In re the Matter of: Peter H. Stier, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0024

In re the Matter of:
Peter H. Stier, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Debra A. Peterson, n/k/a Debra A. Hershberger,
Respondent,

County of Mower, intervenor,
Respondent.

Filed September 18, 2017
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Mower County District Court
File No. 50-FA-08-1204

Amber Lawrence, Dittrich & Lawrence, PA, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

Craig M. Byram, Hoversten, Johnson, Beckmann & Hovey, LLP, Austin, Minnesota (for
respondent Debra A. Peterson, n/k/a Debra A. Hershberger)

Kristen Nelse n, Mower County Attorney, Megan A. Burr oughs, Assistant County
Attorney, Austin, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order, arguing that it was error to
(1) attribute his corporation’s retained income to him for calculati on of child support and
(2) require him to provide and pay for the full cost of medical and dental coverage for the
dependent children. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Peter H. Stier and respondent Debra A. Peterson , n/k/a Debra A.
Hershberger have two minor children, one of whom has special needs. In 2011, they
stipulated that Stier would pay $1,167 per month in child support, $201 per month toward
the children’s medical assistance,1 and 80% of the children’s uninsured medical and dental
expenses. In May 2016, the county moved to modify Stier’s child support under Minn.
Stat. §§ 518A.34, .39, .41 (201 6). The child-support magistrate (CSM) held a hearing on
the motion and instructed Stier to provide supplemental information. After Stier submitted
additional documents, the CSM closed the record.
In an order dated August 23, 2016, the CSM granted the county’s motion. The CSM
found that Stier is the sole owner of Stier Steel Corporation and that Stier Steel paid Stier
an annual salary of $49,250 from 2013 to 2015 but that the total gross profits of Stier Steel
were $221,259 in 2013, $306,386 in 2014, and $265,994 in 2015. The CSM did not find
Stier credible in his assertion that Stier Steel retained most of those earnings for future

1 Respondent Mower County provides IV -D services to Hershberger, who has primary
physical custody of the children.

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business expenses, noting that Stier had used retained earnings for an oil investment that
was unrelated to the business. Using the formula from Minn. Stat. § 518A.30 (201 6), the
CSM determined that Stier’s avera ge gross monthly income from 2013 to 2015 was
$21,379 and ordered Stier to pay $2,280 per month in child support . In addition, n oting
that Stier has medical and dental insurance for himself that is paid through Stier Steel, the
CSM ordered Stier to obtain and maintain dependent medical and dental coverage for the
minor children. The CSM found that a medical offset for Stier was not appropriate given
“the significant disparity in [Stie r’s] and [ Hershberger’s] income.” With respect to any
unreimbursed and/ or uninsured medical expenses, the CSM stated that Stier was
responsible for 95% and Hershberger responsible for 5% of the expenses.
Stier moved the district court to review the CSM’s order. The district court denied
Stier’s motion for review and affirmed the CSM’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
order in its entirety. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I.
Stier contends that the district court incorrectly calculated his gross income for
child-support purposes because it included profits that Stier Steel retained. As this court
has noted:
On appeal from an order deciding a motion for review, this
court reviews the order from which the appeal is taken . . . and,
to the extent the reviewer of the CSM’s original decision
affirms the CSM’s original decision, that original decision
becomes the decision of the reviewer. See Minn. R. Gen. Pract.
378.01 (noting review may be taken from final ruling of CSM
“or” order deciding motion for review).

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Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick , 673 N.W.2d 528, 530 n.2 (Minn. Ap p. 2004) (emphasis added).
We review a district court ’s order modifying child support for an abuse of discretion. 2
Haefele v. Haefele , 837 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2013). “A district court abuses its
discretion when it establishes a child -support obligation in a manner that is against logic
and the facts in the record or when it misapplies the law.” Hubbard Cty. Health & Human
Servs. v. Zacher, 742 N.W.2d 223, 226 (Minn. App. 2007).
The first step of the presumptive child -support formula is to calculat e the gross
income of the parties. Minn. Stat. § 518A.34(b)(1). Gross income includes self -
employment income. Minn. St at. § 518A.29(a) (2016). The statute defines self -
employment income as “gross receipts minus costs of goods sold minus ordinary and
necessary expenses required for self -employment or business operation.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.30. This definition “does not turn on whether the corporation has ‘distributed’ the
funds, or whether the funds are ‘available’ to the parent.” Haefele, 837 N.W.2d at 712.
The district court may depart from this presumption “based on the unavailability of
money included in gross income, or based on other facts or considerations that suggest that

2 Stier frames this issue as one of statutory interpretation of the term “gross income” and
argues that the correct standard of review is de novo. But he does not argue interpretation
of the statute, only that Stier Steel’s retained income should not affect Stier’s gross income
because the undistributed earnings are retained for legitimate business reasons. Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.30 leaves this determination to the district court’s discretion, and thus it is not a
matter of statutory interpretation. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.30 (stating that income from
self-employment “is defined as gross receipts minus costs of goods sold minus ordinary
and necessary expenses required for self -employment or business operation,” and that the
district court may exclude from ordinary and necessary expenses “any other business
expenses determined by the court to be inappropriate or excessive for determining gross
income for purposes of calculating child support”).

