LeRoy J. Rossow, Jr., Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0077

LeRoy J. Rossow, Jr.,
Appellant,

vs.

The City of Lake Elmo, Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed November 27, 2017
Reversed and remanded
Schellhas, Judge
Dissenting, Kalitowski, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-15-6016

Joseph J. Dudley, Jr., Christopher W. Boline, Dudley and Smith, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Mary D. Tietjen, James J. Thomson, Kennedy & Graven Chartered, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judg e; Schellhas, Judge; and
Kalitowski, Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant landowner challenges the district court’s entry of summary judgment in
favor of respondent city, arguing that the city acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or
unreasonably when it denied his preliminary a nd final plat applications. We reverse and
remand with instructions.
FACTS
Appellant LeRoy J. Rossow Jr. is the owner of a ten-acre parcel in the City of Lake
Elmo (the city). The parcel contains a single-family home and an accessory building (pole
barn). According to the city’s zoning ordinanc e, the parcel is zone d as rural residential
(RR), and under the city’s co mprehensive plan, the parcel is designated for rural area
development (RAD).
In 2014, Rossow submitted a sketch plan to the city’s planning commission detailing
a proposal to develop a cemetery on the parcel. Rossow’s sketch plan included “three main
areas for in-ground burials, space for columbarium, and a parking area.” Rossow planned
to repurpose the single-family home and pole barn for cemetery administration and
maintenance. In November 2014, the pl anning commission concluded that Rossow’s
proposal did not require rezoning of the parcel because cemeteries are a permitted use in
the RR zoning district. 1 At the public meeting, Rossow explained that he intended to

1 Despite RR zoning permitting cemetery use, Rossow was required by statute to submit a
sketch plan and proceed with a formal platting process. See Minn. Stat. § 306.05 (2016)
(requiring that cemetery land “be surveyed and divided into lo ts of a size determined by

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convert the existing single-family home into a caretaker’s residence. Rossow also said that
the cemetery would cater to “modern burials,” would be private and non-denominational,
and would not provide fune ral-home services. The planning commission noted that
Rossow’s sketch plan conformed to the city’s comprehensive plan and that the city’s
zoning ordinance did not contain specific development standards for cemeteries. No
community members spoke against the proposed development.
At a December 2014 city co uncil meeting, when the council addressed Rossow’s
sketch plan, a councilmember suggested that the council review the zoning ordinances
related to cemeteries in the future. No community members spoke against the proposed
development. The council took no formal action.
In July 2015, the planning commission held another public meeting after Rossow
submitted his preliminary and final plat applications. 2 In a premeeting report, city staff
stated (1) “these facilities have been designed to comply with the rules of the City of Lake
Elmo and the Valley Branch Watershed District ,” (2) “[b]ased on Staff’s review of the
preliminary and final plat, the applicant has demonstrated compliance with all applicable
code requirements at the level of detail that is required for a plat,” (3) “[t]he proposed
subdivision is consistent with the Lake Elmo Comprehensive Plan [and] . . . cemetery use
is not in conflict with this land use guidance,” (4) the property is zoned RR and “cemeteries
are a permitted use” under this zoning designation, (5) city staff and the city engineer “have

the trustees” and that “[a] map of the survey must be filed with the county recorder of the
county where the cemetery is located”).
2 The city permitted Rossow to submit his preliminary and final plat applications together
because of the small scale of the project.

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not identified any existing conflicts with the City’s Subdivision Ordinance,” and
(6) “Planning Staff has reviewed the overall amount of parking on the plan and found it to
be more than adequate.”
At the July 2015 meeting, seven community members expressed concerns about the
cemetery proposal, including future funding for cemetery maintenance, possible increased
traffic, and possible decreased property values. 3 The planning commission noted that the
surrounding roads were adequa te to accommodate the ceme tery, that the relationship
between cemeteries and surroun ding property values was in conclusive, and that Rossow
had a plan in place to provide for cemetery maintenance. Rossow agreed not to establish a
crematorium on the property and explained that state law required the creation of a
permanent trust fund to maintain the cemetery. See Minn. Stat. § 306.76 (2016) (requiring
cemetery association to establish permanent care and improvement fund when it maintains
public cemetery in or adjacent to city of 50,000 or more people ). The commission voted
6-0 for approval of Rossow’s preliminary a nd final plat applications with proposed
conditions that included a condition that any future expansion of the site, including plans
to install a crematorium, must be revi ewed and approved by the city. The commission
forwarded the plat applications to the city council with a proposed resolution.

