Jayson Dock, et al., Appellants,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0184

Jayson Dock, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

Waconia Landing Homeowners Association, Inc.,
Respondent.

Filed December 4, 2017
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CV-16-817

John P. Boyle, Kelly C. McGinty, Moss & Barnett, A Professional Association,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Margaret E. Dalton, Todd M. Winter, Stoel Rives LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Worke, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant homeowners challenge the district court’s award of summary judgment
to respondent homeowners association in this dispute regarding respondent’s installation
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of a dock, arguing that the district court erred in finding that their lawsuit is barred under
the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellants Jayson Dock and Cristine Dock (the Docks) live in Waconia Landing
Addition (Waconia Landing), a residential subdivi sion on Lake Waconia. The Dock s’
residence abuts Lake Waconia and has 112 feet of shoreline. Each property owner within
Waconia Landing is a member of respondent Waconia Landing Homeowners Association
Inc. (the as sociation), including the Docks. An outlot is directly adjacent to the Docks’
property and has approximately 90 feet of lakeshore on Lake Waconia. Six of the homes
in Waconia Landing (6F Group) abut a marshy portion of Lake Waconia. The marshy
conditions of their shoreline prevent the 6F Group homeowners from using a dock or
launching a boat on Lake Waconia.
In March 2000, the Declaration of Single Family Residential Covenants,
Conditions, and Restrictions for Waconia Landing Addition (declaration) w as recorded in
the office of the Carver County Recorder. The declaration expressly granted the 6F Group
the “right to install, store and maintain one dock with six boat lifts” off of the outlot. The
6F Group currently installs and maintains a seasonal dock off of the outlot (6F dock) with
space for six watercraft. In addition, the association installs and maintains a seasonal dock
(association dock) off of the outlot with space for six watercraft that is available for use by
all of the association members.
In May 2014, the Docks sued the association and the 6F Group homeowners,
asserting trespass and breach-of-contract claims. The Docks alleged that for several years,
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the association and 6F docks had been “installed and maintained at a sharp angle fro m the
[outlot] in such a manner that the [docks] cross[ed] over and encroach[ed] upon that portion
of Lake Waconia located in front of the Dock Property.” The Docks alleged that the
placement of the association and 6F docks created a safety hazard and that it interfered
with the Docks’ riparian rights. The Docks further alleged that the placement of the docks
violated the declaration “because it unreasonably interferes with, annoys, and disturbs
[them]; constitutes an annoyance and nuisance to [them]; and violates Minnesota law and
the DNR published dock installation guidelines.” The Docks requested a declaratory
judgment “declaring that extending the boundary line shared by [the outlot] and the Dock
Property establishes the Riparian Boundary between the portion of Lake Waconia located
in front of [the outlot] and the portion of Lake Waconia located in front of the Dock
Property.”
The district court granted the association and 6F Group’s motion to dismiss the
Docks’ complaint. First, the district court reasoned that the Docks did not “have exclusive
possession [of] Lake Waconia and ha[d] not shown that they have a legal right that ha[d]
been trespassed upon.” Second, the district court found that the Docks failed to state a
viable claim for relief regarding any of the alleged breaches of the declaration. The district
court found that the Docks’ breach -of-contract claim based on a DNR publication did not
state a viable claim for relief because the publication’s ins tallation guidelines were not
rules or regulations and therefore did not have the force of law. The district court also
found that the Docks’ other breach -of-contract claims were without merit because they
failed to “explain how allegedly annoying or offensive activity that occurs in Lake
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Waconia’s public water could constitute annoying or offensive activity that occurs on [the
outlot]” that would be subject to the declaration.
In August 2016, the Docks once again sued the association, alleging that the
association did not have a legal right to install and maintain the association dock. The
Docks relied on the declaration, two Waconia City Council resolutions regarding the outlot,
an agreement between the city and Waconia Landing’s developer, and DNR regulations.
The Docks also alleged that the dense u se of the association dock had “created a
dangerously-congested condition that ha[d] interfered with the safe use by the Docks of
their dock.” The Docks requested a declaratory judgment regarding (1) “[t]he
Association’s right to install and m aintain a separate dock other than the 6F dock off of
[the outlot],” (2) “[w]hether overnight parking of watercraft is permitted on a dock off of
[the outlot],” and (3) “[w]hether a watercraft other than one owned by a 6F property owner
may be moored off of [the outlot].”