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the guidelines do not accurately represent the amount of the child -support obligation for
which a parent should be responsible.” Id. at 714. But “[t]he person seeking to deduct an
expense, including depreciation, has the burden of proving, if challenged, that the expense
is ordinary and necessary.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.30; see also Bunge v. Zachman , 578
N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. App. 1998) (“There is a presumption that the guidelines will be
followed when determining child support; and a party who requests departure from the
guidelines should provide evidence that would merit a deviation.”), review denied (Minn.
July 30, 1998). The district court may also exclude from ordinary and necessary expenses
“any other business expenses determined by the court to be inappropriate or excessive for
determining gross income for purposes of calculatin g child support.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.30.
At the hearing on the county’s motion for child -support modification, Stier
presented evidence regarding Stier Steel’s retained earnings. Stier alleged that the retained
earnings were for legitimate business expenses and later supplemented the record with his
affidavit, a letter from a CPA who had prepared Stier Steel’s tax returns for several years,
copies of his tax returns, and a list of his business expenses. But the CSM determined that
Stier was not credib le in his assertions , in part because he “utilized the retained earnings
for [a $71,842 oil investment] that was wholly unrelated to the business expenses.” The
CSM also noted that Stier Steel functioned “without the benefit of retained earnings
without mishap for prior years.” On this record, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it included Stier Steel’s retained profits in Stier’s gross income.
Haefele, 837 N.W.2d at 713.

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II.

Stier argues that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to make any
findings addressing whether his health -care insurance through his company was
“appropriate” for the children under Minn. Stat. § 518A.41, subd. 3 , and that the record
lacks any evidence that would allow findings addressing the statutory factors. On this
point, Hershberger and the county note that the CSM requested the necessary information
from Stier, but he failed to provide it. As a result, respondents argue that Stier should not
benefit from his failure to provide the CSM with essential information. Stier also
challenges the district court’s decision to allocate 100% of the cost of the coverage to him.
A. Findings
We review a district court ’s decision regarding medical support for an abuse of
discretion. Casper v. Casper , 593 N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. App. 1999). In assessing
“whether a parent has appropriate health care coverage” for joint children, a district court
must consider the comprehensiveness of the health -care coverage, its accessibili ty, any
special needs of the children, and its affordability. Minn. Stat. § 518A.41, subd. 3. To
allow the district court to do so, the parties must provide “information relating to dependent
health care coverage or public coverage available for the benefit of the joint child for whom
support is sought, including all information required to be included in a medical s upport
order under this section.” Id., subd. 13(1).
In this case, the county had been providing the children with medical assistance due
to the fact that they resided primarily with Hershberger. At the hearing, however, Stier
conceded that Stier Steel provided him with medical coverage and stated that he believed

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that the company provided medical coverage to its employees as well. As a r esult, the
CSM directed Stier to provide the relevant company insurance information. After Stier
failed to do so , the CSM found that “[Stier] has coverage that is paid through his
corporation” but that it was “ unclear” both whether that coverage included the joint
children and whether any coverage for the children was “in place.” The CSM then ruled
that if no coverage for the children was in place, Stier should obtain coverage for the
children through his business. The district court adopted these rulings.
Generally, when addressing a basic support obligation, a district court must make
written findings as to each parent’s gross income, each parent’s parental income for
determining child support (PICS), and any other significant evidentiary factors affecting
the determination. Minn. Stat. § 518A.37, subd. 1 (2016) . While Minn. Stat. § 518A.41,
subd. 3, does not explicitly require a district court to make written findings on the medical-
support factors, caselaw suggests that, usually, findings regarding those factors may be
required. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 311 Minn. 76, 82, 249 N.W.2d 168, 171 (1976)
(stating, in a custody dispute , that findings on the statutory factors are required because
they “(1) assure consideration of the statutory factors by the family court; (2) facilitate
appellate review of the family court’s custody decision; and (3) satisfy the parties that this
important decision was carefully and fairly considered by the family court ”); Hesse, 778
N.W.2d at 104 (citing this aspect of Rosenfeld in a child-support dispute). But we decline
to use the lack of findings on the statutory factors as a basis to reverse the district court in
this instance.