3 In addition to commu nity members testifying against Rossow’s proposed development,
individuals created an online petition named “Oppose the proposed Lake Elmo cemetery”
and Facebook users formed a group called “Stop the La ke Elmo Cemetery.” On
September 4, 2015, KSTP news reported on some residents’ opposition to the cemetery.
Some residents also submitted an opposition petition to the city.

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On July 21, 2015, the city council considered the plat applications. The city planner
explained that the preliminary and final plat applications did not include a proposal to
operate the site as a “funeral home.” Comm unity members renewed their concerns. The
council tabled the vote, requested additional information from the city attorney regarding
the definitions of “cemetery” and “funeral home,” and exte nded its 60-day deadline for
addressing Rossow’s plat applications to 120 days under Minn. Stat . § 15.99, subd. 3(f)
(2016).
City staff provided the city council with additional information and prepared two
proposed resolutions for the city council’s consideration at a council meeting on October 6,
2015—one resolution for approva l, like the July 21, 2015 proposed resolution, and one
resolution for denial. At that meeting, te n community members spoke against Rossow’s
applications and an attorney argued against a pproval on behalf of a group of individuals.
A city councilmember stated that the cemet ery “proposal is not what the zoning code
allows for, as it is a large scale business and has overwhelming citizen opposition.” The
Mayor stated that “a cemetery is a reasonable use and could be an asset but the funeral
home component of this proposal doesn’t f it.” The city council denied Rossow’s plat
applications 5-0.
Rossow sued the city in district court, challenging the denial of his preliminary and
final plat applications. Rossow sought declaratory judg ment pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§§ 555.01 −.16, 462.361 (2016), and a lleged that the city council’s denial of his plat
applications was arbitrary, capricious, and with out sufficient factual or legal basis. Both

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parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to the
city and dismissed Rossow’s complaint with prejudice. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The city’s denial of Rossow’s prelimin ary and final plat applications on the
basis of the city counc il’s second finding was unreasonable, arbitrary, and
capricious.

When appellate courts review action by a governmental body, th e focus is on the
proceeding before the decision-making body, not the findings of the district court. Carl
Bolander Sons Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 502 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Minn. 1993). “The denial
or approval of a preliminary plat application is a quasi-judicial administrative decision that
we review to determine whether the decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.”
Hurrle v. Cty. of Sherburne by Bd. of Comm’rs, 594 N.W.2d 246, 249 (Minn. App. 1999),
review denied (Minn. Dec. 19, 2001).
“Reasonableness is measured by ‘the legal sufficiency of and factual basis for the
reasons given.’” Swanson v. City of Bloomington, 421 N.W.2d 307, 313 (Minn. 1988). “A
decision lacks a rational basis if it is unsuppor ted by substantial ev idence in th e record,
premised on a legally insuffi cient reason, or based on s ubjective or unreasonably vague
standards.” PTL, LLC v. Chisago Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 656 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Minn. App.
2003). “While neighborhood feeling may not constitute the sole basis for a zoning decision,
it may still be taken into account.” Swanson, 421 N.W.2d at 313; see also Nw. Coll. v. City
of Arden Hills, 281 N.W.2d 865, 869 (Minn. 1979). In evaluating the city council’s reasons
for its decision, appellate courts “look at the contemporaneous record made by the entity.”
Hurrle, 594 N.W.2d at 249. “Because local offici als have broad discretion in deciding

