In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: D. R. L., Parent.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-2065

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: D. R. L., Parent.

Filed June 12, 2017
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Koochiching County District Court
File No. 36-JV-16-257

Daniel L. Griffith, Griffith Law Office, International Falls, Minnesota (for appellant
D.R.L.)

Jeffrey Naglosky, Koochiching County Attorn ey, Molly J. French , Assistant County
Attorney, International Falls, Minnesota (for respondent Koochiching County)

Steven M. Shermoen, International Falls, Minnesota (for maternal grandmother J.O.)

Terry Iffert, International Falls, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Pr esiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
On appeal from the termination of her pa rental rights, appellant-mother argues that
the district court erred in failing to make findings of facts as they existed at the time of
termination, clearly erred in finding that the agency made reasonable efforts, and abused
its discretion because there was insufficient evidence to support termination. We affirm.
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FACTS
Appellant-mother D.L. and father A.J. are the biological parents of C.L., who was
born in February 2013. Following an October 2016 court trial, the district court
terminated mother’s parental rights to C.L.1 Mother appeals the district court’s decision
to terminate her parental rights.
On October 20, 2015, Child Protection Social Worker Scott Wherley from the
Koochiching County Community Services (the agency) responded to a call from local
law enforcement regarding out-of-home placement for C.L. Police were called to a hotel
by hotel staff to investigate mother’s suspected drug use and C.L. wandering around the
hotel unsupervised. Police contacted Wherley after determining that mother was under
the influence of methamphetamine and unable to care for C.L., who was approximately
two-years-and-eight-months old at that time. When Wherley arrived at the hotel, he
observed that C.L.’s clothes were dirty and that his shoes were on the wrong feet.
Afterwards, Wherley removed C.L. from mother’s custody and arranged for C.L. to be
placed in the care of his maternal grandmother (grandmother).
The agency filed a Child in Need of Protective Services (CHIPS) petition shortly
thereafter. Mother admitted that C.L. was in need of protection or services because her
chemical dependency affected her ability to adequately care for C.L. C.L. was
adjudicated in need of protection or services on December 21, 2015, and mother agreed
to participate in a case plan. Her case plan required that mother (1) complete inpatient

1 Prior to trial, A.J. voluntarily consented to the termination of his parental rights, and his
parental rights are not at issue in this appeal.
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chemical dependency treatment; (2) abstain from using controlled substances and remain
clean on all random urinalysis; (3) undergo a combined parenting/psychological
assessment and follow all recommendations of the assessment; (4) attend individual
counseling; (5) work on home-management services with a family-based worker; and
(6) cooperate with the agency, including maintaining regular contact and signing releases
of information. The goal of the case plan was to provide mother with the necessary
services to rehabilitate her and reunify her with C.L. within a six-month timeframe. The
case plan also outlined concerns that mother could not care for herself or C.L. and that
C.L. exhibited signs of being neglected for long periods of time.
Mother underwent a chemical-dependency assessment, which noted that mother
displayed little awareness about her chemical addiction, did not take responsibility for her
actions, and had no recovery support system. The assessment recommended that mother
undergo long-term inpatient treatment with an aftercare program in a halfway house, see
an individual therapist, comply with any recommendations from the agency and complete
parenting class, abstain from all mood-altering chemicals, attend Alcoholics Anonymous
(AA) or Narcotics Anonymous (NA) meetings, obtain a female sponsor, and resume her
meetings with her mental-health therapist.
Over the next year, mother failed to follow her case plan. Mother was admitted
into an inpatient chemical-dependency treatment program in December 2015 but left the
program two weeks later. After leaving the program, mother failed to maintain regular
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contact with the agency or Wherley.2 Between January and March of 2016, she cancelled
nine meetings with her counselor. Mother failed to address her mental-health issues, she
failed to visit and work with the family-based worker, she was arrested for
methamphetamine possession in March 2016, and she failed to check into another
inpatient treatment facility in April 2016, citing medical issues.
On April 14, 2016, the agency filed its petition to terminate mother’s parental
rights (TPR). The district court ordered the agency to develop a plan for legal permanent
placement for C.L. In May 2016, the agency filed an updated report, which outlined
mother’s lack of progress with her case plan despite the agency’s numerous efforts and
stated that they were seeking a family to adopt C.L. The agency filed similar updates in
June and July.
From the time of removal up until June 2016, C.L. lived with his grandmother.
C.L. completed an assessment that determined that he was lacking in fine motor skills.
At the TPR trial on October 13-14, 2016, grandmother testified that during the time she
cared for C.L., he rarely asked for mother, spent a substantial amount of time crying, and
seemed afraid. On one occasion, C.L. heard footsteps on the stairs outside the house and
began crying and screaming, “[T]he police are coming, the police are coming.”
Grandmother noted that mother only visited C.L. in the early stages of this matter and

