
and that they were without cover while Carter fired. Officer Peter Stanton, in fear, hugged
the side of the building that he was standing next to in response to the shots. C.T., a
bystander who was shot during the gunfire exchange between D.D. -R. and D.G., laid on
the ground and feared for her li fe while Carter fired. J.B., another bystander, hid behind
his pedi-cab while bullets traveled by him. Once Carter stopped shooting, he walked away.
The police apprehended him within a short time.
The state charged Carter with eleven counts of first-degree assault of a peace officer
under Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 2(a) (2014) ; two counts of second-degree assault with
a dangerous weapon under Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2014) ; one count of second-
degree riot under Minn. Stat. § 609.71, subd. 2 (2014); one count of reckless discharge of
a firearm within a municipality under Minn. Stat. § 609.66, subd. 1(a)(3) (2014) ; and one
count of possession of a pistol in a public place under Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1(a)
(2014).
Carter pleaded guilty to possessing a pistol in a public place , waived his right to a
jury trial, and had a bench trial on the remaining charges. At the close of the state’s case-
in-chief, Carter moved for a judgment of acquittal. The district court acquitted Carter of

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eight first-degree assault-of-a-peace-officer counts and the second-degree riot count. After
Carter presented his defense, t he district court issued a written order convicting Carter of
the three remaining counts of first-degree assault (fear) of a peace officer against Officers
Wilks, Alvarado, and Stanton; two counts of second-degree assault (fear) with a dangerous
weapon against C.T. and J.B.; and the counts of reckless discharge of a firearm and
possession of a pistol in a public place.
The district court sentenced Carter to concurrently serve three 120-month sentences
for the first-degree-assault convictions, two 36 -month sentences for the second -degree-
assault convictions, and one 12-month sentence for the possession-of-a-pistol-in-a-public-
place conviction. Carter now appeals his three first -degree-assault convictions and two
second-degree-assault convictions.
D E C I S I O N
Carter argues that his convictions must be reversed because he did not act with
specific intent to cause fear of immediate bodily harm or death to the five victims involved
in his convictions. The district court found that Carter intended to cause fear of immediate
bodily harm or death to D.D.-R. and applied the doctrine of transferred intent to conclude
that Carter intended to cause fear in Officers Wilks, Alvarado, and Stanton, and C.T. and
J.B. The district court reasoned that Carter assumed criminal liability for his action s by
firing a gun into a crowded area and concluded that it was a natural and pr obable
consequence that “anyone in the area was both in danger and could reasonably fear
immediate bodily harm or death.”

5
We review whether a defendant’s conduct meets the stat utory definition of an
offense de novo. See State v. Hayes , 826 N.W.2d 799, 803 (Minn. 2013). A defendant
commits assault -fear if he engage s in “an act with intent to cause fear in another of
immediate bodily harm or death.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012)
(quotation omitted); see Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10(1) (2014) (defining assault-fear).
Because a ssault-fear is a specific -intent crime, the defendant must intend to cause a
particular result. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 309. Assault-fear “does not require a findin g of
actual harm to the victim.” State v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Minn. 1998).
The defendant’s intent, as contrasted with the effect on the victim, becomes the focal
point of the inquiry. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 308. “Intent may be proved by circumstantial
evidence, including drawing inferences from the defendant’s conduct, the character of the
assault, and the events occurring before and after the crime.” In re Welfare of T.N.Y., 632
N.W.2d 765, 769 (Minn. App. 2001). A defendant’s intent may also be inferred from the
natural and probable consequences of his actions. Hough, 585 N.W.2d at 396-97.
In Hough, a defendant fired seven bullets into his school principal’s home while the
principal was inside with his wife and children. Id. at 396. At trial, the defendant testified
that he only intended to scare his principal, but the district court applied transferred intent
to find that he intended to cause fear of immediate bodily harm or death to the wife and
children within the home because it “was a highly probable consequence that others in the
home would be victims of [the defendant’s] actions.” Id. (alteration in original).
This court reversed the district court’s convictions in Hough with respect to the
children because we concluded that transferred intent could not be applied to unintended

