State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0135

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Scott Wayne Srnsky,
Appellant.

Filed December 11, 2017
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Pennington County District Court
File No. 57-CR-15-546

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Peter D. Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Alan G. Rogalla , Pennington County Attorney, Thief River Falls, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Mark D. Nyvold, Special
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Connolly, Judge.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of criminal vehicular homicide, arguing that the
district court erred by denying his motion to suppress a statement that he made without
receiving a Miranda warning. Because appellant was neither in custody for the instant
offense nor interrogated, we affirm.
FACTS
On May 26, 2015, a Pennington County sheriff responded to a traffic incident on a
two-lane highway in Pennington County, where he observed two vehicles badly damaged;
a car on the south shoulder of the road and a pickup truck in a ditch on the south side of
the road. A passerby was in the ditch assisting the truck driver, appellant Scott Srnsky.
Fire Department officers found the car’s driver still inside of it. He was pronounced dead
at the scene. The sheriff retrieved the car driver’s wallet and identified him as J.K. The
sheriff reported that from the location of the vehicles, it appeared that they had collided on
the south side of the highway, which ran east to west.
A Minnesota state t rooper trained in basic crash investigations, Sergeant Bjerken,
also responded to the crash. Sergeant Bjerken observed tire marks beginning in the
eastbound lane and leading to the site of the crash at the south sho ulder of the road. He
saw no tire marks beginning in the westbound lane and going into the eastbound lane.
Thus, Sergeant Bjerken concluded there was no indication that the vehicle that had been
traveling eastbound (the car driven by J.K.) had been operating in the westbound lane.
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A Minnesota state t rooper trained in accident reconstruction, Trooper Eischens,
reported to the accident scene later that day. Trooper Eischens concluded that when the
crash occurred, appellant’s vehicle was traveling westbound but operating in the eastbound
lane and J.K.’s vehicle was travelling eastbound and operating in the eastbound lane.
However, Trooper Eischens agreed with appellant’s counsel that based off his analysis, it
was not possible to determine in which lane a ppellant’s vehicle was when appellant
“perceived the threat” of a collision. Trooper Eischens said it was also not possible to
determine in which lane J.K.’s car was when J.K. initially perceived the threat and
responded to it.
Another crash reconstructionist, Gregory Gravesen, analyzed the data to reconstruct
the collision. He concluded that J.K.’s car was in the wrong lane (the westbound lane while
it was travelling eastbound) when the vehicles began swerving in attempt to avoid the
collision. Gravese n concluded that the vehicles then turned toward the same direction
(south), which resulted in the collision. Unlike Trooper Eischens, Gravesen took into
account each driver’s perception response time, which, appellant argues, allowed him to
accurately co nclude where each vehicle was when its driver perceived the danger of
collision.
On June 30, 2015, Grand Forks, North Dakota police Sergeant Jennings stopped
appellant’s car because it had expired license tabs. After the officer discovered appellant
was not from Grand Forks, the following encounter ensued:
Q: Okay. So what brings you to Grand Forks tonight?
A: I got doctor appointment in Fargo tomorrow . . . I got
stitches in my foot . . . [inaudible].
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Q: Okay, Okay, Okay.
Q: So the wheelchair is yours?
A: Yes.
Q: You’re handicapped?
A: Well . . . I can’t walk on my feet.
. . . .
Q: Okay. Okay. So are you paralyzed or just a foot injury?
A: No, I was in a car crash . . . .
Q: How long ago was that?
A: Ah, May 26th.
Q: Okay, so it was like a month ago.
A: Yeah, I just got out of the hospital like a week ago.
Q: Okay, I got you, okay.
. . . .
Q: Is your license current?
A: I think it’s suspended.
Q: Okay.
A: I don’t want to go to jail . . . .
Q: I understand. Nobody wants to go to jail.
A: I know, I’ve had bad luck in these situations.
Q: You don’t have any warrants or anything for you do you,
[appellant]?
A: No.
Q: Where was the accident that you were in?
A: Thief River.
Q: Thief? In town? In the country?
A: Out in the count[r]y, it was a head on collision.
Q: Okay. Alright, sit tight for a second and I’m going to check
your license see what’s up with that, okay? I’ll come back and
let you know what’s up. I’m going to do what I can to keep you
out of jail, but the problem is that you are from Thief River and
not from around here, so okay, so just sit tight and don’t go
nowhere okay? I’ll be right back with you.

The officer then learned of a warrant out of Fargo , North Dakota for appellant’s
arrest due to unpaid fines. Because of appellant’s injury, the two discussed how to best get
appellant from his car to the squad car. While the officer searched a pouch containing
appellant’s medications, appellant stated: “A week ago I could not lift my leg.” Another
conversation ensued:
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Q: Really. You said you had crushed your heel and busted your
pelvis?
A: [Inaudible]. Pelvis . . . .
Q: Yeah. You want me to push you or are you going to do [it]
yourself?
A: [Inaudible].
Q: Alright.
A: There was a pin, that they plated the front, the front across
here they put a plate or something like that . . . .
Q: You said it was a head on? What happened?
A: My best buddy hit me.
Q: Hit you head on?
A: [Inaudible]. We were playing chicken.
Q: Ahh sorry to laugh, but,
A: He’s my best buddy and uh . . . he died.
Q: Oh, I’m sorry to hear that.

(Emphasis added.)

