Paul Robert Mix, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0034

Paul Robert Mix, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent

Filed June 19, 2017
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-16-3731

Charles L. Hawkins, Arthur J. Waldon, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Joan M. Eichhorst, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order sustaining the re vocation of his
driver’s license and impoundment of his license plates, arguing that the officer lacked a
specific, articulable suspicion to justify the stop. We affirm.

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FACTS
On July 23, 2016, heavy rain caused a power outage at a busy intersection that
rendered the semaphores non functioning. Police officers, including Sergeant Alanna
Kopel, were stationed at the intersection to control traffic. Around 6:28 p.m., a vehicle
pulled up to Sergeant Kopel and the driver indicated that a “motorcycle had crashed just
south” of her location. Sergeant Kopel did not ask the driver’s name.
Sergeant Kopel drove approximately two bl ocks to the incident location. Sergeant
Kopel observed an SUV on the side of the road with its hazard lights flashing and a woman
standing on the side of the road next to an upright motorcycle. Sergeant Kopel did not see
any other evidence of a crash involving a motorcycle. Sergeant Kopel asked the woman
next to the motorcycle , who was later identified, if she was okay, and the woman stated
that she was. Sergeant Kopel asked where the driver of the motorcycle was, and the woman
pointed in the direction of a man walking away. Sergeant Kopel did not ask the woman if
that particular man was the driver of the motorcycle, but she assumed that he was because
she did not see anyone else in the area.
Sergeant Kopel drove her marked squad car to the man who was walking. Sergeant
Kopel had her vehicle’s emergency lights engaged b ecause she was concerned about
possible injuries sustained as a result of a motorcycle crash. Sergeant Kopel exited her
vehicle, asked the man to stop, and asked him if he was okay and if he needed an
ambulance. The man replied that he was fine. Sergeant Kopel asked for the man’s driver’s
license, which identified him as appellant Paul Robert Mix. Mix had fresh injuries to his
right arm, and his shirt was torn. Mix was wearing safety glasses that had abrasions. Mix’s

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clothes were wet, his eyes were glassy and red when he removed his glasses, he was
unsteady on his feet, and he slurred his speech and emitted a strong odor of alcohol when
he spoke.
Sergeant Kopel asked Mix about the crash. Mix denied driving and told Sergeant
Kopel that he did not kn ow what she was talking about. Sergeant Kopel asked Mix what
street he lived on and he could not te ll her the name of the street. Sergeant Kopel asked
Mix where he was comi ng from and he avoided the question. Mix again told Sergeant
Kopel that he did not know about a crash and started walking away . Sergeant Kopel
believed that Mix was impaired and placed him under arrest for driving while impaired
(DWI). Mix refused to submit to the breath test offered to him.
At an implied-consent hearing, Mix challenged the basis for the stop and legality of
the s eizure. The district court sustained the revocation of Mix’s driver’s license and
impoundment of his license plates. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
This court reviews the district court’s findings supporting an order sustaining a
license revocation for clear error. Jasper v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 642 N.W.2d 435, 440
(Minn. 2002). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if, on the entire evidence, [ the
reviewing court is] left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” State
v. Diede , 795 N.W.2d 836, 846 -47 (Minn. 2011). “[We] defer to the district court’s
credibility determinations and ability to weigh the evidence.” Constans v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety, 835 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Minn. App. 2013). We review de novo questions of law in

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implied-consent proceedings. Harrison v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 781 N.W.2d 918, 920
(Minn. App. 2010).
Mix argues that Sergeant Kopel lacked specific, articulable facts upon which to
seize him.1 When the facts are not significantly in dispute, this court determines as a matter
of law “whether the officer’ s actions amounted to a seizure and if the officer had an
adequate basis for the seizure.” State v. Day, 461 N.W.2d 404, 406 (Minn. App. 1990),
review denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 1990).
Mix argues that he was seized when Sergeant Kopel approached him and directed
him to stop. But not all contacts between police and a citizen constitute a seizure. In re
Welfare of E.D.J. , 502 N.W.2d 779, 78 1 (Minn. 1993). An officer does not seize an
individual when she simply talks to that person standing in a public place. State v.
Vohnoutka, 292 N.W.2d 756, 757 (Minn. 1980). In some situations, police officers need
to ask questions to sort out a situation to determine if anyone should be arrested. State v.
Walsh, 495 N.W.2d 602, 604-05 (Minn. 1993) (stating that “on-the-scene” questioning, in
which an officer is simply trying to sort out a situation, is not an in-custody situation).
A seizure occurs when a reasonable person, in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the incident, “would have believed that because of the conduct of t he police

