In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: A. E., Parent.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0212

In the Matter of the
Welfare of the Child of: A. E., Parent.

Filed August 7, 2017
Affirmed
Cleary, Chief Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-JV-15-3274

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Kathryn Eilers, Kathleen Gora, Assistant Ramsey
County Attorneys, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Ramsey County Community
Human Services Department)

Lucas J.M. Dawson, Christa Groshek, Joelle Groshek, Groshek La w, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant A.E.)

Thomas J. Nolan, Jr., Nolan Law Offices, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem
Kelly Brunclik)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge;
and Toussaint, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CLEARY, Chief Judge
Appellant-mother, A.E., argues that the dist rict court erred by adjudicating F.W. as
a child in need of protecti on or services (CHIPS), by adm itting certain evidence, and by
denying her requests for reunification. We affirm.
FACTS
F.W. was born in 2015 and is the child of appellant an d J.W. Both appellant and
J.W. cared for F.W., at times without any other person present. F.W. attended New
Horizons daycare about once or twice a week from late summer 2015 until early December
2015 and attended the YMCA daycare six times between October and December 2015. In
November 2015, appellant noticed a bruise on F.W.’s left jaw after a visit to her sister’s
home. On December 4, 2015, J.W. cared for F.W. for a couple of hours while appellant
was at work. On December 5 and 6, 2015, J.W. attended navy drill and appellant cared for
F.W. alone from approximately 6:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
On December 7, 2015, appella nt took F.W. to his pediat rician, Dr. Mayrand, after
appellant and J.W. saw that F.W.’s eyes were red. Dr. Mayrand observed that F.W. had
several finger-sized bruises on his cheeks, a bruise along his jaw, a bruise on his ear, and a
bruise on his left shoulder. She also observ ed a dense concentration of petechiae on both
of F.W.’s upper eyelids and red subconjunctival hemorrhages around the irises of both
eyes. Dr. Mayrand instructed appellant to take F.W. to the emergency room at Children’s
Hospital. Later that day, F.W. was examined by Dr. Swenson, a pediatrician at Midwest
Children’s Resource Center who is certified in child abuse pediatrics. Appellant told
3
Dr. Swenson that F.W. looked like he had been in a “bar fight” when he woke up that day
and described previous bruising that occu rred on F.W.’s face in November 2015.
Appellant and J.W. denied that F.W. had fa llen from a significant height. Dr. Swenson
observed F.W.’s bruising and or dered a skeletal survey, wh ich revealed a healing rib
fracture that likely occurred at least 7 to 14 days earlier, but might have been older. F.W.
was placed on a protective hold.
On December 9, 2015, Julie Anderson, a Ramsey County child-protection worker,
and Sergeant Mollner, a det ective with the St. Paul Po lice Department, interviewed
appellant and J.W. separately. In her intervie w, appellant said that F.W. fell out of his
bouncy seat on December 6, 2015 and suggeste d that this fall caused the bruise under
F.W.’s eye. Appellant reported that F.W. sometimes fell from a seated position onto toys
or hit his head on a mirror, but offered no other specific explanations for F.W.’s bruises.
Appellant wondered if F.W.’s rib fractured when J.W. played with F.W. by tossing him up
and catching him and indicated that a medical condition caused F.W.’s bruising. Anderson
and Sergeant Mollner then interviewed J.W., who said that F.W. had fallen into toys. He
said that he threw F.W. into the air when appellant returned from a trip to see her sister,
but explained that F.W. laughed and that he did not know how F.W. could have broken a
rib.
In December 2015, the Ramsey County Community Human Services Department
(RCCHSD) filed a CHI PS petition alleging that F.W. was abused and the district court
ordered RCCHSD to assume emergency protective care of F.W. An emergency protective
care evidentiary hearing was held that month. Appellant testified th at she did not harm
4
F.W. and did not believe that J.W. or anyone else had harmed F.W. Appellant testified that
F.W.’s injuries could be caused by a medical condition and denied that she had considered
that J.W. could have hurt F.W. J.W. testified that he did not injure F.W. and had
considered that appellant might have hurt F.W., but immediately dismissed the idea.
In December 2015 and January 2016, F.W. was evaluated by several doctors. These
evaluations did not reveal a me tabolic bone disease, rickets, osteogenesis imperfecta, or
Ehlers-Danlos syndrome (EDS).
On January 6, 2016, J.W. told appellant that he wanted to shoot himself and
assaulted appellant. On January 8, 2016, J.W.’s body was discovered after he committed
suicide. A suicide note was found and read, in part:
I hurt my wife, who I love completely. I can’t beat alcohol and
anger. . . . I love my son, please forgive my tremendous
weakness. I hurt my son. Then lied about it to everyone. And
will never forgive myself. I can’ t bear the shame. I’m done.
A lifetime of service to others destroyed by one moment of
weakness. . . .