7

whether to grant or de ny a proposed land use, we give great deference to their land-use
decisions and will reverse only in rare instances where the decision lacks a rational basis.”
PTL, 656 N.W.2d at 571. But “[t] he absence of substantial evidentiary support and [a]
board’s failure to justify its finding based on an ordinance indicate arbitrary action.”
Hurrle, 594 N.W.2d at 251.
“[W]e apply the substantial-evidence test to determine whether the decision is
supported by legally sufficient reasons and factually supported in the record.” Watab Twp.
Citizen All. v. Benton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs , 728 N.W.2d 82, 93 −94 (Minn. App. 2007),
review denied (Minn. May 15, 2007). “The decision must be supported by substantial
evidence on the r ecord, which addresses the requirement s of the applicable ordinances.”
Id. at 94. “[W]hen an ordinance specifies minimum standards to which subdivisions must
conform, local officials lack discretionary authority to deny approval of a preliminary plat
that meets those standards.” PTL, 656 N.W.2d at 571 (quotation omitted).
“To determine whether a governmental entity’s decision wa s unreasonable or
arbitrary and capricious, we look to the controlling ordinance.” Hurrle, 594 N.W.2d at 250.
“[T]he interpretation of an existing ordinance is a question of law for the court.” Frank’s
Nursery Sales, Inc. v. City of Roseville, 295 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn. 1980). “[W]here the
question is whether an ordinance is applicable to certain facts, the determination of those
facts is for the governmental authority, but the manner of ap plying the ordinance to the
facts is for the court.” Id.
In reviewing zoning decisions of local go verning bodies, appellate courts make an
“independent examination” of “the record and decision and arrive at [their] own

8

conclusions as to the propriety of that determination without according any special
deference to the same review conducted by the [district] court.” Nw. Coll., 281 N.W.2d at
868. “Along with a clearly articulated rationa le for its decision, specific reference to the
local ordinance is essential to fac ilitate effective judicial review.” Earthburners, Inc. v.
County of Carlton, 513 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Minn. 1994).
“A zoning ordinance should be construe d (1) according to the plain and ordinary
meaning of its terms, (2) in favor of the property owner, and (3) in light of the ordinance’s
underlying policy goals.” Watab Twp. Citizen All., 728 N.W.2d at 94 (quotation omitted);
see also Mendota Golf, LLP v. City of Mendota Heights , 708 N.W.2d 162, 172 (Minn.
2006) (“Generally, [appellate courts] narrowly construe any restrictions that a zoning
ordinance imposes upon a property owner.”); Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass’n v. City
of Chanhassen, 342 N.W.2d 335, 340 (Minn. 1984) (“[A] zoning ordinance is in derogation
of the common law and should be construed strictly against the city and in favor of the
property owner.”). If an entity’s zoning ordinances specify “standards to which a proposed
plat must conform, it is arb itrary as a matter of law to deny approval of a plat which
complies in all respects” with the ordinances. Nat’l Capital Corp. v. Vill. of Inver Grove
Heights, 301 Minn. 335, 337, 222 N.W.2d 550, 552 (1974).
“[C]ourts generally strive to construe a term according to its plain and ordinary
meaning.” Frank’s Nursery Sales, 295 N.W.2d at 608. To determine the plain and ordinary
meaning of an undefined te rm, appellate courts turn to dictionary definitions. State v.
Thonesavanh, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ 2017 WL 3880768, at *3 (Minn. Sept. 6, 2017).

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In the ordinance at issue in this case, cemetery is defined as “[l]and used or intended
to be used for the burial of the dead and dedicated for cemetery purposes, including
columbariums, crematories, mausoleums, and mortuaries when operated in conjunction
with and within the boundaries of such cemetery.” Lake Elmo, Minn., Code of Ordinances
(LECO) § 154.012(B)(2)(a) ( 2012). Apart from the definiti on of cemetery, the zoning
ordinance contains few regulat ory standards for cemeteries. The city council made four
findings to support its denial of Rossow’s pre liminary and final plat applications. In its
second and fourth findings, the city alleged nonconformities with the zoning ordinance.
In its second finding, the council stated:
That the [proposed cemetery] does not comply with the
City’s RR – Rural Residential zoning district because it
includes uses and activities that are not allowed under the
definition of a “Cemetery” in Section 154.012 of the Zoning
Ordinance. Specifically, the pr oposed site plan includes an
administration building, a proposed expansion of this structure
to add room for public gathering space, and parking lot that
will accommodate 59 parking st alls. The definition of
“Cemetery” offers no provisions for the conduct of services on
the premises. The proposed buildings and parking areas exceed
the activities allowed for “land used or intended to be used for
the burial of the dead and dedicated for cemetery purposes.”

