In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: M. D. R. and K. E. B., Parents

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0166

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
M. D. R. and K. E. B., Parents

Filed July 3, 2017
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-JV-16-368

Jennifer L. Eichten, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant father K.E.B.)

Gretchen R. Severin, Munstenteiger & Severi n, P.A., Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent
mother M.D.R.)

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Kathryn M. Timm, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent Anoka County)

Jena Schuler, Ramsey, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Pr esiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
On appeal from the termination of his pa rental rights to child M.R.R., appellant-
father K.E.B. challenges the district court’s determinations that te rmination is supported
by a statutory basis, that termination is in th e child’s best interests, and that the county
made reasonable efforts to reunite the family. We affirm.

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FACTS
Mother M.D.R. gave birth to M.R.R. in August 2015. M.R.R. was born
prematurely, and her meconium tested positive for methamphetamine. M.R.R. remained
hospitalized for two months because she was frequently experiencing apnea and spells in
which her heart rate would drop. She has continuing special needs related to apnea, a heart
murmur, and developmental delays with respect to motor skills and verbal skills.
Shortly after M.R.R. was born, M.D.R. told K.E.B. that M.R.R. had been born, was
his daughter, and was hospitalized due to a medical condition. M.D.R. had not told K.E.B.
about the pregnancy. K.E.B. and M.D.R. vis ited M.R.R. in the hospital together twice in
September.1
Anoka County Social Serv ices (the county) became i nvolved after M.R.R.’s birth
because of the methamphetamine-screening result. In October 2015, M.R.R. was
adjudicated to be a child in n eed of protection or services and temporarily placed in the
custody of the county. Later in October, M.R.R. was discharged from the hospital for the
first time and brought to the foster home where she currently resides.
K.E.B. was never married to M.D.R., is not named on M.R.R.’s birth certificate, did
not register with the Father’s Adoption Registry, and did not sign a recognition of parentage

1 As of the trial, K.E.B. had never interacted with M.R.R. outside of these two visits.
K.E.B. testified that he attempted to visit M.R.R. on other occasions and was not allowed,
but the district court found that testimony not credible.

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of M.R.R. until after appearin g in these court proceedings. 2 Both parents testified that
M.D.R. never told K.E.B. that social services was involved or that M.R.R. was in foster
care; instead, M.D.R. claimed that M.R.R. wa s still in the hospital and then changed the
subject whenever K.E.B. asked about her.
M.D.R. initially refused to tell the coun ty who M.R.R.’s father was. When she
eventually disclosed his name, she misspelled it and did not provide his birthdate, address,
and phone number. On March 23, 2016, the county filed a petition to terminate the parental
rights of both M.D.R. and K.E.B. to M.R. R., but K.E.B.’s name was misspelled and no
address was listed for him on the petition.
The county had no contact with K.E.B. un til June 21, 2016, when K.E.B. called the
county after seeing published no tice of a hearing on the petition to terminate his parental
rights. K.E.B. told the county that he di d not have a permanent address because he was
avoiding active warrants for his arrest.
K.E.B. attended the termination-of-p arental-rights hearing on June 29, 2016. 3 He
was then arrested on his outstanding warrants a nd taken into custody. K.E.B. eventually
received a 13-month prison sentence, with expected release on parole in March 2017.

2 Genetic testing done during the proceedings determined that there is a 99.99% probability
that K.E.B. is the biological father of M.R.R.
3 M.D.R. also attended the June 29 hearing, where she voluntarily consented to M.R.R.’s
adoption, conferred guardiansh ip and legal custody of M. R.R. on the commissioner of
human services, and waived notice in any adoption hearing for M.R.R.

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K.E.B. signed a recognition of parentag e for M.R.R. in July 2016. The county
developed a case plan that addressed K.E.B.’s chemical dependency, mental health, and
parenting skills, and directed him to begin as many services as possible while incarcerated.
At trial in December 2016, K.E.B. te stified that, while in prison, he had
(1) completed a chemical-dependency evalua tion concluding that he did not need
chemical-dependency treatment, (2) completed a psychological evaluation that resulted in
no further recommendations, and (3) complete d 14 of the 16 classes in the prison’s
parenting-skills course, pursuant to his case pl an. The district court found this testimony
not credible.
The district court determined that K.E. B.’s parental rights to M.R.R. should be
terminated pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(1), (5), (7), and (8) (2016), and
determined that terminating K.E. B.’s parental rights is in M. R.R.’s best interests. The
district court terminated K.E.B.’s parental rights to M.R.R. and granted legal custody of
M.R.R. to the commissioner of human services.
K.E.B. appeals.
D E C I S I O N
A natural parent is presumptively a “fit and suitable person to be entrusted with the
care of his or her child,” and “[o]rdinarily, it is in the best interest of a child to be in the
custody of his or her natural parents.” In re Welfare of A.D., 535 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn.
1995). As a result, parental rights may be terminated “only for grave and weighty reasons.”
In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990).