I died of PTSD. The stress of the world was too much for me.

In January 2016, Sergeant Mo llner interviewed appellant. Sergeant Mollner told
appellant that J.W. left a note stating that he hurt F.W. and asked appellant what she
believed caused F.W.’s injuries. Appellant said that she did not believe that J.W. hurt F.W,
that J.W. and appellant had discussed the idea of J.W. claiming that he hurt F.W. so that
F.W. could be returned to appellant’s care, and that J.W. told appellant that he would have
to kill himself if he claimed responsibility for F.W.’s injuries. Anderson also interviewed
appellant following J.W.’s death. Appellant stated that even before she saw J.W.’s suicide
5
note she knew that he would take responsibility for hurting F.W. Ap pellant stated that,
before J.W.’s death, she sent an e-mail to her attorney asking whether F.W. could come
home if appellant falsely said that she injured F.W. even though she had not harmed him.
She said that J.W. said that he could admit that he hurt F.W ., but that he was such a poor
liar that he would have to kill himself.
In January 2016, appellant testified befo re the Minnesota Legislative Task Force on
Child Protection and stated that Dr. Mayrand, RCCHSD, and appellant’s ex-husband, H.C.,
conspired to falsely accuse appellant and J.W. of abuse and to prevent them from pursuing
a medical diagnosis for F.W.
A CHIPS trial commenced in April 2016 and continue d into November 2016.
Numerous witnesses testified and appellant testified on several occasions. Appellant’s ex-
husband testified that he had two children with appellant and he discussed their respective
roles in parenting those childre n. H.C. denied speaking with F.W.’s pediatrician about
F.W. Ramona Olson and Matthew Shore, who respectively served as the guardian ad litem
and parenting-time evaluator in the case i nvolving appellant and H.C., testified and
submitted reports indicating that appellant distorted things and attempted to undermine
H.C.’s relationship with their shared children.
Providers from the New Horizons and YMCA daycares testified about their policies
and how the daycares report injuries that occur while a child is in their care. No evidence
produced at trial showed that F.W. suffered an injury at either daycare.
Various doctors also testified. Dr. Mayr and testified that F.W.’s bruising was not
consistent with self-injury and that she was concerned about abuse. Dr. Swenson testified
6
that F.W.’s rib fracture could not have been caused by birth trauma , and explained that
F.W.’s bruises could not have resulted from a single fall or from self-injury and were
unlikely to have been caused by a single blow. Dr. Swenson op ined that F.W.’s injuries
were clinically diagnostic of child abuse. Dr. Maxwell-Wiggins tes tified that lab tests
showed that F.W.’s vitamin D level was normal. He testified that both F.W.’s bruising and
rib fracture could be explained by trauma. Dr. Maxwell-Wiggins testified that if a child’s
injuries were caused by a medi cal condition, he woul d expect injuries to recur while the
child was in protective custody. Dr. Rittenhouse testified that he did not believe that F.W.
had rickets or osteogenesis imperfecta and that he saw no radiological evidence of a
metabolic bone disease. He explained th at abuse is a concer n when no reasonable
explanation is provided for a fracture in a non-mobile infant . Dr. Scharer testified that
appellant displayed some clin ical symptoms of EDS and likely has some form of a
connective-tissue disorder. But he explained that he did not believe that F.W. suffered
from the same condition. Dr. Morkeberg testified that he saw some marks on F.W.’s skin
in January 2016, but did not believe they were bruises.
Jacqueline Harden, an RCCHSD case aide, tes tified that she supervised F.W.’s visits
with his parents between December 2015 and April 2016. Harden testified that F.W. was
becoming increasingly mobile and sometimes fell and bumped his head, but that she never
observed any marks or bruises after F.W. hi t his head. Sergeant Mollner and Anderson
testified regarding their interviews and interactions with appellant and J.W.
In October 2016, appellant testified to th e following. When she arrived home one
day in October 2015, she found J.W. and F.W. covered in f ecal matter, soap, and water.
7
J.W. told her that F.W. slipped while being bathed and she discovered a bruise on F.W.’s
forehead.1 After her nephew played roughly with F.W. in November 2015, F.W. developed
a bruise on his left jaw, which was still visi ble on December 7, 20 15. She did not notice
any other injuries in November 2015. In Decemb er 2015, she noticed changes in J.W.,
including hypervigilance and crying at the sight or sound of a baby. Before appellant saw
J.W.’s suicide note, she learned that J.W. clai med that he hurt F.W. Appellant could not
begin to make sense of things until she saw the suicide note on February 17, 2016. She
testified that what J.W. wrote “might be true on some level,” and “even if [F.W.] did have
the same medical history I do, that doesn’t mean that he can’t also be abused. They’re not
mutually exclusive.” She acknowledged that F.W. was abused and said that she would do
anything to protect him. Appellant explained that she reviewed J.W.’s records and that her
view of what happened to F.W. changed significantly between January 2016 and October
2016.
Carol Tellett, a psychologist with experi ence in Hennepin Coun ty’s family court
services, testified about the parenting assessment and fore nsic psychological evaluation
that she completed of appellant. Tellett testif ied that she believed that J.W. was F.W.’s
sole abuser, had been unaware that Dr. Swen son determined that there was a pattern of
abuse, and believed that this information was important in de termining the weight to be
given to her report. Tellett testified that some of her testing relied on self-reported

