A17-0708

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0004
A17-0708

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jerrmaine Winston Knowles,
Appellant.

Filed December 11, 2017
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-13-10054

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Pete r R. Marker, Assistan t County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant Public Defende r, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of identity theft involving eight or more
victims, his sentence, and his restitution order. He also raises other pro se arguments. We
affirm.
FACTS
After the discovery of documents in appellant Jerrmaine Knowles’s car and shared
bedroom at a halfway house th at contained the identities, birthdates, social security
numbers, and driver’s license s of 12 people, respondent State of Minnesota charged
Knowles with one count of iden tity theft involving eight or more victims in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.527, subds. 2, 3(5) (2012). Knowles signe d a plea petition,
acknowledging that he was pleading guilty to identity theft involving eight or more victims
and that the maximum penalty the court coul d impose was 20 years in prison. He then
entered a straight Alford plea to the district court on one count of iden tity theft. The
prosecution offered nothing to Knowles in exchange for his plea. The district court
accepted Knowles’s Alford plea, scheduled sentencing, and conditionally released
Knowles “to Project Remand to verify treatment, inpatient treatment program.”
The record before us is unclear as to when Knowles was released from custody, but
on September 8, 2014, Knowles filed a moti on for a downward dispositional sentencing
departure or, in the alternative, permission to withdraw his plea. The district court did not
consider Knowles’s motion because he failed to appear for his sentencing hearing on
September 17.

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On July 12, 2016, after his apprehension , Knowles filed a motion to withdraw his
Alford plea. The district court heard the motion on August 9 and denied it. At his sentencing
hearing on October 5, Knowles moved to proceed pro se and again moved to withdraw his
plea. The court granted his motion to proceed pro se but denied his plea-withdrawal motion.
The court then sentenced Knowles to a middle-of-the-box presumptive guidelines term of
108 months’ imprisonment, based on a criminal -history score of seven. At a contested
restitution hearing, the court ordered Knowle s to pay restitution of $1,000 per victim,
totaling $11,000.
This consolidated appeal from Knowles’ s conviction and restitution order follows.
D E C I S I O N
Validity of Alford plea
At the plea hearing, the prosecution summarized the evidence that it would offer at
trial, including evidence of Knowles’s prior record of using people’s identities to purchase
phones. The prosecution discussed its intent ion to offer testimony from Stanley Luckett
that he and Knowles would use the information, which they called “profiles,” to open new
cellphone accounts in other people’s names and then sell the phones to a different store for
money. The prosecution also pl anned to introduce conversati ons of phone calls made by
Knowles from jail in which he discussed needing to “get[ ] rid of” the “profiles” found in
his car as soon as possible.
Knowles acknowledged the prosecution’s summary of evidence and agreed that a
substantial likelihood existed that a jury would conclude that he committed theft by swindle
and was participating in identity theft, and he agreed that a jury “probably” would find him

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guilty of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court found that the
evidence summarized by the state was sufficient to support Knowles’s Alford plea, and that
Knowles entered his plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
In his July 2016 motion to withdraw his plea, Knowles argued that his plea was not
supported by a sufficient factual basis, partic ularly regarding the el ement of intent. The
district court found that Knowles’s plea wa s supported by an adequate factual basis,
including the element of intent, and was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent and denied the
motion. Knowles now asks this court to “invalidate” his plea.
“A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it.” State
v. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). “Withdrawal is permitted in two
circumstances. First, a court must allow wit hdrawal of a guilty plea if withdrawal is
necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Id. (quotation omitted); Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05,
subd. 1. “Second, a court may allow withdrawal any time before sentencing if it is fair and
just to do so.” Id. (quotation omitted); Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. “A manifest
injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. Knowles appears
to argue that he must be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to avoid a manifest injustice.
We review the validity of a guilty plea de novo. Id. at 94.
The supreme court has “held that there are three prerequisites to a valid guilty plea:
it must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent (i.e. knowingly and understandingly made).”
Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).
“In the context of an Alford plea, an adequate factual basis must be established to
ensure the plea is voluntary and represents an intelligent choice of the alternative courses

