The holding in the court’s own words
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that husb and’s evidence was insufficient to meet his burden of proving a substantial change in circumstances that renders his spousal- maintenance obligation unreasonable and unfair.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Marriage of Hecker v. Hecker 568 N.W.2d 705
- Silbaugh v. Silbaugh 543 N.W.2d 639
- Marriage of Antone v. Antone 645 N.W.2d 96
- Marriage of Hemmingsen v. Hemmingsen 767 N.W.2d 711
- In re the Marria ge of: Marla Jean Knapp v. James Alan Knapp 883 N.W.2d 833
- Marriage of Prange v. Prange 437 N.W.2d 69
- Marriage of Tuthill v. Tuthill 399 N.W.2d 230
- Marriage of Beck v. Kaplan 566 N.W.2d 723
- Marriage of Sefkow v. Sefkow 427 N.W.2d 203
- Marriage of Dobrin v. Dobrin 569 N.W.2d 199
Opinion text
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0177
In re the Marriage of:
Michael Keith Rhyan, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
Marni Linette Rhyan,
Respondent.
Filed September 11, 2017
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge
Dakota County District Court
File No. 19AV-FA-12-2905
Maury D. Beaulier, Beaulier Law Office, St. Louis Park, Minnesota (for appellant)
Laurie A. Cylkowski, Katherine M. Ray, Cylkowski Law Office, P.A., Eagan, Minnesota
(for respondent)
Considered and decided by Ross, Pres iding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.
*
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to modify his spousal-
maintenance obligation, arguing that the court abused its discretion by (1) failing to give
sufficient weight to wife’s cohabitation, and (2) understating wife’s ability to support
herself. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Michael Rhyan (husband) and respondent Marni Rhyan (wife) married in
1995 and separated in Sept ember 2012, when wife moved from the family home in
Minnesota and to Missouri. In May 2013, the district court dissolved the parties’ marriage
by a bifurcated judgment and decree and, in May 2014, resolved, in relevant part, the
parties’ remaining financial issues. The court found that wife “[wa]s not capable of self-
support and require[d] [husband’s] assistance to meet her reasonable monthly expenses,”
and that husband “[wa]s capable of paying such support.” The parties stipulated to an award
of permanent spousal maintenance to wife as follows:
Commencing December 1, 20 13, [husband] shall pay
[wife] $1,350.00 per month as and for spousal maintenance,
inclusive of child support. This amount shall be payable in two
equal installments of $675.00 on the 1st and 15th of each
month. This entire amount sha ll be characterized as spousal
maintenance for income tax purposes. The amount may be
modifiable pursuant to applicable Minnesota law. [Husband]’s
maintenance obligation shall terminate upon the death or
remarriage of [wife].
3
In December 2016, the distri ct court denied a motion by husband to terminate his
spousal-maintenance obligation o r, alternatively, to suspend or modify it. This appeal
follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellate courts review a district court’s decision to grant or deny modification of
spousal maintenance for an abuse of discretion. Hecker v. Hecker, 568 N.W.2d 705, 709–
10 (Minn. 1997). The district court abuses its discretion if it makes findings unsupported
by the evidence or misapplies the law. Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn.
1996). Appellate courts review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. Antone
v. Antone, 645 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. 2002). Factual findings are clearly erroneous if they
are “manifestly contrary to the weight of th e evidence or not reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” Hemmingsen v. Hemmingsen , 767 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. App.
2009) (quotation omitted). This court defe rs to the district court’s credibility
determinations, including its opportunity to weigh the evidence, which may be in affidavit
form. Knapp v. Knapp, 883 N.W.2d 833, 837 (Minn. App. 2016).
“A party moving to modify an award of maintenance bears the burden of showing
a substantial change of circumstances since th e last time maintenance was modified or, if
maintenance has not been modified, since it was originally set.” Hemmingsen, 767 N.W.2d
at 716−17 (quotation omitted). “After showing changed circumstances, the moving party
must demonstrate that the change renders the original award unreasonable and unfair.” Id.
at 717; see Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a) (2016) (providing eight bases for a finding of
changed circumstances including, among other things, substantially increased or decreased
4
gross income or needs of an obligor or obli gee). A finding of changed circumstances is a
factual finding. Prange v. Prange, 437 N.W.2d 69, 70 (Minn. App. 1989), review denied
(Minn. May 12, 1989). “In modification of maintenance obligations, as well as in the initial
determination, particularized findings are necessary to show that relevant statutory factors
have been considered.” Tuthill v. Tuthill, 399 N.W.2d 230, 232 (Minn. App. 1987).
Spousal maintenance also may be modified if the “cohabitation by the maintenance
obligee with another adult following dissolu tion of the marriage” makes the spousal-
maintenance obligation unreasonable and unfair. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 6(a) (2016).1
To determine if spousal main tenance should be modified be cause of cohabitation, the
district court must consider the following f our factors: (1) “whether the obligee would
marry the cohabitant but for the maintenance award”; (2) “the economic benefit the obligee
derives from the cohabitation”; (3) “the length of the cohabitation and the likely future
duration of the cohabitation”; and (4) “the economic impact on the obligee if maintenance
is modified and the cohabitation ends.” Id.
A spousal-maintenance stipulation serves as a baseline “against which claims of
substantial change are evaluated.” Hecker, 568 N.W.2d at 709. “[ T]he district court
considering the modification motion must appr eciate that the stipulation represents the
parties’ voluntary acquiescence in an equitable settlement.” Beck v. Kaplan, 566 N.W.2d
723, 726 (Minn. 1997). The supreme court has “cautioned the district court to exercise its
1 Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 6(a) (2016), became effective on August 1, 2016, and applies
to modification motions brought on or after the effective date. See 2016 Minn. Laws ch.