Rossow argues that this finding was arbitrar y because his plat applications are in
compliance with the applicable zoning ordinances. He asserts that the finding is based on
zoning restrictions that are not clearly expressed in the zoni ng ordinance. He also asserts
that the city council failed to apply the least -restrictive interpretation of its definition of
cemetery and that, because cemeteries are a “permitted use” in the RR zoning district, the
city council was required to approve his applications.

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Rossow notes that the zoning ordinance does not contain a dditional development
standards for cemeteries and argues that b ecause the definition of cemetery does not
prohibit buildings or structures, the denial of his applications was arbitrary, capricious, and
unreasonable. Rossow argues that an administ rative office and gathering space for the
bereaved, which would be “operated in conjunction with and within the boundaries of” the
cemetery, is permitted under the ordinance. He also argues th at if permissible uses of
cemetery land include crematories and mortuaries , the city council’s interpretation of the
ordinance as not permitting administrative space is unreasonable.
As to the city council’s claim that the proposed parking lot is not a permitted
cemetery use, Rossow notes that Table 5-2 in LECO § 154.210 (2013), states that the
minimum off-street parking requirement for ce meteries is to be “determined by the
Planning Director.” The record reflects that the planning commission reviewed Rossow’s
proposed parking and found it to be adequate. And, as Rossow notes, the zoning ordinance
does not prohibit parking spaces at cemeteries . Rossow therefore argues that the city
council unreasonably relied on imprecise regulatory standards to deny his plat applications.
The city argues that Rossow’s proposal did not comply with the zoning ordinance’s
“narrow” definition of cemetery that it claims “only allows fo r the use of land for burial
and the keeping of remains of deceased persons.” The city also points to LECO § 154.401
(2013), and Table 9-1 within that section, wh ich provide that any us es not indicated as
permitted, conditional, or interim, “shall be considered prohib ited.” The city asserts that
the “unambiguous definition” of cemetery included in the zoning ordinance disallows use

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of cemetery land “for wake services, memorial and funeral services, and accommodations
for large gatherings of people.”
But the city conceded at oral argument that burial services would necessarily occur
at a cemetery. And we note that the definition of “cemetery” includes the use for “dedicated
. . . cemetery purposes.” LECO § 154.01 2(B)(2)(a) (2012). Adopting the city’s
interpretation of the ordinance would require us to conclude that, despite the lack of
guidance in the zoning ordinance, Rossow’s proposed cemetery-related activities, such as
administration, memorial-type services, and parking, were require d to be exhaustively
listed in Table 9-1 of section 154.401. Our examination of Table 9-1 does not support such
a conclusion. See LECO § 154.401, Table 9-1 (2013).
The city’s argument is further undercut by the fact that the city’s own zoning
ordinance defines “cemetery” mo re narrowly as it relates to the PF (“Public and Quasi-
Public Open Space”) zoning district, providing that a landowner may obtain a conditional-
use permit to operate a cemetery so long as there is “[n]o mausoleum, crematorium, or
other structure . . . except a 1-story tool or storage shed of 160 square feet . . . maximum
floor area.” LECO § 154.600(B) (2007). If the city desired similar limitations on cemetery
structures or permitted cemetery-related activities in the RR zoning di strict, it could have
included those limitations in its ordinance, but it did not. See PTL, 656 N.W.2d at 572
(“Regulatory standards must be sufficiently pr ecise to ensure the a pplication of objective
standards to all similarly situated property, to adequately inform landowners of the
requirements they must satisfy to gain subdivision approval, and to allow a reviewing court
to evaluate noncompliance.”).