6
victims who did not suffer harm. Id. at 395. But the supreme court reversed and upheld
the district court’s convictions. Id. at 397. The supreme court concluded that “the doctrine
of transferred intent [was] not necessary to resolve this case. Instead, [it] affirm[ed] all of
the convictions by looking to the plain language of the statute and to [its] earlier decisions.”
Id. at 395. It reasoned:
While the [district] court referred to the doctrine of transferred
intent when it convicted [the defendant] for the assaults against
[the wife] and the four children, the findings of the [district]
court support the conclusion that [the defendant] acted with
intent to cause fear of immediate bodily harm or death to all of
the occupants of the home. In effect, the [district] court
convicted [the defendant] because it found that [he] intended
the natural and probable consequences of his actions.

Id. at 396.
Carter argues that we must reverse all five assault -fear convictions because the
district court erred by applying the doctrine of transferred intent. Currently, no Minnesota
appellate caselaw has applied transferred inten t to an assault -fear conviction and the
supreme court has expressly declined to apply transferred intent to assault-fear when the
appellant’s intent could be determined by circumstantial evidence. Id. Therefore, like the
supreme court in Hough, “[w]e conclude that the doctrine of transferred intent is not
necessary to resolve this case.” Id. at 395. Instead, we analyze whether Carter intended to
cause fear to the five victims in the street by examining the natural and probable
consequences of his actions. Id.
Like the family in the house in Hough, we conclude that the circumstantial evidence
here establishes that Carter intended to cause fear of immediate bodily harm or death to all

7
five victims. First, Carter was aware that the street was filled with innocent bystanders
when he fired his gun. Before the exchange of gunfire started, police officers patrolled the
area on foot, bike, and horseback wearing unifo rms clearly demonstrating that th ey were
officers. The district court stated that “[e]ven a casual observer would [have been] aware
of their presence.” And w hen the shooting started, v ideo evidence demonstrates that
pedestrians stood on the ligh t-rail platform ; others stood outside bars that had r ecently
closed; and others walked down the street as they left the area. As discussed by the district
court, when Carter fired, “there were several people huddled on the north sidewalk of 5th
Street North, fleeing [D.D.-R.], or exposed on the light-rail platform.”
Second, Carter’s bullets traveled toward or past all five victims . Officer Stanton
stood on the same sidewalk and walked toward Carter . But upon hearing the gunfire,
Officer Stanton hugged a nearby building in fear. C.T. laid on the ground in front of Carter
as he fired , and J.B. hid behind his pedi -cab at the end of the block to avoid being shot.
Officer Wilks and Officer Alvarado crouched behind J.B. without cover as Carter fired his
gun. Although we do not analyze the effect on the victim in an assault -fear case, we may
infer the defendant’s intent based on his conduct and the natural and probable consequences
of his actions. See Hough, 585 N.W.2d at 395-97 (stating that a defendant’s intent may be
inferred from the natural and probable consequences of his actions ); T.N.Y., 632 N.W.2d
at 769 (stating that we do not focus on the effect of the victims in an assault -fear case, but
we may look at the defendant’s conduct as c ircumstantial evidence of his intent).
Therefore, we agree with the district court that the “natural and probable consequence of
firing five bullets down a crowded public sidewalk with countless people already running

8
in every direction in a panic is that those present, within range, will continue to fear
immediate bodily harm or death.”
Carter contends that we cannot apply Hough’s analysis because the district court
explicitly found that he had no intent to cause fear of immediate bodily harm or death to
the police officers when it stated that he did not intend “to target” the officers. Carter relies
on the emphasized language in the following paragraph from the district court’s order:
The State has also proved beyond a reasonable doubt
Mr. Carter used deadly force against Officers Wilks, Alvarado,
and Stanton. Though it cannot be proved he fired with the
specific intent to target one or more officers, Mr. Carter did
fire in their direction with an illegal gun at a person he
intended to shoot. Officer Stanton in particular saw
Mr. Carter’s gun raised at him, and was in personal, direct
danger of Mr. Carter’s shots. Officers Wilks and Alvarado,
without seeing Mr. Carter, were conscious of the shots coming
in their direction and were well withi n the zone of danger
caused by Mr. Carter firing from the opposite end of the block
in their general direction. Thus, the State has proven beyond a
reasonable doubt Mr. C arter used deadly force against the
officers on September 12, 2015.