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of action available.” Id. at 37−38 (quotations omitted). “[A] defendant who enters an Alford
plea must, despite maintaining his innocence, agree that the evidence the State is likely to
offer at trial is sufficient to convict.” Id. at 38 (citing State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 649
(Minn. 2007)). Citing Theis, the supreme court has “outlined the factual basis necessary
for a proper Alford plea.” Id. at 38. “[T]he better practice is for the factual basis to be based
on evidence discussed with the defendant on the record at the plea hearing.” Id. (quoting
Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649). If a plea is entered without an adequate factual basis, the district
court must permit the plea to be withdrawn. Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 650.
A person commits identity theft under Minn. Stat. § 609.527, subd. 2, when he or
she “transfers, possesses, or uses an identity that is not the person’s own, with the intent to
commit, aid, or abet any unla wful activity.” The statute de fines “identity” as “any name,
number, or data transmission that may be used , alone or in conjun ction with any other
information, to identify a specific individual or entity,” including: “a name, Social Security
number, date of birth, official government-issued driver’s license or identification number,
government passport number, or employer or taxpayer identification number.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.527, subd. 1(d)(1) (2012). “Direct victim” is defined in the identity-theft statute by
reference to the restitution statute, in whic h “victim” is defined as a natural person who
incurs loss or harm as a result of a crime, including good faith efforts to prevent a crime.
Id., subd. 1(b) (2012) (referencing Minn. Stat. § 611A.01(b) (2012)).

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Accuracy
“The accuracy requirement exists to pr otect a defendant from pleading guilty to a
more serious offense than he could be convicted of if he were to go to trial.” Id. (quotation
omitted). An Alford plea is acceptable when “the State demonstrate[s] a strong factual basis
for the plea and the defendant clearly expresse [s] his desire to enter the plea based on his
belief that the state’s evidence would be sufficient to convict him.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at
647 (quotation omitted).
Knowles argues that his plea was not supported by an adequate factual basis because
the state failed to discuss a ny evidence that would prove that any of the 12 purported
identity-theft victims suffered a loss or harm. Knowles’s argument is unavailing. Although
“[t]he [identity-theft] statute does not define ‘harm,’” this court has concluded that the
statute does not require a showing of economic loss to establish loss or harm. State v. Moua,
874 N.W.2d 812, 817 (M inn. App. 2016) (“[W]e do not re ad the identity-theft statute to
require a showing of economic lo ss to establish loss or harm.”), review denied (Minn.
Apr. 19, 2016). “[R]eal harm occurs even in the absence of economic loss, and it follows
that the legislature intended direct victims to include those who incur such non-economic
harm.” Id.
Here, the evidence discussed at Knowle s’s plea hearing clearly showed that
Knowles possessed documents c ontaining the identities, birt hdates, social security
numbers, and driver’s licenses of 12 people, and that Knowles did not have permission to
possess the documents. The documents in Know les’s possession fall squarely within the
definition of “identity” under Minn. Stat. § 609.527, subd. 1(d), and the 12 people clearly

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exceed the requirement of 8 or more victims under Minn. Stat. § 609.527, subd. 2. Under
Moua, real harm occurred. 874 N.W.2d at 817.
To succeed on an identity-theft charge under section 609. 527, subdivision 2, the
state must prove that Knowles possessed identities with the intent to commit, aid, or abet
any unlawful activity, which includes theft by swindle under Minn. Stat. § 609.527, subd.
1(g) (2012). Knowles argues that the facts disc ussed by the state at his plea hearing were
not adequate to establish his intent to co mmit an unlawful activity while possessing other
people’s personal information and insufficient to establish the elements of theft by swindle.
We disagree.
“Intent is generally proved by inferences drawn from a person’s words or actions in
light of all the surrounding circumstances.” Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 860 (Minn.
2016) (quotation omitted). During the plea hearing, the prosecution explained to Knowles
that its theory was that his conduct was theft by swindle because Knowles was getting
phones from cellphone providers, using other people’s information, and the people entering
the agreements did not understand the true na ture of the transac tion. The anticipated
testimony of Stanley Luckett was adequate to establish that Knowles possessed identities
with the intent to commit or aid and abet theft by swindle.
Knowles argues that the anticipated test imony of the prosecution’s witness would
be inadmissible Spreigl evidence of a prior bad act and uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice, and that the evidence therefore was insufficient to establish that he possessed
the identities with the intent to commit theft by swindle. The state argues that the witness’s
testimony concerned an ongoing criminal ac tivity and would be corroborated by other

