State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0132

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Antonio Dion Washington-Davis,
Appellant.

Filed September 18, 2017
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-13-2492

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Toussaint,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Antonio Dion Washington-Davis challenges his resentencing on multiple
convictions of prostitution -related offenses following a remand from this court, arguing
that (1) the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commissio n exceeded its authority by
establishing a sentence enhancement based upon a prior human-trafficking conviction; and
(2) his sentence unfairly exaggerates the criminality of his conduct. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Antonio Dion Washington -Davis was involved in a family -operated
prostitution scheme run out of his uncle’s home. In 2013, he was convicted of six
prostitution-related offenses:
 Count 1: aiding and abetting the solicitation or inducement of a minor
to practice prostitution, with an aggravating factor;1

 Counts 2-4: aiding and abetting the promotion of the prostitution of
an individual, with an aggravating factor;2

 Count 6: aiding and abetting the solicitation or inducement of an
individual to practice prostitution, with an aggravating factor;3 and

 Count 7: conspiracy to engage in the sex trafficking of an individual,
with an aggravating factor.4

Washington-Davis’s convictions resulted from acts occurring between September
2010 and July 2012 that involved five women—J.M., B.R., S.A., C.B., and T.B.—four of

1 See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, subd. 1, 609.322, subd. 1(a)(1), (b)(1) (2010).
2 See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, subd. 1, 609.322, subds. 1a(2), 1(b)(1) (2010).
3 See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, subd. 1, 609.322, subds. 1a(1), 1(b)(1) (2010).
4 See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.175, subd. 2(3), 609.322, subds. 1a(4), 1(b)(1) (2010).
3
whom testified at his trial. He was deeply involved in the prostitution scheme and engaged
in acts such as assigning women to sexual encounters with men at outside locations, posting
website advertisements for the prostitutes, and driving women to hotels and other locations
for sex. State v. Washington-Davis, 867 N.W.2d 222, 2 28 (Minn. App. 2015), aff’d, 881
N.W.2d 531 (Minn. 2016).
Washington-Davis was initially sentenced to a total of 432 months in prison on his
prostitution-related convictions. On appeal, we affirmed those convictions, but vacated the
sentence on count 7 because that offense was committed as part of a single behavioral
incident; we remanded for resentencing. Id. a t 241. 5 On remand, the district court
resentenced Washington-Davis to 396 months in prison. The district court imposed a 300-
month sentence on count 1, to be served concurrently with lesser sentences imposed on
counts 2-4. On count 6, soliciting or inducing a person to engage in prostitution, the district
court imposed a 96-month sentence, to be served consecutively to the 300-month sentence.
The district court enhanced the presumptive 48 -month sentence on count 6 by adding an
additional 48 months based on the aggravating factor of Washington -Davis’s prior
stipulated qualified human -trafficking-related offense. See Minn. Stat. § 609.322,
subd. 1(b)(1) (2010). The sentence on count 7 was vacated. This appeal follows.

5The supreme court affirmed Washington -Davis’s convictions in 2016. Washington-
Davis, 881 N.W.2d 531, 545 (Minn. 2016).

4
D E C I S I O N
I. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission did not exceed its authority
by enhancing Washington -Davis’s sentence on his conviction of soliciting a
person to engage in prostitution, based on his prior human-trafficking offense.

Washington-Davis first argues that the sentencing guidelines commission exceeded
its authority by establishing a 48 -month sentence enhancement based upon his prior
human-trafficking conviction. He contends that Minn. Stat. § 244.09 (2010), which
establishes the guidelines commi ssion and sets forth its duty to promulgate advisory,
presumptive sentences, does not grant authority to create sentencing enhancements apart
from the sentencing grid. He also argues that the enhancement was not authorized by law
because the statute crimi nalizing his conduct, Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1(b), contains
no reference to a sentencing enhancement, but only increases the statutory maximum term
of imprisonment by 5 years for a conviction under that statute. We reject these arguments.
Interpretation of a statute and the sentencing guidelines present question of law,
which we review de novo. State v. Williams , 771 N. W.2d 514, 520 (Minn. 2009).
Washington-Davis was sentenced on count 6, soliciting or inducing an individual to
practice prostitution, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1a(1).6 The district court
imposed a 96-month sentence, which included a 48-month sentence enhancement based on
his stipulated -to aggravating factor, having “ committed a prior qualified human
trafficking-related offense.” Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1(b)(1).

