State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0070

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Randy Donald Reed,
Appellant.

Filed January 8, 2018
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Morrison County District Court
File No. 49-CR-14-1797

Lori Swanson, Attorney Gene ral, Edwin W. Stockmeyer, A ssistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian Middendorf, Morrison County Attorney, Little Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Ju dge; Worke, Judge; and
Toussaint, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Randy Donald Reed appeals from hi s conviction, after a jury verdict, of
being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm. Appellant challenges the sufficiency
of the circumstantial evidence that he constructively possessed the firearm, and argues that
the district court lacked jurisdiction to determine his guilt because the district court did not
comply with the Uniform Ma ndatory Disposition of Deta iners Act (UMDDA). Because
the record evidence sufficien tly supports the jury ’s guilty verdict, and because the
UMDDA timeline was tolled by appellant’s pretrial motions, we affirm.
FACTS
On October 27, 2014, an arrest warrant was issued for appellant, a convicted felon.1
Two days later, officers arrived at the property of appellant’s parents looking for appellant.
The officers spoke with severa l family members and search ed the surround ing property,
including the camper trailer where appellant’s girlfriend was then living and a steel shed
attached to a chicken coop. The officers walked around the exterior of the shed and found
three doors, two of which were padlocked fro m the outside and a third that was locked
from the inside. Suspecting that appellant was inside the shed, an officer used the public-
address system on a law enforcement vehicle to announce that appellant should come out
of the shed.

1 Neither the arrest warrant nor appellant’s status as a felon is challenged here.

3
When appellant did not respond, two team s of officers entered the shed. Once
inside, officers observed a “kind of shop or storage area” that included a loft above it. The
area also included a makeshift bedroom contai ning a bunkbed and seve ral coolers. The
officers did not immediately see appellant. One officer saw a Winchester 30/30 lever-
action rifle laying on a waist-hi gh shelf, approximately four feet from the bunkbed. The
officers eventually found appellant lying on the dirt floor beneath the bunkbed.
The state charged appellant with being a prohibited person in possession of the
Winchester rifle in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2014). On June 24,
2015, and while he was incarcerated on an unrelated conviction, appellant signed a written
request for disposition under the UMDDA. The request was filed with the district court on
July 2, 2015. The UMDDA, enacted in this state as Minn. Stat. § 629.292 (2016), requires
the state to bring to trial any untried indictment or complaint against an imprisoned person
within six months of the impr isoned person’s request. Appella nt did not talk to anyone
about the form’s significance and maintains on appeal that he signed it “without knowing
what it was about.”
Over the next six months, appellant was assigned a public defender who was
unaware of appellant’s UMDDA request. Appellant’s attorney requested two separate 60-
day continuances to prepare motions, in A ugust and in November of 2015. These
continuances were granted. On December 30, 2015, appellant moved to suppress evidence.
Before the omnibus hearing where the motion to suppress would be argued, appellant’s
attorney learned that the UMDDA six-month pe riod had expired. Appellant’s attorney
requested a continuance of the omnibus hearing because he was in trial in another county.

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Appellant’s attorney raised the UMDDA issue fo r the first time at the hearing. After the
contested omnibus hearing, the district c ourt denied appellant’s suppression motion.
Concerning the UMDDA, the di strict court denied appellant’s motion to dismiss the
complaint for noncompliance with the UMDDA. The district court ordered that the charges
against appellant be tried within 120 days of January 2, 2016, the original UMDDA
deadline, adding this 120-da y additional period because of the two 60-day continuances
that had been granted at the request of appellant’s attorney.
The case was tried over three days, from Ma rch 21 to 23, 2016 . The jury found
appellant guilty of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. Appellant’s posttrial
motion for acquittal was denied.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
I. Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict.
The jury found appellant guilty of being a prohibite d person in possession of a
firearm under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2). Appellant challenges the district court’s
denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that th e evidence is insufficient to
prove that he constructively possessed the rifl e found in the shed near his bunkbed. On
appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues specifically that the
circumstantial evidence tending to prove constructive possession is insufficient to establish
that he had exclusive dominion and control over the rifle.
We review the sufficiency of the evidence based on a thorough analysis of the
record, viewing the evidence in “the light most favorable to the conviction.” State v. Webb,