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evidence, specifically the jail calls in which Knowles men tioned having the victims’
personal information in his car. We agree with the state. When the district court asked
Knowles if he agreed that a ju ry was likely to find that hi s conduct was theft by swindle,
he said yes. He also agreed that there was a substantial likelihood that a jury would
conclude that he was guilty. And, as to his Spreigl-evidence argument, Knowles waived
such objections in his petition to enter a guilty plea. We conclude that the factual basis for
Knowles’s Alford plea was adequate.
Intelligent and knowing
“The purpose of the requirement that the pl ea be intelligent is to insure that the
defendant understands the charges, understands the rights he is waiving by pleading guilty,
and understands the consequences of his plea.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn.
1983). Knowles argues that his plea was not intelligent because he did not know the number
of direct victims involved when he entered the plea. Knowles’s argument is unsupported
by the record.
The number of victims was set forth in the criminal compla int and plea petition.
Moreover, at the plea hearing, Knowles specifically acknowledged that the charge against
him involved eight or more victims when the prosecution asked him, “Of the papers that
were found in your room and in your car, there are a total of twelve different individuals
whose names and dates of birth or social se curity numbers or driver’s licenses were
contained within those papers , correct?” Knowles answered yes. We conclude that
Knowles entered his plea knowingly. The evidence discussed by the state clearly included
the number of the direct vic tims involved and th at the number exceed ed eight. Because

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Knowles’s plea was supported by a sufficient factual basis, making it accurate, and it was
knowingly entered, his Alford plea was valid.
Sentencing
Blakely Inapplicable
Knowles claims that the dist rict court failed to obtain a Blakely wavier from him
before sentencing him to a presumptive senten ce under the sentencing guidelines of 108
months’ imprisonment. See Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296, 303, 124 S. Ct. 2531,
2537 (2004) (applying Apprendi to sentencing guidelines and holding that, under the Sixth
Amendment, “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a
judge may impose solely on the basis of the fact s reflected in the jury verdict or admitted
by the defendant” (emphasis om itted)). “[A] defendant must expressly, knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to a jury determination of facts supporting an
upward sentencing departure before his statements at his guilty-plea hearing may be used
to enhance his sentence.” State v. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644, 650–51 (Minn. 2006).
Here, if an identity theft involves eight or more direct victims, a defendant may be
sentenced to a maximum 20-year sentence. See Minn. Stat. § 609.527, subd. 3(5). But the
involvement of eight or more victims is an el ement of the crime; it is not an aggravating
factor. The prosecution discussed the eviden ce regarding the 12 direct victims of
Knowles’s identity theft and K nowles agreed that, based on the evidence , a jury was
substantially likely to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude that Blakely
does not apply to Knowles’s sentencing and that the district court was not required to obtain

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a Blakely waiver from Knowles before imposing th e presumptive guidelines sentence of
108 months’ imprisonment.
Criminal-history score
Knowles argues that his sentence must be reversed and remanded for resentencing
because the state failed to pr ove that the out-of-state and federal convictions used to
calculate his criminal-history score would be fe lonies in Minnesota. “The district court’s
determination of a defendant’s criminal-history score will not be reversed absent an abuse
of discretion.” State v. Maley, 714 N.W.2d 708, 711 (Minn. App. 2006).
At his sentencing on October 5, 2016, Knowles’s sentencing worksheet showed six
felonies:
1. Delivery of cocaine (MI, 1994) – 2 points
2. Aggravated theft over $5,000 (OH, 2006) – 1 point
3. Fraud and related activity to ID documents (Federal, 2008) – 1.5 points
4. Identity fraud (OH, 2008) – 1 point
5. Forgery (OH, 2006) – 0.5 point
6. Aggravated theft over $2,500 (OH, 2006) – 1 point

Knowles also had one misdemeanor/gro ss misdemeanor point and one custody-
status point. The district court included th e misdemeanor/gross misdemeanor point but
rejected the custody-status point. Neither is disputed in this appeal. And the state conceded
that the last two Ohio convictions listed above (forgery and aggravated theft over $2,500)
would not be considered felonies under Minnesota law and therefore should not be included
in Knowles’s criminal-history score.
A district court must take into consider ation a defendant’s out-of-state convictions
when it calculates a defendant’s criminal-histo ry score. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.5 &