1 Appellant explained that she did not report th is incident to social services because she
was only asked about F.W.’s bruising history beginning in mid-November 2015.
8
information and that she unders tood that there was a concern that appellant might distort
information.
In October 2016, appellant requested reun ification with F.W. In November 2016,
the district court denied appellant’s motion fo r reunification, stating that the issue of
appellant’s ability to protect F.W. was to be determined at trial.
In November 2016, the court heard te stimony from appellant and Kelly Brunclik,
the court-appointed guardian ad litem. Appellant testified th at she sent an e-mail to her
attorney on December 23, 2015, asking what w ould happen if she said that she injured
F.W. Brunclik testified that she was con cerned that appellant maintained that F.W.
suffered from a medical condition despite being told by medical professionals that F.W.’s
injuries were not caused by a condition. Brun clik also explained that she was concerned
that appellant might not reliably report information if F.W. suffered another injury.
On December 5, 2016, the dist rict court filed its findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and order for adjudication, adjudicating F.W. as a CHIPS. The next day, the district court
filed an amended order, correcting clerical errors made in the December 5, 2016 order. On
December 15, 2016, appellant moved for the correction of clerical errors, amended findings
and conclusions, a new trial, and a stay pending appeal. On December 23, 2016, appellant
filed a notice of appeal. On January 11, 2017 , this court dismissed appellant’s appeal as
premature. On January 26, 2017, the distri ct court filed an orde r granting appellant’s
motion for the correction of clerical errors and denying appellant’s motion for a new trial.
That same day, the district court separately filed its second ame nded findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and order for adjudica tion (second amended order). Appellant now
9
challenges the district court’s CHIPS adju dication and denial of her requests for
reunification.
D E C I S I O N
I. CHIPS Adjudication
Appellant asks this court to reverse th e CHIPS adjudication. She argues that the
district court erred in assessing the credibility of the witnesses and in making its factual
findings and that, absent these erroneous credibility and factual determinations, the district
court’s conclusions are unsupported by substantial evidence and must be reversed.
A district court has broa d discretion when deciding child-protection matters. In re
Welfare of Child of S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d 723, 733 (Minn. App. 2009). When an appellate
court reviews “a determination whether a child is in need of protection or services, . . . [i]t
should be kept in mind that a trial court . . . has the opportunity to see the parties as well as
their witnesses, hear their testimony, observe their actions, and weigh the evidence in light
of those factors.” Id. at 734 (quotation omitted). Unless th e district court clearly abused
its discretion, this court must affirm. Id.
A. We defer to the district court’s credibility determinations.
This court gives considerable defere nce to a district court’s credibility
determinations “because a district court is in a superior position to assess the credibility of
witnesses.” Id. at 733; see In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 374-75 (Minn. 1990)
(recognizing that district courts are in a better position to determine credibility). Because
the evidence supports the cha llenged credibility determinations , we defer to the district
court.
10
Appellant argues that J.W.’s suicide note is inherently credible and that the district
court misconstrued it. But the evidence suppor ts the district court’s determination.
Appellant stated that she knew that J.W. would take responsibility for F.W.’s injuries even
before seeing J.W.’s suicide note, and that J.W. had talked about falsely admitting that he
hurt F.W. and then killing himself. We defer to the district court’s determination that
J.W.’s suicide note is not conclusive evidence that J.W. hurt F.W.
Appellant also challenges the district court’s determination that some of her
testimony lacked credibility. In particular, appellant argues that the district court erred by
failing to credit her testimony that she accepted that J.W. abused F.W. only after reviewing
J.W.’s documents and other evidence. The evidence shows that appellant falsely testified
before the legislative task fo rce and considered falsely adm itting that she injured F.W.
Because this evidence suggests that appellant was willing to falsify information during the
CHIPS proceeding, we defer to the district court’s credibility determination. Appellant
argues that the district court cannot declare her patently not credible and then credit her
statements regarding J.W.’s suicide note. Appellant misconstrues the district court’s order.
Although the district court found that some of appellant’s statements lacked credibility, it
did not find her “patently” no t credible. A fact-finder ma y properly find some of a
witness’s statements credible and others not credible.
Appellant argues that the district court e rred by determining that Tellett’s testimony
and report lacked credibility. At trial, Tellett testified tha t: (1) she had not previously
performed any parenting assessment for a child-protection case in Ramsey County; (2) she
did not know whether there were standards or guidelines for forensic psychology; (3) she
11
was unaware that Dr. Swenson found that F.W. was subjected to a pattern of abuse and that
this information would be important in determ ining the weight to be given to her report;
(4) some of her testing relied on appellant’s self-reported information; and (5) she
understood that there was a concern that appellant might distort information. Because this
evidence calls into question the accuracy of Tellett’s conclusions, we defer to the district
court’s credibility determination.
B. The district court’s factual find ings are supported by clear and
convincing evidence.

