In re the Marriage of: Michele Lura Honderich-Flannery, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0062

In re the Marriage of: Michele Lura Honderich-Flannery, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Christopher John Flannery,
Appellant.

Filed November 20, 2017
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-08-2078

Ryan M. Schmisek, Schmisek Law Office PLLC, Bloomington, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Amy L. Helsene, Larkin Hoffman Daly & Lindgren, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Worke, Judge.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant-husband challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to require
respondent-wife to reimburse him for her use of an education fund and to terminate his
spousal-maintenance obligation. We affirm.
FACTS
The district court dissolved the marriage of a ppellant-husband Christopher John
Flannery and respondent -wife Michele Lura Honderich on December 16, 2008 , pursuant
to a stipulated judgment and decree. The judgment and decree established custody and
parenting time regarding the parties’ children and outlined each party’s current financial
circumstances. Wife reported monthly income of $478.83 and that she earned $9 per hour
working 13 hours per week at a hardware store. She claimed a monthly budget of $6,700
with the children’s expenses and $5,500 without the children’s expenses . Husband
reported a monthly income of $10,416.66 and a monthly budget of $5,500.
The district court ordered husband to pay wife spousal maintenance of $3,000 per
month and child support of $1,300 per month. The parties agreed that wife had an
obligation to increase her earning capacity to decrease husband’s spousal-maintenance
obligation. The judgment and decree provided that “[t]he amount of maintenance shall be
reviewed four years after the entry of the Judgment and D ecree to determine whether the
[wife’s] education and increased income justifies a reduction in the amount of maintenance
paid by [husband].” The judgment and decree also provided that the parties would set aside
$40,000 in an education fund for wife and that “[i]f [wife] does not successfully complete
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her degree within a reasonable time, unl ess that occurs through no fault of her own, she
shall refund half of the amount used from the account as well as half the remaining balance
to [husband].”
On September 21, 2015, the district court adopted a stipulation of the parties in
accordance with a binding mediation agreement , and it modified parenting time , child
support, and spousal maintenance in accordance with the stipulation. The district court
found that wife’s monthly income was $2,000 per month, that she worked less t han full
time, and that she earned $16.59 per hour. The district court reduced husband’s spousal -
maintenance obligation to $2,500 per month and indicated that it would review the spousal-
maintenance obligation in June 2016. The district court also reduce d husband’s child -
support obligation to $800 per month. Lastly, the district court ordered husband to provide
$8,100 for wife’s continued education in a lab oratory-assistant program, pursuant to the
parties’ agreement.
On August 3, 2016, husband moved t he district court to terminate his spousal -
maintenance obligation and to order wife to reimburse him for half of the education fund.
The district court denied the motion. The district court reasoned that the judgment and
decree established wife’s budget as $5,500 per month. The court noted that it had reduced
husband’s maintenance to $2,500 in 2015, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. The district
court found no reason to reduce wife’s budget and that circumstances had not changed
since the parties’ 2015 stipulation.
Regarding the education fund, the district court found that wife “presented
compelling evidence that her changes in her educational path were caused by legitimate
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concerns over which sh e had little to no control ” and concluded that she d id not owe
husband any reimbursement for her use of the fund . The district court also found that
husband had waived his right to object to wife’s use of the education fund when he entered
into the 2015 stipulation , reasoning that because the 2015 agreement addressed the
education fund and provided that wife would receive $8,100 toward further education al
expenses, “husband waived any objection to amounts spent out of the education fund prior
to September 2015.”
Husband requested leave to move for reconsideration. Husband a rgued that the
district court had misconstrued the parties’ intent when it found that he would provide “an
additional” $8,100 to further wife’s education because the parties actually agreed that wife
would receive the $8,100 rem aining in the education fund and no more. Husband also
argued that his agreement to provide the $8,100 should not preclude him from challenging
wife’s prior use of the fund. The district court denied the reconsideration request,
reasoning that whether ad ditional funds were provided did not affect the court’s
“conclusion that the parties had reached a settlement o ver the use of these funds and
Husband cannot reopen issues regarding how the funds were used prior to the agreement.”
Husband appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I.
Husband contends that the district court erred when it did not order wife to
reimburse him half of the $40,000 education fund. As support, husband assigns error to
several of the district court’s related findings of fact.
