Michael Dejaris Denson, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0156

Michael Dejaris Denson, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed September 25, 2017
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-14-2060

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul,
Minnesota; (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his motion for postconviction relief requesting to
withdraw his guilty plea for second-degree criminal sexual conduct. Because appellant was
2
not entitled to substitute counsel, his plea was not involuntary, and his other challenges to
the validity of the plea are unavailing, we affirm.
FACTS
In March 2014 , the state charged appellant Michael Dejaris Denson with three
counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and two counts of third-degree criminal
sexual conduct for repeated ly raping and sexually abusing M.H., his teenage daughter.
According to the criminal complaint, Denson and M.H. had minim al contact until 2011,
when Denson agreed to let M.H. live with him, telling her he would have sex with her. On
the day she moved in, Denson performed oral sex on M.H. and had sexual intercourse with
her. During the next year, Denson abused M.H. every day. The abuse continued until March
2014, although the frequency decreased.
In August 2014, Denson told the court he wanted to accept a plea agreement by
which he would plead guilty to an amended charge of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct and receive a guidelines sentence of 300 months in prison. In exchange, the state
would dismiss the other charges. Denson asked to speak before entering his plea. The
district court responded that Denson’s counsel had “worked very hard to get this offer,”
but that Denson did “not have to accept it.” Denson stated:
I don’t feel like I’m being forced to plead, Your Honor.
I’m just upset with the public defender’s office. And putting
me and [trial counsel] in this position, where he never tried a
case like this. And it’s not, I don’ t think it’s fair to him or fair
to me.
As far as guilty plea, I mean, I’ m guilty. I want to get
this behind me. I’ m just going to say I’ m guilty of the crime.
Let’s get this done. Let’s just get this done. I’m guilty. Let’s
get it done.
3

The district court told Denson that his counsel was “an excellent trial attorney.” Denson
replied, “I believe that, your honor,” but later insisted that his counsel had “never tried a
case like this.” The district court replied “I think he probably has. But anyway, do you want
to plead guilty or not?” Denson said, “Yeah. Let’s do it. Let’s get this over with, man. Then
we don’t have to see each other again.” The district court, defense counsel, and Denson
also discussed Denson’s questions regarding his conditional release period. Denson
interrupted the conversation, saying “I’m guilty, your honor. Let’s go. Let’s go. Let’s go.”
Defense counsel and Denson then went over the signed plea petition, which stated
that he admitted to “sexual contact with my daughter [through] multiple acts over an
extended period of time.” Denson continued to interject that he wanted to “get this out of
the way.” He also admitted he was freely and voluntarily waiving his trial rights. The
district court accepted Denson’s plea as voluntary and accurate. After the plea, the state
filed an amended complaint, as promised in the plea agreement, adding a second-degree
criminal sexual conduct charge.
At his scheduled sentencing hearing, Denson was represented by a public defender
who was different from his appointed counsel. The new attorney told the court that Denson
had considered whether to withdraw his plea, but was prepared to be sentenced. The district
court proceeded with sentencing, beginning with the prosecution’s statement. Denson
twice interrupted, claiming that the state was “dramatizing” the events. During Denson’s
allocution, he stated he “never touched my daughter inappropriately,” and expressed
dissatisfaction with the quality of his legal representation.
4
The court asked Denson whether he wanted to withdraw his plea instead of going
forward with sentencing, and Denson responded, “Well, your honor. I cannot go to trial
with him. . . . It ain’t fair to him. It ain’t fair to me.” The district court again asked Denson
whether he wanted to withdraw his plea; Denson did not respond directly, but generally
complained about his appointed counsel. The district court noted that Denson was giving
the “impression that you were being forced by somebody to plead guilty to something you
didn’t do,” and then asked a third time whether Denson wanted to withdraw his plea.
Denson stated, “to be honest, I really don’t know.” The district court told Denson he would
continue the case for one week to allow Denson to decide whether he wanted to be
sentenced or withdraw his plea. Denson responded, “Let’s go with the guilty. Let’s get this
done.” The district court refused, telling Denson to take the week to think it over and
discuss questions with his counsel.
At the continued sentencing hearing the following week, Denson was again
represented by his appointed counsel. Denson told the court he was “gonna go with guilty”
and proceed with sentencing. He refused to go through the predat ory offender materials,
stating, in part, “I’m guilty, man. Let me go to the joint. I’ m guilty.” He also stated, “I’m
guilty. I ain’t trying to be no fool, your honor. I’m just trying to get this over with . . . . I’m
sick of him. He’s a sell out, man. I don’t want to be around him no more.” The district
court sentenced Denson to 300 months in prison on October 24, 2014.
Denson filed a petition for postconviction relief on August 16, 2016, arguing that
he was forced to plead guilty due to his dissatisfaction with trial counsel. The
postconviction court noted that Denson acknowledged his satisfaction with counsel during
5
the plea colloquy , and the record established the adequacy of appointed counsel’s
representation. The postconviction court also found that Denson made his own decision to
plead guilty. The postconviction court determined Denson’s plea was voluntary and denied
Denson’s petition for postconviction relief. Denson appeals.
D E C I S I O N
“At any time the cou rt must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea upon a
timely motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to
correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. Minnesota appellate courts
have recognized that manifest injustice exists where a guilty plea is invalid because it is
inaccurate, involuntary, or unintelligent. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007).
An appellant bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid. State v. Raleigh, 778
N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). Although we review a denial of post conviction relief for
abuse of discretion, the validity of a guilty plea is reviewed de novo. James v. State, 699
N.W.2d 723, 728 (Minn. 2005).
I. The postconviction court did not err in determining Denson voluntarily
pleaded guilty.