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The city also argues that because th e definition of “funeral home” in LECO
§ 154.012(B)(3)(h) (2012), incl udes “undertaking services” and “managing funerals,”
memorial services are permitted at a funeral home but not at a cemetery. But “undertaking
services” implies something di fferent than permitting graves ide memorial services or
services in an administrative building in the event of inclement weather, and nothing in the
record indicates that Rossow planned to conduct undertaking services or to manage
funerals.4 The record reflects only that if a pers on purchased a cemetery plot, an on-site
service would be an option.
Interpreting the zoning ordinance in favor of Rossow, we conclude that the
ordinance does not prohibit the uses and activities identified in the city council’s second
finding. We therefore conclude that Rossow’s proposed development and use set forth in
his applications are permissible under the zoning ordinance, and that the denial of
Rossow’s applications based on the city council’s second finding was unreasonable,
arbitrary, or capricious, and la cked legal and factual support. See Hurrle, 594 N.W.2d at
250−52 (concluding that record did not contain evidentiary support for board’s denial of
plat application).

4 “Undertaking” means: “The professi on or duties of a funeral director.” American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1890 (5th ed. 2011). “Funeral director”
means: “One whose business is to arrange for the burial or cremation of the dead and assist
at the funeral rites and who is usually an embalmer. Also called mortician, undertaker.”
Id. at 711. Additionally, the city’s defin ition of “funeral home” makes the difference
between “undertaking” and memo rial services clear by stating that funeral homes are
“[e]stablishments engaged in undertaking services such as preparing the dead for burial.”
LECO § 154.012(B)(3)(h) (emphasis added).

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II. Rossow’s preliminary and final plat applications comply with the city’s
comprehensive plan.

Zoning ordinances “regulate[] the buildin g development and uses of property.” In
re Denial of Eller Media Co.’s Applications , 664 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn. 2003). But a
“comprehensive guide plan . . . has an advisory role that is different from that of the official
controls embodied in the zoning and subdivision ordinances.” PTL, 656 N.W.2d at 574. A
comprehensive plan is merely a guide cont aining “objectives, policies, standards and
programs to guide public and private la nd use, development, redevelopment and
preservation for all lands and waters within the jurisdiction of the local governmental unit.”
Minn. Stat. § 473.859, subd. 1 (2016); see also PTL, 656 N.W.2d at 574 (differentiating
between advisory role of comprehensive land-use plan and zoning ordinances which “have
the force of law”).
The city council’s first finding reads as follows:
That the [proposed cemetery] Final Plat is not consistent
with the Lake Elmo Comprehensive Plan and the Future Land
Use Map for this area. The site under consideration is located
within the City’s Rural Development Area land use
classification, which allows for: large areas of rural
residential development within the City. Common uses found
in these areas include working farms, alternative agricultural
uses as defined by City Code, and rural single family detached
residences. Development in th ese areas requires 10+ acres,
or a conditional use permit to authorize a cluster development
meeting the City’s Open Space Preservation regulations. The
establishment of a private cemetery and related gathering
space, administrative activities, funeral services, and large
parking area is not consistent with the City’s land use plan for
this area.

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“Compatibility with the public’s health, sa fety, and general welfare of the local
government’s comprehensive land-use plan is an appropriate consideration in approving
an application for a conditional use.” PTL, 656 N.W.2d at 573; see Minn. Stat. § 394.22,
subd. 7 (2016) (defining conditional use).
[F]or a permissible use, the law recogniz es that when a city
designates a specific use as permissible in a particular zone or
district, the city has exercised its discretion and determined that
the permitted use is consistent with the public health, safety,
and general welfare and conson ant with the goals of its
comprehensive plan.

PTL, 656 N.W.2d at 574 (quotation omitted).