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A district court’s findings of fact are not set aside unless clearly erroneous. Maiers
v. Maiers, 775 N.W.2d 666, 668 (Minn. App. 2009). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous
when they are manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably
supported by t he evidence as a whole.” Hemmingsen v. Hemmingsen , 767 N.W.2d 711,
716 (Minn. App. 2009 ) (quotation omitted), review granted (Minn. Sept. 29, 2009) and
appeal dismissed (Minn. Feb. 1, 2010). “When determining whether findings are clearly
erroneous, [an] appellate court views the record in the light most favorable to the [district]
court’s findings.” Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. App. 2000). “We
defer to the district court’s credibility determinations as to conflicting affidavits.” Knapp
v. Knapp , 883 N.W.2d 833, 837 (Minn. App. 2016). “That the record might support
findings other than those made by the [district] court does not show that the court’s findings
are defective.” Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 474.
The parties’ stipulated judgment and decree provided as follows: “If [wife] does not
successfully complete her degree within a reasonable time, unless that occurs through no
fault of her own, she shall refund half of the amount used from the account as well as half
the remaining balance to [husband].” (Emphasis added.) Husband argues that the district
court erroneously found that “[wife] had completed her education as a laboratory
technician,” that “the entire education fund had been spent at the tim e the parties entered
into the S tipulation,” and that husband “specifically agreed to [wife’s] career in the
laboratory assistant field.” Because these findings do not materially impact the dispositive
issue—whether wife failed to complete a degree within a reasonable time through no fault
of her own —any associated error is not prejudicial. To prevail on appeal, an appellant
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must show both error and prejudice resulting from the error. Toughill v. Toughill , 609
N.W.2d 634, 639 (Minn. App. 2000). We therefore focus our review on the district court’s
finding that is most relevant: wife “presented compelling evidence that her changes in her
educational path were caused by legitimate concerns over which she had little or no
control.”
Wife submitted evidence regarding many circumstances that prevented her from
completing a degree. These circumstances included mental -health issues, allergic
reactions, medication issues, and other practical difficulties. Wife’s evidence included her
diagnoses of major depressive disorder, anxiety, attention deficit disorder, and a parasite-
induced gastrointestinal problem. Wife’s affidavit opposing husband’s motion stated that
she was forced to reconsider her course of education after being denied a letter of
recommendation based on her attention-deficit-disorder diagnosis. This evidence supports
the district court’s determination that wife presented compelling evidence showing that the
changes in her educational path were beyond her control.
In sum, the evidence supports the district court’s determination that wife’s f ailure
to obtain a degree was beyond her control . The district court therefore did not err by
denying husband’s request for reimbursement from wife. Because we affirm the district
court’s ruling on the merits of husband’s request for reimbursement, we do not address
husband’s argument that the district court err oneously concluded that he waived his right
to request reimbursement.
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II.
Husband contends that the district court erred by denying his request to terminate
his spousal-maintenance obligation. He argues that the district court erred by applying the
statutory standard for modification instead of reviewing his request de novo as the parties’
stipulation intended. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2 (a)-(b) (2016) (stating that
maintenance may be modified when a substantial change in circumstance makes the terms
unreasonable and unfair and listing bases for determining that terms are unreasonable and
unfair).
De novo review of a maintenance award is appropriat e when a stipulated order
“clearly calls for” and the “parties specifically agreed to” such review. LeRoy v. LeRoy ,
600 N.W.2d 729, 732 -33 (Minn. App. 1999) , review denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 1999). “In
general, a district court should defer to a stipulation entered into by the parties.” Id. at 732.
Courts treat stipulated marriage -dissolution judgments as contract s for purposes of
construction. Grachek v. Grachek , 750 N.W.2d 328, 333 (Minn. App. 2008), review
denied (Minn. Aug. 19, 2008).
Husband’s challenge to the district court’s failure to engage in de novo review under
the parties’ stipulation is unavailing because husband is not entitled to modification under
the stipulation. The 2008 stipulated judgment and decree provided that “ [t]he amount of
maintenance shall be reviewed four years after the entry of the Judgment and D ecree to
determine whether [wife’s] education and increased income justifies a reduction in the
amount of maintenance paid by [husband].” (Emphasis added.) The part ies reviewed
husband’s spousal-maintenance obligation in 2014 and reached a stipulated agreement that
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was ordered by the district court in 2015. The stipulated agreement provided that
husband’s spousal -maintenance obligation would be reduced to $2,500 and that the
reduced amount would be reviewed again in June 2016. The relevant portion of the
resulting 2015 order provides as follows:
Maintenance shall be reviewed on or about June 1, 2016, and
that review shall be limited to the monthly amount of spousal
maintenance . . . . The amount of maintenance shall be
reviewed to determine whether W ife’s increased income
following completion of the additional education referenced
below justifies a reduction in the amount of maintenance paid
by Husband.

(Emphasis added.)
