Eldon Paul Koestler, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-2076

Eldon Paul Koestler, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed July 24, 2017
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Faribault County District Court
File No. 22-K2-00-000114

Eldon Paul Koestler, Lino Lakes, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Troy Timmerman, Faribault County Attorney, Blue Earth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Pr esiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Randall, Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Pro se appellant challenges the district c ourt’s denial of his “motion to correct
sentence” under Minn. R. Cr im. P. 27.03, subd. 9, as a time-barred petition for
postconviction relief. We affirm.
FACTS
On March 15, 2000, appellant Eldon Paul Koestler shot a nd killed his estranged
wife in her mother’s home in front of six ot her people, including her mother and brother.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Koestler with second-degree murder and indicated
its intent to seek an indictment for first- degree murder and add second-degree assault
charges as to the six others present when Koestler brandished a pistol and shot his wife to
death.
Koestler quickly reached a plea agreement under which he pleaded guilty to second-
degree murder and agreed to an upward-departure sentence of 459 months’ imprisonment.
The state agreed not to seek an indictment for first-degree murder or add any second-degree
assault charges. Koestler also agreed to concurrent sentences based on his guilty pleas to
gross-misdemeanor obstructin g arrest/legal process and misdemeanor driving while
intoxicated (DWI), charges that arose from an unrelated incident on February 28, 2000.
The state agreed to dismiss se ven other charges that arose fro m the February 28 incident,
including a felony charge of first-degree criminal damage to property.
In May 2000, Koestler entere d his guilty pleas, testified that his wife made a “little
snotty remark” that “set [him] off” so he “pulled out the gu n and shot her,” consented to

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an upward departure of 459 months’ impr isonment, and acknowledged that he was
“voluntarily and knowingly giving up th[e] right” to seek the presumptive guidelines
sentence of 306 months’ imprisonment. The district court stated that the upward departure
was based on the parties’ plea agreement and the aggravating factors of (1) zone of privacy,
(2) impact on others, and (3) lack of remorse. The court sentenced Koestler to 459 months’
imprisonment.
In October 2016, Koestler moved the distri ct court pro se to correct his sentence
under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. Koes tler claimed that his sentence was “illegal”
because “two aggravating factors had to be pr esent to receive an upward departure,” his
wife’s murder did not take pl ace in her zone of privacy, a nd a murder’s impact on others
is not a valid aggravating factor. The court denied Koestler’s filing as a time-barred petition
for postconviction relief.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
“The court may at any time correct a sent ence not authorized by law.” Minn. R.
Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. The district court also may “correct [a] sentence” on a petition for
postconviction relief if the sentence is illegal “under the Constitution or laws of the United
States or of the state.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2016). While “[r]ule 27 authorizes
the district court to correct an illegal sentence at any time,” State v. Schnagl, 859 N.W.2d
297, 301 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted), “[n]o petition for postconviction relief may be
filed more than two years afte r . . . the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no
direct appeal is filed,” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2016).

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“[A]pplying the 2-year limitations period in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, to a Minn.
R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9 motion vi olates the separation of powers.” Reynolds v. State ,
888 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Minn. 2016). But if a defendant’s “challenge to his sentence
implicates more than simply his sentence,” the filing in which he asserts that challenge “is
properly viewed as a petition for postconviction relief under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, not as a
motion to correct a sentence under Rule 27.03,” regardless of how the defendant labels the
filing. State v. Coles, 862 N.W.2d 477, 482 (Minn. 2015). “[W]here the sentence at issue
is imposed as part of a plea agreement, a motion to change that sentence impacts more than
simply the sentence,” at least where the sentence “was a crucial reason” for the state’s entry
into the plea agreement. Id. at 481 −82. Such a filing implicates the plea agreement itself
and therefore is subject to the two-year limitations period on postconviction petitions. Id.
After examining the record in this case, we are confident that Koestler’s upward-
departure sentence was central to the plea agreement, under which Koestler received
significant benefits including (1) the state’s abandonment of its expressed intent to seek an
indictment for first-degree murder and add up to six second-degre e assault charges and
(2) the dismissal of seven charges, including one felony charge. As a result, any attack on
the upward-departure se ntence is tantamount to an attack on the plea agreement itself.
Because Koestler’s October 2016 filing atta cks the legality of th e upward-departure
sentence, which the district court imposed under the terms of a plea agreement more than
16 years before the filing, we conclude that the filing is properly viewed as a petition for
postconviction relief, and we further conclude that the petition is time-barred.
Affirmed.