State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0031

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Joveda Marie Edwards,
Appellant.

Filed December 11, 2017
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-15-3988

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Nicholas M. Jannakos, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
PETERSON, Judge
Appellant challenges her gross-misdemeanor conviction of neglect of a child,
arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. We affirm.

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FACTS
D.W. was born on July 20, 2014, to a 15-year-old developmentally disabled mother,
who was also an untreated sex offender. Hennepin County assigned a social worker and
appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for the child.
The social worker, the child’s doctor, and the child’s daycare provider had concerns
about the mother’s ability to safely care for the child , and D.W. was removed from his
mother’s home and placed first at a shelter and later at a nonrelative foster home. In
November 2014, the child was placed with appellant Joveda Marie Edwards , a cousin of
the child’s grandmother.
Between his removal from his mother’s home and his placement with appellant, the
child had some minor illnesses, but, at a checkup on October 9, 2014, the child’s weight
was within normal range for a child of his age. At a second visit on October 23, 2014, the
child had lost four ounces of weight, but the nurse practitioner believed that was due to his
respiratory illness. The GAL visited the child in the nonrelative foster home and stated
that he was “doing very well . . . [h]e was very loved a nd well taken care of there.” She
said “he appeared to be a healthy, content ba by who was starting to explore his
surroundings.”
During her first visit to appellant’s home after the child was placed there, the social
worker thought that D.W. seemed healthy. Appellant did not interact with the child; he lay
on the floor, or the social worker held him. Appellant told the social worker that the child
“was a very spoiled baby, he wanted to be held all the time,” but the child was “feeding off
a bottle and doing well and eating fine.” The GAL visited the child in appellant’s home in

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November and had no “significant concerns” about the child ’s “physical appearance” at
that visit.
The social worker and the GAL visited appellant’s home in December. The social
worker thought that the child’s legs were “pretty skinny,” but appellant told her that was a
family trait. The child had started to roll over; the social worker thought that he was a little
“fussy” and “wanted to be held,” but appellant did not respond to those cues. Appellant
repeated that D.W. was “a spoiled baby and wanted to be held all the time, . . . and she
didn’t want to spoil him.” Appellant told the social worker that she was feeding the child
formula.
At her December visit, the GAL noted that appellant had “minimal interaction” with
the child, in contrast with the previous foster parent. At this visit, appellant told the GAL
that the child was “a very greedy baby and a spoiled baby and that he had been spoiled by
the previous foster parent.” Appellant said that the baby “wanted constant attention and
she didn’t feel that was good for him”; “he fussed if left alone too much”; and “he wanted
to eat all the time.” Appellant indicated that “he was too greedy and was going to get too
fat.” The GAL testified that appellant said she was giving the baby water. When the GAL
appeared shocked and told appellant that was not right, appellant denied giving him water.
At this visit, the GAL was more concerned about the child because he did not seem to have
grown since the last visit.
The GAL visited a third time on January 2 2, 2015, with the social worker . The
social worker testified that the child was “very, very thin” and “[h]is development had
regressed.” The child could not lift his head or roll over. Appellant told the social worker

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that the child was feeding well and she would have to stop him because he ate all the time.
The social worker thought that the child “looked malnourished” and his face “looked dull
and very dim.” She could feel all of his ribs and vertebrae . When the social worker
questioned appellant about feeding, appellant said that she could tell when t he child was
full because his belly was hard and she could “hear the water sloshing around.” When
questioned about that statement, a ppellant said she “meant milk, not water.” Appellant
said she gave the child bottles of water to satisfy his sucking needs. She had not started
the child on solid food despite being told that it was fine to do so.
When the GAL walked in on January 22, she thought the child “must be very, very
ill,” and for a split second, she thought he was dead. She described the child as “thin,” and
said “his limbs were just flaccid and there was just no reaction in his face.” When she
picked him up, the child “felt like he was hollow like a hollow doll, he was that thin.” She
could feel “every one of his vertebrae ,” and “[h]e was skeletal.” He would not return her
gaze.
At the end of this visit, the GAL and the social worker decided that the child either
had to be seen by a doctor immediately or removed from the home. The social worker
asked appellant to take the child to the doctor, but appellant refused to do so because she
had another commitment that evening and did not want to alter her schedule ; she also
refused to let the social worker take the child. The social worker and her supervisor told
appellant that she had to get medical care for the child or he would be removed from her
home, and appellant said “that was fine.”

