In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: J. A. K. and J. M. S., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0021

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
J. A. K. and J. M. S.,
Parents.

Filed May 30, 2017
Affirmed
Toussaint, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-JV-16-879

Patricia A. Zenner, Zenner Law Office, Stillwater, Minnesota (for appellant J.A.K.)

J.M.S., Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Kathryn M. Timm, Assista nt County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Pamela Boyer, Ramsey, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Cleary, Chief Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Toussaint, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
TOUSSAINT, Judge
Appellant-mother J.A.K. used methamphetamine while pregnant, prompting Anoka
County’s involvement with J.A.K. and her daughter, E.M.K. The county later petitioned to

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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terminate J.A.K. ’s parental rights to E.M.K. and presented evidence at trial detailing
J.A.K.’s struggles with substance abuse, domestic violence, mental health, combative
behaviors, and begrudging case-plan compliance. Substantial evidence addressed E.M.K.’s
past traumas, her present and future needs, and J.A.K.’s ability to address those needs. The
district court acknowledged J.A.K. ’s progress and her desire to be reunited with E.M.K.,
but it nonetheless determined that J.A.K. failed to comply with her parental duties, that
reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to E.M.K. ’s out-of-home
placement and the termination petition, and that termination was in E.M.K.’s best interests.
On appeal, J.A.K. argues that the evidence does not support either statutory ground for
termination, that the county failed to provide reasonable efforts toward reunification, and
that termination was not in E.M.K. ’s best interests . We affirm the district court ’s
termination order because clear and convincing evidence established both statutory bases
for termination, the county made reasonable efforts toward reunification , and termination
was in E.M.K.’s best interests.
D E C I S I O N
The district court may terminate parental rights if clear and convincing evidence
establishes: (1) at least one statutory basis for termination; (2) that reasonable efforts were
made to reunite the family or that reasonable efforts were not required ; and (3) that
termination is in the child ’s best interests. See In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P. , 744
N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008) ; Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subds. 1(b), 8 (2016) . We give
“considerable deference” to the district court ’s termination decision. S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d
at 385. But we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. In re Children of

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T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660 (Minn. 2008) . J.A.K. argues that ( 1) there was insufficient
evidence to establish either statutory ground for termination; (2) the county did not provide
reasonable efforts toward reunification; and ( 3) termination was not in E.M.K. ’s best
interests.
I.
J.A.K. challenges the district court ’s determination that clear and convincing
evidence supported two statutory grounds for termination. The district court may only
terminate parental rights if clear and convincing evidence establishes at least one statutory
ground for termination. See S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385; see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b). We “closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether
it was clear and convincing.” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385; see also In re Children of J.R.B.,
805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 201 1) (stating that district court’s determination of
whether a statutory basis for termination is present is reviewed for an abuse of discretion,
while “underlying or basic facts” supporting statutory basis for termination are reviewed
for clear error), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). J.A.K. challenges specific components
of the district court ’s determinations on both statutory bases. Because there is significant
factual overlap and similarities, we will address her arguments in the context of both
termination grounds.
The district court first determined that J.A.K. failed to comply with her parental
duties. The district court may terminate parental rights if it finds that
the parent has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly
refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon
that parent by the parent and child relationship, including but

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not limited to providing the child with necessary food,
clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control
necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health
and development, if the parent is physically and financially
able, and either reasonable efforts by the social services agency
have failed to correct the conditions that formed the basis of
the petition or reasonable efforts would be futile and therefore
unreasonable[.]

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). The district court must determine that the parent is
not presently able and willing to assume her responsibilities and that the condition s
requiring termination will continue for the reasonably foreseeable future. See In re Welfare
of J.K., 374 N.W.2d 463, 466–67 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 1985).
The district court also determined that reasonable efforts failed to correct the
conditions leading to E.M.K.’s placement. The district court may terminate parental rights
if clear and convincing evidence establishes that “following the child ’s placement out of
the home, reasonable efforts , under the direction of the court, have failed to correct the
conditions leading to the child’s placement.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). As is
relevant here, a presumption that reasonable efforts have failed arises upon a showing that:
(i) the child resides outside the parental home for a total of 12 of the preceding 22 months;
(ii) the court approved and filed a section 260C.212 out -of-home placement plan;
(iii) conditions leading to the out -of-home placement have not been corrected; a nd
(iv) reasonable efforts have been made to rehabilitate the parents and reunite the family.
Id. “It is presumed that conditions leading to a child ’s out-of-home placement have not
been corrected upon a showing that the parent or parents have not substan tially complied
with the court’s orders and a reasonable case plan.” Id.

