In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: W. L. and R. R., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0119

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
W. L. and R. R., Parents.

Filed July 31, 2017
Reversed and remanded
Toussaint, Judge

Waseca County District Court
File No. 81-JV-16-667

Steven D. Winkler, Jones and Magnus, Mankato, Minnesota (for appellant R.R.)

Brenda Miller, Waseca County Attorney, Rachel V. Cornelius, Assistant County Attorney,
Waseca, Minnesota (for respondent Waseca County)

David R. Borchardt, Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent W.L.)

Renae Streich, West Concord, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and
Toussaint, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
TOUSSAINT, Judge
Appellant-father challenges the order determining that appellant’s child was a child
in need of protection or services (CHIPS), arguing that the district court (1) failed to make
particularized findings of fact, (2) failed to apply the correct standard of law, and (3) erred
in determining that appellant’s child was a CHIPS. We reverse and remand.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant-father R.R. and mother W.L. are the biological parents of M.L.R. who
was born in October 2008.
On October 18, 2016, Bridget Van Hecke, a family case assessment worker for
respondent Minnesota Prairie County Alliance (MNPrairie), filed a petition alleging that
M.L.R. was a CHIPS. The petition alleged that Van Hecke began her investigation after
Dr. Sarah Beckman, M.L.R.’s pediatrician, sent MNPrairie a report, highlighting that
neither R.R. nor W.L. were adequately caring for M.L.R., including her medical conditions.
Soon after the petition, M.L.R. was placed in emergency protective care. The district court
held a trial on the petition and issued an order adjudicating M.L.R. a CHIPS against R.R.
and W.L.1
There is a “presumption that a natural parent is a fit and suitable person to be
entrusted with the care of his or her child.” In re Welfare of A.D. , 535 N.W.2d 643, 647
(Minn. 1995). “Ordinarily, it is in the best interest of a child to be in the custody of his or

1 W.L. admitted to M.L.R. being a CHIPS and M.L.R. was adjudicated a CHIPS with
respect to W.L., who does not appeal that adjudication.

3
her natural parents.” Id. Thus, a child only meets the statutory definition of a CHIPS under
Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6 (2016), when the petitioner proves “that one of the
enumerated child-protection grounds exists and that the subject child needs protection or
services as a result.” In re Welfare of Child of S.S.W. , 767 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Minn. App.
2009). “[A]llegations of a petition alleging a child to be in need of p rotection or services
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 1(a)
(2016).
“On appeal of a juvenile -protection order, we review the [district] court’s factual
findings for clear error and its finding of a statutory basis for the order for abuse of
discretion.” In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D. , 865 N.W.2d 315, 321 (Minn. App. 2015),
review denied (Minn. July 21, 2015). A district court’s individual fact-findings will not be
reversed “unless the review of the entire record leaves the court with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re Welfare of B.A.B., 572 N.W.2d 776, 778
(Minn. App. 1998) (quotation omitted). Furthermore, this court closely “inquires into the
sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing ” to
sustain the district court’s decision . S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d at 733. In a case such as this,
where R.R. did not move for a new trial, this court’s review is limited to whether the record
supports the district court’s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the
district court’s conclusions of law. Id.
R.R. argues that the district court’s order adjudicating M.L.R. a CHIPS lacks
sufficient par ticularized findings of facts to facilitate meaningful appellate review.
Minnesota law requires written findings setting forth the reasons for a CHIPS adjudication.

4
Minn. Stat. § 260C.201, subd. 2 (2016). “[A] district court’s recitation of what others have
observed is not a finding of fact that those observations are true.” In re Civil Commitment
of Spicer, 853 N.W.2d 803, 810 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted). Here, the CHIPS
petition noted that R.R. was not fulfilling his role as caregiver in pr operly addressing
M.L.R.’s medical conditions and that M.L.R. is in need of protection or services pursuant
to Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(3), (4), (5), (8) (2016).
In the district court’s CHIPS order, however, the court mostly recites the witnesses’
testimony rather than making findings of fact based on that testimony. For example, the
district court begins most of its findings with variations of “Dr. Beckman reported . . . ,”
“Ms. Warner testified . . . ,” or “Ms. Warner has observed . . . .” “This court previously
has stated that findings beginning with phrases such as ‘petitioner claims,’ ‘according to
petitioner’s application,’ and ‘respondent asserts,’ are not true findings.” Spicer, 853
N.W.2d at 810 (quotation omitted). Thus, the district court failed to make particularized
findings that would allow us to review its findings against the law it applied.
We note that , in some instances, the district court does make findings of fact . In
finding 26, the district court states, “Much more than just the medications, it was the routine
that was important to [M.L.R.’s] success.” In reciting Warner’s testimony , the district
court makes additional findings. In finding 41, the district court f ound that R.R. did not
engage in services with a personal care attendant . In finding 42, the district court f ound
that R.R. did not utilize offered family based services. And in finding 45, the district court
states, “Because consistency was a problem for the parents, having the medications
administered at school would have been to [M.L.R.’s] benefit.”

5
Nonetheless, overall the district court’s order does not provide sufficient insight into
the facts on which it relied in adjudicating M.L.R. a CHIPS. See In re Welfare of M.M. ,
452 N.W.2d 236, 239 (Minn. 1990) (noting that for sufficient appellate review, district
court’s findings must provide insight into facts the court relied on in reaching its ultimate
conclusion). Without more, we cannot marry the district court’s findings to the statutory
grounds on which it based its CHIPS adjudication. Therefore, we reverse the district
court’s CHIPS adjudication and remand for particularized and sufficient findings to permit
meaningful appellate review.2
Reversed and remanded.

2 Because we remand for more specific findings, we do not address the other issues raised
by appellant.