1 The record shows that Mix was not the driver of the motorcycle. If an individual whose
license has been revoked claims that he was not driving, the commissioner must prove that
he was driving by a preponderance of the evidence. Llona v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 389
N.W.2d 210, 212 (Minn. App. 1986). But only individuals who take and fail a chemical
test may raise this issue. Flamang v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 516 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Minn.
App. 1994), review denied (Minn. July 27, 1994). Because Mix refused testing, whether
he was driving is irrelevant. See id.

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he was not free to leave.” E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d at 783; see State v. Cripps , 533 N.W.2d
388, 391 (Minn. 1995) (stating that a seizure occurs when the circumstances show that a
reasonable person wo uld have believed that he was neither free to disre gard the police
questions nor free to end the encounter); State v. Hanson , 504 N.W.2d 219, 220 (Minn.
1993) (“[T]he question to be asked by the reviewing court is whether, looking at all of the
facts, the conduct of the police would communicate to a reason able person in the
defendant’s physical circumstances an attempt by the police to capture or seize or otherwise
to significantly intrude on the person’s freedom of movement.”). Situations in which a
reasonable person would not feel free to leave may inclu de “the threatening presence of
several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person
of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
officer’s request might be compelled.” State v. Pfannenstein, 525 N.W.2d 587, 588 (Minn.
App. 1994) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 14, 1995).
In Hanson, the supreme court stated that a seizure does not necessarily occur when
an officer turns on the squad car’s emergency lights before approaching an already stopped
car on the shoulder of the road. 504 N.W.2d at 220. The court stated that the officer’s
conduct would not have communicated to a reasonable person that the officer was
attempting to seize the person. Id. Rather, “[a] reasonable person would have assumed
that the officer was not doing anything other than checking to see what was going on and
to offer help if needed.” Id.
Here, Sergeant Kopel drove her marked squad car with the emergency lights
activated to Mix, whom the woman at the scene had pointed toward when Sergeant Kopel

6
asked the location of the driver. She exited her vehicle and asked Mix to stop. Sergeant
Kopel asked Mix if he was okay, and he replied that he was fine. Sergeant Kopel asked
Mix to produ ce his driver’s license. Mix had fresh injuries to his arm, a torn shirt, and
abrasions to his safety glasses. Mix’ s clothes were wet, h e was unsteady on his feet, he
slurred his words and smelled of alcohol when he spoke, and when he removed his glasses
his eyes were glassy and red. S ergeant Kopel asked Mix what street he lived on and he
could not tell her the name of the street. Sergeant Kopel asked Mix where he was coming
from and he avoided the question. Mix told Sergeant Kopel that he did not know about a
crash and started walking away from her.
The circumstances do not show “the threatening presence of several officers”; there
was one officer who testified at the implied -consent hearing that she did not ask Mix to
perform field sobriety tests because she did not believe that it was safe because she was
alone, he attempted to walk away from her, he was under the influence of a lcohol, and
because of his physical size compared to her size. See Pfannenstein, 525 N.W.2d at 588.
Sergeant Kopel did not display a weapon, and there is no evidence that she physically
touched Mix, or used “language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with [her]
request might be compelled.” See id. Additionally, Mix attempted to walk away from
Sergeant Kopel. See E.D.J. , 502 N.W.2d at 783 (stating that a seizure occurs when a
reasonable person would feel he was not free to leave). The circumstances are more akin
to Hanson, because Sergeant Kopel approaching Mix would have communicated to Mix
that she was “check ing to see what was going on and to offer help if needed.” See 504
N.W.2d at 220. We conclude that Sergeant Kopel did not seize Mix when she approached