The voluntariness requirement aims to ensure that a defendant is not coerced,
improperly pressured, or induced to enter a plea agreement. See State v. Brown, 606
N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000); State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 1994).
Whether a plea is voluntary is determined by consideration of “all of the relevant
circumstances surrounding” the plea. State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d 539, 544 (Minn. 1994).
6
The postconviction court determined Denson’s plea was voluntar y. Denson argues
he pleaded guilty because he did not believe his appointed counsel could adequately
represent him at trial and he was not given “the option of alternative counsel.” To be clear,
Denson’s argument is not that he received ineffective assistance in negotiating and
accepting the plea, but that he accepted the plea to avoid receiving inadequate assistance
at trial. In effect, Denson argues the district court’s failure to appoint substitute counsel
compelled him to plead guilty. The erroneous denial of a request for substitute counsel may
form the basis for a plea withdrawal if the plea is shown to be involuntary due to the denial.
See United States v. Taylor, 652 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2011) (determining that “[a] waiver
[of counsel] is involuntary if the defendant is offered the ‘Hobson’s choice’ of proceeding
to trial with unprepared counsel or no counsel at all”).
An indigent defendant is not entitled to an attorney of his choice, but substitute
counsel may be granted in “exceptional circumstances.” State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270,
278 (Minn. 1998). “When the defendant voices serious allegations of inadequate
representation, the district court should conduct a searching inquiry before determining
whether the defendant’s complaints warrant the appointment of substitute counsel.” State
v. Munt, 831 N.W.2d 569, 586 (Minn. 2013) (quotations omitted). We review the denial of
a request for substitute counsel for abuse of discretion. Id.
Although Denson never formally made a request for substitute counsel, it was clear
that Denson was dissatisfied with his appointed attorney and thought he was un fit to try
the case. At one point, Denson stated, “I’m asking that Ramsey County needed to give me
7
a different attorney.” We conclude that Denson’s statements amounted to a request for
substitute counsel.
The issue on appeal is whether Denson “voice[d] serious allegations of inadequate
representation” such that his concerns warranted appointment of substitute counsel. Munt,
831 N.W.2d at 586 (quotation omitted). The “exceptional circumstances” that necessitate
appointment of substitute counsel are those that “affect a court-appointed attorney’s ability
or competence to represent the client.” State v. Gillam, 629 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn. 2001).
General dissatisfaction with counsel is not sufficient. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d at 278.
Here, Denson stated his concerns about appointed counsel, but he did not raise any
specific concerns about his counsel’s representation beyond claims that the attorney had
not previously tried this type of case to a jury. We conclude that these concerns do not
amount to “exceptional circumstances,” and therefore no substitute counsel was necessary.
See, e.g., State v. Voorhees, 596 N.W.2d 241, 255 (Minn. 1999) (holding general
dissatisfaction and personal tension are not exceptional circumstances warranting
substitute counsel). The district court discussed Denson’s concerns with him on multiple
occasions, and even continued sentencing so that Denson could consider whether to
withdraw his plea. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it did not appoint substitute counsel and that the failure to appoint substitute counsel
did not render Denson’s plea involuntary.
8
Aside from his substitute-counsel argument , Denson provides little support for his
argument that his plea was involuntary. 1 Our review of the record shows that Denson
demonstrated that he desired to enter into the plea agreement. He stated repeatedly “I’m
guilty,” “let’s go,” and “let’s get this done.” These repeated statements do not indicate
coercion or force, but voluntariness to settle the case. Moreover, the district court asked
repeatedly whether he wanted to go forward with or withdraw his plea. These inquiries and
Denson’s repeated decision to proceed with the plea agreement support the postconviction
court’s determination that his plea was voluntary. Accordingly, we conclude that the
postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it denied relief.
II. Denson’s plea was accurate.