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We turn to J.A.K.’s specific arguments.
Present Conditions
The district court expressed “substantial concerns” over J.A.K.’s continued sobriety
at the time of trial. J.A.K. argues that the district court gave undue weight to old evidence
of her methamphetamine addiction . In termination proceedings, the district court should
focus on circumstances at the time of trial. See In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 893
(Minn. 1996) ( “When considering termination of parental rights, the court relies not
primarily on past history, but to a great extent upon the projected permanency of the
parent’s inability to care for his or her child.” (quotations omitted)).
J.A.K. emphasizes that she was sober for several months leading up to the trial, that
she was a leader for her addiction -recovery group, and that she was residing with her
sponsor. But her limited emphasis ignores the context of the district court ’s “substantial
concern” over her continu ed sobriety. It did not focus solely on J.A.K. ’s history of
methamphetamine abuse. It heard testimony that J.A.K. had been most stable during her
pregnancies, and it knew that at the time of trial, J.A.K. was pregnant again. J.A.K. ’s
sobriety did not go unrecognized, but the prevailing concern was that “there are additional
dangerous and deep -[seated] problems that [J.A.K.] has been unable to overcome, ” and
that J.A.K. “still lacks the introspection needed to facilitate meaningful change. ” The
district cour t did not improperly rely on old evidence; it contextualized J.A.K. ’s
circumstances at the time of trial, linking concerns about J.A.K. ’s sobriety to overarching
problems with J.A.K.’s ability to parent E.M.K.

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Case Plan Compliance
The district court found that J.A.K. failed to follow components of her case plan,
including Dialectical Behavioral Therapy (DBT), aftercare, and parenting class. J.A.K.
challenges the district court ’s finding addressing DBT. S he emphasizes that she was
waitlisted for DBT programming on July 19, 2016 , which she apparently construes as
contradicting the district court ’s determination that she had failed to participate in DBT
programming. But the record and J.A.K. ’s trial testimony establish that J.A.K. chose to
terminate an earlier DBT diagnostic assessment. J.A.K. ignores that she frustrated the
process through noncompliance. We cannot say that the finding is clearly erroneous. And
J.A.K. does not challenge the district court’s findings that she failed to complete aftercare
or parenting classes as ordered.
J.A.K. also emphasizes that the district court found that she successfully, although
begrudgingly, completed “the important aspects ” of her case plan. And relying on her
sobriety at the time of trial, she a rgues that she corrected the central condition leading to
E.M.K.’s placement: drug abuse. But her argument overlooks the purpose of compliance:
improvement. We have said “there is no presumption that completion of a case plan
necessarily equates with a cor rection of the conditions that led to the out -of-home
placement.” In re Welfare of Children of K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d 656, 667 (Minn. App. 2012).
And as we have explained,
A parent’s substantial compliance with a case plan may
not be enough to avoid termination of parental rights when the
record contains clear and convincing evidence supporting
termination. The critical issue is not whether the parent
formally complied with the case plan, but rather whether the

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parent is presently able to assume the responsibilities of caring
for the child.

In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 89 (Minn. App. 2012).
J.A.K. did complete a substantial portion of her case plan. But J.A.K. ’s past
substance abuse was not the only reason for termination: J.A.K. ’s addiction, her mental
health, the history of domestic abuse, her combative tendencies, and her failure to
understand what was appropriate and necessary for E.M.K. ’s wellbeing were all r elevant
conditions. See In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Minn. App. 2015)
(“Even if the parent eliminates the factual bases that existed at the time of the child’s
removal, if a new factual basis arises after removal, the condition cannot be corrected until
that new factual basis also has been eliminated.”), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2015).
The district court heard testimony that J.A.K. had failed to sufficiently improve and
that she was merely “checking boxes” in her case plan. J .A.K. downplayed the effects of
domestic abuse and substance abuse on E.M.K. ’s wellbeing. She insisted that E.M.K. ’s
trauma was attributable to their separation. She failed to recognize certain problems and to
develop insight into E.M.K.’s needs. J.A.K. was frequently combative and aggressive with
parties involved in her case. There were continuing patterns of emotional dysregulation.
The district court found, “Despite the best efforts of the Court and County this case
is far from reunification, even if the re was full compliance. [J.A.K.] has worked to check
boxes on her case plan, but she has not internalized the lessons to be found there. She has
put in a lot of time but made very limited progress.” We conclude that the evidence supports