The association moved to dismiss the Docks’ complaint under Minn. R. Civ. P.
12.02(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, alleging that the
association had a lawful right to install and maintain the associatio n dock and that the
Docks’ claim was barred under the doctrine of res judicata . The district court granted the
association’s motion. The Docks appeal.
D E C I S I O N
I.
The Docks contend that the district court erred in dismissing their complaint under
Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) under the doctrine of res judicata.
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A pleading can be dismissed under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) if it “fail[s] to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” A pleading should be dismissed under rule
12.02(e) “only if it appears to a certainty that no facts, which could be introduced consistent
with the pleading, exist which would support granting the relief demanded.” Bahr v.
Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts
review orders to dismiss under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) de novo. Sipe v. STS Mfg., Inc.,
834 N.W.2d 683, 686 (Minn. 2013). This court considers “only the facts alleged in the
complaint, accepting those facts as true.” Id. (quotation omitted). However, this court is
“not bound by legal conclusions stated in a complaint.” Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744
N.W.2d 226, 235 (Minn. 2008).
“Once there is an adjudication of a dispute between parties, res judicata prevents
either party from relitigating claims arising from the original circumstances, even under
new legal theories.” Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2004). “Res
judicata . . . prevents parties from splitting claims into more than one lawsuit and precludes
further litigation of the same claim.” Loo v. Loo, 520 N.W.2d 740, 744 n.1 (Minn. 1994).
The res judi cata doctrine “reflects courts’ disfavor with multiple lawsuits for the same
cause of action and wasteful litigation.” Schober v. Comm’r of Revenue, 853 N.W.2d 102,
111 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).
Res judicata bars a subsequent claim when “(1) the earlier claim involved the same
set of factual circumstances; (2) the earlier claim involved the same parties or their privies;
(3) there was a final judgment on the merits; (4) the estopped party had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the matter.” Hauschildt, 686 N.W.2d at 840. “All four prongs must
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be met for res judicata to apply.” Id. “Res judicata applies equally to claims actually
litigated and to claims that could have been litigated in the earlier action.” Brown-Wilbert,
Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 220 (Minn. 2007). However, “[r]es judicata
is not applied rigidly but is a flexible doctrine in which the focus is on whether its
application would work an injustice on the party against whom estoppel is urged.” Mach
v. Wells Concrete Prods. Co., 866 N.W.2d 921, 925-26 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).
This court reviews the application of res judicata de novo. Rucker v. Schmidt, 794 N.W.2d
114, 117 (Minn. 2011).
The Docks concede that there was a final judgment on the merit s in the prior
litigation. And although the Docks note that the 6F Group homeowners were defendants
in the prior litigation and they are not defendants in this action, the Docks do not argue that
the same-parties prong of the res judicata four-part test is not satisfied. We therefore focus
on the remaining two res judicata inquiries: whether the Docks’ earlier claim involved the
same set of factual circumstances and whether the Docks had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the matter.
Factual Circumstances
The Docks argue that “[t]he Prior Litigation did not involve the same factual
circumstances, the same cause of action, or the same claims” as this action. Specifically,
the Docks contend that their “request for a judicial determination re garding the permitted
number of docks differs in form, purpose, and scope from the Prior Litigation” and that
“[t]he proof required to determine the issues in this action differs from the proof required
in the Prior Litigation.”
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“Identity of subject matter does not establish that two claims are the same cause of
action.” Care Inst., Inc. -Roseville v. C ounty of Ramsey , 612 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Minn.
2000). “Two causes of action are the same when they involve the same set of factual
circumstances or when the same evidence will sustain both actions.” SMA Servs., Inc. v.
Weaver, 632 N.W.2d 770, 774 (Minn. App. 2001) (quotation omitted). Two causes of
action involve the same set of factual circumstances when “the same operative nucleus of
facts is alleged in su pport of the claims.” Anderson v. Werner Cont’l., Inc., 363 N.W.2d
332, 335 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn. June 24, 1985); see Hauschildt, 686
N.W.2d at 840 (describing a claim or cause of action as “a group of operative facts giving
rise to one or more bases for suing” (quotation omitted)). A change in legal theory cannot
be used to avoid res judicata. Hauschildt, 686 N.W.2d at 837; Nitz v. Nitz , 456 N.W.2d
450, 452 (Minn. App. 1990); see, e.g., Dollar Travel Agency, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 354
N.W.2d 880, 882-83 (Minn. App. 1984) (holding that judgment in earlier contract action
barred later tort action because the plaintiff could have litigated both legal theories in the
first action).