“The factual basis of a plea is inadequate when the defendant makes statements that
negate an essential element of the charged crime because such statements are inconsistent
with a plea of guilty.” State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2003). This rule
applies when a defendant specifically denies an element of the crime. See, e.g., Kelsey v.
State, 298 Minn. 531, 532, 214 N.W.2d 236, 237 (1974) (noting that first-degree murder
defendant had admitted to fighting with the decedent, but “denied he had used a dangerous
weapon or inflicted great bodily harm upon the victim” and “this was all that the trial court

1 Denson attempts to highlight his questions to the district court and the prosecutor
regarding to which charge he was entering a plea. During the plea colloquy, Denson twice
addressed the court before answering a question, asking “Is this what I’m plead guilty to?”
and “How many counts am I pleading guilty to here?” Denson answered the questions
affirmatively after the court answered his questions. The fact that Denson asked questions
during his plea colloquy and these questions were answered immediately, apparently to his
satisfaction, does not render his plea invalid.
9
had before it in the nature of a factual basis”); Chapman v. State, 282 Minn. 13, 22, 162
N.W.2d 698, 704 (1968) (holding defendant’s guilty plea to a murder charge was
inaccurate because he “specifically denied an intent to kill”); State ex rel. Grattan v.
Tahash, 262 Minn. 18, 20-21, 113 N.W.2d 342, 343-44 (1962) (determining that a guilty
plea was inaccurate because defendant’s statements at the plea colloquy did not establish
the intent element). Denson contends that his plea was inaccurate because he later denied
elements of the charged offense. We are not persuaded.2
At the plea hearing and in response to leading questions, Denson admitted to
touching his daughter’s vagina several times over the course of two years. While leading
questions at a plea hearing are disfavored, Denson’s admissions are sufficient to support
the second-degree criminal sexual conduct charge to which he pleaded guilty. C.f. Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d at 95-96 (determining a plea was valid despite its use of the “disfavored
format” of leading questions).
Denson later made statements negating elements of the charged offense when he
met with probation and at the first sentencing hearing, but these later statements do not
negate the testimony he provided at the plea hearing. When a defendant asserts his
innocence after pleading guilty, these later statements do not invalidate the plea. See State
v. Williams, 373 N.W.2d 851, 853 (Minn. App. 1985) (determining that defendant’s
assertion of innocence after the plea did not meet the “fai r and just” standard for
presentence plea withdrawal) abrogated on other grounds by Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d

2 The postconviction court determined that Denson did not challeng e the accuracy of his
plea. On appeal, the state responds to Denson’s argument and, thus, we consider it.
10
263, 266 (Minn. 1989). Moreover, when Denson returned for sentencing, he made no
comments about the eleme nts of his offense or his innocence. Accordingly, we conclude
that Denson’s plea was accurate.
III. The issues raised in Denson’s pro se brief are unavailing.
Denson submitted a pro se supplemental brief that asserts facts not raised in his
principal brief. For example, Denson alleges that his appointed counsel was assigned
through a pool system by which “the one with the least experience is assigned the case,”
that his counsel at the first sentencing hearing “held his folder over his mouth and said I’m
only here if you plead guilty,” and that his appointed counsel now prosecutes
misdemeanors. None of these factual allegations are supported by the record; therefore, we
do not consider them further. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (defining the appellate
record as “[t]he documents filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the
proceedings”); In re Welfare of J.P.-S. , 880 N.W.2d 868, 874 (Minn. App. 2016) (“We
may not base our decision on matters that were not received into evidence by the district
court and that are outside the record on appeal.”).
Denson also claims that, before he entered his plea, counsel stated he would receive
a 200-month sentence. But the plea-hearing transcript and signed plea petition reflect that
Denson pleaded guilty in exchange for a 300-month sentence. Finally, Denson complains
that he was charged with the same crime five times. “[I]f a person’s conduct constitutes
more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only
one of the offenses.” Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2014). Here, Denson was convicted
of and sentenced for only one of the six counts of criminal sexual conduct. Denson pleaded
11
guilty to second-degree criminal sexual conduct for sexually abusing M.H. over a two-year
period when she was 14 and 15 years old. Thus, Denson’s sentence does not violate section
609.035.
Because we conclude that Denson’s plea was voluntary and accurate, the
postconviction court did not abuse its discretion, and also determine that Denson’s pro se
arguments lack merit, we affirm his conviction.
Affirmed.