A17-0297 A17-0059

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0055
A17-0297
A17-0059

Russell James Jensen, Jr.,
Appellant,

Park Development Corporation, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

Therese Brown Jensen, et al.,
Respondents,

and
Russell James Jensen, Jr.,
Appellant,

vs.

James R. Brown, as Trustee of the
Therese Brown Jensen Trust, et al.,
Respondents,

Brian Jensen, et al.,
Defendants,

and

James R. Brown, as the Trustee of
the Therese Brown Jensen Trust, et al.,
Respondents,

vs.

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Russell James Jensen, Jr.,
Appellant,

Silvanesti, Inc.,
Defendant,

and

In re Petition of:
Russell James Jensen, Jr., Petitioner,
for Revocation of Deed,
Certificate of Title No. 131355
(129068) Outlots A & G,
St. Clair Park 3rd Addition,
Anoka County, Minnesota

Filed October 9, 2017
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File Nos. 02-CV-15-623;
02-CV-16-2742;
02-CV-15-716;
02-CV-16-594

Russell James Jensen, Jr., Arden Hills, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Stanford P. Hill, Daniel R. Olson, Bassford Remele, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondents)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and
Kalitowski, Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
This case consolidates three appeals arising from a 2014 divorce in Washington and
involving property in Minnesota to which the divorcing parties and their respective
assignees claim an interest. Appellant Russell James Jensen Jr. and respondent Therese
Brown Jensen divorced in Washington in 2014, with certain Minnesota real properties to
be divided under their agreement. Disputes over the properties culminated in quiet- title,
deed-revocation, and fraudulent-transfer actions in Minnesota. The district court in
Minnesota dismissed Russell’s quiet-title and deed-revocation claims and sanctioned him
by awarding respondents their fees and costs. The district court also granted summary
judgment to respondents in their fraudulent-transfer action, and again sanctioned Russell
by awarding respondents their fees and costs. On appeal, Russell challenges the district
court’s sanctions and attorney-fee decisions in the quiet-title and deed-revocation cases.
He also challenges the district court’s summary -judgment, sanctions, and fee decisions in
the fraudulent-transfer case. We affirm because Russell forfeited his arguments against
sanctions and fees by failing to present them to the district court and because the district
court properly granted summary judgment against him in the fraudulent-transfer case.
FACTS
Russell James Jensen Jr. and Therese Brown Jensen married in 1981, and they
acquired several Minnesota properties and titled some in corporate entities. Therese filed
for divorce in August 2013 in the state of Washington. A Washington district court issued
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its dissolution decree in September 2014, dividing their property according to a stipulated
settlement agreement.
The dissolution decree awarded ownership of Park Development Corporation to the
Therese Brown Jensen Trust. Park Development owned three properties at the time:
Outlot A 3rd Addition, Outlot G 3rd Addition, and “Blaine 5.” The dissolution decree
awarded Blaine 5 to T herese’s brother, James. R. Brown (the trust’s trustee). It awarded
Russell Outlots A and G (3rd Additions). The decree was docketed as a foreign judgment
in Ramsey County. Russell appealed the dissolution decree in Washington. Litigation
relating to the properties soon began in Minnesota.
Appeal A17-0055
Quiet-Title One
Russell allegedly served a summons and civil complaint against Therese and Brown
in October 2014, asking the district court to declare him the owner of Outlot A 3rd