Rossow argues that the city council’s first finding is arbitrary. He emphasizes the
consistency of the zoning ordinance with the comprehensive plan: “The zoning districts in
this chapter and the delineation of zoning district boundaries on the zoning map are
consistent with the goals a nd policies of the Lake [Elmo] City Comprehensive Plan.”
LECO § 154.352 (2012). Rossow argues that wh en the city designated cemetery use as a
permissible use in the RR zoning district, it exercised its discretion and determined that a
cemetery is consistent with the goals of its comprehensiv e plan. Rossow asserts that
because his plat applications were for a perm issible use and complied with the regulatory
standards included in the zoning ordinance, his applications necessarily complied with the
city’s comprehensive plan.
The city argues that the proposed cemetery conflicted with the city’s comprehensive
plan because Rossow’s proposed cemetery did not comply wi th the zoning ordinance’s
definition of cemetery. But the city concedes that a cemetery, as defined by the zoning

15

ordinance, is permissible in the proposed location and only argues that Rossow’s proposal
was not for a “cemetery” because it included memorial services and a parking lot.
Because Rossow’s proposal to host memorial services and build a parking lot does
not clearly conflict with the zoning ordinanc e’s definition of ceme tery, and because the
city concedes that a cemetery in the proposed location is permissible and would not conflict
with the city’s comprehensive plan, we conclude that the city’s denial on the basis of its
first finding was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious, and lacked legal and factual
support.
III. The city’s zoning ordinance does no t regulate the size of cemetery-related
buildings in the RR zoning district.

The city council’s third finding reads as follows:
That the combined size of over 6,000 square feet for the
proposed administration build ing, expansion area, and
maintenance garage is not propo rtional to the size of the
proposed cemetery. The re-use and expansion of the existing
single-family structure far exc eeds what would otherwise be
required to provide for the care and maintenance of the
cemetery.

Rossow argues that this finding creates land restrictions not found in the zoning
ordinance and therefore is arbitrary. We agree. The zoning ordinance contains no
requirements that regulate the size of cemetery-related buildings in the RR zoning district
or cemetery care and maintenance. The city coun cil’s denial therefore lacks a legal basis.
See PTL, 656 N.W.2d at 572 (noti ng that two objectives of regulatory standards are “to
ensure the application of obj ective standards to all similarl y situated property,” and “to
adequately inform landowners of the requireme nts they must satisfy to gain subdivision

16

approval”). Without regulations to support the city council’s third finding, the finding lacks
legal support and therefore the city’s denial of Rossow’s plat applications on the basis of
the third finding was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.
IV. The city’s zoning ordina nce does not unambiguously prohibit the existence of
two “principal uses” on one property in the RR zoning district, nor does it
unambiguously define “accessory use.”

The city council’s fourth finding reads as follows:
The Zoning Ordinance does not allow for two principal
uses to exist on property that is zoned [RR]. Specifically, the
continued occupation of a si ngle-family residence on the
property is in conflict with the proposed platting of a cemetery
on the same property. Because the site is 10 acres in size and
is at the minimum requirement of the Zoning Ordinance for lot
size in a RR zoning district, the applicant would not be able to
separate the home from the cemetery use.

Rossow notes that the city council did not rely on a specific provision in the zoning
ordinance to support this finding and argues that the lack of citation demonstrates arbitrary
action and prevents this court from conducting an effective re view of the denial. And he
argues that because the record contains no evidence that the dual cemetery and single-
family residential uses would be injurious to the health, safety, or welfare of the
neighboring landowners or the community at large, both should be allowed.
The city argues that LECO § 154.401(A) (2 013) prohibits two principal uses on a
single parcel. The city acknowledges that, at the same time of Rossow’s proposal, both
cemetery use and single-family residential use were “perm itted uses” in Table 9-1 of