Appellant next challenges certain factual fi ndings made by the district court. In
juvenile-protection proceedings, we closely review the sufficiency of the evidence to
determine whether it is clear and convincing. In re Welfare of B.A.B ., 572 N.W.2d 776,
778 (Minn. App. 1998). We w ill reverse the district court’s factual findings only if they
are clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence. S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d at 733.
A finding is clearly erroneous if the “entire r ecord leaves the court with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” B.A.B., 572 N.W.2d at 778 (quotation
omitted).
Appellant asserts that the district court’s finding that appellant, either alone or with
J.W., abused F.W. is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. However, the district
court did not find that appellant abused F.W. Rather, the district court found that “[t]here
is clear and convincing evidence that [F.W.] was injured in the care of [appellant], [J.W.],
or both,” but that “[t]here is not clear and convincing evidence that [F.W.] was injured in
the care of any one of those.” The evidence supports these findings. Both appellant and
12
J.W. cared for F.W. and were sometimes alone with F.W. Although F.W. also received
care at the New Horizons and YMCA daycares, the evidence shows that F.W.’s abuse did
not occur at either daycare because each us ed multiple care providers to care for F.W.,
documented injuries that occurred at daycare, and did not provide any evidence that F.W.
was injured at daycare. Clear and convincing evidence shows that F.W. was injured while
in the care of appellant, J.W., or both.
Appellant argues that the district court’s fi nding that appellant failed to protect F.W.
is not supported by clear and convincing eviden ce. She asserts that she did not directly
observe the abuse and, because mandated reporters spent time with F.W. without noticing
his rib fracture, it was unreasonable to conc lude that she should have known about the
abuse. She argues that she appropriately sought medical care for F.W. and that the district
court erred by finding that she failed to prot ect F.W. after he was taken into protective
custody. The evidence shows that appellant failed to recognize F.W.’s visible injuries as a
product of repeated abuse and failed to take corrective action. Employees at New Horizons
daycare observed that F.W. came in with mu ltiple facial bruises and inquired about the
origins of the bruising. Appellant failed to seek medical care for F.W. until he looked like
he had been in a “bar fight.” The fact that mandated reporte rs did not report abuse does
not preclude the district court from finding that appellant failed to protect F.W.
Furthermore, the district court’s finding is supported by appellant’s refusal to accept
that F.W. was repeatedly abused and her promotion of implausible explanations for F.W.’s
injuries. In January 2016, a ppellant testified before the legislative task force that
Dr. Mayrand, RCCHSD, and H.C. conspired to falsely accuse J.W. and appellant of abuse
13
and to deny F.W. access to medical care. However, no evidence in the record supports this
testimony. And, until the spring of 2016, appellant continued to claim that F.W.’s injuries
were caused by a medical condition despite doctors’ opinions that no underlying condition
could explain F.W.’s bruising and broken rib. Finally, th e finding is supported by
appellant’s consideration of a plan to falsely admit to inju ring F.W., which could have
again exposed F.W. to abuse. Clear and convincing evidence supports the district court’s
finding that appellant failed to protect F.W.
C. The CHIPS adjudication is supported by at least one statutory basis.