Addition, Outlot G 3rd Addition, Blaine 5, and other properties. On November 14, 2014,
Therese and Brown’s attorney served Russell with a motion for sanctions, warning that
they would seek fees and costs if Russell did not withdraw his allegedly frivolous
complaint. Russell instead served an amended complaint and discovery requests.
The trust granted Russell a warranty deed for Outlots A and G 3rd Additions on
January 27, 2015. Therese and Brown moved to dismiss R ussell’s quiet-title action on
February 6, 2015 , for failure to state a claim under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure
12.02(e). Therese and Brown also moved for sanctions. Russell responded, contending that,
5
because his claims were apparently satisfied as of February 6, he saw “no reason to have
such a hearing.”
The district court granted Therese and Brown’ s motion to dismiss. It reasoned that
the only real-estate issue on appeal in the Washington dissolut ion case involved the
Jensens’ home, and therefore Russell was “judicially barred from asserting any interest in
the real estate awarded to [Brown] . . . . Thus, the complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted at the current time because the issues raised in the complaint
are either moot or barred by judicial estoppel. ” The district court dismissed the complaint
without prejudice.
As for sanctions, the district court found that “[t]he record here demonstrates that
[Russell] acted throughout this litigation in a vexatious and oppressive manner.” The
district court referenced insulting emails, threats of complaints and litigation, other
insulting behaviors, disrespect for the law, continued pursuit of the action after the lawsuit
became baseless, and misrepresentations to the court. The district court limited fees and
costs to those incurred after February 6, 2015, the date that Russell admitted that his claims
were satisfied.
Therese and Brown submitted their related petition for attorne y fees and costs.
Russell responded by challenging the district court’s jurisdiction on the ground that he
never filed the complaint and by challenging the award of attorney fees. The district court
characterized Russell’s response as a reconsideration motion, which failed to comply with
Minnesota Rule of General Practice 115.11. The district court also concluded that Russell
was actually arguing against the merits of Therese and Brown’s sanctions motion, which
6
Russell had already forfeited by not responding. It determined that the sanction was
reasonable and awarded $20,747.50.
Russell refiled his complaint on July 17, 2015. He also filed a statement of the case
on the same file in June 2016. Therese and Brown moved to dismiss the refiled quiet-title
action on July 20, 2016.
Quiet-Title Two
Russell m eanwhile had filed another quiet- title action against Therese, Brown
personally, Brown as t rustee, and others, in May 2016. It involved property in Anoka
County, Ramsey County, and Ottertail County , some of which he included in his first
complaint. Russell filed an unsigned voluntary dismissal of this quiet-title action in June
2016. Therese and Brown moved to dismiss on July 20, 2016.
Consolidated Quiet-Title One & Two
The district court consolidated the quiet-title actions in July 2016 . Therese and
Brown moved for sanctions in the combined actions on August 3, 2016. The district court
adopted its findings from the first quiet-title order. The district court also found,
The actions of [Russell] in filing the Statement of [the]
Case indicating that the dismissed lawsuit was ready for trial
and in commencing a new lawsuit involving virtually the same
parties, the same real estate and the same claims is simply a
continuation of [his] vexatious and oppressive conduct . . . .
Further, his actions are an abuse of the legal process.