The Docks argue that because the relevant evidence in this action is different than
that in the prior action, the two lawsuits do not involve the same cause of action. They
assert that “three of the governing documents were not even at issue in the Prior Litigation,
and the fourth, the Declaration, was raise d for a wholly different purpose.” We are not
persuaded. Although the Docks submitted additional documents in this action regarding
whether the association is authorized to install the association dock, the Docks alleged the
same “operative nucleus of fa cts” in both actions. In the prior action, the Docks sued the
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association, alleging that the placement of the association dock created a safety hazard,
interfered with their riparian rights, and violated the declaration and DNR regulations. In
this action, the Docks again sued the association, alleging that the association dock had
created a “dangerously-congested condition,” interfered with the Docks’ use of their dock,
and violated the declaration and DNR regulations. The two actions clearly involve the
same set of factual circumstances.
The Docks also argue that their prior action “concerned the location and trajectory
of the Association’s docks into the lake” and “whether an enforceable riparian boundary
line existed in the waters beyond the natural extensions of the property line between [the
outlot] and the Docks’ parcel.” (Emphasis omitted.) They contrast those claims with the
relevant legal question in this case: whether “one dock or . . . two docks, and more than six
watercraft [are] authorized by the governing documents.” The Docks argue that under
Nelson v. Am. Family Ins. Grp., 651 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Minn. 2002), res judicata does not
apply because the two actions are not identical to each other.
In Nelson, a plaintiff prevailed in a personal injury action in South Dakota against a
driver following an automobile accident. 651 N.W.2d at 502. The plaintiff then sued her
own insurance company in Minnesota to recover future medical expenses and past income
loss caused by the accident. Id. The insurance company argued that the second action was
barred by res judicata. Id. The supreme court contrasted the two actions, noting that the
South Dakota action “was a personal injury tort action brought to recover damages arising
out of personal injuries and the negligence of the defendant” and that the Minnesota action
was “for breach of contract to recover mandatory no -fault insurance benefits under an
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insurance policy.” Id. at 512. The supreme court concluded that the plaintiff was “not
barred by res judicata from asserting her cause of action because the cause of action in the
prior litigation [was] not identical to the cause of action in [that] litigation.” Id.
The Docks’ reliance on Nelson is misplaced. First, Nelson involved two separate
actions brought against two different defendants, unlike the two actions against the
association here. Second, the two actions in Nelson involved distinct underlying disputes.
Although both actions were related to the automobile accident, one was a person al injury
tort action against the tortfeasor and the other was a breach -of-contract action against the
plaintiff’s insurer . Here, both of the Docks’ actions are based on the same underlying
dispute regarding the association’s installation of the associati on dock. Third, since
Nelson, the supreme court has once again stated that a change in legal theory cannot be
used to avoid res judicata. Hauschildt, 686 N.W.2d at 837. The differences that the Docks
identify in their two actions against the association merely show a change in legal theory.
The underlying operative facts, that is, the existence of the association dock, the alleged
hazard caused by the dock, the dock’s alleged interference with the Docks’ enjoyment of
their property, and the association’s alleged violation of the declaration and DNR
regulations are the same.
In sum, the Docks’ earlier claim involved the same set of factual circumstances as
this action.
Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate
“The question of whether a party had a full an d fair opportunity to litigate a matter
generally focuses on whether there were significant procedural limitations in the prior
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proceeding, whether the party had the incentive to litigate fully the issue, or whether
effective litigation was limited by the nature or relationship of the parties.” State v. Joseph,
636 N.W.2d 322, 328 (Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted).
The Docks argue that they “did not receive a full and fair opportunity in the prior
litigation to litigate the claims asserted in this matter” b ecause the claims at issue in this
action were not “raised, addressed, or decided” in the prior litigation . Whether the
association’s right to install and maintain the association dock was raised, addressed, or
decided in the prior action is immaterial because res judicata applies both to claims actually
litigated and to claims that could have been litigated. Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 220.
The key question is whether the Docks had a full and fair opportunity to litigate t he
association’s right to install the association dock in the prior lawsuit.
The Docks argue that the prior lawsuit was “dismissed before any discovery was
undertaken” and that the Docks did not have a chance to fully develop the facts and issues.
