A17-0036

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0035
A17-0036

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
N.M. a/k/a N.S. and M.T., Parents.

Filed May 22, 2017
Affirmed
Kalitowski, Judge

Lyon County District Court
File No. 42-JV-16-107

Matthew B. Gross, Quarnstrom & Doering, P.A., Marshall, Minnesota (for appellant N.M.
a/k/a N.S.)

Kyle O ’Dwyer, Runchey, Louwagie & Wellman, PLLP, Marshall, Minnesota (for
appellant M.T.)

Richard R. Maes, Lyon County Attorney, Nicole A. Springstead, Assistant County
Attorney, Marshall, Minnesota (for respondent Lyon County Human Services)

Sara Larson, Marshall, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Kalitowski, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KALITOWSKI, Judge
In this consolidated appeal, appellants challenge the termination of their parental
rights, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that (1) a statutory
basis for terminating their parental rights existed, (2) termination of parental rights was in
the best interests of their minor children, and ( 3) the county made reasonable efforts
towards rehabilitation and reunification. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant N.S. is the mother of two children, S.M. and E.T. S.M. was born in 2007,
and E.T. was born in 2014. Appellant M.T. 1 is the father of E.T. S.M. had a different
father, whose parental rights were terminated on June 1, 2016. S.M. and E.T. both ha ve
special needs. S.M. receives individual education and after -school services, and she is
diagnosed with ADHD. S.M. is also “slow to process information and does not consistently
demonstrate appropriate fear or apprehension of risks.” E.T. receives ear ly childhood
services, special services to assist her with speech and socialization, and physical therapy
to assist her with various cognitive and motor skills.
M.T. has mental-health issues but “feels that he is doing fine on his own without
therapy.” He does not take his mental-health medications “because he does not like to take
pills.” N.S. has had “a history of cognitive delays dating back to elementary school.”

1 N.S. and M.T. will hereinafter collectively be referred to as “appellants.”

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On October 8, 2015, law enforcement executed a search warrant at appellants’ house
on an unrelated matter and, based on the condition of the home, placed S.M. and E.T. on a
law-enforcement hold. The house was dirty and had a strong smell of dog urine/feces, and
trace amounts of methamphetamine were discovered. On October 12, 2015, responde nt
Lyon County filed a child -in-need-of-protection-or-services (CHIPS) petition , seeking
emergency protective care for S.M. and E.T. The district court granted the petition and
ordered that the children remain in protective care. S.M. and E.T. have been in foster care
in Minnesota since October 12, 2015, by order of the district court in the CHIPS
proceedings.
Upon entering foster care, E.T. “had a double ear infection, pink eye, was very
congested, and had diaper rash.” She was quiet and lethargic. E. T.’s communication
improved greatly after tubes were placed in her ears. S.M. required “substantial dental
work when she entered foster care including a cap, pulled tooth, filling cavities, and a
crown.” S.M. requires supervision “to ensure that she comp letes basic hygiene routines,
such as brushing her teeth and combing her hair.” Both children did not appear familiar
with rules and structure when they entered foster care.
The district court ordered a case plan for appellants with respect to E.T. M.T. failed
to participate in individual therapy as required by the case plan. Appellants had supervised
and unsupervised parenting time with S.M. and E.T. while they were in foster care; E.T.
often suffered from diarrhea and stomach ailments after these visits. The condition of
appellants’ home remains poor. And in nearly one year of in -home services, the district

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court found that appellants “have made minimal, if any, progress on developing and
improving their parenting skills.”
The county petitioned the district court to terminate appellants’ parental rights on
August 17, 2016. Appellants, the children’s guardian ad litem, a social worker assigned to
their case, appellants’ in-home caseworker, and one of the foster parents testified at a two-
day court trial.
After trial, the district court terminated N.S.’s parental rights to E.T. and S.M., and
it terminated M.T.’s parental rights to E.T. It found that appellants are unable “to provide
an environmentally safe home for the children” due to their cognitive deficits. The district
court then concluded that appellants are palpably unfit to parent S.M. and E.T., the children
are neglected and in foster care, the county made reasonable efforts to provide services to
appellants, and termination of appellant s’ parental rights to S.M. and E.T. is in the be st
interests of the children. Through a posttrial motion, N.S. asked the district court to amend
its findings o f fact and order a new trial. The district court amended one finding of fact
and denied the motion for a new trial.
D E C I S I O N
Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion in terminating their
parental rights . We review the district court’s “determination of whether a particular
statutory basis for involuntarily terminatin g parental rights is present for an abuse of
discretion.” In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011),
review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). “[W]e will review the district court’s findings of the
underlying or basic facts for clear error.” Id. “A finding is clearly erroneous if it is