The district court dismissed both of Russell’s cases with prejudice and granted the motion
for sanctions.
7
Therese and Brown submitted an affidavit for fees and costs, and Russell responded,
antagonistically to the district court, as follows:
The court has determined to find against the plaintiff in
each and every element of the case between the parties.
Plaintiff has been found to be wrong on 100% of the issues and
100% of the facts 100% of the time. . . .

The attorneys for the defendants now seek attorney ’s
fees. It does not appear that the court will ever find any issue
in favor of the plaintiff so a very limited response is made here.
Plaintiff objects to any award of attorney ’s fees to the
defendants or their attorneys. Any further argument would
appear futile.

The district court issued an amended dismissal order that awarded $22,000 in
attorney fees to Therese and Brown on January 4, 2017.
Appeal A17-0297
On January 27, 2015, Therese and Park Development Corporation recorded a
warranty deed to Russell for Outlots A and G 3rd Additions. Russell filed a petition with
the district court on February 18, 2015, for an order “revoking the deed and placing
ownership of the property back in the name of Park Development Corporation.” Therese
and Park Development argued that Russell’s petition was merely his attempt to avoid
judgment liens on the property.
Therese and Park Development moved for summary judgment and sanctions. The
district court granted the motion. It recounted the following undisputed facts: the properties
were awarded to R ussell in the Washington dissolution decree; the deed was issued in
Russell’s name and mailed to him in February 2015; and Russell executed and recorded a
8
quitclaim deed in November 2015, conveying the property to M. J. Scott Company
(forming the basis for the related fraudulent-transfer claim).
The district court determined that the undisputed facts established any of several
legal conclusions, each warranting summary judgment to Therese and Park Development.
As for sanctions, the district court found no legitimate purpose for Russell’s claim. It also
concluded that his legal position did not rest on existing law or a nonfrivolous extension of
law. It granted the motion for sanctions. Therese and Park Development sought $40,707 in
fees and costs. The district court issued an amended order granting summary judgment,
awarding Therese and Park Development $32,424 in attorney fees and expenses.
Appeal A17-0059
Therese Trust and M. J. Scott Company sued Russell and Silvanesti, Inc. , in
February 2016, alleging that Russell had fraudulently transferred four properties to avoid
their judgment collection efforts: two Anoka County properties (Outlots A and G, 3rd
Additions) and two Scott County properties. Therese Trust and M. J. Scott moved for
summary judgment, arguing that there was no material dispute that Russell had transferred
the properties from M. J. Scott to Silvanesti to escape a sheriff’s sale. They also argued
that they were entitled to recover their attorney fees. Russell and Silvanesti defended by
acknowledging there had been a conveyance but asserting that Therese Trust and M. J.
Scott’s claim failed because Russell never made any “effort to make the property
unavailable.” The district court identified the following undisputed material facts from the
documentary exhibits:
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• Russell incorporated M. J. Scott Company on August 20, 2014;
• Russell purchased the Scott County properties on September 8, 2014;
• Therese Trust requested a writ of execution on judgments against R ussell, with a
writ issued for $100,193.46 on November 18, 2015;
• Also on November 1 8, 2015, Russell recorded a deed conveying the Anoka
properties to M. J. Scott;
• The writ of execution was delivered to the Ramsey County Sheriff’s Office to levy
on Russell’s shares in M. J. Scott and other corporations;
• A sheriff’s sale was scheduled for February 1, 2016;
• Russell filed for reinstatement of Silvanesti, Inc. on January 30, 2016;
• Russell executed warranty deeds transferring the Anoka and Scott County
properties from M. J. Scott to Silvanesti on January 30;
• Russell began negotiating for settlement of claims in exchange for M. J. Scott
Company’s stock without disclosing that the assets had been transferred;
• Russell recorded the deeds on the morning of the sheriff’s sale, filed an emergency
ex parte motion to stay the sale, claimed there was a settlement in place, and failed
to disclose his earlier conveyance;
• Therese Trust purchased the stock in M. J. Scott and the other companies at the
sheriff’s sale;
• Russell recorded mortgages by Silvanesti against the Anoka County and Scott
County properties; and
• Russell continued to attempt to negotiate a settlement without disclosing that M. J.
Scott’s assets had been transferred.