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A decision to involuntarily te rminate a person’s parental rights is discretionary with
the district court. In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 136-37 (Minn. 2014).
To terminate parental rights, a district court must determine both that at least one statutory
basis for termination exists and that termination is in the best interests of the child. Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1, 7 (2016); R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 137 (explaining that “an
involuntary termination of parental rights is proper only when at least one statutory ground
for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence and the termination is in the
child’s best interest”). Both of these determinations are discretionary with the district court
and must be based on underlying findings of fact that are supported by clear and convincing
evidence. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895, 901, 905 (Minn. App.
2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2012).
Determinations of whether a statutory basi s for involuntarily terminating parental
rights is present, whether termination is in th e best of interest of the child, and whether
parental rights should be terminated are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 900-02.
A district court abuses its discretion if its underlying findings of fact are clearly erroneous,
if it misapplies the law, or if it resolves the matter in a manner that is against logic and the
facts on the record. Dobrin v. Dobrin , 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (M inn. 1997) (noting that
clearly erroneous findings and misapplication of law constitute abuse of discretion); Rutten
v. Rutten , 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984) (s tating that resolving matter in manner
contrary to logic and facts on the record cons titutes abuse of discretion). In termination
proceedings, appellate courts review the district court’s underlying findings of fact for clear
error, taking into account the clear-and-convin cing evidence standard of proof used in

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juvenile-protection proceedings. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 900-02. A factual finding is clearly
erroneous if it is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably
supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656,
660-61 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
Unless not required in the particular ca se, a decision to involuntarily terminate
parental rights also requires a finding, base d on clear and convincing evidence, that the
county made reasonable efforts to reunite th e parent and child. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 8 (2016) (requiring district courts to make specific findings that reasonable efforts at
reunification were either made or were not required under Minn. Stat. § 260.012 (2016));
In re Children of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Minn. 2005). Appellate courts review the
district court’s findings regarding reasonable efforts for clear error, again taking into
account the clear-and-conv incing-evidence standard of proo f used in juvenile-protection
proceedings. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 387 (Minn. 2008).
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that K.E.B.
abandoned M.R.R.
K.E.B. challenges the district court’s dete rmination that he abandoned his child.
Abandonment is one of the statutory bases on which a termination of parental rights may
be based. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(1).
To support an order terminating parental rights, the district court must “make clear
and specific findings which conform to the st atutory requirements for termination” and
those findings must “address conditions that exist at the time of the [termination] hearing.”
In re Welfare of Chosa, 290 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1980). The decision should rely “to

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a great extent upon the projected permanency of the parent’s inability to care for his or her
child.” In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1996) (quotation omitted).
Abandonment may be established under Mi nn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(1), if
the parent has actually deserted the child with the intention to forsake parental duties. In
re Welfare of L.A.F. , 554 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 1996 ). A parent’s failures to have
contact with the child, show consistent intere st in the child’s well-being, and offer help
with child-rearing expenses are factors that support a finding of abandonment. Id. at
398-99. Incarceration alone is not enough to support a finding of abandonment, and the
parental rights of an incarcerated parent “may be preserved if a parental relationship existed
prior to incarceration, and if the imprisoned parent continued the relationship to the best of
his ability while incarcerated.” In re Children of Wildey, 669 N.W.2d 408, 413-14 (Minn.
App. 2003), aff’d, 678 N.W.2d 47 (Minn. 2004). Inferences about a parent’s intentions are
best made by the district cour t and will not be disturbed on ap peal absent clear error.
L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d at 399.
The district court found that K.E.B. desert ed M.R.R. by having no contact with her
at any point after his second hospital visit in September 2015, even though more than nine
months passed after that before he was taken into custody for criminal charges. The district
court found that K.E.B. intended to abandon his parental duties, and that he manifested this
intent by “not personally taking any steps to provide for [M.R.R.], care for her, bond with
her, visit her, learn how to care for her, lear n what her special needs were, learn if her
medical condition was improving and/or learn what medical conditions she had that needed
on-going care” from September 2015 through Ju ne 2016 when he learned about the