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manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Children of K.S.F. , 823 N.W.2d 656, 665 (Minn.
App. 2012) (quotations omitted).
1. Statutory Basis For Terminating Appellants’ Parental Rights
Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that
because S.M. and E.T. were neglected and in foster care , a statutory basis existed for
terminating appellants’ parental rights. We disagree.
The district court may terminate all rights of a parent to a child if it finds that the
child is neglected and in foster care. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(8) (2016). A child
neglected and in foster case is defined as a child
(1) who has been placed in foster care by court order;
and
(2) whose parents’ circumstances, condition, or conduct
are such that the child cannot be returned to them; and
(3) whose parents, despite the availability of needed
rehabilitative services, have failed to make reasonable efforts
to adjust their circumstances, condition or conduct, or have
willfully failed to meet reasonable expectations with regard to
visiting the child or providing financial support for the child.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 24 (2016).
Among other factors, the district court shall consider the following factors in
determining whether a child is neglected and in foster care: (1) the length of time the child
has been in foster care; (2) the level of effort by the parent to correct the circumstances that
caused the child’s removal; (3) whether the parent has visited the child; (4) whether the
parent had regular contact with the agency or person responsible for the c hild; (5) the
adequacy of services provided to the parent; (6) whether additional services would likely

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enable a return of the child at some point in the future; and (7) the nature of the agency’s
efforts to reunite the family. Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, sub d. 9 (2016); see also J.R.B., 805
N.W.2d at 902.
Because appellants concede that the district court placed S.M. and E.T. in foster
care, our analysis is limited to a review of the second and third statutory criteria. Here, the
district court concluded that appellants’ “circumstances and conduct are such that S.M. and
E.T. cannot be returned to them” and appellants “failed to adjust their conduct and/or
condition” even though rehabilitative services were provided.
N.S. contends that the district court’s c onclusions are unsupported by the record
because she corrected the conditions that led to the initiation of the CHIPS case and
completed the case plan requirements . M.T. argues that the record demonstrates some
evidence that he (1) has the ability to pare nt, (2) satisfied reasonable expectations to visit
E.T. or provide her with financial support, (3) did not need rehabilitative services, and
(4) made reasonable efforts to adjust his circumstances.
The district court found that appellants do not possess the necessary parenting skills
and insight to ensure that S.M.’s and E.T.’s medical, educational, cognitive, and mental -
health needs are met. It also held that, if appellants “are not prompted and supervised, it is
highly unlikely that any of the foregoing necessary services would be provided to the
children consistently, if at all.” It determined that appellants “have not demonstrated that
they have been able to put any plans to address their parenting deficits into effect.” The
district court found that M.T. is not receptive to mental -health or cognitive -development
services, and N.S. “minimizes her deficits and issues” because she “does not believe she

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has any struggles with parenting, that there are any improvements she needs to make, or
that she has any deficits in her daily life.” The record supports the district court’s findings
and conclusions.
At trial, N.S. testified in response to a question about what she could do to improve
her skills as a parent: “I’m trying to do stuff by myself. That’s wh at I’m doing. I don’t
need anybody’s help.” M.T. testified that he left supervised visits with E.T. because he did
not agree with the monitors’ direction and he did not “want to get too mad and irate” at
them because he d id not like them. He also testified: “I don’t like authorities like higher
people than me. Like —I like to do my own thing.” Further, he stated that he probably
missed other visits with E.T. because he “would rather go out and work.”
Appellants’ in-home caseworker testified as to major concerns, including failure to
follow visitation rules, missing appointments, and S.M.’s report on how the visits were
going. She testified that she was worried about appellants’ ability to understand what she
taught them because “they have some si gnificant limitations with their IQ, with their
functioning, [and] with their ability to learn and comprehend the information that [she is]
telling them.” Their in-home caseworker also testified that no additional services would
help N.S. improve her parenting skills and that M.T. could benefit from a developmental -
disabilities service, but he declined those services.
Finally, the district court appropriately considered the significant amount of time
that S.M. and E.T. have been in foster care: 389 days, as of November 3, 2016.
Because its conclusion that S.M. and E.T. were neglected and in foster care is
supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record, the district court did not abuse