6 We cite generally to the 2010 version of the Minnesota Statutes, which was in effect at
the time that Washington-Davis’s offenses began, and note that section 609.322 has not
been amended since 2009. Washington-Davis, 867 N.W.2d at 229 n.1.
5
A defendant convicted of violating section 609.322, subdivision 1a, is subject to
imprisonment for not more than 15 years. Minn. Stat. § 609.332, subd. 1a. But if the actor
violates subdivision 1a and certain aggravating factors are present, the maximum term of
imprisonment is increased to not more than 25 years. Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1(b).
When a defendant is sentenced for a completed crime under Minn. Stat. § 609.322,
subd. 1(b), as occur red here, “the presumptive sentence is determined by the sentencing
guidelines grid cell defined by the offender’s criminal history score and the severity level
of the underlying crime with the highest severity level, or the mandatory minimum,
whichever is greater, plus an additional 48 months.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.G (2010).
As Washington -Davis acknowledges, the legislature authorized the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission to establish presumptive sentences. Minn. Stat.
§ 244.09, subds. 1, 5(2). Here, the guidelines commission established a presumptive
sentence for a defendant who is convicted of solicitation or inducement of an individual to
practice prostitution when an aggravating factor is present. According to the sentencing
guidelines, “ the presumptive sentence is determined by the [appropriate] sentencing
guidelines grid cell . . . plus an additional 48 months. ” Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.G
(emphasis added).
Washington-Davis argues, with no citation to authority, that Minn. Stat. § 244.09
does not grant the guidelines commission authority to create sentencing enhancements
apart from the sentencing grid . We reject this argument. Section 244.09 contains no
requirement that the advisory sentences promulgated by the guidelines commiss ion must
appear in a grid. See Minn. Stat. § 244.09 , subd. 5. And the Minnesota Supreme Court
6
has recognized the use of sentencing modifiers that exist outside of the grid. See State v.
Kangbateh, 868 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Minn. 2015) (stating that Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.G
“outlines the procedures for calculating the presumptive sentencing ranges for a number of
offenses that do not appear on the standard Sentencing Guidelines Grid”). Therefore, the
guidelines sentencing-enhancement provision is not unauthor ized by law merely because
it is not listed in the sentencing-guidelines grid. See id.
Washington-Davis also argues that the 48 -month enhancement applied by the
district court to his sentence is unauthorized because it is not contained in Minn. Stat.
§ 609.322, subd. 1(b) , which merely increases the statutory maximum sentence when
certain aggravating factors are present. We are unpersuaded by this argument as well. A
similarly designed sentencing regime exists with respect to a crime committed for the
benefit of a gang. Minnesota Statutes section 609.229, subdivision 3(a) (2010), increases
the statutory maximum sentence by ten years for a felony committed for the benefit of a
gang, if the victim was under 18 years of age. The statute provides no specific duration of
presumptive-sentence modification for such a crime. See Minn. Stat. § 609.229, subd. 3(a).
Rather, the guidelines commission set forth that specific duration: if the victim is under the
age of 18, and the felony was completed for the bene fit of a gang, 24 months are added to
the duration listed in the appropriate cell of the grid applicable to that offender. Minn.
Sent. Guidelines 2.G. In this instance, the sentencing guidelines provide a method for
determining presumptive sentences outs ide of the standard grid. See Kangbateh, 868
N.W.2d at 12. We therefore do not agree that specific durations for sentence modifiers
used to determine presumptive sentences must appear in the underlying criminal statute.
7
Washington-Davis has failed to point to any authority prohibiting the type of static
sentencing enhancement used to determine his presumptive sentence. We conclude that
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission had authority in its guidelines, outside
of the grid, to prescribe an additional 48 months as an aggravating factor for a person who
is convicted of solicitation or promotion of prostitution. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.G.
II. Washington-Davis’s 396 -month sentence does not unfairly exaggerate the
criminality of his conduct.