132, § 1, at 203−04.
5
considerable discretion carefully and only relu ctantly when it is face d with a request to
alter the terms of an agreement which was negotiated by the parties.” Id.
A. Cohabitation
Husband argues that wife’s cohabitation w ith A.S. has significantly reduced her
expenses and that the district court therefore abused its discretion by not finding that wife’s
cohabitation with A.S. established a substantial change in circumstances. The district court
found that the record containe d no credible evidence to supp ort a finding that wife was
cohabitating with A.S. The court concluded, “Because Wife is not cohabitating with [A.S.],
a modification is not warranted on that basis alone.” We agree.
Husband acknowledges that wife’s reside nce in A.S.’s home in Missouri has not
changed since the time of the dissolution; husband describes wife’s residence as “a
continuation of a cohabitating relationship that [wife] previously described as temporary.”
To support his modification motion, husband relied primarily on information that was
available at the time of the dissolution, admitting that the information upon which he relied
to prove wife’s cohabitation with A.S. “was available at the time of the divorce.” He
submitted his own affidavit, describing events that occurred and statements that wife and
others made in 2012 and 2013, prior to and contemporaneous with the marriage dissolution.
But husband argues that the in formation in the record should be considered to determine
whether a substantial change in circumstances has occurred because, at the time of the
dissolution, “Minnesota Statutes . . . did not specifically address cohabitation as a basis for
granting or modifying spousal support.” We reject husband’s argument because it is based
upon a change of the law rather than a change of wife’s circumstances.
6
Regarding the statutory factors upon which maintenance may be modified based on
cohabitation, the record contains no evidence to support a finding that wife would marry
A.S. but for the spousal-main tenance award. Husband asserts that A.S. and wife are
cohabitating because they are in a long-term romantic relationship. But the record evidence
is conflicting about the nature of the relationship between A.S. and wife. Wife asserts that
she and A.S. are simply roommates and platoni c family friends with separate lives. She
submitted an affidavit denying her cohabitation with A.S. and declari ng that she rents a
room from him and pays rent by paying for the electric and gas utilities at a cost of about
$300 per month, in addition to the cost of Internet service. A.S. submitted an affidavit,
stating that he and wife are not, and never have been, involved in a romantic relationship.
The district court was required to resolve the conflict in that evidence by weighing
the evidence and determining which evidence was credible. See Sefkow v. Sefkow , 427
N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (stating that the district court’s findings must be sustained
unless clearly erroneous, and deferring to district court’s credibility determinations). This
court cannot “usurp[] the role of the [district] court by reweighing the evidence and finding
its own facts.” Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted).
The district court found that husband’s evidence of a romantic relationship of cohabitation
was not credible, and this court must defer to the district court’s credibility determinations.
Our review of the record leads to the conclusion that the dist rict court did not clearly err
by determining that no credible evidence supports a finding of changed circumstances
based on the cohabitation of A.S. and wife. Because husban d has not met his burden of
proving that wife and A.S. are cohabitating, he cannot satisfy any of the four required
7
factors articulated in Minn. Stat. § 518.552 , subd. 6(a), for modification of spousal
maintenance based on cohabitation. Husband’s cohabitation argument therefore fails.
B. Substantial change of circumstances
Husband also argues that wife’s needs have decreased because she does not live on
her own—she lives with A.S.—and that her decreased need constitutes a substantial change
in circumstances. After hearing husband’s m odification motion, the district court found
that “Husband reports monthly expenses of $6,141 and Wife reports monthly expenses of
$3,223.” In the dissolution judgment, the district court found that, “[t]he parties have not
reached a complete agreement regarding expenses, and these figures [of husband’s claimed
monthly expenses in the amount of $5,481.64 and wife’s cl aimed monthly expenses of
$3,348.00] shall not be determinative for future spousal maintenance obligations.”
We acknowledge that, in light of the language in the dissolution judgment,
husband’s burden of proving a su bstantial change in circumstances is difficult. We agree
that the amount of expenses wife reported for herself in response to husband’s modification
motion is less than the amount that she submitted to the court at the time of the dissolution
judgment, but they are not substantially decreased. Wife’s monthly expenses are $225 less
than the court noted in the di ssolution judgment when it also noted that “these figures
[about the parties’ expenses] shall not be determinative fo r future spousal maintenance
obligations.”
Husband also argues that the district cour t clearly erred by not finding that wife’s
salary is less than her earning potential and th at, because wife did not enroll in interior
design classes to increase her earning potentia l, a substantial cha nge in circumstances
8
occurred. We disagree. First, nothing in the record suggests that wife has any obligation to
engage in rehabilitative efforts to advance he r earning capacity, and husband provides no
legal authority to support his argument. In fa ct, husband admits that such an expectation
“was not written into the parties Judgment and Decree.”
Secondly, as to wife’s income, the di strict court noted in its order, denying
husband’s modification motion, that “[a]t th e time of the Decree, Husband was earning
$7,500 each month and Wife was imputed in come of $1,884 each month. Husband
currently earns $7,980 each month and Wife earns approximately $1,824 each month.”
(footnote omitted). The record su pports the district court’s findings. At the time of the
modification motion, wife’s income was less than the income imputed to her at the time of
the dissolution, but her actual earnings had mo re than doubled since the dissolution. And
the parties stipulated to husband’s permanent spousal-maintenance obligation based not on
wife’s earning potential but on income imputed to her at the time of the dissolution. She
now earns less than the imputed amount. Mo reover, since the dissolution, husband’s
income has increased more than $5,000 annually. We conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by finding that husb and’s evidence was insufficient to meet his
burden of proving a substantial change in circumstances that renders his spousal-
maintenance obligation unreasonable and unfair.
Affirmed.