The officer then told appellant he had to handcuff him, but that he would cuff his
hands in the front and remove them once they got to the jail. Appellant then stated, “My
mom’s a jailer too.” The officer asked where, and appellant responded, “Linda, in Thief
River. . . . did you see my record?” The officer responded, “No I haven’t seen your record.”
Appellant then told the officer of his previous driving violations.
On July 1, 2015, the state filed a complaint against appellant for criminal vehicular
homicide. The statement of probable cause in this complaint reported: (1) a BAC test
revealed that appellant was under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of the car
crash, (2) appellant and J.K. were roommates, (3) accident reconstruction reveal ed that
appellant “clearly crossed into the opposite lane of traffic,” and (4) during an unrelated
incident, appellant told a Grand Forks police officer that he was “playing chicken” at the
time of the car crash. Appellant filed a motion to suppress evide nce obtained from:
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(1) execution of a search warrant on June 11, 2015 , seeking appellant’s medical records,
(2) the blood drawn from appellant on May 26, 2015, and (3) the statements appellant made
to the officer on June 30, 2015. The district court grant ed defendant’s motion to suppress
everything except the statements. The district court found that when appellant made these
statements, he was neither in custody for the purposes of this offense, nor was he
interrogated.
After a jury trial, appellant was convicted of criminal vehicular homicide pursuant
to Minn. Stat. § 609.2112, subd. 1(1) (2014) (gross negligence) , and sentenced to 68
months in prison. Appellant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress the statement.
D E C I S I O N
A Miranda warning is required when a suspect “is both in custody and subject to
interrogation.” State v. Thompson, 788 N.W.2d 485, 491 (Minn. 2010). “When reviewing
a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, [appellate courts] review
the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district
court’s legal determinations de novo.” State v. Gauster , 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn.
2008) (quotation omitted) . “ An appellate court reviews a [district] court’s findings of
historical fact relating to the circumstances of the interrogation pursuant to the clearly
erroneous test but makes an independent review of the [district] court [’]s determination
regarding custody and the need for a Miranda warning.” State v. Sterling , 834 N.W.2d
162, 16 7-68 (Minn. 2013) (quoting State v. Wiernasz , 584 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1998)
(footnote omitted)). The district court found that, for Miranda purposes, appellant was
neither in custody for the instant offense, nor subject to interrogation. We agree.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that custody for an unrelated offense is not
necessarily custody for all Miranda purposes. State v. Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d 305, 309
(Minn. 1999). “ The [district] court must look to the circumstances of the custody and
determine whether it would cause a reasonable person to feel compelled or coerced to
confess to the offense for which the interrogation is being conducted.” Id.
The district court held that while appellant was in custody when he made the
incriminating statement, he was not in custody for purposes of being asked how the crash
had happened because appellant offered no evidence tha t he was subjected to restraint
beyond that to which he was subject for having been arrested under the warrant. See id.
(holding that an officer asking an incarcerated juvenile if there was anything he wanted to
tell her amounted to no evidence of restrai nt on the juvenile’s freedom other than that to
which he was already subject by being in custody for an unrelated of fense); see also State
v. Werner, 725 N.W.2d 767, 770-71 (Minn. App. 2007) (holding that a defendant arrested
on a warrant, placed in handcuffs, and then asked whether he had been drinking, was not
subject to additional restraint for the suspicion of DWI; thus, he was not “in custody” f or
the DWI charge for Miranda purposes). We agree.
Appellant asks this court to infer that an officer would know that a person who had
been in a serious car crash could later be charged with a crash -related offense. However,
the officer specifically told appellant that he was only being arrested for the outstanding
North Dakota warrant and that once appellant took care of that fine, he would be released:
If you come up with the money you can post the bail here, and
then they will call down to Fargo. . . a nd say he posted the
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money, give us a court date, and then Fargo will tell Grand
Forks to release you[.]

The officer appeared reluctant to arrest appellant altogether:
So my hands are tied my man, if it was just me stopping you
for these tabs and your lic ense is suspended as well. If it was
just that I could stroke you a couple of tickets, set you a court
date and you would be out of here.

Appellant also specifically asked the officer if the officer had seen appellant’s record, to
which the officer replied, “No, I haven’t seen your record.”
Since there is no evidence that appellant was subject to any additional restraint when
he told the officer he was “playing chicken,” the district court’s finding that appellant was
not “in custody” for purposes of Miranda when he made the statement was not clearly
erroneous.
Further, appellant was not subject to interrogation for Miranda purposes. In
determining whether an individual was interrogated, this court independently examines the
totality of the circumstances b ased on the facts as found by the district court. State v.
Jackson, 351 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Minn. 1984). Interrogation includes both express
questioning and “its functional equivalent,” meaning “any words or actions on the part of
the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 -01, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689 -90 (1980). “[E]ven express
questions are not always interrogation” if not reasonably likely to elicit a response that is
incriminating. Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d at 309. The crux of the inquiry is whether, from
the suspect’s perspective, the police conduct reflects “a measure of compulsion above and
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beyond that inherent in custody itself.” State v. Edrozo, 578 N.W.2d 719, 724-25 (Minn.
1998) (quotation omitted).
The district court concluded that the officer’s asking appellant how the crash
happened was not a question that could reasonably be expected to illicit an incriminating
response because appellant had initiated conversations about the car crash multiple times
and the officer was unawa re of both the car crash and the possibility of appellant being
charged for it.
Once again, the only argument appellant makes is that the officer likely knew that
appellant could be facing criminal charges connected to the car crash. However, appellant
offered no evidence to support this assertion, and the facts show the exact opposite. The
district court’s findings are supported by the record; thus, they were not clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.