The district court ordered summary judgment, concluding that “the undisputed facts
clearly establish that the transfers from M. J. Scott Company to Defendant Silvanesti and
the mortgages from Silvanesti to Defendant [Russell] Jensen were done with the actual
intent to defraud.” It also indicated that it had reviewed Russell’ s earlier summary -
judgment motion and his response to Therese Trust and M. J. Scott’s summary -judgment
motion, but that those filings were not executed under oath and therefore could not provide
a basis for any f act dispute. As for attorney fees, the district court determined that the
undisputed facts established Russell’s actual intent to defraud and delay collection efforts,
10
and it ordered sanctions “limited to the fraudulent conveyance actions in Anoka County
and Scott County.”
Therese Trust and M. J. Scott requested a total of $72 ,466.50. Russell again
generally objected, declaring, “It does not appear that the court will ever find any issue in
favor of the defendants so a very limited response is made here. [Defendant] objects to any
award of attorney’s fees to the [plaintiffs] or their attorneys. Any further argument would
appear to be futile.”
The district court amended its summary judgment order and incorporated the
attorney fee directive. Its final order (1) granted summary judgment against R ussell;
(2) voided the warranty deeds for the Anoka and Scott County properties; (3) voided the
mortgages; (4) denied Russell’s earlier motion for release of the land from judgment;
(5) denied an earlier discovery motion as moot; and (6) awarded $65,000 in attorney fees
plus $1,359 in costs to Therese Trust and M. J. Scott. Russell appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Russell challenges four of the district court’s orders: (I) the district court’s sanctions
order in Quiet-Title One; (II) the district court’s sanctions order in Consolidated Quiet-
Titles One and Two; (III) the district court’s sanctions order in the deed-revocation action;
and (IV) the district court’s summary -judgment and sanctions order in the fraudulent-
transfer case. Most of Russell’s arguments are forfeited, and the remainder are
unpersuasive.
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I
In Quiet-Title One, the district court granted Therese and Brown ’s motion for
sanctions and ordered Russell to pay the respondents’ attorney fees and costs totaling
$20,747.50. Russell asks us to reverse the sanctions decision, apparently challenging the
basis for sanctions and the amount of the award. We generally review the district court’s
decision to impose attorney fees as sanctions for an abuse of discretion. See In re Claims
for No-Fault Benefits Against Progressive Ins. Co., 720 N.W.2d 865, 874 (Minn. App.
2006), review denied (Minn. Nov. 22, 2006). But we do not reach the merits here. This is
because respondents correctly argue that R ussell forfeited his arguments by failing to
present them to the district court. We generally do not consider arguments raised first on
appeal. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1998). Russell failed to raise and
preserve his arguments by presenting them to the district court.
II
In consolidated Quiet-Titles One and Two, the district court granted Therese and
Brown’s motion for sanctions and ordered Russell to pay attorney fees and expenses
totaling $22,835. Russell again urges us to reverse the sanctions, but again, Therese and
Brown accurately emphasize that Russell forfeited his arguments. Russell presented no
argument generally against sanctions, and his response to the attorney fees request included
no substantive argument. His argument on appeal is therefore forfeited. See Thiele, 425
N.W.2d at 582.
12
III
In the deed-revocation case, the district court granted Therese and Park’s motion for
sanctions and ordered Russell to pay the respondents’ attorney fees and expenses totaling
$32,424. Russell asks us to reverse the sanctions award, but he also claims, “The decision
of the trial court must be overturned in all its parts including any sanctions.” (Emphasis
added.) We clarify that the underlying summary judgment in the deed-revocation case is
not the subject of this appeal; we previously limited Russell’s appeal only to the sanctions
and fees determination. See Jensen v. Jensen, Nos. A17-0055, A17-0059, A17-0297 (Minn.
App. Feb. 23, 2017) (order). T herese and Park argue that we should deem Russell’s
arguments for reversal forfeited because he failed to oppose their motions for sanctions or
fees. The argument is convincing. Although Russell opposed summary judgment and
suggested that sanctions against respondents ’ counsel were appropriate, he offered no
substantive argument against sanctions or the amount. Russell’s arguments are forfeited.
IV
The district court granted summary judgment against R ussell and Silvanesti in the
fraudulent-transfer case and sanctioned them for $66,359 in attorney fees and costs. Russell
argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment and abused its discretion
by sanctioning him with fees. For the following reasons, we affirm both summary judgment
and sanctions.
A. Summary Judgment
The district court granted summary judgment against Russell and Silvanesti ,
concluding that the undisputed facts established that Russell transferred assets from M. J.
13
Scott Company to Silvanesti with the intent to avoid collection, violating the Minnesota
Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (MUVTA).1 We review de novo whether any genuine
issue of material fact exists and whether the district court properly applied the law. Storms,
Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., 883 N.W.2d 772, 776 (Minn. 2016).
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgm ent as
a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. A disputed fact is material if its resolution would
affect the outcome of the case. Zappa v. Fahey, 310 Minn. 555, 556, 245 N.W.2d 258,
259–60 (1976). There is no genuine issue for trial if the nonmoving party “presents
evidence which merely creates a metaphysical doubt as to a factual issue and which is not
sufficiently probative with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party ’s case
to permit reasonable persons to draw different conclusions.” DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566
N.W.2d 60, 71 (Minn. 1997). But a party need not show substantial evidence to prevent
summary judgment. Schroeder v. St. Louis County, 708 N.W.2d 497, 507 (Minn. 2006).
The MUVTA provides the framework for the respondents’ fraudulent-conveyance
claim:
A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is
voidable as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose
before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the

1 In 2015, the Minnesota Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (MUFTA) was amended to the
Minnesota Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (MUVTA). See Minn. Stat. §§ 513.41–.51
(Supp. 2015). The record refers to both the MUFTA and MUVTA, but we refer solely to
the MUVTA.
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obligation . . . with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
any creditor of the debtor[.]