(Emphasis added.)
We disagree with Carter’s interpretation of this language. Whether Carter “intended
to cause fear ” in another involves a broader analysis than whether Carter “intended to
target” the officers with his gun. The supreme court’s decision in State v. Rieck supports
this distinction. 286 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1979). In Rieck, a defendant threw a firebomb
toward a house, intending to silence a teenager . The intended victim was not home, but
five other family members were present. The supreme court upheld the defendant’s
sentence for each victim because it concluded th at he “knew, or should have known, that

9
there would be multiple victims.” Id. at 727. Likewise, in Hough, the defendant testified
that he only intended to scare the principal, implying that he did not intend to target others
within the home. 585 N.W.2d at 396 -97. But the supreme court upheld Hough’s
convictions against the other family members because it determined that the district court’s
findings s upported the conclusion that Hough acted with the intent to cause fear of
immediate bodily harm or death to all the occupants in the home based on the natural and
probable consequences of his actions. Id. at 397.
The same reasoning applies here. Carter may only have intended to target D.D.-R.,
but he also “knew, or should have known” that he would cause fear in the other bystanders
by firing his gun down a crowded street. Just like the defendant in Hough did not intend
to target the other family members within the home , Carter did not intend to target the
peace officers . Therefore, we do not agree with Carter that the district court’s order
explicitly found that Carter lacked the intent to cause fear to the peace officers.2

2 The placement of the district court’s discussion also supports our conclusion that the
district court did not conclude that Carter had no intent to cause f ear by stating he did not
intend to “target” the officers. The district court discussed that the state had to demonstrate
that Carter satisfied the four following elements to be convicted of assault-fear: (1) Carter
committed the act with intent to cause fear of immediate bodily harm or death in the victim;
(2) the victim was a peace officer at the time of the assault and was engaged in the
performance of a duty imposed by law, police or rule; (3) Carter used, or attempted to use,
deadly force against the victim; and (4) Carter’s act took place on September 12, 2015 in
Hennepin County. The district court had already concluded that the state demonstrated the
first factor —that Carter intended to cause fear of immediate bodily harm to the peace
officers—in previous paragraphs of its order. It only mentioned that Carter did not intend
to target the officers to discuss whether the state demonstrated that the third factor, the use
of deadly force, was satisfied.

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Thus, we find that the evidence sufficiently supports a finding that Carter acted with
the requisite intent to cause fear of immediate bodily harm against the five victims here.
When an assailant fires numerous shots from a gun into a crowded down town street, we
may infer that the assailant intends to cause fear of immediate bodily harm or death to those
put in danger by the gunfire. As noted by the district court, it was a natural and probable
consequence that Carter’s actions would endanger the bystanders and officers wi thin the
line of fire. We cannot excuse Carter’s behavior simply because he claims that he only
intended to cause fear in D.D. -R. when the natural and probable consequences of his
actions support a finding of intent. Therefore, we affirm the three first-degree-assault and
two second-degree assault convictions.
II.
Carter also argues the district court erred in sentencing him pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 609.221, subd. 2(b) (2014), which imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years
of incarceration for a person convicted for assaulting a peace officer under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.221 subd. 2(a). Subdivision 2(a) states that “[w]hoever assaults a peace officer . . .
by using or attempting to use deadly force against the officer . . . while the person is
engaged in the performance of a duty imposed by law” may not be sentenced to
imprisonment for more than 20 years. Carter argues that even if the district court properly
determined that he assaulted the police officers, he cannot be sentenced under subdivision
2(a) because he did not use deadly force “against the officers” given that he did not intend
to target them.