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its discretion by invoking this basis to terminate appellants’ parental rights. And although
the district court also determined that appellants are palpably unfit to parent S.M. and E.T.,
we need not address any additional statutory grounds for involuntary termination. See In
re Welfare of Children of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 -87 (Minn. 2008) (affirming the
district court’s termination of parental rights after concluding that the district court did not
err with respect to one of two statutory grounds).
2. Best Interests of the Children
Appellants challenge the district court ’s conclusion that terminating their parental
rights was in the best interests of S.M. and E.T. “We review a district court’s ultimate
determination that termination is in a child’s best interest for an abuse of discretion.”
J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905.
“[I]nvoluntary termination of parental rights is proper only when at least one
statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence and the
termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d
127, 137 (Minn. 2014). To determine whether termination of parental rights is in the
child’s best interests, the district court “must balance three factors: (1) the child’s interest
in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-
child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905.
Competing interests of the child may “include such things as a stable environment, health
considerations and the child’s preferences.” Id.
M.T. argues that there “was hardly any evidence offered as to why [his] parental
rights to E.T. should be terminated.” N.S. contends that termination of her parental rights

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is not in the best interests of the children because S.M. and E.T. (1) love and care for her,
(2) were never malnourished, (3) were clothed, (4) and had housing in N.S.’s care.
In concluding that terminating appellants’ parental rights is in the best interests of
S.M. and E.T., the district court reasoned that, “[d]ue to the children’s special needs, they
need to attend numerous appointments throughout the week. Coordinating these necessary
appointments requires some degree of commitment on the caretaker’s part and the ability
to coordinate these appointments with other activities the children participate in.” The
district court determined that appellants are not able to provide the children with “a stable
and consistent home that can meet their needs” now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
The record supports this conclusion.
At trial, the guardian ad litem testified that appellants lacked the ability “to accept
the information [on parenting] and to put it into action.” She also testified,
“[U]nfortunately I think that . . . it’s best fo r the children if their parents’ rights are
terminated.” Appellants’ social worker testified about her concern that appellants would
be unable to satisfy S.M.’s and E.T.’s needs. Specifically her concern was
[t]hat their medical needs would not be met, that dental
appointments would be missed. Even though [S.M.] is on an
[individual education plan], that does require additional work
at—in the home and there would be concerns that that would
not happen, that her school work would not get done, that
[E.T.]’s early childhood services would not be able to be
meeting with her as those are appointments that are set up with
the parents. A lot of concerns about the follow through with
appointments, that the children would not be supported
emotionally or developmentally.

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She also testified that appellants failed to attend all doctor appointments and education
appointments; “they missed two of [E.T.]’s medical appointments and one of [ S.M.]’s
medical appointments.”
The children’s foster -care provider also testif ied about concerns she had about
M.T.’s ability to parent:
Q. What was your concern?
A. Um a couple times um [M.T.] would buckle [E.T.] in
and he would snap her um skin in the buckle and then
he would say, I don’t understand why she’s crying. I just
don’t know why. And -- and she would really scream.
Well then when we’d get home -- and I knew what
happened. I knew that she had gotten buckled in the seat
so when I got home, she had a quarter size um sore on
her stomach from being buckled.
Q. Did this happen on one occasion or more than once?
A. Um more than once, yes.
Q. And was that always when [M.T.] would buckle [E.T.]
in?
A. Yes. [N.S.] never really put her in the car.

