State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0194

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jonathan David Janssen,
Appellant.

Filed April 2, 2018
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-15-5122

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, James P. Spencer, Assistant County Attorney,
Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court abus ed its discretion by refusing to strike a
juror for cause and by admitting prior bad-act evidence pursuant to Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)
2
and Minn. Stat. § 634.20. Appellant also argue s in his pro se supplemental brief that the
evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Jonathan David Janssen moved in with his girlfriend J.J. and her four
children, including A.S. and B.S., in 2011. They married in 2014. Appellant sexually
abused A.S. five times from March to D ecember 2013. A.S. wa s 12 years old when
appellant first sexually abused her. Each in cident involved digita l penetration and the
touching of A.S.’s breast while she was sleeping on the bottom bunk of a bunk bed and her
sister B.S. was sleeping on the top bunk. After the fifth incident, A.S. switched beds with
B.S., and appellant stopped sexually assaulting A.S. A.S. did not accuse appellant of sexual
assault until July 2015, when she and B.S. visited their grandmother in Wisconsin. Shortly
before they left, B.S. urged A.S. to tell their grandmother that appellant had sexually abused
A.S. Their grandmother promptly notified law enforcement after A.S. told her about
appellant’s sexual abuse.
Shortly thereafter, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with two counts
of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in viol ation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subds. 1(b),
1(g) (2014). During pretrial, B.S. came fo rward with new testimony that appellant also
sexually abused her after she and A.S. had sw itched beds. Over the objection of defense
counsel, the district court told the state that it may admit B.S.’s testimony during trial
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20 and Minn. R. Evid. 404(b).
On June 28, 2016, during voir dire, one prospective juror told the court that both of
his two ex-wives were sexual-assault victim s and that their traumatic experience had
3
affected their marriages. Although the juror described himself as an impartial and fair
person, he said that he “can’t say for sure that these situation’s[sic] wouldn’t affect” him.
When the district court asked him whether he could put aside thos e experiences and be
unbiased, he said that he was a very emotional person, and it may be difficult for him. He
also said that he is overprotective of his two daughters and couldn’t “imagine if something
like that happened to them.” The district c ourt asked him again if he could be unbiased,
and the juror replied that he would put aside his experiences and emotion. The district
court asked him a third time if he could be fa ir and unbiased, to wh ich the juror replied,
“I’d like to think I can.”
Defense counsel then asked the juror lead ing questions as to whether the juror’s
“emotional desire” to protect his daughters wo uld come into play if there was reasonable
doubt of appellant’s guilt. The juror respond ed, “[i]t could I suppose[,]” acknowledging
that doing so would be contrary to the district court’s instruction, and stated, “I would hope
it wouldn’t. I don’t know.” The juror stated that it had never crossed his mind that his ex-
wives were wrong in making their allegations and said, “I’d hope so” after defense counsel
asked him if he would be able to be impartial without letting his emotions sway him.
The state told the juror that the district court would provide the jury instructions
about reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence, and the law and rules that the jury
must follow. The state then asked the juror if he would be able to follow the rules and
instructions. The juror answer ed “yes” and said that he th ought following the rules was
more important than following any emotions.
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During reexamination, defense counsel as ked the juror again whether he thought
emotion would affect his ability to follow the rules. The juror answered, “I think emotion
affects all of our decision-making as we try to follow the rules. I don’t know that mine
would be any more so than anybody else sitting in this room.” Defense counsel motioned
to strike the juror for cause, which the district court denied.
Both A.S. and B.S. testified at trial. Th e jury found appellant guilty of first-degree
sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(g). This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion to
strike the juror for cause.