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On January 23, the social worker met appellant and the child at a medical clinic, and
appellant gave the child and two trash bags full of his belongings to the social worker. The
child was placed in a new foster home, where he “gained weight,” “started making progress
again developmentally,” and “became more engaged.”
The doctor who examined the child on January 23 testified that appellant told him
that she was concerned because the child was irritable and had trouble sleeping. The child
“appeared very thin,” and his motor strength was not normal. The child ’s weight was
below the zero percentile for his age, or “well below normal.” The doctor considered a
number of things: (1) the child had been within normal weight range, but was now below
normal; (2) the child fit the diagnosis for f ailure to thrive, which means that his physical
growth was abnormal; (3) the failure -to-thrive diagnosis appeared to arise when the child
was under appellant’s care; (4) the child’s newborn metabolic screen was normal; and
(5) the child was not suffering from an illness at the examination. The doctor decided that
“the most likely explanation” for the child’s failure to thrive was “extrinsic factors” or
“inadequate calorie intake.” He wrote that the child did not seem to have a n illness or an
infection, but he was “severely underweight and appeared malnourished.”
Appellant was charged with neglect of a child. T he district court made specific
findings about the child’s condition while under appellant’s care and in foster care. The
court then found that appellant willfully deprived the child of “necessary food and health
care appropriate to the child’s age,” appellant was reasonably able to provide food and
health care, and “the deprivation harmed or was likely to substantially harm the child’s

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physical, mental or emotional health.” Based on these findings, the district court entered a
guilty verdict. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant was convicted for violating Minn. Stat. § 609.378, subd. 1 (a)(1) (2014),
which provides:
A parent, legal guardian, or caretaker who willfully
deprives a child of necessary food, clothing, shelter, health
care, or supervision appropriate to the child ’s age, when the
parent, guardian, or caretaker is reasonably able to make the
necessary provisions and the deprivation harms or is likely to
substantially harm the child ’s physical, mental, or emotional
health is guilty of neglect of a child and may be sentenced to
imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a
fine of not more than $3,000, or both.

Appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence that D.W. lost weight while under
her care but was fine after he was removed from her home “was insufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was feeding the infant water instead of milk
causing failure to thrive. ” But it was not necessary to prove that feeding D.W. water,
instead of milk, caused D.W.’s failure to thrive, and t he district court did not find that
feeding D.W. water, instead of milk, caused the failure to thrive. The district court found
that appellant willfully deprived D.W. of necessary food and, by doing so, harmed or was
likely to substantially harm D.W.’s health.
The district court’s findings of fact included that appellant “talked about giving the
Child bottles filled with water” and “said that she had been giving the Child bottles of water
when the Child was fussy.” The district court also found that the doctor who examined
D.W. on January 23 “gave the Child a diagnosis of Failure to Thrive.” But the district

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court did not find that feeding D.W. water, instead of milk, caused the failure to thrive.
The district court did not even find that appellant fed D.W. water, instead of milk; it simply
found that appellant gave D.W. bottles of water. The district court’s conclusion that
appellant violated Minn. Stat. § 609.378, subd. 1(a)(1), was not based on a determination
that feeding D.W. water, instead of milk, caused the failure to thrive.
Appellant also argues that the state failed to prove why D.W. lost weight. To prove
a violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.378, subd. 1(a)(1), the state needed to show that appellant
willfully deprived D.W. of necessary food that she was reasonably able to provide and that
the deprivation harm ed or is likel y to substantially harm D.W.’s physical, mental, or
emotional health. When considered in light of these elements of the offense, appellant’s
argument appears to be that the state failed to prove that D.W. lost weight because appellant
deprived him of necessary food.
We agree with appellant that there is not sufficient direct evidence to prove that she
deprived D.W. of necessary food. But we conclude that the circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to prove that D.W. lost weight because appellant deprived him of necessary food.
When the direct evidence of guilt on a particular
element is not alone sufficient to sustain the verdict, . . . , we
apply a heightened two -step standard, which we have called
the circumstantial evidence standard of review. In the first
step, we identify the circumstances proved by the State. We
defer at this stage to the jury’s acceptance of the State’s
evidence and its rejection of any evidence in the record that is
inconsistent with the circumstances proved by the State. After
identifying the circumstances proved, we move on to the
second step, which requires us to determine whether the
circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent
with any rational hypothesis other than guilt. We do not defer
to the jury at this stage, but rather we independently examine

8
the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from
the circumstances proved, including inferences consistent with
a hypothesis other than guilt. If a reasonable inference other
than guilt exists, then we will reverse the conviction.