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440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989); see also State v. Hawkins , 260 N.W.2d 150, 157
(Minn. 1977) (requiring a reviewing court to c onsider the evidence in a manner that is
“most favorable to the state” and assume th at the jury “disbelieved” any contradictory
testimony). If the evidence is “sufficient to permit the juro rs to reach the verdict which
they did,” Webb, 440 N.W.2d at 430, and the jury “c ould reasonably c onclude that the
defendant was guilty of the offense charged,” then this court “will not disturb the verdict.”
Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted).
A jury may reach a guilty verdict based on direct or circumstantial evidence. Direct
evidence is “based on personal knowledge or obs ervation . . . that, if true, proves a fact
without inference or presumption.” State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 604 (Minn. 2013)
(quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence is that “from wh ich the factfinder can infer
whether the facts in dispute existed” and “alw ays requires an inferen tial step to prove a
fact.” State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2 017) (quotations and citations
omitted). A conviction based on circumstantial evidence is subject to heightened scrutiny.
State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010). This heightened scrutiny requires
us to apply a two-step analysis. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 600. First, we identify the
circumstances proved and defer “to the ju ry’s acceptance of the proof of these
circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances
proved by the State.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 598-99 (quotation omitted). Second, we
“determine whether the circum stances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent
with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. at 599 (quotation omitted). “[I]f any
one or more circumstances found proved are in consistent with guilt, or consistent with

6
innocence, then a reasonable do ubt as to guilt arises.” Al-Nasseer, 788 N.W.2d at 474
(quotation omitted).
Here, the record contains no direct evid ence that appellant actually possessed the
rifle. The state relied on circumstantial evid ence to prove that ap pellant constructively
possessed it. Constructive possession exists when “there is a strong probability (inferable
from other evidence) that the defendant was at the time consciously exercising dominion
and control over [the firearm].” State v. Florine, 303 Minn. 103, 105, 226 N.W.2d 609,
611 (1975). The constructive-possession doctrine applies in
cases where the state cannot prove actual or physical
possession at the time of arrest but where the inference is
strong that the defendant at one time physically possessed the
[contraband] and did not abandon his possessory interest in the
[contraband] but rather contin ued to exercise dominion and
control over it up to the time of arrest.

Id. at 104-05, 226 N.W.2d at 610. To prove constructive possession, the state must show
the object in question to have been either (1 ) “in a place under the defendant’s exclusive
control to which other[s] did not normally have access,” or (2) where, despite others having
had access to where the object was found, a strong probability exists that the defendant was
“consciously exercising dominion and control over it.” Id. at 105, 226 N.W.2d at 611.
The state proved these circumstances at trial: appellant, the only person inside the
shed with the rifle, had lock ed the shed from the inside; appellant was the only occupant
of the shed; he constructed a bed near wher e the rifle was found; appellant had been
sleeping in the shed fo r 30 to 40 nights before his a rrest; a medical condition prevented
appellant from climbing stairs, which would have been necessary for him to enter his

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parents’ home; the officers found the rifle on a shelf only four feet from the bunkbed under
which appellant was hiding; and there were two padlocks on the outside of the shed. The
record does not reveal who padlocked the shed from the outside or whether and when others
might have had access to the shed.
We next examine the circumstances prov ed to determine whether there is any
rational inference from those circumstances that is inconsistent with appellant’s guilt. See
Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599 (stating that a re viewing court must determine whether
circumstances proved are “consistent with guilt”). We see no such inference here.
Appellant’s proximity to the rifle is an im portant factor in determining constructive
possession. See e.g., State v. Breaux, 620 N.W.2d 326, 334 (Minn. App. 2001) (“Proximity
is an important factor when establishing constructive possession.”); State v. Denison, 607
N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn. App. 2000) (reasoni ng that the close proximity of a banned
substance near the defendant was a factor pe rmitting a jury to infer she had constructive
possession of the substance). Appellant was found mere feet from where the rifle was
stored, and he remained inside the shed with the rifle despite multiple police orders to come
out.2 Appellant was the only person in the shed. He was essentially living there when the
rifle was found. The rifle was not conceale d from view; officers saw it lying on a shelf

2 There was testimony that another person owned the rifle found in the shed. But the jury
was not obligated to accept that testimony, an d the guilty verdict suggests that it may not
have believed that testimony. Regardless, it does not matter whether appellant owned the
rifle, because the act of exercising dominion and control over the rifle does not depend on
ownership. See State v. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d 156, 160 n.3 (Minn. 2015) (“[A] person may
possess property even if another person owns that property.”).