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section 154.401 but claims that , because they were not “acce ssory uses,” they must be
“principal uses,” and therefore cannot coexist.5
LECO § 154.401(A) provides: “ Combinations of uses. Principal and accessory
uses may be combined on a single parcel.” This language could be interpreted to prohibit
the combination of multiple principal uses on a single parcel. But the language is not
unambiguous and could simply mean that accessory uses are allowed when principal uses
already exist. Further, even if this court as sumes that this language clearly prohibits the
combination of multiple princi pal uses on a single parcel , section 154.401 addresses
“permitted” and “conditional” uses, not “p rincipal” uses. At the time of Rossow’s
application, Table 9-1 include d multiple categories of uses, such as “residential uses,”
“public and civic uses” (including cemeteries ), and “accessory uses.” Table 9-1 did not
include a category of “principal uses.” We note also that under “accessory uses,” Table 9-1
listed, without further definition, “other st ructures typically incidental and clearly
subordinate to pe rmitted uses,” and notes that such structures are permitted in the RR
zoning district. LECO § 154.401, Table 9-1.
We conclude that these provisions are ambiguous for the purpose of determining
whether a single-family residence is a “principal use” that cannot coexist with a cemetery
or a structure incidental and clearly subordinate to cemetery use.
Rossow also argues that the zoning ordinance contains no restrictions that prohibit
two permitted uses on the same property and that unless dual use would be injurious to the

5 The city amended Table 9-1 in 2016 and removed cemeteries as a permitted use on land
zoned RR. Lake Elmo, Minn. Ordinance No. 08-136 (June 14, 2016).

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health, safety, or welfare of the neighboring properties, both uses can exist. The record
before the city council contained no evidence to support a finding that Rossow’s proposed
dual uses would be injurious to the health, safety, or welfare of the neighboring properties.
See N. R. Fairbanks Co. v. City of Blaine , 308 Minn. 315, 317 –18, 242 N.W.2d 99, 102
(1976) (“If both plaintiff’s retail [uses] are individually permissible . . . we conclude that
the combination of these uses must also be found permissible, absent a showing by the city
that the hybrid use is in so me way injurious to the health , safety, or welfare of the
neighboring landowners or the community at large.”).
The city council’s fourth finding lacks legal and factual support. We therefore
conclude that the city’s denial of Rossow’s pl at applications on the basis of the fourth
finding was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious.
Because none of the city council’s findings provides a rational basis for denial, we
reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the city and remand to the district
court for an order directing the city to approve Rossow’s preliminary and final plat
applications.
Reversed and remanded.

D-1

KALITOWSKI, Judge (dissenting)
I respectfully dissent. I agr ee with the district court th at the city provided legally
sufficient rational bases for denying Rossow’s preliminary and final plat applications. And
if there is a rational basis for the city’s decisi on, or if the wisdom of the city’s decision is
“reasonably debatable,” a cour t should not interfere. Honn v. City of Coon Rapids , 313
N.W.2d 409, 417 (Minn. 1981). “[E]xcept in those rare cases in which the city’s decision
has no rational basis, ‘it is the duty of the judiciary to exercise restraint and accord
appropriate deference to civil authorities in the performance of their duties.’” Swanson v.
City of Bloomington, 421 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Minn. 1988).
The city found that Rossow’s proposal, which included an expansion of an existing
single-family home to a more than 6000 square foot comme rcial public gathering space
with 59 parking stalls, enco mpasses uses and activities that are not allowed under the
definition of “cemetery” in the city’s applicable zoning ordinance. The city had a rational
basis for interpreting the ordi nance in this manner and fo r rejecting this commercial
proposal because, at the time of Rossow’s app lication, Table 9-1 of Lake Elmo, Minn.,
Code of Ordinances § 154.40 1 (2013) categorized cemetery use as a “Public and Civic
Use,” and because funeral home us e is not a permitted use in the rural residential (RR)
zoning district. In addition, the city f ound that appellant’s proposal for continued
occupation of the single-family home would result in two pr incipal uses on the property,
which the city reasonably interpreted as prohibited by the zoning ordinance. Here, the
district court properly affirmed the city’s denial of Rossow’s plat applications after

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determining that denial on these bases “is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.”
A municipal body’s denial of a land-use request need only be based on one reason
that satisfies the rational-basis test. St. Croix Dev., Inc. v. City of Apple Valley, 446 N.W.2d
392, 398 (Minn. App. 1989), review denied (Minn. Dec. 1, 1989). Therefore, I would
affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the city.