The Docks assert that “[t]he issu es being raised in the 2016 lawsuit came to light during
the course and conduct of criminal proceedings” occurring after the prior litigation and
before this action, when “new documents were obtained during the discovery that occurred
in those proceedings.” The Docks argue that this action is based on three “new” governing
documents identified during the criminal proceedings and that “ [i]t is those governing
documents, and not the Declaration, that confer any arguable right to the placement of more
than one dock and six watercraft off of [the outlot].”
The three governing documents —two Waconia city council resolutions and an
agreement between the city and Waconia Landing’s developer—are dated 1999, 2000, and
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2000 respectively.1 Each document generally states that the association may install a single
dock with six slips for watercraft. The Docks assert that “[b]ecause the Declaration
conveys no dock or mooring rights to the Association, it is the other three governing
documents that need to be construed, in light of applicable DNR rules and regulations, to
determine what dock and mooring rights, if any, those three governing documen ts convey
to the Association.”
Contrary to the Docks’ assertion, the declaration is consistent with the three
governing documents because it authorizes the placement of one dock and six watercraft
off of the outlot. Thus, the three governing documents from 1999 and 2000 did not reveal
new information relevant to the Docks’ claims , and the Docks did not need to discover
those documents to bring the current action. In sum, we discern no justification for the
Docks’ failure to allege , in their first action , that the association was not authorized to
install and maintain the association dock. And because a ruling that the association could
not install the association dock would have addressed the Docks’ complaints about the
placement of that dock, they had a significant incentive to fully litigate that issue in the
prior litigation.
In sum, the Docks had a full and fair opportunity to litigate whether the association
was authorized to install and maintain the association dock in the prior litigation. Because
all four parts of the test for application of res judicata are satisfied, its application was
proper in this case.

1 A memorandum from the Waconia city planner dated 1999 is attached to the 2000 city
council resolution.
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Additional Arguments
The Docks contend that certain contractual language in the declaration prevents the
application of res judicata here. That language states that members of the association have
“the right to enforce, by any proceeding at law or in equ ity, all restrictions, conditions,
covenants, reservations, liens, and charges now or hereafter imposed by the provision of
this Declaration” and that the failure of a member to “enforce any covenant or restriction
herein shall in no event be deemed a waiver of the right to do so.” The Docks do not cite
caselaw in support of their contention that this contractual language bars application of res
judicata here.
The association counters that a “no-waiver clause in a contract” cannot override the
doctrine o f res judicata because “such a concept is fundamentally incompatible with a
court’s judicial power to conclusively decide cases.” The association stresses the policy
reasons underlying res judicata, including “the interest in avoiding unnecessary litigati on,
the economy of judicial time, and the public policy favoring the establishment of certainty
in legal relations.” Wessling v. Johnson, 424 N.W.2d 795, 799 (Minn. App. 1988), review
denied (Minn. July 28, 1988).
In the context of forum -selection claus es, we have recognized that in some
circumstances, courts may refuse to enforce an agreed -upon contractual provision despite
the parties ’ general right to contract , if enforcement contravenes the public policy of
“‘[j]udicial economy and the prevention of multiple actions on similar issues.’” See
Maslowski v. Prospect Funding Partners LLC, 890 N.W.2d 756, 763-64 (Minn. App. 2017)
(quoting Interfund Corp. v. O’Byrne, 462 N.W.2d 86, 89 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied
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(Minn. May 16, 2017)). These same policy concerns underlie the doctrine of res judicata.
See Schober , 853 N.W.2d at 111 (noting that the res judicata doctrine “reflects courts’
disfavor with multiple lawsuits for the same cause of action and wasteful litigation ”).
Based on the policy concerns underlying the doctrine of res judicata and its clear
application in this case, we are not willing to treat the relevant language in the declaration
as a waiver of the doctrine in the absence of legal authority suggesting we should do so.
Lastly, t he Docks contend that dismissal of “this action on res judicata grounds
would ‘work an injustice’ on [them]” by preventing them from “ever obtaining a legal
determination on the fundamental question of whether the governing documents authorize
one or two docks and more than six watercraft off of [the outlot].” Because this issue was
known and the Docks had a full and fair opportunity to litigate it in their prior action,
application of the doctrine of res judicata does not work an injustice on the Docks.
Affirmed.