State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-2059

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Michael John Miller,
Respondent.

Filed June 26, 2017
Reversed and remanded
Bratvold, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-15-3913

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for appellant)

Paul P. Sarratori, Mesenbourg & Sarratori Law Offices, P.A., Coon Rapids, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant State of Minnesota challenges the district court’s sentence, which stayed
imposition of sentence for respondent’s conviction of felony driving while impaired
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(DWI). Because we conclude that Minn. Stat. § 169A.276, subd. 1(b) (2014), prohibits a
district court from staying imposition of sentence for this convi ction, we reverse and
remand.
FACTS
Respondent Michael John Miller pleaded guilty to one count of first -degree DWI
with three or more prior offenses in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2014)
and Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(1) (2014). The presumptive sentence for this offense
was a stay of execution of 42 months in prison, which was reflected in Miller’s presentence
investigation report and not challenged for accuracy by either party . See Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 4.A (2014).
Before the se ntencing hearing, Miller filed an informal letter brief, moving the
district court to stay imposition of the presumptive sentence. The state opposed Miller’s
request, arguing that Minn. Stat. § 169A.276, subd. 1(b), prohibited a stay of imposition of
a sentence for first-degree DWI offenses.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court stayed imposition of Miller’s sentence,
ordered him to serve a staggered jail sentence of 300 days, and placed him on probation
for seven years. In its order, the district c ourt acknowledged that this sentence was
prohibited by Minn. S tat. § 169.276, but stated, “I t is not the role of the legislature to
mandate sentences to the cour ts.” The district court commented that statistics from the
Sentencing Guidelines Commission ind icate that some convictions for first-degree DWI
result in a stay of imposition of sentence; moreover, the district court observed that the
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recent development and success of treatment courts supported its sentencing decision. The
state’s appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
District courts have broad discretion in imposing sentences, and appellate courts
will not reverse a sentencing decision absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Soto , 855
N.W.2d 303, 307–08 (Minn. 2014). A district court “abuses its discretion when its decision
is based on an erroneous view of the law.” State v. Williams, 862 N.W.2d 701, 703 (Minn.
2015) (quotation omitted).
The legislature is vested with the power to define criminal conduct and to determine
the punishment for such conduct , including providing for mandatory sentences . State v.
Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13, 17–18 (Minn. 1982); see also State v. Meyer, 228 Minn. 286, 293–
94, 37 N.W.2d 3, 9 (1949). This power includes setting “the limits of discretion vested in
the courts in the imposit ion of the sentence.” Meyer, 228 Minn. at 293, 37 N.W.2d at 9.
The legislature may “grant the court power to suspend a sentence and may limit such power
to certain cases and deny it as to others.” Id. at 293–94, 37 N.W.2d at 9. The judiciary is
vested with the power to impose the final sentence for a criminal violation “within the limits
prescribed by the legislature.” Olson, 325 N.W.2d at 18 (emphasis added).
Miller was convicted of an offense set out in chapter 169A. “It is a crime for any
person to drive, operate, or be in physical control of an y motor vehicle . . . when: (1) the
person is under the influence of alcohol.” Minn. St at. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) . “A person
who violates section 169A.20 (driving while impaired) is guilty of [felony] first -degree
driving while impaired if the person: (1) commits the violation within ten years of the first
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of three or more qualified prior impaired driving incidents.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subds.
1(1), 2 (2014). A person convicted of first -degree DWI “is subject to t he mandatory
penalties described in section 169A.276.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 2.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court acknowledged th at Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.276, subd. 1(b), prohibits a court from staying imposition of sentence for first -
degree DWI offenses. Nevertheless, the district court stayed imposition of Miller’s
sentence.1
The state argues that the district court erred. Miller argues that Minn Stat.
§§ 609.135 (2014) and 609.11, subd. 8(a) (2014), authorize a district court to s tay
imposition of a sentence in this case . Section 609.135 provides that except “ when a
mandatory minimum sentence is required by section 609.11, any court may stay imposition
or execution of sentence.” Minn. Stat. § 609.135, subd. 1(a). Because a mandatory
minimum sente nce under section 609.11 is not required here, Miller contends that the
statute authorized the district court to stay imposition of his sentence.
But chapter 169A contains specific provisions regarding mandatory sentencing for
DWI offenses. Indeed, a person convicted of first-degree DWI is “subject to the mandatory
penalties described in section 169A.276.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 2. S ection
169A.276 provides that t he mandatory minimum sentence for first -degree DWI is

