Ryan Daniel Jones-Adams, Petitioner

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-2072

Ryan Daniel Jones-Adams,
Petitioner

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed June 12, 2017
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27C-CR-10-3559

Ryan Daniel Jones-Adams, Rush City, Minnesota (pro se petitioner)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Pr esiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Ryan Daniel Jones-Adams appeals the denial of his request to correct an
unlawful sentence, arguing that the district court erred in construing his request as a petition
for postconviction relief and dismissing it as untimely and Knaffla barred. Jones-Adams

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also argues that the sentencing court ab used its discretion by imposing an upward
durational departure from sentencing guidelines because the aggravating factor was legally
inadequate and unsupported by the record, the aggravated se ntence unfairly exaggerates
the criminality of his condu ct, and his guilty plea and Blakely waiver were inadequate.
Because the district court properly construed the sentence-correction request as a petition
for postconviction relief, the petition is untimel y, and the issues Jones-Adams raises are
Knaffla barred, we affirm.
FACTS
Jones-Adams pleaded guilty to second-degree intentional murder in October 2010.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the state dism issed more serious charges and Jones-Adams
agreed to a prison sentence of 420 months, which was a 94-month upward departure from
the presumptive sentence. Jones-Adams waived his right to a Blakely trial on aggravating
factors and admitted that the crime was un usually dangerous beca use it occurred in a
residential area where multiple bystanders were present and at risk of harm. The district
court accepted the guilty plea and found that the upward durational departure was justified.
Before sentencing in November 2010, Jones- Adams moved to withdr aw his guilty plea
because he believed that he had had insuffici ent time and information to fully understand
the agreement. The district court denied the motion and imposed a 420-month prison
sentence.
In 2012, Jones-Adams filed his first pe tition for postconviction relief, arguing that
the sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing the aggravated sentence, which,
Jones-Adams argued, unfairly exaggerated the criminality of his conduct. The

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postconviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Jones- Adams reassert ed that the
sentence unfairly exaggerated th e criminality of his conduct and also argued that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not ensure that he fully
understood the plea agreement and Blakely waiver. Jones-Adams v. State, No. A13-0951,
2014 WL 802136, at *1 (Minn. App. Mar. 3, 2014), review denied (Minn. May 20, 2014).
This court rejected Jones-Adams’s arguments and affirmed the denial of the postconviction
petition. Id.
On July 27, 2016, representing himself, Jones-Adams filed a “petition for correction
of unlawful sentence pursuant to Minn.R.Crim.P. 27.03 Subd .(9),” seeking to reduce his
sentence to the presumptive 326 months. The district court construed the request as a
petition for postconviction relie f. In this petition, Jone s-Adams again challenges his
sentence, asserting that the aggravated sentence unfairly exaggerates the criminality of his
conduct and the aggravating factor was unsupported and did not justify the departure. He
also again challenges the adeq uacy of his guilty plea and Blakely waiver because he did
not fully understand what he was agreeing to . The district court denied relief after
concluding that the petition was untimely and the issues were barred from relitigation under
Knaffla.
Jones-Adams appeals.

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D E C I S I O N
I. The district court properly construed the request as a petition for
postconviction relief.
Jones-Adams asserts that his 2016 requ est was a motion to correct an unlawful
sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. Subdivision 9 permits a court to “at any
time correct a sentence not authorized by la w.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9.
However, the district cour t construed Jones-Adams’s request as a petition for
postconviction relief under Minn. Stat. § 590.01 (2016).
In State v. Coles, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a defendant who agreed
to an upward durational departure in exchan ge for conviction of a lesser charge may not
challenge his sentence on a correction motion under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. 862
N.W.2d 477, 482 (Minn. 2015). Instead, such a challenge must be brought in a petition for
postconviction relief under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1. Id. In Jones-Adams’s plea
agreement, like in Coles, the conviction component and the sentence component of the plea
agreement were interrelated, with the defendant agreeing to a longer sentence in exchange
for a conviction of a lesser charge. See id. If Jones-Adams were to successfully petition
for a sentence reduction, he would retain the benefit of the reduced charge but the state
would lose the benefit of the longer sentence. See id. Under Coles, therefore, because it
implicates the plea, the challenge to Jones-Adams’s agreed-upon sentence must be viewed
as a petition for postconviction relief rather than a petition to correct an unlawful sentence.
See id. The district court therefore did not e rr by construing Jones-Adams’s request as a
petition for postconviction relief.