Loving v. State , 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017) (quotations and citations omitted) .
We view the circumstances proved as a whole. State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 598
(Minn. 2017). When determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction,
we review a criminal bench trial the same as a jury trial. State v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393,
396 (Minn. 1998).
Appellant waived her jury-trial rights and was tried by the district court. The district
court made the following relevant findings of fact : (1) while in nonrelative foster care,
there were no issues with the child’s nutrition or weight; (2) when the child was first placed
with appellant, the child appeared to be doing well; (3) at a visit in De cember 2014, the
child appeared to be skinny; the child was on the floor and wanted to be held; appellant
mentioned giving the child bottles of water; (4) at the January 22, 2015 visit, the child was
very thin and the social worker could feel his ribs and individual vertebra e; the child was
weak, could not lift his head, turn over, or grasp the social worker’s finger; (5) the physical
condition of the child was “easily seen” and appellant “should have seen that the [c]hild
was in distress”; (6) appellant told the social worker and the GAL that she gave the child
bottles of water when he was fussy and that she had not started him on soft foods; (7) the
doctor who examined the child on January 23, 2015, said that his weight was “extrem ely
below normal growth,” his motor skills were below normal, nothing during the physical
exam explained “a cause for the zero percentile growth,” the metabolic screen done at birth

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did not raise any concerns, and the child had no infections; (8) the docto r diagnosed the
child with failure to thrive; (9) the doctor opined that diarrhea would not have resu lted in
significant weight loss; (10) when appellant requested a letter from the doctor stating that
he had no concerns about the child , the doctor wrote a letter indicating that the child was
“severely underweight . . . [bu t] had no illness or infection”; and (11) once removed from
appellant’s home, the child “gained weight and his ribs and vertebra e were no longer
prominent,” and he “flourished” in a new foster home.
When viewed as a whole, these circumstances are inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis other than that D.W. lost weight while in appellant’s care beca use appellant
deprived him of necessary food . D.W. was not underweight when he was plac ed in
appellant’s care. Soon after being placed in appellant’s care, D.W. began losing weight,
and, eventually, he became severely underweight. Medical examinations did not identify
an illness or condition that caused D.W. to lose weight. When D.W. was removed from
appellant’s home and placed in a foster home, he gained weight.
Appellant argues that even if D.W. did not eat enough food to maintain his weight,
the evidence was insufficient to prove that she willfully deprived D.W. of necessary food.
In the context of Minn. Stat. § 609.378, subd. 1(a)(1), “willfully” means “conduct that is
negligent, but that is so far from a proper state of mind that it is treated in many respects
as if it were so intended.” State v. Cyrette , 636 N.W.2d 343, 348 (Minn. A pp. 2001)
(quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2002). This standard is higher than
“ordinary civil negligence.” State v. Tice, 686 N.W.2d 351, 355 (Minn. App. 2004), review
denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2004). In Cyrette, this court reasoned that “willfully” means “that

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the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known
or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow”
and that such a state of mind “is usually accompan ied by a conscious indifference to the
consequences.” 636 N.W.2d at 348 (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted).
The district court found that, in December 2014, D.W. appeared to be skinny, and
on January 22, 2015, D.W. was very thin and weak, could not lift his head, turn over, or
grasp the social worker’s finger, and the social worker could feel his ribs and individual
vertebrae. The district court also found that D.W.’s physical condition was “easily seen”
and appellant should have seen that D.W. was in distress. These circumstances are
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than that D.W.’s weight loss was apparent
to anyone who saw him and that appellant was aware of his weight loss. In spite of her
awareness of the weight loss, appellant did not provide D.W. with enough food to stop the
weight loss, and the weight loss continued . Failing to provide enough food to stop the
weight loss was an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of the obvious risk that
D.W.’s weight loss was so gr eat as to make it highly probable that harm would follow .
We, therefore, conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove that appellant willfully
deprived D.W. of necessary food.
Affirmed.