Although M.T. argues that we should not credit this testimony, we give a district court
considerable discretion in its credibility determinations because it “is in a superior position
to assess the credibility of witnesses.” In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn.
1996).
Because the record supports its determination that termination of appellants’
parental rights to S.M. and E.T. is in the children’s best interests, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion.

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3. Reasonable Efforts For Reunification
Appellants contend that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the
county made reasonable efforts toward rehabilitation. We disagree.
In every termination-of-parental-rights proceeding, the district court must find
either that reasonable efforts for reunification are not required or “that reasonable efforts
to finalize the permanency plan to reunify the child and the parent were made including
individualized and explicit findings regarding the nature and extent of efforts made by the
social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 8(1) (2016).
In determining whether the county’s efforts a re reasonable, the district court must
consider whether the services were
(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child;
(2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family;
(3) culturally appropriate;
(4) available and accessible;
(5) consistent and timely; and
(6) realistic under the circumstances.
In the alternative, the court may determine that
provision of services or further services for the purpose of
rehabilitation is futile and therefore unreasonable under the
circumstances. . . .

Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2016). “Reasonable efforts at rehabilitation are services that go
beyond mere matters of form so as to include real, genuine assistance. The quality and
quantity of efforts to rehabilitate and reunify the family impact the reasonableness of those
efforts.” In re Welfare of Children of S.W. , 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007)
(quotations and citation omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007). “Whether the

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county has met its duty of reasonable efforts requires consideration of the length of the
time the county was involved and the quality of effort given.” In re Welfare of H.K., 455
N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. July 6, 1990).
Here, the record indicates that the county provided the following services: child -
protection case -management services, foster -care and respite -care services, supervised
parenting time, diagnostic assessments, mental -health referrals, parental -capacity
assessments, cognitive testing, health home referral, chemical -use assessments, family
group decision-making, urinalysis hair-follicle testing, Minnesota choices evaluation, and
in-home services. The district court concluded that the county’s efforts were reasonable.
The record further indica tes that the county provided accommodations for
appellants. The in -home caretaker testified that she changed meeting times to
accommodate M.T.’s schedule. And the social worker testified that she helped M.T. with
his work schedule and wrote a letter to M .T.’s employer, explaining the importance of
attending in-home therapy.
N.S. argues that the county’s efforts were not reasonable because she only had about
one month after all of her assessments were complete before the county petitioned to
terminate her parental rights . But ap pellants’ in -home caseworker testified that no
additional services could be provided to help N.S. improve her parenting skills. And the
guardian ad litem testified that appellants were not willing to offer S.M. and E.T. a stable
consistent home to meet their needs now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Citing In re Children of T.R. , M.T. argues that the county’s efforts were not
reasonable because it failed to provide appropriate services to accommodate his needs as a

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person diagnosed with ADHD. 750 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 2008). In T.R., the supreme court
concluded that services provided to the father were unreasonable because, after the father
testified “that he had difficulty understanding what was happening” during meetings w ith
his social worker and guardian ad litem, no services were offered to address his “lack of
verbal skills and acknowledged difficulty in understanding the proceedings.” Id. at 659,
666. But the facts here are distinguishable because M.T. never testified or mentioned that
he did not understand what was required of him . Rather, he testified that he did not want
to listen to his caseworker because he would “rather listen to certain people” and he had
“enough people to listen to.”
M.T. also argues that th e county’s efforts were not reasonable because it failed to
respond to a request by the district court regarding unsupervised visitation at appellants’
home. But the county determined, based on its further review, that unsupervised visitation
at appellants’ home was inappropriate because appellants’ progress had deteriorated, they
failed to abide by visitation rules, and they were not attending appointments. The record
supports the county’s assertions.
Because it s finding that the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate and
reunite appellants with S.M. and E.T. is reasonably supported by the record as a whole, the
district court did not abuse its discretion.
Finally, N.S. argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying her
motion for a new trial. Because we conclude that the district court’s findings are supported
by the record, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating appellants’

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parental rights, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denyin g N.S.’s request for
a new trial. See Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 45.04(g)-(h), 45.06(a).
Affirmed.