1 We note that it appears the district court believed Minn. Stat. § 169A.276 violates the
separation-of-powers doctrine. However, the district court did not conduct a constitutional
analysis of the statute, nor did the parties raise this issue in the distric t court, or brief or
argue it before this court. Thus, we do not decide the issue here.

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imprisonment for not less than three years. Minn. Stat. § 169A.276, subd. 1(a). “The court
may stay execution of this mandatory sentence . . ., but may not stay imposition or
adjudication of the sentence or impose a sentence that has a duration of less than three
years.” Id., subd. 1(b); see also Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.E.2.e (2014) (stating mandatory
minimum sentence applicable for felony DWI is at least 36 months).
The i ssue before us is which statute governs Miller’s sentence . “[W]hen two
criminal statutes, one general and one specific, conflict . . . the more specific statute governs
over the more general statute, unless the legislature manifestly intends for the general
statute to control.” State v. Craven, 628 N.W.2d 632, 635 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied
(Minn. Aug. 15, 2001); see generally Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (2014).
Here, the more specific st atute is section 169A.276, subdivision 1(b), because it
expressly addresses felony-level DWI sentences. In contrast, section 609.135, subdivision
1(a), which authorizes a stay of i mposition of sentence, applies when a ma ndatory
minimum sentence is not required by section 609.11. But section 609.11, subdivision 8(a),
states that it applies only to “mandatory minimum senten ces established by this section, ”
which are specific to dangerous weapon, firearm, and drug offenses. Minn. Stat. § 609.11,
subds. 4–5a (2014). We conclude that section 609. 135 does not apply to sentencing for
convictions of felony DWI offenses and chapter 169A exclusively governs sentencing of
DWI offenses.
The language of section 169A.276, subd. 1(b) is unambiguous. The statute provides
that a court may stay execution of sentence for felony -level DWI offenses, but “may not
stay imposition . . . of the sentence.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.276, subd. 1(b) (emphasis added).
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The plain language of section 169A.276 limits a district court’s discretion and prohibits a
district court from staying imposition of sentence for this offense. Thus, we reject Miller’s
argument that the district court had discretion to stay imposition of sentence.
On appeal, Miller argues public policy reasons for changing minimum sentencing
for DWI convictions. T he district court’s comments at sen tencing suggest that it was
persuaded by these concerns . Caselaw firmly establishes, however, that district courts do
not have authority to stay imposition or adjudication of sentences when the legislature
mandates otherwise. For example, the supreme court reversed a district court’ s decision
that stayed imposition of sentence instead of imposing the mandatory six -month
incarceration period for a controlled -substance conviction . State v. Bluhm , 676 N.W.2d
649, 653 (Minn. 2004). The supreme court held that when the legislature “clearly state[s]
its intent to create a mandatory sentence ” the district court does not have discretion to
deviate from the mandatory sentence. Id. at 652; see also State v. Osterloh , 275 N.W.2d
578, 581 (Minn. 1978) (holding that a district court’s “sentencing power is statutory rather
than inherent”).
Because the legislature established a mandatory-minimum sentence for felony DWI
offenses under section 169A.276, subdivision 1(b), and expressly prohibited a stay of
imposition of sentence, the district court abused its discretion when it stayed imposition of
Miller’s sentence . Thus, we reverse and remand to the district court to vacate its order
staying imposition of sentence and direct the district court to impose a sentence consistent
with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.