2 In February 2016, D.L. called Wherley and expressed frustrations with him. She
accused him of preventing her from seeing C.L. and asserted that she did everything she
could to comply with the case plan. Wherley noted that D.L. seemed very irate, spoke
rapidly, and slurred her words. Wherley believed she was using methamphetamine again.
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that after each visit C.L.’s demeanor would change, he would not sleep well, and he
would become “very needy.”
In June 2016, C.L. was placed with relative J.J.O. and her family as C.L.’s
adoptive family. C.L. quickly started calling J.J.O. “mommy” without anyone’s
prompting or encouragement. C.L. displayed separation anxiety and J.J.O. constantly
had to reassure him that she was not leaving him. C.L. displayed many developmental
delays and was receiving special-education services and occupational therapy at his
preschool. C.L. assimilated and demonstrated attachment to the family. J.J.O. noted that
she would like to adopt him and that she would continue C.L.’s relationship with J.J.O. as
well as mother, so long as she is sober.
On June 6, 2016, mother entered a second inpatient chemical-dependency
program. Mother successfully completed the program and was discharged in July 2016
with the following recommendations: abstain from the use and possession of mood-
altering chemicals; attend outpatient treatment program; attend AA/NA meetings at least
twice per week; find a sponsor; attend mental-health treatment; and follow all the
recommendations from the out-of-home placement plan. Mother subsequently enrolled
in outpatient chemical-dependency treatment.
Mother has not visited C.L. since December 2015. Mother asked to visit C.L.
after leaving the inpatient chemical-dependency program in December 2015, in February
2016, and again after graduating from her inpatient treatment program in July 2016.
Wherley testified that, while C.L. has shown some improvements, the agency did not
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allow her to have visits with C.L. because she was not complying with her case-plan
requirements.
Prior to trial, Wherley received a report from a counselor at the outpatient
program, which stated that mother had been making progress, displayed no signs of
intoxication or withdrawal, and that mother reported that she had not used drugs in over
five months. However, the report also indicated that mother still “ha[d] difficulty with
impulse control and lack[ed] coping skills,” was not seeing an individual therapist, and
was passively involved in treatment. The report further indicated that mother had a poor
understanding of her chemical-dependency issues “and display[ed] moderately high
vulnerability for further substance use or mental health problems.”3 The report also noted
that mother had yet to set up an AA/NA meeting and did not have an adequate support
system.
A couple of weeks later, and two days before trial, the same counselor submitted a
letter that was much more positive about mother’s progress. This letter indicated that
mother “is committed to her recovery, . . . [g]etting visitation with her son is [her]
number one [priority],” and that her attendance and participation in the program has been
“very good.”
At trial, Wherley testified that, although mother had recently obtained employment
and had been sober for several months, he still recommended the termination of her

3 The report also indicated that D.L. had returned to using, but the record suggests that
this entry was in error. D.L.’s drug tests all came back clean. Wherley testified at trial
that he was confused about this statement and that it was probably not accurate, and the
district court did not rely on this fact to reach its conclusions.
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parental rights. He based his recommendation on mother’s failure to timely comply or
make adequate progress with her case plan, her lack of an adequate support network, and
her decision to continue dating a known drug user while displaying a high vulnerability to
relapse. Grandmother, mother’s father, and the guardian ad litem (GAL) also testified in
support of terminating mother’s parental rights.
Following trial, the district court ordered the termination of mother’s parental
rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subds. 1(b)(2),4 (4), (5) (2016). The district court
determined that the agency made reasonable efforts toward reunification and that
termination is in the child’s best interest based on the following findings: (1) although
mother successfully completed her inpatient program, she had not successfully completed
individual therapy, attended AA/NA meetings, or obtained a sponsor pursuant to the out-
of-home placement plan; (2) mother failed to maintain a sufficient period of sobriety,
“especially considering her long history of chemical dependency;” (3) mother’s boyfriend
was a negative influence; (4) C.L. had not seen mother since December 1, 2015 and C.L.
had formed a strong parent-child relationship with his adoptive parents and had started
calling them “mom” and “dad”; (5) C.L. had demonstrated substantial developmental
progress since being removed from mother’s care; and (6) the GAL testified that it is in
C.L.’s best interest to remain with the adoptive family.
This appeals follows.