Washington-Davis next argues that his 396-month sentence unfairly exaggerates the
criminality of his conduct and is excessive compared to other sentences imposed for more
egregious conduct. We disagree.
District courts are afforded great discretion in the imposition of sentences. State v.
Spain, 590 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Minn. 1999). This includes the discretion to impose
consecutive sentences for multiple felonies with multiple victims. State v. Vang, 847
N.W.2d 248, 264 (Minn. 2014). However, the district court may not impose sentences that
unfairly exaggerate the criminality of a defendant’s conduct. Id.; State v. Marquardt, 294
N.W.2d 849, 850 -51 (Minn. 1980). A district court’s decision to impose a consecutive
sentence will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Vang, 847 N.W.2d at 264.
Washington-Davis concedes that the 300 -month sentence imposed on count 1 is a
presumptive sentence. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4 (Supp. 2011) (Sex Offender Grid). As
previously discussed, the 96 -month sentence imposed on count 6 is presumptive as well.
See id. Nonetheless, he maintains that the district court should have sentenced count 6
8
concurrently to count 1, and that his 396 -month sentence is excessive because it unfairly
exaggerates the criminality of his conduct in committing the offenses.
Sentences received by other offenders for similar offenses provide guidance for
determining whether a consecutive sentence unfairly exag gerates a defendant’s conduct.
Carpenter v. State, 674 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Minn. 2004). Published cases discussing sex -
trafficking sentences are sparse. Washington-Davis points to three unpublished cases
where lesser sentences were imposed. U npublished cases from this court are not bindin g
authority, Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016), but we recognize that they may have some
persuasive value. Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch , 502 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn. App. 1993).
Given the dearth of recent published cases covering the issue of sentencing for sex -
trafficking crimes, we examine the three unpublished cases offered.
In State v. Rhodes, this court affirmed a 300-month sentence for sex trafficking of a
minor and a 15-month consecutive sentence for possession of child pornography. No. A14-
0433, 2015 WL 4611883, at *1, *7 (Minn. App. Aug. 3, 2015), review denied (Minn.
Oct. 28, 2015). In that case, the defendant drove a 15 -year-old girl to Minnesota for
prostitution, took nude photographs of her, manipulated her into having sex with a stranger
for money, and physically assaulted her while threatening to kill her so that she could not
notify police. Id.
In State v. Cross , we affirmed a 158 -month sentence for aiding and abetting sex
trafficking of a minor and a consecutive 96 -month sentence for aiding and abetting sex
trafficking. No. A13 -2329, 2014 WL 7236942, at *2, *6 (Minn. App. Dec. 22, 2014),
review denied (Minn. Feb. 25, 2015). The defendant played a significant role in a sex -
9
trafficking operation that victimized two young women, one of whom was a minor. Id. In
a related case, State v. Diggs , this court affirmed a 178 -month sentence for aiding and
abetting sex trafficking of a minor and a consecutive 96-month sentence for sex trafficking.
No. A13 -2354, 2015 WL 404453, at * 2, *9 (Minn. App. Feb. 2, 2015), review denied
(Minn. Apr. 14, 2015). The defendant sexually assaulted the two victims in order to
establish control over them. Id.
Washington-Davis argues that, unlike in the cited cases, his conduct with respect to
counts 1 and 6 involved minimal contact with the victims involved, who never worked as
prostitutes and were not subjected to rape or violence. We are unpersuaded by the attempt
to minimize his actions. The supreme court concluded that Washington -Davis was not a
passive observer, but an active participant in soliciting the women to engage in prostitution.
Washington-Davis, 881 N.W.2d at 544. Washington-Davis, who was actively involved in
a prostitution scheme spanning multiple years and affecting multiple victims and had a
prior human-trafficking-related conviction, no doubt intended to prey upon the women, to
turn them into sex workers for financial gain. We cannot conclude that the consecutive,
presumptive sentences imposed are excessive.
Washington-Davis also argues that his sentence would have been less severe had
his crimes under counts 1 and 6 been co mmitted earlier, under less -severe sentencing
guidelines. Compare Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4 (Supp. 2011) with Minn. Sent. Guidelines
IV, V (201 0). We are unpersuaded by this argument as a basis for concluding that the
district court abused its discretion. The heightened presumptive sentences reflect a
growing societal concern with sex trafficking and a desire to treat sex trafficking as a sex
10
offense, with presumptive sentences similar to other offenses on the sex-offender grid. See
2010 Minn. Laws ch. 2 15, art. 11, § 23, at 286; Minn. Sentencing Guidelines Comm’n,
MSGC Report to the Legislature, January 2010 at 8-9, App. E (2010).
District courts have “a unique perspective on all stages of a case, including
sentencing,” and are best situated “to evaluate an offender’s conduct and weigh sentencing
options.” State v. Hough , 585 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1998). For many years,
Washington-Davis played an active role in soliciting and promoting the prostitution of
women. Washington-Davis, 881 N.W.2d at 544. His numerous victims included
particularly vulnerable adults, as well as a minor. Washington-Davis, 867 N.W.2d at 229
n.2. Yet, at his original sentencing hearing, he “described himself as ‘the victim.’” Id. at
230. We cannot conclude that the district court clearly abused its discretion in sentencing.
See Vang, 847 N.W.2d at 264.
Affirmed.