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very near appellant’s bed. Although appellant raises alternative inferences, “[w]e will not
overturn a conviction based on ci rcumstantial evidence on the ba sis of mere conjecture.”
Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 473 (quota tion omitted). Here, the ci rcumstances proved give
rise to a single rational inference—that appe llant constructively possessed the rifle found
mere feet from where he was arrested, in a space occupied only by him.
II. The district court had jurisdiction despite appellant’s UMDDA request made
more than six months before disposition.

Appellant also argues that the district court lost jurisdiction over the case because it
did not honor his UMDDA request and failed to dispose of th is charge within six months
of appellant’s request. The district court he re determined that the six-month period was
tolled by appellant’s continuance requests.
The UMDDA allows detained persons char ged with a crime to request a final
disposition of a pending untried indictment or complaint. Minn. Stat. § 629.292, subd. 1.
Once a petition is received by the court and prosecuting attorney, the case must be “brought
to trial” within six months. Minn. Stat. § 629.292, subd. 3. The purpose of the UMDDA
is to “establish a prisoner’s right to a speedy disposition of untried charges.” State v. Miller,
525 N.W.2d 576, 583 (Minn. App. 1994). Additional time may be added to the six-month
period when the district court finds good cause, when the parties stipulate for a
continuance, or when a continuance is grante d “on notice to the atto rney of record and
opportunity for the attorney to be heard.” Minn. Stat. § 629.292, subd. 3.
Here, the district court did not find “g ood cause” to exceed the UMDDA’s six-
month period before that period ended. We recognized in State v. Kurz that a “good cause”

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determination to extend the applicable peri od must be made within it. 685 N.W.2d 447,
449 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 2004). Accordingly, the good-cause
provision of Minn. Stat. § 629.292, subd. 3, has no application here.
Kurz also recognized a tolling exception when a delay in disposition is caused by
the defendant. 685 N.W.2d at 449-50 . Here, we follow the analysis in Kurz rather than
the earlier Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972), analysis we applied in
Miller. Compare Kurz, 685 N.W.2d at 450 with Miller, 525 N.W.2d at 581-83. The district
court recognized that appellant requested the stipulated continuances that occasioned the
delay in disposing of the charge. The stat e received appellant’s signed UMDDA request
on July 2, 2015. Six months from that date was January 2, 2016. On August 31, 2015,
appellant’s attorney requested a 60-day con tinuance to prepare omnibus motions. On
November 2, 2015, appellant’s attorney reque sted another 60-day continuance to prepare
a motion to suppress evidence. The state did not object to either continuance request. The
district court granted both continuances.
The district court did not e rr. These continuances requested by appellant’s lawyer
tolled the six-month period under the UMDDA. See Minn. Stat. § 629.292, subd. 3; Kurz,
685 N.W.2d 447. The UMDDA trial period was tolled for the duration of the time afforded
to appellant’s lawyer under the continuances , and for the time that the district court
considered appellant’s motion to dismiss. See Kurz, 685 N.W.2d at 4 49-50. Appellant
argues that there was no tolling because he di d not know what he had signed and his
attorney was unaware of his request. Regard less of the subjective belief or knowledge of
the request, the continuances requested by appe llant, and granted by the district court,

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tolled the six-month period. The situ ation here is similar to that in Kurz: a defendant’s
filing of motions cannot “create a UMDDA violation” by causing the proceedings to extend
beyond the six-month period. Id. at 450. The short extens ion of time to accommodate
appellant’s counsel were reasonable and tolled the UMDDA period.
Because the six-month period under the UMDDA was tolled during the period after
appellant’s lawyer requested c ontinuances and until the distri ct court decided appellant’s
motions, the district court reta ined jurisdiction to adjudicate the state’s charge against
appellant despite the expiration of more than six months from the receipt of appellant’s
UMDDA request. As we noted in Kurz, dismissal would be “absurd” in such a
circumstance. Id.
Affirmed.