8
involvement of social services. The district court also found that K.E.B. never financially
supported M.R.R.
The record contains clear and convinci ng evidence to support these findings.
K.E.B.’s testimony and the hospital nurses’ notes support the finding that K.E.B. saw
M.R.R. only twice, both times in September 2015. There is no evidence that K.E.B. took
any steps to understand M.R.R’s special need s, learn how to care for her, develop a
relationship with her, or provide financia l support for her at any time before his
incarceration. At the time of the hearing, K.E.B. still had had no contact with M.R.R. and
had not made efforts to get to know her or to show interest in her well-being.
This case is factually similar to In re Welfare of Staat, in which the supreme court
held that an incarcerated father’s lack of financial support, visits, correspondence, or
evidence showing his interest in the welfare of the children, after refusing to acknowledge
his fatherhood for the first ten months of their lives, constituted abandonment. 287 Minn.
501, 178 N.W.2d 709 (1 970). The father in Staat had seen his children only once, for a
two-hour visit. Id. at 507, 178 N.W.2d at 713. Similarly, K.E.B. saw M.R.R. only in two
short visits and has been absent from her life since less than three weeks after her birth.
K.E.B. never expressly denied hi s parenthood like the father in Staat, but he also never
meaningfully accepted responsibility for supporting or raising M.R.R. Although he made
an effort to challenge the term ination of his parental rights and claims that he wishes to
parent M.R.R., he has not demonstrated that interest by making effo rts to get to know
M.R.R., to ask anyone in contact with her about her well-being, or to learn how to care for
her special needs.

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The facts of this case are also analogous to L.A.F., in which the supreme court
upheld the district court’s finding that the father intentionally abandoned the child because
his only contact with the child was in one visit two weeks after the child’s birth, he showed
no consistent interest in the child’s well-being, he never offered to help with child-rearing
expenses, and he di d not attempt to legally establish paternity until a court required it.
L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d at 398.
Because the district court’s findings of fact underlying its determination that K.E.B.
intentionally abandoned M.R.R. are not clearl y erroneous, K.E.B. has not shown that the
district court abused its discretion by invoking abandonment under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(1), as a statutory ba sis for involuntarily terminating K.E.B.’s parental rights.
Further, if one statutory basis for terminati ng parental rights is a ffirmable, other bases
invoked by the district court to terminate parental rights need not be addressed. See In re
Welfare of Children of R.W. , 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004 ) (“Termination of parental
rights will be affirmed as long as at least one statutory ground for termination is supported
by clear and convincing evidence and terminati on is in the child’s best interests.”).
Therefore, we decline to address the other statutory bases for terminating K.E.B.’s parental
rights invoked by the district court, though we note that th e record clearly supports the
district court’s determination that reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading
to placement under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5), as a separate statutory basis for
terminating K.E.B.’s parental rights.

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II. The district court did not abuse its di scretion in determining that termination
of K.E.B.’s parental rights is in M.R.R.’s best interests.
In proceedings to terminate parental rights, the best interests of the child are the
paramount consideration. Minn. Stat. § 260C.3 01, subd. 7. A district court must make
findings regarding how the order is in the best interests of the child. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P.
42.08, subd. 1(b). The district court must balance three factors: “(1) the child’s interest in
preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-
child relationship; and (3) any comp eting interest of the child.” In re Welfare of R.T.B. ,
492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992). A district court’s dete rmination that termination of
parental rights is in a child’s best interest s is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. J.R.B.,
805 N.W.2d at 905.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the termination of
K.E.B.’s parental rights is in M.R.R.’s best interests. The district court acknowledged
K.E.B.’s interest in preserving the parent-ch ild relationship, but questioned the weight of
that interest in light of the l ack of interest K.E.B. showed in M.R.R. before he learned of
the petition to terminate his parental rights. We note that by actively avoiding being found
for the first ten months of M.R. R.’s life, K.E.B. placed his personal interest in eluding
arrest above M.R.R.’s and his own interests in preserving the parent-child relationship.
The district court made detailed findings related to several of M.R.R.’s interests that
conflict with the preservation of the parent-child relationship. The district court found that
M.R.R. has continuing special needs related to apnea, developmental and language delays,
difficulty with fine motor skills, and a heart murmur, and did not believe that K.E.B. would

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be able to understand, care for, and continue to monitor those ne eds sufficiently. The
district court also found that it is in M.R.R.’s best interests to rema in in the care of her
foster parents, with whom she has a “stable, trusting relationship,” in “the only home she
has ever known.” These findings are supported by the record.
K.E.B. does not allege that any specific finding underlying the district court’s best-
interests analysis is clearly erroneous, but he argues that the district court abused its
discretion by failing to consider M.R.R.’s inte rest in preserving relationships with her
younger brother and her two older half-sisters. Although M.R.R. is biologically related to
these children, the record indicat es that she has never met them or interacted with them.
Under the facts of this case, it was within the district court’s discretion to conclude that the
termination of K.E.B.’s parental rights was in M.R.R.’s best interests without addressing
any interest M.R.R. might have in establishing relationships with other relatives.
III. The district court did not err in findin g that the county made reasonable efforts
to reunite the family.
K.E.B. challenges the district court’s finding that the county made reasonable efforts
to reunite him with M.R.R. Before terminating a person’s parental rights, the district court
must make specific findings either “that reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan
to reunify the child and the parent were made[,] including individualized and explicit
findings regarding the nature and extent of e fforts made by the social services agency to
rehabilitate the parent and reun ite the family,” or that reas onable efforts for reunification
are not required. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8. The county’s efforts must be aimed at
alleviating the conditions that gave rise to out-of-home placement and must conform to the