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We are not persuaded. Minn. Stat. § 609.066 (2014) defines deadly force as “[t]he
intentional discharge of a firearm . . . in the direction of another person.” The district court
determined that Carter intentionally discharged his firearm and that bullets traveled in the
direction of Officers Alvarado, Wilks, and Stanton. Therefore, Carter used deadly force
against the officers by firing his bullets in the ir direction. Carter’s actions met the other
requirements of Minn. Stat. § 609.221 subd. 2(a) , because Carter assaulted the police
officers by engaging in an act with the intent to cause fear of immediate bodily harm or
death when he fired his gun down the crowded street. The district court also found that the
officers were engaged in the performance of a duty imposed by law , and Carter does not
challenge this finding . Therefore, the district court properly applied the ten -year
mandatory minimum sentence to Carter’s three first-degree assault-of-a-peace-officer
convictions.
Affirmed.

CS-1

KIRK, Judge (concurring specially)
I concur in the majority’s decision. However, I would affirm based on the district
court’s application of the doctrine of transferred intent. The doctrine of transferred intent
allows for there to be an unintended victim of a specific -intent crime. State v. Hall, 722
N.W.2d 472, 477 -78 (Minn. 2006) (noting that intent can be transferred in first -degree
premeditated murder cases); State v. Bakdash, 830 N.W.2d 906, 913-14 (Minn. App. 2013)
(discussing that “Minnesota caselaw has consistently applied the doctrine of transferred
intent to specific-intent crimes”), review denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 2013). “[T]he applicability
of transferred intent depends upon whether the intended harm is different or substantially
similar to the unintended harm.” Bakdash, 830 N.W.2d at 913. Here, the specific-intent
crime is assault -fear. As the majority notes, the doctrine of transferred intent has not
ultimately been dispositive in the final appellate decision in an assaul t-fear case. But on
these facts, I believe that the doctrine is dispositive.
I do not agree with the majority that the supreme court’s analysis in State v. Hough,
585 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1998), and in State v. Rieck , 286 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1979),
applies to this case. In both Hough and Rieck, the defendant intended to cause fear of
bodily harm or death in a specific individual, but acted in such a way that he did not know
whether the intended victim would be affected at all, or whether multiple victims would be
affected. See Hough, 585 N.W.2d at 394 (noting that defendant fired seven shots into the
house where his intended victim lived with his wife and children); Rieck, 286 N.W.2d at
725 (noting that the defendant threw a firebomb at the intended teenage victim’s house
where she lived with her family). In both of these cases, the defendant targeted a dwelling

CS-2

that, at the time of the incident, may, or may not, have contained the intended victim and
additional people. Hough, 585 N.W.2d at 394; Rieck, 286 N.W.2d at 725. Those
defendants did not know who was present in the targeted dwellings and did not see their
intended victims before they acted to cause fear, and thus, the supreme court reached the
conclusion that the defendants intended to cause fear in all persons in those dwellings.
Hough, 585 N.W.2d at 396-97; Rieck, 286 N.W.2d at 727.
The majority’s approach treats this case as though Carter was “flock shooting” when
he fired his gun —as though he intended to cause fear in or to hit whomever was on the
street in the group of people . The facts of this case are substantially different than that
situation. Here, the record shows that Carter fired into a crowded street , in the direction
that D.D.-R. ran, with the specific intent to cause fear in, or harm, to D.D.-R. But because
there were many people in the zone of danger, the fear or harm experienced by those people
was substantially similar to the fear or harm Carter intended for D.D.-R. There is no
dispute that the civilians and law enforcement officers in the zone of danger were fearful
during the shooting. On this record, when Carter acted to cause fear in or harm to D.D.-R.,
it was a highly probable consequence that the civilians and law enforcement officers
present in the c rowded street would feel the same fear or harm. Therefore, I would
conclude, as the district court did, that the doctrine of transferred intent applies, and I would
affirm Carter’s convictions on that basis.