4 In its determination under this subdivision, the district court mistakenly cited to
subdivision 1(b)(4).
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D E C I S I O N
“[P]arental rights may be terminated only for grave and weighty reasons.” In re
Welfare of Child of W.L.P., 678 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Minn. App. 2004).
We review a district court’s basic factual findings for clear error, but we review its
determination that a statutory basis for termination exists and its ultimate decision to
terminate parental rights for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B.,
805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). “A
finding is clearly erroneous if it is either manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence
or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Children of
T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). We give a district
court’s decision considerable deference because the “district court is in a superior
position to assess the credibility of witnesses.” In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393,
396 (Minn. 1996). Nonetheless, we closely inquire into the evidence to determine
whether there was clear and convincing evidence supporting termination. In re Welfare
of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008).
A district court must make findings of fact that are supported by clear and
convincing evidence and make a determination that (1) reunification efforts were
reasonable;5 (2) there is a statutory ground for termination; and (3) termination is in the
child’s best interests. Id. The statutory-ground determination must be based on evidence

5 Prior to terminating parental rights, the district court must make specific findings “that
reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan to reunify the child and the parent were
made” or “that reasonable efforts [were] not required” as set out in Minn. Stat. § 260.012
(2016). See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8 (2016).
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of conditions existing at the time of termination that may “continue for a prolonged,
indefinite period.” In re Welfare of P.R.L., 622 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Minn. 2001).
I. The district court did not abuse its di scretion because it found that the agency
made reasonable efforts and the district court’s determination that a
statutory ground for termination exists is supported by the record.
Mother challenges the district court’s termination of her parental rights, arguing
that the conditions that led to C.L.’s out-of-home placement no longer existed at the time
of the termination. We are not persuaded.
A statutory basis for terminating parental rights exists under Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5), when “reasonable efforts, under the direction of the
court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s out-of-home placement.”
The statute further provides that a failure of reasonable efforts is presumed when a child
under the age of eight has been out of the parent’s home for at least six months, the
parent did not maintain regular contact with the child, and the parent was not complying
with the out-of-home placement plan. Id., subd. 1(b)(5)(i). Because the reasonable-
efforts analysis is so closely related to the analysis under subdivision 1(b)(5), we analyze
that issue as part of the statutory analysis here.
A. Reasonable efforts
“When determining whether reasonable efforts have been made,” the district court
must consider “whether services to the child and [parent] were: (1) relevant to the safety
and protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and [parent];
(3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and
(6) realistic under the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h). “Reasonable efforts at
10
rehabilitation are services that go beyond mere matters of form so as to include real,
genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Children of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn.
App. 2007) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007). “Whether the
[agency] has met its duty of reasonable efforts requires consideration of the length of the
time the [agency] was involved and the quality of the effort given.” In re Welfare of
H.K., 455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. July 6, 1990).
Additionally, in determining that the agency made reasonable efforts, the district court
must make “individualized and explicit findings regarding the nature and extent of efforts
made by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8(1).
Here, the district court found that the agency made reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate mother and reunite mother with C.L. following the child’s out-of-home
placement. The district court found that the agency offered child-protection and welfare
services, assistance in getting mother chemical-dependency and mental-health
assessments and treatment, individual therapy, supervised parenting time, and parenting
educational services. The district court’s findings are supported by the record. Since
C.L.’s out-of-home placement, the agency attempted to provide services to mother to
help her comply with the case plan. Wherley testified that he repeatedly encouraged
mother to address her chemical dependency and mental health. After mother left the first
inpatient treatment program, Wherley attempted to contact her on numerous occasions to
support her compliance with the case plan.
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Even after the agency filed its permanency petition it continued to work with
mother. The agency helped mother get treatment at the second inpatient treatment
program, followed mother’s progress afterward in outpatient treatment, and monitored
mother’s chemical dependency by requesting random urinalysis up until trial.
Ultimately, the record demonstrates that the agency expended considerable time
and resources in attempting to address mother’s problems that led to removal of C.L.
The district court’s finding that the agency’s extensive efforts were genuine and adequate
to address mother’s unique needs is not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the district court
did not clearly err in finding that the agency made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate
mother and to reunite her with C.L.
B. Failure to correct the conditions
The district court determined that the agency presented sufficient evidence to
warrant the presumption that reasonable efforts have failed to correct the conditions that
led to C.L.’s out-of-home placement. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5)(i). It is
uncontested that at the time of trial, C.L. was under the age of eight and had resided
outside the parental home for more than six months. As such, the district court did not
err in determining that the presumption applied.
In her testimony, mother presented evidence that she continued to attend
outpatient services, recently began attending individual therapy sessions, and would
sometimes attend AA/NA meetings. Even though mother was on the path of complying
with a majority of her case plan, that does not “necessarily equate[] with a correction of
the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement.” In re Welfare of Children of
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K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d 656, 667 (Minn. App. 2012). “The critical issue is not whether the
parent . . . complied with the case plan, but rather whether the parent is presently able to
assume the responsibilities of caring for the child.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814
N.W.2d 76, 89 (Minn. App. 2012).
The record demonstrates that mother did not complete her inpatient program or
achieve a meaningful period of sobriety until seven months after the case plan was
finalized. Furthermore, while mother was attending individual therapy sessions6 for her
mental health, she had failed to notify the agency about this and failed to complete them.
Additionally, mother was not regularly attending AA/NA meetings and had not obtained
a sponsor or a sober-support network even though she admitted to having a boyfriend
with a noted history of drug issues. Clear and convincing evidence supports the district
court’s findings.
Considering mother’s long history of struggling with chemical dependency, even
after C.L. was removed from her custody, the district court’s determination that mother
had not rehabilitated herself and failed to correct the conditions that led to the out of
home placement was not an abuse of discretion. See In re Welfare of Maas, 355 N.W.2d
480, 483 (Minn. App. 1984) (affirming that mother’s substantial compliance with court-
ordered parenting sessions, psychological treatment, and sobriety were insufficient to
avoid termination given her negative parenting history and poor prognosis for long-term
improvement). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining