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problems presented. In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T. , 814 N.W.2d 76, 88 (Minn. App.
2012). The district court must consider whet her the services offere d by the county were
(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child, (2) adequate to meet the needs of the
child and family, (3) culturally appropriate, (4) available and accessible, (5) consistent and
timely, and (6) realistic under the circumstances. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h). “Whether the
county has met its duty of reas onable efforts requires consid eration of the length of the
time the county was involved and the quality of effort given.” In re Welfare of H.K., 455
N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. July 6, 1990).
The district court identified two steps the county took in its efforts to place M.R.R.
in K.E.B.’s care. First, the district court found that the county “made every possible effort
to identify [K.E.B.] du ring the proceedings.” Second, the district court found that the
county developed a case plan for K.E.B. afte r meeting with him and consulting with his
prison case manager.
The district court found th at the county “made every possible effort” to identify
K.E.B. early in the process but “did not have the power to identify [K.E.B.] because he
made no effort to be identifiable.” The re cord supports this finding. The county asked
M.D.R. to identify K.E.B. and requested a court order compelling her to provide
information about him. The county searched mu ltiple databases a nd websites for the
misspelled names M.D.R. provide d, attempting to identify K.E.B. K.E.B. did not make
himself identifiable by signing a recognition of parentage, registering with the Father’s
Adoption Registry, or filing a paternity action, and he deliberately did not keep a permanent
address because he did not want to be found due to warrants for his arrest.

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The county’s efforts to id entify K.E.B. were aimed at alleviating one of the
conditions that led to M.R.R.’s placement in foster care. See J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 88.
From the county’s perspective, when M.R.R. was placed in foster care in October 2015,
K.E.B. was absent from M.R.R.’s life. Until the county could identify and contact K.E.B.,
it had no way to move forward with efforts to assess K.E.B.’s ability to care for M.R.R.
and to determine what services were needed to rehabilitate him and reunite the family.
Thus, the county’s efforts to locate K.E.B. were part of its reasonable efforts to reunite him
with M.R.R.
The district court also found that the c ounty created a case plan for K.E.B. that
identified areas of concern—chemical depende ncy, mental health, and parenting skills—
that “were reasonable in light of the fact th at” K.E.B. had been convicted of fifth-degree
drug possession, provided a urinalysis that tested positive for methamphetamine while on
probation three weeks before M.R.R.’s birth, and failed to fulfill a probation requirement
that he address mental-health concerns. The district court found the parenting-skills part
of the case plan reasonable because K.E.B. had shown poor parenting skills by not regularly
visiting M.R.R. when he believed she was hospitalized for ten months and not making
efforts to learn about M.R.R.’s medical needs, care for her, bond with her, or parent her.
The district court noted that all of the areas of concern identified in the case plan were
“issues that [K.E.B.] could address while in prison.”
The district court’s discussion about the a ppropriateness of the case plan reflects
consideration of all of the factors in Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h), with the exception of the
“culturally appropriate” factor. K.E.B., however, does not challenge the cultural

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appropriateness of the county’s efforts in this case, and nothing in the statute indicates that
the district court must make findings on an uncontested factor in Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h).
Therefore, the district court’s failure to address the cultural propriety of the county’s plan
does not require reversal of the district court.
K.E.B. argues that the county did not provi de any services and that the case plan
alone is not enough to constitute “reasonable efforts.” The county argues that its efforts
were reasonable under the circumstances be cause there was nothing more it could have
done before K.E.B. was identified in June 20 16 or while he was incarcerated from June
2016 to March 2017.
We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the county made
reasonable efforts. This ca se is factually similar to R.W., in which the supreme court
concluded that the county was not required to make efforts to establish a relationship
between a father and his childre n where the father had previo usly lived with the children
but provided only “marginal” care, and the father was now incarc erated and failing to
“maintain any type of meaningful relationship with the children.” R.W., 678 N.W.2d at 52,
56 (quotation omitted). In R.W., the district court found that there was “nothing” the county
could do to reunify the fam ily, meaning that creating a ca se plan would be futile and
therefore not a reasonable effort. Id. at 56. Although the district court in this case did not
make a finding that further efforts would be futile, it did make findings, supported by the
record, that K.E.B. “does not know [M.R.R.]” and “has not shown an interest in learning
what it means to care for [M.R.R.] or get to know her.”

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Given the minimal existing relationship be tween M.R.R. and K.E.B. and the fact
that the county created a case plan addressing areas of concern that K.E.B. could work on
while incarcerated, we conclude that the district court did not err in finding that the county
made reasonable efforts to reunify M.R.R. and K.E.B.
Affirmed.