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II. The district court prop erly denied the petition.
We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of
discretion. Swaney v. State, 882 N.W.2d 207, 214 (Minn. 2016). We review legal issues
de novo and review factual findings for clear error. Id.
A district court may deny a postconviction petition without a hearing if the files and
records of the proceedings conclusively establish that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.
Brown v. State , 863 N.W.2d 781, 786 (Minn. 2015); see Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1
(2016). In order to warrant a hearing, a petitioner’s allegations must be more than
argumentative assertions without factual support. Doppler v. State, 771 N.W.2d 867, 871
(Minn. 2009).
The district court denied Jones-Adam s’s petition without a hearing because it
concluded that (1) the petition was untimely under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, and
(2) the arguments are barred from relitigation under Knaffla.
A. Untimeliness
With certain exceptions, “[n]o petition fo r postconviction relief may be filed more
than two years after the later of: (1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no
direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate co urt’s disposition of petitioner’s direct appeal.”
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4. Jones-Adams di d not directly appeal his conviction, so his
deadline to file a postconvic tion petition was two years afte r the entry of judgment of
conviction or sentence. Id. Jones-Adams pleaded guilty in October 2010 and was
sentenced in November 2010. He filed the current petition on July 27, 2016, well over two
years after the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence. Jones-Adams does not argue

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that any of the statutory ex ceptions apply to his petition. The petition for postconviction
relief therefore is untimely under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(1), and the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition without a hearing.
B. Knaffla bar
Even if the petition were timely, all of the issues raised in Jones-Adams’s
postconviction petition are barred under Knaffla. When a petition for postconviction relief
follows a prior postconviction pe tition, all claims that were or could have been raised in
the prior petition are procedurally barred. Doppler, 771 N.W.2d at 873 (citing State v.
Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976)).
1. Validity of the aggravated sentence
In the current petition, Jones-Adams cha llenges the adequacy of the aggravating
factor on which the district court based th e upward departure, argues that there was
insufficient evidence to support the finding that he placed others at risk, and asserts that
the aggravated sentence unfairly exaggerates the criminality of his conduct. These issues
were litigated under Jones-Adams’s 2012 petiti on for postconviction relief. On appeal
from the order denying the first petition for postconviction relief, this court concluded that
the departure ground was legally adequate, th e record supported th e finding that Jones-
Adams placed bystanders at risk, and the di strict court did not a buse its discretion in
imposing the 420-month sentence. Jones-Adams, 2014 WL 802136, at *2-3. Jones-Adams
is barred from relitigating these issues. See Knaffla, 309 Minn. at 252, 243 N.W.2d at 741.

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2. Adequacy of the guilty plea and Blakely waiver
Jones-Adams argues that his sentence shoul d be reduced because he did not fully
understand the plea agreement due to his young age at the time and the fact that he suffered
from certain mental illnesses and “an extremely low comprehension level.” But the issue
of whether Jones-Adams intell igently entered into the pl ea agreement was previously
litigated and decided. On ap peal from his 2012 petition fo r postconviction relief, Jones-
Adams argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed
to ensure that he fully unde rstood the plea agreement. Jones-Adams, 2014 WL 802136,
at *3. This court concluded that Jones-Adams’s trial counsel was not ineffective and that
the record showed that Jones-Adams knew that his guilty plea would lead to a 420-month
prison sentence and knew that this was an upward departure from the presumptive
sentence. Id. Jones-Adams is barred from relitigating the issue of whether he intelligently
entered into the plea agreement. See Knaffla, 309 Minn. at 252, 243 N.W.2d at 741.
Jones-Adams also argues that he did not fully understand that he was waiving his
Blakely right to have a jury determine the existence of an aggravating factor to support the
sentencing departure. See Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004)
(holding that the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires that facts supporting
an enhanced sentence be found by a jury or admitted by the defendant). But this issue was
previously litigated and decide d. On appeal fro m Jones-Adams’s 2 012 postconviction
petition, this court concluded that the record established that Jones-Adams understood that
he was waiving his right to a trial on the exis tence of aggravating factors and understood
that he was admitting to an aggravating fact or that would support an upward sentencing

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departure. Jones-Adams, 2014 WL 802136, at *3. Jones-Adams is barred from relitigating
the issue of whether he adequately understood his Blakely waiver. See Knaffla, 309 Minn.
at 252, 243 N.W.2d at 741.
3. Filing of th e departure report
Jones-Adams asserts that the sentencing court violated his fundamental right to
fairness by failing to file the departure report with the sentencing guidelines commission.
This issue arose just after sentencing in 2010 and could have been raised in Jones-Adams’s
2012 postconviction petition. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, su bd. 4(C) (requiring that a
departure report be filed with the commission within 15 days after sentencing). This issue
is therefore barred by Knaffla. See Knaffla, 309 Minn. at 252, 243 N.W.2d at 741.
Furthermore, even if this issue were not procedurally barred, Jones-Adams does not
identify any evidence to suppor t his assertion that the depa rture report was not properly
filed. A petitioner seeking postconviction relief bears the burden of establishing by a fair
preponderance of the evidence the facts alleged in his petiti on. Minn. St at. § 590.04,
subd. 3 (2016). Jones-Adams has not met his burden to establish a factual basis for this
argument. Because this alle gation is supported only by “mere argumentative assertions
that lack factual support,” Jones-Adams is not entitled to postconviction relief on this
ground. See Powers v. State, 695 N.W.2d 371, 374 (Minn. 2005).
Affirmed.