11
cmt. 2.B.502 (Supp. 2013). “The state . . . has the burden at a se ntencing hearing of
establishing the facts necessary to justify c onsideration of out-of-s tate convictions in
determining a defendant’s criminal history score.” State v. McAdoo, 330 N.W.2d 104, 109
(Minn. 1983). The state must establish by a prep onderance of the evidence that the prior
conviction was valid, the defendant was th e person involved, and the crime would
constitute a felony in Minnesota. State v. Griffin, 336 N.W.2d 519, 525 (Minn. 1983).
To prove an out-of-state conviction, the state is not required to supply certified
copies of the conviction, and may, in the absence of certified copies, supply such evidence
as would be sufficient un der Minn. R. Evid. 1005. Id. Minnesota Rule of Evidence 1005
states:
The contents of an official record, or of a document
authorized to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or
filed, including data compilati ons in any form, if otherwise
admissible, may be proved by copy, certified as correct in
accordance with Rule 902 or testified to be correct by a witness
who has compared it with the original. If a copy which
complies with the foregoing cannot be obtained by the exercise
of reasonable diligence, then ot her evidence of the contents
may be given.
“Griffin does not relieve the state of its burden to prove out-of-state convictions by a
preponderance of the ev idence; rather, it permits the district court to rely on persuasive
evidence that sufficiently substitutes for the official, certified record of conviction.” Maley,
714 N.W.2d at 712.

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Here, the district court calculated Know les’s criminal-history score to be seven. 1
The record contains sufficient evidence to prove Knowles’s out-of-state convictions,
particularly based on the detailed presentenc ing investigation (PSI) describing each of
Knowles’s prior convictions and the comparab le Minnesota crime with its associated
points. The PSI included all the necessary info rmation (e.g., descriptions of each crime,
relevant dates, value of the property stolen, sentence received) from which the district court
could appropriately determine whether each conviction was considered a felony under
Minnesota law. Id.
Because the PSI provided sufficient information on which to determine that the state
proved by a fair preponderanc e of the evidence that Know les’s out-of-state and federal
convictions constituted felonies in Minnesota, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion and Knowles’s sentence need not be reversed and remanded.
Restitution Challenge
A district court has broad disc retion to order restitution. State v. Tenerelli , 598
N.W.2d 668, 671 (Minn. 1999 ). Unlike fines, which are typi cally punitive in nature, the
aim of restitution is to either rehabilitate a defendant or compensate the victim. State v.
Fader, 358 N.W.2d 42, 48 (Minn. 1984). Under the identity-theft statute, the district court
“shall order” $1,000 to each di rect victim of identity theft. Minn. Stat. § 609.527, subd.

1 Seven is the criminal-history score that the parties used in their briefing. Based on our
calculation, Knowles’s criminal-history score was six, rounded down from 6.5. See Minn.
Sent. Guidelines 2.B.1(i) (Supp. 2013) (stating that “[i]f the sum of the weights results in
a partial point, the point value must be roun ded down to the nearest whole number). But
the calculation error does not change the pres umptive range of the applicable sentence—
92 to 129 months. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4 (Supp. 2013).

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4(b) (2012); see also Anderson v. State , 794 N.W.2d 137, 140–41 (Minn. App. 2011)
(explaining that the specific pr ovisions of the identity-theft st atute, which do not require
proof of loss, control over the general restitution procedures, which require proof of loss),
review denied (Minn. Apr. 27, 2011).
Knowles challenges his court-ordered restitution to pay each victim $1,000, except
the deceased victim, arguing that the restitution mandated by Minn. Stat. § 609.527. subd.
4(b), violates his procedural and substantive ri ghts to due process, and that the restitution
award constitutes an unconstitutional fine. We disagree. “Minnesota statutes are presumed
constitutional, and our power to declare a statute unconstitutional should be exercised with
extreme caution and only wh en absolutely necessary.” In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363,
364 (Minn. 1989). The party challenging constitutionality bears the burden to demonstrate
that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Craig, 826 N.W.2d
789, 791 (Minn. 2013).
Knowles did not make any c onstitutional arguments at his restitution hearing on
February 1, 2017. Having rais ed no constitutional issues rega rding the restitution statute
before the district court, Knowles cannot ra ise the issues for the first time on appeal. See
Roby v. State, 463 N.W.2d 506, 508 (Minn. 1990) (“[Appellate courts] do not decide issues
which are not first addressed by the [district] court and are raised for the first time on appeal
even if the issues involve constitutional questions regard ing criminal procedure.”
(quotation omitted)).
Moreover, this court recently rejected the constitutional challenges asserted by
Knowles as to mandatory minimum restitution. See State v. Rey, 890 N.W.2d 135, 139–42