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the district court’s findings of the underlying facts on these points and its conclusion that
J.A.K.’s compliance was insufficient to preclude termination.
Housing
J.A.K. challenges the district court ’s finding that she had not secure d housing for
herself or E.M.K. She claims that her ineligibility for a two -bedroom apartment stemmed
from the county’s failure to recommend a transition to in-home supervision of her daughter;
she was not eligible for the housing she sought unless E.M.K. resided with her for “at least
half time.” J.A.K. argues that the district court erroneously ignored the fact that it could
have authorized E.M.K. ’s in-home transition “knowing it would allow J.A.K. to secure
suitable and safe housing for herself and her child.”
J.A.K. was approved for a two-bedroom apartment in March 2016, subject to the
condition that “there would need to be a 2 -person household, e.g. mother and child. ” But
the record also informs us that in October 2016, much closer to trial, J.A.K. moved out of
her apartment and moved in with her sponsor. But even ignoring J.A.K. ’s choice to move
in with her sponsor , her argument that the county and district court prevented her from
securing housing is circular; it would have required the district court to return E.M.K. to
J.A.K. to fulfill a condition relevant to determining whether E.M.K. should be returned to
J.A.K. The argument is unpersuasive.
Domestic Abuse
The district court concluded that J.A.K. had “failed to correct the domestic abuse at
the heart of this case.” J.A.K. and J.M.S., E.M.K.’s father, had a long history of domestic
abuse. J.M.S. violently abused J.A.K. on several occasions, including while J.A.K. was

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working her case plan. E.M.K. witnessed and became involved in some of these abuses,
contributing to her post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). And testimony established that
J.A.K. failed to recognize the significance of the domestic abuse on E.M.K. and often
attempted to shift the focus to E.M.K.’s separation from J.A.K. to explain E.M.K.’s trauma.
J.A.K. emphasizes that she compl eted domestic -abuse programming and implies
that this contradicts the district court’s conclusion. It is true that J.A.K. received certificates
of completion for domestic-abuse programming, but the district court’s prevailing concern
was that J.A.K. repeatedly sought contact with J.M.S. The record establishes that J.A.K.
arranged for J.M.S. to see E.M.K. at a park despite a court order prohibiting the contact,
repeatedly sought out J.M.S. and was violently abused on several occasions, and on the
day of trial, objected to the default termination of J.M.S. ’s parental rights because she
believed that J.M.S. could still support E.M.K.
Although J.A.K. “checked the boxes ” concerning t he domestic -abuse issue, the
record supports the district court ’s conclusion that J.A.K. failed to correct the domestic -
abuse issue. And J.A.K.’s continuing involvement with J.M.S., and her persisting belief
that he could support E.M.K., support the district court’s conclusion that “[t]ermination is
necessary to ensure that [J.A.K.] does not allow contact between [E.M.K.] and [J.M.S.]
The Child’s mental, physical, and emotional safety necessitates the termination.”
Conclusion
We are unpersuaded by J.A.K. ’s arguments addressing specific components of the
district court’s statutory determinations. There is sufficient clear and convincing evidence
supporting the district court ’s findings of fact underlying its determinations that J.A .K.

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failed to comply with her parental duty to provide for E.M.K. ’s physica l, mental, and
emotional health, and that reasonable efforts to correct the underlying conditions either
failed or proved futile. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by invoking
these statutory bases to terminate J.A.K.’s parental rights. J.A.K. lacked the insight and
understanding necessary to care for E.M.K., she downplayed her role in contributing to
E.M.K.’s trauma, she remained combative and aggressive throughout the proceedings, she
did not have suitable housing at the time of trial, and she persisted in her belief that J.M.S.
could be a father to E.M.K. We have carefully reviewed the record , and despite J.A.K.’s
urging, we affirm the district court’s determinations on both statutory bases for termination.
We turn to J.A.K.’s reasonable-efforts and best-interests arguments.
II.
The district court concluded that the “services provided to [J.A.K.] have been
reasonable and future efforts would be futile. ” J.A.K. argues that the county failed to
provide reasonable efforts toward reunification. In any proceeding under section 260C.301,
the district court must find either:
(1) that reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency
plan to reunify the child and the parent were made including
individualized and explicit findings regarding the nature and
extent of efforts made by the social services agency to
rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family; or
(2) that reasonable efforts for reunification are not
required as provided under section 260.012.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8 ; see also Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2016) ( “Reasonable
efforts to prevent placement and for rehabilitation and reunification are always
required . . . . ”). When the district court con siders whether reasonable efforts have been

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made, it must consider whether the efforts were: “(1) relevant to the safety and protection
of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family; (3) culturally
appropriate; (4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under
the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2016).
J.A.K. attributes her January 2016 relapse in part to the unanticipated emotional
effects of the adoption of her son, who was born in May 2015. The significance of this, she
argues, is that her social worker failed to recommend any supportive services focusing on
the emotional impact of the adoption. She characterizes that failure as unreasonable. She
urges us to remand her case to the district c ourt with instructions that reasonable efforts,
presumably programming focusing on post -adoption emotional impact, be ordered with a
transition plan returning E.M.K. to her care.
We are unpersuaded. As the county emphasizes, J.A.K. was offered extensive
services aimed at addressing mental health, chemical dependency, and domestic abuse. The
failure to offer one service specific to the emotional impact of the adoption does not render
the county’s efforts unreasonable. The county offered comprehensive services comporting
with the considerations of section 260.012(h) . We see no error in the district court ’s
determination that the county made reasonable efforts toward reunification.
III.
J.A.K. challenges the district court’s determination that termination was in E.M.K.’s
best interests. The district court must also determine that termination is in the child ’s best
interests before terminating parental rights . See In re Welfare of Children of R.W. , 678
N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004). “In analyzing the best interest s of the child, the court must