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him and asked him to stop. Rather, the seizure occurred after questioning led Sergeant
Kopel to believe that Mix had consumed alcohol and drove a motorcycle.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Subject to limited exceptions,
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88
S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967). An investigatory stop is one exception to the warrant requirement.
Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 842 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)).
An officer may conduct “a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528
U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884).
Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific facts that permit the officer to articulate a
“particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.”
Cripps, 533 N.W.2d at 391.
The reasonable, articulable suspicio n standard is “not high.” State v. Bourke , 718
N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted); Magnuson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety,
703 N.W.2d 557, 560 (Minn. App. 2005) (stating that the factual basis required to justify
an investiga tory stop is minimal). An investigatory stop is justified if it “was not th e
product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
that intrusion.” State v. Anderson , 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004) (quotat ions
omitted). Appellate courts will consider the totality of the circumstances, recognizing that
the “special training of police officers may lead them to arrive at inferences and deductions

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that might well elude an untrained person.” State v. Askerooth , 681 N.W.2d 353, 369
(Minn. 2004) (quotations omitted).
An investigatory stop “ need not arise from the personal observations of the police
officer but may be derived from information acquired f rom another person.” Magnuson,
703 N.W.2d at 560. An informant’s tip may justify an investigatory stop if it has
“sufficient indicia of reliability.” Id. “Identified citizen informants are presumed to be
reliable,” id., and officers may rely on an inf ormant if he or she “provides sufficient
[identifying] information so that he [or she] may be located and held accountable for
providing false information.” Playle v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 439 N.W. 2d 747, 748
(Minn. App. 1989). An eyewitness observation “lends significant support to the tip’s
reliability,” even if the informant is anonymous. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683,
1688-89 (2014).
The following facts allowed Sergeant Kopel to form a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that Mix was involved in criminal activity : (1) the weather conditions; (2) the
report of a motorcycle crash; (3) an SUV parked on the side of the road in the area of the
reported motorcycle crash with its hazard lights engaged; (4) a motorcycle on the side of
the road; (5) a woman standing next to the motorcycle, responding to the officer’s question
of whether she was okay and not denying that a motorcycle crash occurred; (6) the woman
pointing in Mix’s direction when asked the location of the driver of the motorcycle; (7) Mix
walking away from the motorc ycle; (8) Mix being the only individual walking from the
area; (9) Mix responding to the officer’s question whether he was okay; (10 ) Mix’s arm
injury and torn shirt; (11 ) Mix wearing safety glasses that a motorcyclist wears that

9
appeared to have abrasions; and (12 ) Mix being unsteady, slurring, smelling of alcohol,
and having glassy red eyes.
Mix asserts that the only information that Sergeant Kopel possessed at the time he
was seized was provid ed by unidentified in formants. But the motorist’s report was not
necessarily of criminal activity, but more likely made to assist a potentially injured
motorcyclist. And while the report was from an unidentified individual, the motorist likely
observed the incident. See id. (stating that a n eyewitness observation “lends significant
support to the tip’s reliability,” even if the informant is anonymous). Mix conceded at oral
argument that Sergeant Kopel was justified in using the information from the motorist to
go to the location. Additionally, the woman standing next to the motorcycle was identified
and can be located and held accountable for providing false information. See Playle, 439
N.W.2d at 748. Moreo ver, at the time of the seizure, Sergeant Kopel had made her own
personal observations. Based on all of the circumstances, Sergeant Kopel seized Mix after
observing clues that he may have been involved in a motorcycle crash and indicia of
intoxication. Sergeant Kopel formed a reasonable , articulable suspicion of criminal
activity to conduct a brief investigatory stop. Accordingly, the district court did not err in
sustaining the revocation of Mix’s driver’s license and impoundment of his license plates.
Affirmed.