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(Minn. App. 2017) (“We do not believe the legislature inte nded identity-theft victims to
incur actual pecuniary loss as a prere quisite to claiming restitution.”), review granted
(Minn. Mar. 28, 2017). In Rey, this court also concluded that “because Rey is not entitled
to a jury trial to determine the underlying facts that form the basis for the amount of
restitution, the restitution ordered is not an unconstitutional fine.” Id. at 142; see also State
v. Maxwell, 802 N.W.2d 849, 851 −52 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Oct. 26,
2011). And in Moua, this court rejected the argument that the mandatory restitution statute
violated an appellant’s procedural due-process rights. 874 N.W.2d at 815–16.
Ability to Pay
Knowles argues that the district court did not consider his ability to pay restitution
before ordering the mandatory minimum rest itution. In determining whether to order
restitution and the amount of restitution, the court shall consider the defendant’s ability to
pay. Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a)(2) (2 012). But “[t]here is no strict requirement
regarding how the district court should address the issue.” State v. Miller, 842 N.W.2d 474,
479 (Minn. App. 2014) (emphasis omitted), review denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 2014). The
district court is not required to issue specific findings on the defendant’s ability to pay. Id.
If a PSI is prepared under Minn. Stat. § 609. 115, subd. 1, it must contain information
pertaining to the defendant’s ability to pay. Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 2 (2012). The
district court has broad discretion to award restitution, which this court reviews for an abuse
of discretion. Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d at 671.
In this case, the PSI contains informati on about Knowles’s income, resources, and
obligations. It summarizes Knowles’s prev ious education, consisting of a GED and

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culinary certification, and re ports that Knowles had maintained consistent employment,
including during periods of incarceration. The PSI also states that Knowles had a debt of
$30 from a cellphone bill and had applied for food and medical assistance.
The district court reduced Knowles’s fi nes and fees to $50 before ordering
restitution in the amount of $11, 000. This court has recognized that “[t]he district court
judge’s imposition of a minimum fine of $5 0 acknowledges that [the defendant] is
indigent,” and that “[t]his fact demonstrates that the district court judge properly considered
his ability to pay.” Rey, 890 N.W.2d at 142 n.6.
And even when an appellant may not be able to pay the restitution amount,
Minnesota courts have up held restitution orders. See, e.g., State v. Lindsey , 632 N.W.2d
652, 663−64 (Minn. 2001) (explaining that district court considered defendant’s ability to
pay when it ordered restitution to be paid from prison earnings); State v. Tenerelli , 583
N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. App. 1998) (“Since the statute is not explicit as to how the court must
consider the appellant’s ability to pay, the court’s reference to the appellant’s [prison]
earnings as the source of restitution payments shows that the court did in fact consider
appellant’s payment capabilities.”), aff’d as modified, 598 N.W.2d 668 (Minn. 1999); State
v. Maidi, 520 N.W.2d 414, 419 (Minn. App. 1994) (“[A]lthough it is possible that appellant
may not be able to pay the entire restitution award, the court was also required to consider
[the victim’s] economic losses.”), aff’d, 537 N.W.2d 280 (Minn. 1995).
Because the record reflects that the district court cons idered Knowles’s ability to
pay restitution, the court did not abuse its discretion.

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Pro Se Arguments
Knowles also challenges his conviction and sentence in pro se arguments. Knowles
argues that Ramsey County l acked jurisdiction over him and that the district court
miscalculated his criminal-history points beca use his out-of-state convictions occurred in
the same course of conduct.
A “pro se defendant will be held to the standard of an a ttorney in presenting his
appeal.” State v. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d 368, 372 (Minn. 1988), superseded by rule on other
grounds, Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 5, as recognized in Black v. State , 560 N.W.2d
83, 86 (Minn. 1997). Knowles’s pro se brief includes neither arguments in support of his
position nor citations to legal authority. The supreme court has said:
General allegations of error, w ithout detailing specific factual
or legal errors, do not aid our review of the lower court’s
proceedings and consequently, almost never aid an appellant’s
cause. Therefore, we will not consider any claim lacking
supporting argument or authority unless prejudicial error
appears obvious upon inspection of the record.

Nelson, 880 N.W.2d at 859 n.2. Because no such errors ar e obvious here, we will not
consider these arguments.
Affirmed.