The plain language of the order, which is based on the parties’ stipulation, shows
that any reduction of husband’s spousal-maintenance obligation must be based on wife’s
increased income. In addressing husband’s motion to terminate spousal maintenance, the
district court found that wife’s income had decreased—and not increased—since the most
recent stipulated order. Specifically, the district court found that wife’s income was $2,000
per month in 2015 and only $817 per month at the time of the 2016 motion hearing.
Husband challenges the district court’s finding s regarding wife’s reduced income.
He generally argues that wife’s reduced income is voluntary. H e specifically argues that
“[t]he district court made no finding as to what future income could or should be produced
by [wife] with reasonable effort.” He also argues that, based on the district court’s findings,
“a step reduction may also be appropriate.”
We do not consider these arguments because husband did not ask the district court
to determine wife’s future income or impose a step reduction. We generally do not consider
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issues that were not raised and determined in district court. Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d
580, 582 (Minn. 1988). And we do not fault the district court for not making findings it
was not asked to make. See Hesse v. Hesse, 778 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Minn. App. 2009) (citing
Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk , 668 N.W.2d 235, 243 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied
(Minn. Nov. 25, 2003)) (holding that it was not error to decline to make findings regarding
party’s expenses where party failed to submit party’s expenses for consideration). In sum,
because husband did not ask the district court to determine wife’s future income or impose
a step reduction, he cannot assign error to the district court’s failure to do so.
As to wife’s current financial circumstances, the district court noted that the parties
stipulated to wife’s standard of living in the original judgment and decree. The court
received evidence regarding wife’s current income , which shows that she made
significantly less at the time of the motion hearing than she made when the district court
last modified maintenance. Lastly, the court found that the changes in wife’s career path
were involuntary. Under these circumstances and the s tandards that govern our review ,
husband does not persuade us that the findings regarding wife’s reduced income are clearly
erroneous.
In the alternative, husband argues that he demonstrated a substantial change in
circumstances justifying modification of his spousal -maintenance obligation under the
statutory standard for modification. That standard provides:
The terms of an order respecting maintenance or
support may be modified upon a showing of one or more of the
following, any of which makes the terms unreasonable and
unfair:
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(1) substantially increased or decreased gross i ncome
of an obligor or obligee;
(2) substantially increased or decreased need of an
obligor or obligee . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2 (a). We review a district court’s analysis of an alleged
change of circumstances, as well as its decision whether to modify the terms of a stipulated
judgment and decree, for an abuse of discretion. Hecker v. Hecker, 568 N.W.2d 705, 709
(Minn. 1997).
Husband asserts that “ [t]he frustration of the parties’ expectations on which a
stipulation was based can satisfy the modification analysis.” See id. at 709-10 (stating that
“the frustration of the parties’ expectations” was a substantial change in circumstances
warranting modification of spousal maintenance ). Husband notes that wife’s obligation
under the 2008 decree was to “ significantly increase her earning capacity in order to
decrease the amount of maintenance [husband] needs to pay in order for [wife] to meet her
budget.” Husband argues that wife “has not upheld her share of the parties’ agreement”
and that wife’s “failure to perform with respect to both the Decree and the 2015 Stipulation
in contrast to [husband’s] consistent performance under both constitute a qualifying change
of circumstance upon which a complete review of the entire arrangement is necessary.”
Husband’s argument that wife fail ed to uphold her end of the agreement is
unavailing given the d istrict court’s finding that wife “has not violated the terms of the
[judgment and decree ] requiring her to ‘successfully complete her degree within a
reasonable time, unless that occurs through no fault of her own.’” Moreover, the district
court found, and the record supports, that wife’s income has decreased since the 2015 order
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reducing husband’s spousal-maintenance obligation, whereas the district court foun d, and
husband does not dispute, that his projected earnings for 2016 included $150,000 in salary
and a bonus of $185,000.
On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
husband did not establish a substantial change in circumstances justifying termination of
his spousal -maintenance obligation. Because husband has not demonstrate d a basis to
modify his spousal-maintenance obligation under either the terms of the parties’ stipulation
or the statutory standard for modification, husband’s remaining arguments assigning error
to the district court’s findings regarding wife’s budget are immaterial. See Tuthill v. Tuthill,
399 N.W.2d 230, 232 (Minn. App. 1987) (“The failure to show [a substantial change in
circumstances] precludes a modification of maintenance obligations under Minn. Stat.
§ 518.64, subd. 2. Therefore, it is not necessary for the [district] court to make findings
regarding any other factors addressed in the statute.”).
In conclusion, the district court did not err by denying husband’s request for
reimbursement or his request for termination of his spousal -maintenance obligation. We
therefore affirm.
Affirmed.