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balance three factors: (1) the child ’s interest in preserving the parent -child relationship;
(2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing
interest of the child.” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992); see also
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.05, subd. 3(b)(3). “[T]he best interests of the child must be the
paramount consideration,” and if the child ’s interests and parent ’s interests conflict, the
child’s interests take priority. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2016). “We review a district
court’s ultimate determination that termination is in a child ’s best interest for an abuse of
discretion.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905.
The district court received a substantial a mount of evidence addressing E.M.K. ’s
best interests. It learned that E.M.K. had been involved in and witnessed domestic abuse
and drug abuse. It knew that E.M.K. was diagnosed with PTSD that manifested in troubling
behaviors. It heard how E.M.K. had grown comfortable with her foster parents, her aunt
and uncle, and reviewed allegations that contact with J.A.K. was disruptive to E.M.K. ’s
progress in recovery . And it considered testimony detailing E.M.K. ’s need for stability,
permanency, safety, comfort, and support. Significantly, testimony and record documents
addressed J.A.K.’s inability to recognize and provide for those needs.
The district court did not discount J.A.K. ’s interest in maintaining the parent -child
relationship; it recognized J.A.K.’s love for E.M.K. and her determination to have E.M.K.
returned to her care. (“Mother loves the Child. Mother’s love of the Child has never once
been called into question.”) Nonetheless, the district court did determine that “at this time,
and in the reasonable future, she is unable to provide a safe, calm, understanding,

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therapeutic environment necessary for [E.M.K.] It is in [E.M.K.’s] best interest that she not
be reunited with [J.A.K.]”
J.A.K. argues that the evidence established that deregulating behaviors surrounding
E.M.K.’s PTSD were linked to J.M.S., not J.A.K. She details a history of visitation
characterized by benign interactions and no notable problems. She also emphasizes
E.M.K.’s troubled behavior in her foster pl acement, apparently inferring that E.M.K. ’s
problems were the result of the foster placement.
J.A.K. directs us to visitation notes describing her interactions with E.M.K. as
evidence that E.M.K. was not fearful of her. She focuses on an April 28, 2016 report to the
district court. E.M.K. ’s foster parent apparently reported that , on March 30 , J.A.K. took
E.M.K. and that E.M.K. started screaming until she was set down, then ran back to the
foster parent. The foster parent reported further maladaptive behavi ors after the visit.
J.A.K. is correct that the corresponding visitation notes indicate that the closest visitation
date was March 28, 2016, and that no notes exist proving a visitation date of March 30,
2016. The relevant entry appears as follows in the report to the district court:
3/30/16: Kinship Foster Parent 1 reported to ACSS that at the
ECFE visit on 3/30/16, [E.M.K.] did not want to go inside . . . .

It is not clear whether the information relayed is “patently false,” as J.A.K. claims, or if the
date of the reported visit and entry were merely incorrect. J.A.K. suggests that the disparity
between the foster parent’s statements and J.A.K.’s characterizations of good visits “should
have given both the social worker and t he court a reason to question the veracity of the
foster care provider.” She asks, “If the child was behaving badly only in the foster home,

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why wasn’t it assumed that it was due to the child wanting to be with her mother, rather
than the foster care providers[?]”
J.A.K. urges us to “carefully review” the record to understand that E.M.K. “was not
distressed when she was with her mother. ” She claims that she exhibited a positive
relationship with E.M.K. and that “the evidence presented at trial give[s] this Court valid
reasons to determine that the district court failed to fully examine the best interests of the
child.” The county emphasizes that E.M.K. functioned poorly while in J.A.K. ’s care and
that her behaviors regressed when visiting J.A.K. It asserts that “J.A.K. demonstrated by
her actions that she was not capable of putting E.M.K.’s needs before her own.”
We have carefully reviewed the record, and we decline J.A.K.’s invitation to reverse
because the district court ’s best-interests determination finds ample independent support
in the record. The district court weighed J.A.K.’s interest in maintaining the parent -child
relationship against conditions preventing her from providing E.M.K. with the care E.M.K.
required. It considered that E.M.K.’s foster placement provided her with the type of stable
and comforting environment she needed. And it appropriately consider ed E.M.K.’s best
interests as paramount. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
termination was in E.M.K.’s best interests.
Affirmed.