6 The record establishes that D.L. attended five individual therapy sessions, roughly once
a week beginning August 30, 2016.
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that a statutory ground for termination exists. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5).
Because one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing
evidence, we need not review the district court’s conclusions regarding the other statutory
grounds relied on by the district court. See In re Welfare of P.J.K., 369 N.W.2d 286, 290
(Minn. 1985) (stating district court need find only one statutory termination condition to
terminate parental rights).
II. Best interests of the child
In a proceeding regarding the termination of parental rights, the best interests of
the child is the paramount consideration. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 902. “We review a
district court’s ultimate determination that termination is in a child’s best interest[s] for
an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 905. “[T]he [district] court must balance three factors:
(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest
in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.”
W.L.P., 678 N.W.2d at 711. Competing interests of the child “include a stable
environment, health considerations, and the child’s preferences.” In re Welfare of
M.A.H., 839 N.W.2d 730, 744 (Minn. App. 2013). In its termination order, the district
court must explain its rationale for concluding why termination is in the child’s best
interests. In re Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. App. 2003).
Here, as to the first factor, the district court found that C.L. had not seen mother
since December 2015 and, in that time, had not asked for her. Furthermore, the district
court found that C.L. is thriving and has developed a strong parent-child relationship with
his adoptive parents.
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With regard to the second factor, mother testified that she is opposed to the
termination of her parental rights and feels that “no child should have to live without their
real mother.” As to the third factor, the district court found that removal is in C.L.’s best
interests because (1) C.L. has benefitted from a stable home life and his behavioral issues
have improved; (2) C.L. has demonstrated developmental improvements and is thriving
in daycare; and (3) C.L.’s nutrition has substantially improved. The district court’s
findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence and are not clearly erroneous.
The testimony of the GAL provides further support for the district court’s
findings. The GAL testified that she supports mother’s parental rights being terminated.
Grandmother and D.L.’s father also supported termination of mother’s parental rights.
The GAL testified that C.L. has an interest in being in a stable environment especially
considering his young age. The GAL testified that she sees no reason to extend the six-
month permanency-plan timeline to give mother additional time to work on her case plan.
Therefore, the district court adequately weighed mother’s and C.L.’s interests and
determined that the child’s best interests supported termination of mother’s parental
rights. We commend mother for the progress she has made recently, including
maintaining sobriety for at least four months. Nevertheless, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that it was in C.L.’s best interests to
terminate mother’s parental rights.
Affirmed.