Appellant argues that the district cour t abused its discretion when it denied
appellant’s motion to strike the juror for cause because the juror’s bias precluded him from
being impartial. We disagree.
We review the district court’s denial of a challenge for cause for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Munt, 831 N.W.2d 569, 576 (Minn. 2013 ). Our review of the district
court’s findings of juror impartiality is esp ecially deferential because “the question of
whether a juror is impartial is a credibility determination.” State v. Prtine , 784 N.W.2d
303, 310 (Minn. 2010) (citing State v. Logan, 535 N.W.2d 320, 30 3 (Minn. 1995)). The
United States Supreme Court has described th e deference due to the district court’s
determination of juror impartiality as being “at its pinnacle.” Skilling v. United States, 561
U.S. 358, 396, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2924 (2010).
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Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant
the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6.
A party may strike a prospective juror for caus e if the party can demonstrate a “state of
mind” showing that the juror expressed “actual bias.” Munt, 831 N.W.2d at 577 (citation
omitted). See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 5. If a juror has ac tual bias, we must then
decide whether the juror was properly rehabilitated. Logan, 535 N.W.2d at 323.
A juror is rehabilitated if he or she “state s unequivocally that he or she will follow
the district court’s instructions and will se t aside any preconceived notions and fairly
evaluate the evidence.” State v. Fraga , 864 N.W.2d 615, 623 (Minn. 2015) (quoting
Prtine, 784 N.W.2d at 310). In contrast, a juror is not rehabilitated if he or she is equivocal
when given the opportunity to express his or her sentiments in his or her own words. Id.
at 625. If a juror is actually biased, is not adequately rehabilitated, and sits in judgment, a
structural error has occurred that requires a new trial. State v. Geleneau, 873 N.W.2d 373,
380 n.1 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 2016).
Here, we need not decide whether the ju ror expressed actual bias because he was
properly rehabilitated. After defense couns el questioned the juror, the state asked him
whether he would be able to follow the di strict court’s instructions. The juror
unequivocally said, “Yes.” And to the state’s follow-up question of whether he would be
overcome by emotion that would make it difficu lt for him to follow th e rules of law, the
juror answered, “I think following the rules would be more important than the emotion.”
Based on these answers, the district court found that he could be fair and impartial.
The district court may consider that a pros pective juror may have never experienced the
6
leading questions and cross-examination tactics employed during voir dire, and the district
court is in the best position to evaluate this in conjunction with the juror’s answers. Logan,
535 N.W.2d at 323-24 (citing Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1039, 104 S. Ct. 2885, 2893
(1984)). The district court found the juror’s unequivocal statement given to the state to be
credible. Because we defer to the district court’s juror-credibility determinations, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defense’s motion to strike the juror
for cause.
II. The district court did not abuse its discre tion in admitting B.S.’s testimony as
evidence of appellant’s prior-bad-acts evidence pursuant to Minn. R. Evid.
404(b).

Appellant argues that the district cour t erred in admitting B.S.’s testimony as Spreigl
common-scheme-or-plan evidence. We are not persuaded.
Appellate courts review the district court’s evidentiary rulings under Minn. R. Evid.
404(b) for an abuse of discretion. State v. Ness , 707 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn. 2006).
Generally, evidence of a defe ndant’s other crimes, wrongs or acts, referred to as Spreigl1
evidence, is inadmissible as character evidence, but is admissible for other purposes, such
as “motive, opportunity , intent, preparation, plan, know ledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident, and common plan or scheme.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b); State v.
Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 20 (Minn. 2008) (quot ation omitted). Before admitting Spreigl
evidence, district courts should apply a following five-step analysis:
(1) The state must give notice of its intent to admit the
evidence; (2) the state must clearly indicate what the evidence

1 State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965) (permitting the use of evidence
of a defendant’s prior bad acts for limited purposes).
7
will be offered to prove; (3) there must be clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant participated in the prior act; (4) the
evidence must be relevant and material to the state’s case; and
(5) the probative value of the evidence must be outweighed by
its potential prejudice to the defendant.

Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 686. Appellant does not dispute that the first two steps were satisfied.
His challenge focuses on the last three steps of the process, and our analysis therefore
examines only theses three steps.
A. Clear-and-convincing evidence
“The clear and convincing standard requ ires more than a preponderance of the
evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Miller, 754 N.W.2d 686,
701 (Minn. 2008) (quotati on omitted). A victim’s Spriegl testimony may be considered
clear and convincing when it is highly probable that the testimony is truthful, even absent
corroboration. State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 389-90 (Minn. 1998).
Here, the district court found B.S.’s recorded testimony to be credible and
consistent. We generally defer to a di strict court’s credibility determinations, State v.
Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992), which the record supports here. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that there was clear-and-convincing
evidence that appellant committed the other bad act.
B. Relevance and materiality
For Spreigl evidence admitted to s how common plan or scheme, it must have a
“marked similarity in modus operandi” to the charged offense. Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 688.
“[T]he closer the relationship between the other acts and the charged offense, in terms of
time, place, or modus operandi, the greater the relevance and probative value of the other-
8
acts evidence and the lesser the likelihood that the evidence will be used for an improper
purpose.” Id.
Here, the district court determined that B.S.’s testimony tended to establish that the
conduct on which appellant’s charge was based actually occurred and that it was indicative
of a common plan or scheme. The record s upports the district court’s determination
because B.S.’s testimony and the charged o ffense had a marked similarity in modus
operandi. Both incidents occurred in the same room, in the same bed, and within a year.
The victims are sisters and th e stepdaughters of appellant. Additionally, the conduct in
both incidents involved sexual touching that occurred at night when the girls were in bed.
Appellant argues that, because he touched different body parts of the sisters, the two
incidents are not markedly similar. Appellant further argues that his actions were not
unusual and distinctive and therefore did no t constitute a signature way of behaving.
However, we have repeatedly he ld that the other bad act does not need to be identical to
the charged crime, see State v. Rucker , 752 N.W.2d 538, 549 (Minn. App. 2008), review
denied (Minn. Sept. 23, 2008), and does no t need to be a signature crime, see State v.
Jackson, 615 N.W.2d 391, 395, (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Oct. 17, 2000).
C. Probative value vers us prejudicial effect
Finally, in determining wh ether the potential for unfair prejudice outweighs the
probative value of the evid ence, courts must “balance the relevance of the [ Spreigl
evidence], the risk of the evidence being used as propensity evidence, and the State’s need
to strengthen weak or inade quate proof in the case.” State v. Fardan , 773 N.W.2d 303,
319 (Minn. 2009).
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Here, the state’s case relies entirely on A.S.’s statement because there were no
eyewitnesses to the crime or physical evidence. In a similar circumstance, when the state’s
evidence consisted solely of th e statements of two girls with out any physical evidence of
an assault, we concluded that the Spreigl evidence was not unfairly prejudicial, and was
properly admitted. State v. Duncan , 608 N.W.2d 551, 55 7 (Minn. App. 2000), review
denied (Minn. May 16, 2000). Also, the district court properly gave limiting instructions
to the jury before B.S. testified and in its final jury instructio ns, which significantly
lessened any danger of unfair prejudice to appellant. Therefore, the district court properly
admitted B.S.’s testimony as Spreigl evidence pursuant to Minn. R. Evid. 404(b).
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting relationship
evidence pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20.

Appellant also argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting B.S.’s
testimony as relationship evidence pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20 because the danger of
unfair prejudice outweighed its probative value. We disagree.
We review the district court’s decision to admit relationship evidence for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d 752, 7 55 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied
(Minn. Oct. 29, 2008). Sectio n 634.20 allows the district c ourt to admit prior domestic
conduct, including evid ence of the accused’s sexual assau lt of the victim’s family or
household members, if the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice. Fraga, 864 N.W.2d at 627. “[E]vidence showing how
a defendant treats his family or household me mbers . . . sheds light on how the defendant
interacts with those close to him, which in turn suggests how the defendant may interact
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with the victim.” State v. Valentine , 787 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Minn. App. 2010), review
denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010).
Appellant cites State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. 2004), and argues that his
conduct does not constitute relationship evid ence and has no probative value because he
did not assert any control over A.S., and A.S. was willing to testify. However, McCoy lists
the abuser’s assertion of cont rol and the victim’s unwillingne ss to testify as reasons why
domestic-abuse cases may be difficult to prosec ute, not as factors to consider when
determining its probative value. 682 N.W.2d at 161. As the district court noted, B.S.’s
testimony had probative value because it could shed light on how appellant interacted with
A.S. Moreover, the district court’s limiting instructions lessened the danger of unfair
prejudice. Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d at 757 (noting that limiting instructions minimize potential
for unfair prejudice.) The district court di d not abuse its discretion in admitting B.S.’s
testimony as relationship evidence pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20.
IV. Appellant’s pro se arguments lack merit.
In his pro se supplemental brief, appella nt argues that the jury’s verdict was
supported by insufficient evidence. We disagree.
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, assuming that
the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary. State
v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). “The weight and credibility of the testimony
of individual witnesses is for the jury to determine.” Id.
Here, the jury heard the witness testim ony, evaluated its credibility, and found
appellant guilty. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury’s
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verdict is supported by suffici ent evidence that appellant committed the crime of first-
degree criminal sexual conduct.2
Affirmed.

2 The latter half of appellant’s pro se supplem ental brief raises the same evidentiary issue
that we have already addressed and need not address again.