Minn. Stat. § 513.44(a)(1) (2016). The se elements require proof that: (1) a debtor;
(2) makes a transfer or incurs an obligation; (3) with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud;
(4) a creditor. See id. A “claim” means the “ right to payment, whether or not reduced to
judgment.” Minn. Stat. § 513.41(3) (2016). A “creditor” is a person who has a claim. Minn.
Stat. § 513.41(4). A “ debtor” is the person liable on the claim. Minn. Stat. § 513.41(6).
And a “transfer” includes “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary
or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and
includes payment of money, release, lease, license, and creation of a lien or other
encumbrance.” Minn. Stat. § 513.41(16).
Russell challenges the district court’s summary-judgment decision on several bases.
He argues that (i) there was no creditor-de btor relationship; (ii) there was no intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud; (iii) there was no valuation of the debt and the asset; and (iv) the
district court improperly excluded certain documents. We address each theory.
i. Creditor-Debtor Relationship
The district court determined that the undisputed material facts established that
judgments for Therese Trust and against Russell were docketed in Ramsey County, that
the trust received a writ of execution for $100,193.46, and that the writ levied on shares of
stock Russell owned in M. J. Scott and other companies. Russell argues that the MUVTA
cannot apply because the parties had no creditor-debtor relationship:
The only creditor- debtor relationship in this case is between
appellant and [ the trust]. There is no allegation that appellant
15
transferred anything. The transfer of property in question was
made by M. J. Scott, a corporation that had no debt obligations
to the trust.

The argument requires us to interpret the MUVTA, a task we undertake de novo. See Finn
v. Alliance Bank, 860 N.W.2d 638, 644 (Minn. 2015).
Therese Trust and Scott direct us to our recent decision in Reilly v. Antonello, 852
N.W.2d 694 (Minn. App. 2014). Reilly supports affirming. In Reilly, the respondents
obtained judgments against Antonello and levied on Antonello’s shares in a corporation.
Id. at 696–97. Antonello sold investors his interest in the corporation without revealing that
he had authorized the release of thousands of new shares, diminishing the value of his
interest. Respondents sued Antonello under the MUFTA and the district court granted
summary judgment. Id. On appeal, Antonello presented an argument substantially similar
to Russell’s. See id. at 698–99. We rejected that argument:
Appellants assert that the corporation legally diluted Michael
Antonello’s shares before the sheriff ’s sale, but this argument
ignores the reality that Michael Antonello was exclusively
responsible for the actions of the corporation and that he
fraudulently transferred assets to the detriment of his creditors.
To allow a sole director, officer, and shareholder to mask his
fraudulent actions behind the façade of a closely held
corporation would defy the plain meaning and intent of the
Minnesota Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.

Id. at 701. We reject Russell’s ar gument on the same reasoning. The judgments against
Russell establish that he was a debtor and Therese Trust was his creditor. See Minn. Stat.
§ 513.41(4), (6). Russell was exclusively responsible for the transfer.
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ii. Intent to Hinder, Delay, or Defraud
The legislature provides a non-exclusive list of factors indicating an actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud under the MUVTA. See Minn. Stat. § 513.44(b)(1)– (11). The
district court made the following findings relevant to proof of fraud:
(1) the transfer was to an insider because Russell was the sole
shareholder of M. J. Scott and Silvanesti;
(2) Russell retained sole control of the property after the
transfer;
(3) the transfer was concealed;
(4) Russell had been sued or threatened with suit prior to the
transfer;
(5) the transfer was essentially all of the assets.