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First, on appeal, “a party cannot complain about a district court’s failure to rule in
[his] favor when one of the reasons it did not do so is because that party failed to provide
the district court with the evidence that would allow the district court to fully address the
question.” Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk, 668 N.W.2d 235, 243 (Minn. App. 2003), review
denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2003) . Stier refused to produce the insurance i nformation
requested by the CSM. Even if caselaw is read to require findings on the statutory factors
in the typical case , Stier’s conduct in this case precludes him from complaining about a
lack of findings.
Second, and more fundamentally, because Stier refused to provide the relevant
information, the record lacks the evidence on which the district c ourt could make the
missing findings. Stier is functionally arguing that the district court erred by not
speculating about medical insurance. We will not reverse the district court because it
declined to speculate. See, e.g., Grigsby v. Grigsby , 648 N.W.2d 716, 727 (Minn. App.
2002) (affirming a district court’s refusal to “speculate” about certain tax consequence s,
stating that the refusal to do so was “ proper[]”), review denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2002); see
also Taflin v. Taflin, 366 N.W.2d 315, 319 (Minn. App. 1985) (stating, in a child -support
dispute, that “[t]his court will not engage in speculation and the father will not be heard to
complain when he has failed to provide this court with a reviewable record”).
For similar reasons, we will not r everse the district court’s requirement that Stier
provide medical-insurance coverage for the children . Specifically, Stier’s refusal to
provide the insurance information sought by the CSM justifies an inference adverse to him
on the issue. See, e.g., Butt v. Schmidt, 747 N.W.2d 566, 576 (Minn. 2008) ( noting, in a

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child-support dispute, that “we have stated that if a party is in exclusive possession of
evidence and that party fails to produce the evidence, an unfavorable inference may be
drawn about that party as to the relevant issue”); Bollenbach v. Bollenbach, 285 Minn. 418,
428, 175 N.W.2d 148, 155 (1970) (stating that in dissolution proceedings, parties “must
make a full and accurate disclosure of their assets and liabilities ” and failure to do so
“justifies inferences adverse to the party who conceals or evades”); Zaldivar v. Rodriguez,
819 N.W.2d 187, 197 (Minn. App. 2012) (allowing an adverse inference to be drawn in a
contempt matter arising out of child -support dispute) , review denied (Minn. Sept. 25,
2012). Therefore, on this record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it ordered Stier to obtain and maintain medical coverage for the children.
B. Cost
Stier challenges the requirement that he pay for all of the children’s medical
coverage. The crux of Stier’s argument is that, under the relevant part of Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.41, subd. 5(a), a court “mus t” apportion the cost of health -care coverage between
the parties “based on their proportionate share of the parties’ combined monthly PICS, ”
and that “must” is st atutorily defined as “mandatory. ” Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15a
(2016). We reject Stier’s argument as it applies to this case.
By statute, “[t]o determine the presumptive child support obligation of a parent, the
court shall follow the procedure set forth in [Minn. Stat. § 518A.34.]” Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.34(a). Under Minn. Stat. § 518A.34, calculating “the presumptive child support
obligation” requires the court to ca lculate the parents’ basic, ch ild care, and “medical
support” obligation s. Minn. Stat. § 518A.34(b)-(e). “Medical support” is defined, in

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relevant part, as “providing health care coverage for a joint child.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.41,
subd. 1(d). Once t he various figures are calculated, “[t] he court shall determine each
parent’s total child support obligation by adding together each parent’s basic support, child
care support, and health care coverage obligations . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 518A.34(f).
After adding these figures, the district court may elect to deviate from “the
presumptive child support obligation computed under section 518A.34.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.43, subd. 1 (2016); see Minn. Stat. § 518A.37, subds. 1, 2 (2016) ( using the same
“presumptive child support obligati on computed under section 518A.34 ” language to
address findings necessary to make a support award). Thus, the figure from which a district
court can deviate is the sum of amounts including the cost of health -care coverage—not
any particular component of that sum. For this reason, Stier’s argument base d solely on
the medical-support provisions both misapprehends the figure from which the district court
may deviate and reads those medical-support provisions without the greater context of the
overall child-support scheme.
Further, as a result of Stier’s failure to provide the CSM with information
concerning the cost, if any, of medical insurance to Stier Steel employees, it is unknown
whether there is a cost to an individual for single or family coverage. Gi ven the lack of
evidence regarding whether there are, in fact, any costs to even apportion, as well as the
significant disparity in the parties’ incomes , any error in not apportioning th ose possible
costs is de minimis. And de miminis errors regarding chi ld support are insufficient to
compel a remand. See, e.g., Hesse, 778 N.W.2d at 105; Duffney v. Duffney, 625 N.W.2d
839, 843 (Minn. App. 2001) ; Wibbens v. Wibbens , 379 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Minn. App.

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1985); see also Risk ex rel. Miller v. Stark , 787 N.W.2d 690, 694 n.1 (Minn. App. 2010)
(refusing to remand for de minimis error in property division), review denied (Minn. Nov.
16, 2010).
Affirmed.