See Minn. Stat. § 513.44(b)(1)–(5).
Russell argues that he had no intent to hinder, delay, or defraud collection because
he was “making every effort to give the property to [Brown] to satisfy the debt. [Brown]
would not take it.” But Russell’s transfer included several indicators of fraud, such as his
attempt to conceal the transfer from Therese Trust. Russell’s argument therefore fails.
iii. Valuation of Debt and Asset
Russell argues that the MUVTA requires determining the value of both the claim
and the asset that will satisfy the claim before a transfer can be voided. The statute allows
a creditor to obtain relief in the form of “avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent
necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim.” Minn. Stat. § 513.47(a)(1) (2016). Russell argues
that the district court erred by granting summary judgment because the court did not
determine either the debt or the value of the asset: “The claimant has to argue, and the court
has to determine, the amount of the debt and only void so much of the transfer as is
17
necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim. ” But Russell did not make this argument in the
district court, and we decline to consider it for the first time on appeal. See Thiele, 425
N.W.2d at 582.
iv. Excluded Documents
The district court concluded that Russell’s submissions opposing summary
judgment were not executed under oath and could not create a genuine issue of material
fact. We review the district court’s decision to exclude evidence from its summary -
judgment assessment for an abuse of discretion. Antonello v. Comm’r of Revenue, 884
N.W.2d 640, 644–45 (Minn. 2016).
Russell essentially argues that the district court’s decision amounted to striking his
pleadings under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 11.01, and he proceeds to argue that
his digital signature was sufficient. But the form of supporting aff idavits is framed by
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 56.05:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all documents or parts thereof
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served
therewith. A “sworn copy ” includes documents that are
authenticated by a signature under penalty of perjury, pursuant
to Minnesota Statutes, section 358.116.

Russell’s documents did not comply with this rule. The district court therefore did
not abuse its discretion by declining to rely on them in its examination for a genuine issue
of material fact. And it likewise did not err by granting summary judgment. We turn to
Russell’s sanctions arguments.
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B. Sanctions
The district court sanctioned Russell and Silvanesti with $66,359 in attorney fees
and costs. Russell argues first that the district court abused its discretion by ordering
sanctions because the trust and M. J. Scott did not provide a safe -harbor notice and did not
file a separate motion for sanctions . See Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03(a)(1) (prohibiting filing of
sanctions motion until 21 days after service of motion and requiring motion to be made
separately); see also Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subd. 4(a) (2016). Russell argues second that
the award was unreasonable. We need not fully analyze the substance of Russell’s
arguments because, again, he failed to present them to the district court.
We observe that compliance with the safe-harbor and separate-motion requirements
for sanctions is mandatory, as Russell now suggests. See, e.g., Johnson ex rel. Johnson v.
Johnson, 726 N.W.2d 516, 518 (Minn. App. 2007); Dyrdal v. Golden Nuggets, Inc., 672
N.W.2d 578, 589 (Minn. App. 2003), aff ’d, 689 N.W.2d 779 (Minn. 2004). But Russell
had ample opportunity to argue any procedural defects and failed to do so; he responded to
the memorandum that requested attorney fees without addressing the request, and he did
not raise the arguments even during the summary -judgment hearing. We have described
the formal requirements of rule 11 and section 549.211, subdivision 4(a), as due process
protections. See Buscher v. Montag Dev., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 199, 210 (Minn. App. 2009)
(“Due process requires that the parties and attorneys receive notice of such potential
sanctions and a hearing.” (quotation omitted)); Johnson, 726 N.W.2d at 519 (“[The] ‘safe-
harbor’ provision is intended to give the offending party time to withdraw the improper
papers or otherwise rectify the situation.” (quotation omitted)). But even due process
19
arguments may be forfeited by failing to present them to the district court. See, e.g., Rubey
v. Vannett, 714 N.W.2d 417, 424 (Minn. 2006); In re Welfare of Children of Coats, 633
N.W.2d 505, 512 (Minn. 2001); In re W elfare of J.B., 698 N.W.2d 160, 171 (Minn. App.
2005). Russell’s tardy arguments are forfeited. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582.
We are unconvinced by Russell’s contention that he “opposed the fees and the court
noted his opposition.” Russell apparently refers to his response to the trust and M. J. Scott’s
requested amount of fees. Russell’s response was not an argument; it was a general
objection that relied on the supposed futility of his presenting any actual argument. Russell
again forfeited his challenge to the amount of sanctions by failing to present his arguments
to the district court.
Affirmed.