Appellant argues that the CHIPS adjudication must be reversed because the district
court’s determination that F.W. was in need of protection or services is not supported by
clear and convincing evidence. Appellant argues that the determination that F.W. needed
protection or services was based on her failur e to protect and asserts that there was no
evidence of a risk of abuse at the time of the CHIPS adjudi cation because J.W. was dead
and she was not seeking a relationship with a potential abuser.
A parent is presumed to be fit to care for his or her child. In re Welfare of C.K., 426
N.W.2d 842, 847 (Minn. 1988). Before a distri ct court adjudicates a child as a CHIPS, it
must determine that at least one statutor y basis exists to support its decision. S.S.W., 767
N.W.2d at 728. A statutory basis exists if one of the child-protection grounds enumerated
under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6 (2016), exists and th e child needs protection or
services as a result. S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d at 732. The district court found that F.W. was a
child in need of protection or services unde r the statutory bases e numerated in section
260C.007, subdivision 6(2), (3), (8) and (9).
14
A CHIPS petition may be granted if a child requires protection or services because
the child “has been a vi ctim of physical or sexual abuse . . . [or] resides with or would
reside with a perpetrator of domestic child abuse.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(2).
The district court found that F.W. was a vict im of physical abuse in the form of multiple
blows to the head and shoulder and extreme s queezing sufficient to break a rib and that
F.W. was injured while in the care of appellant, J.W., or both. Because these findings are
supported by clear and convincing evidence , the child-protection grounds of section
260C.007, subdivision 6(2), have been met. However, section 260C.007, subdivision 6(2),
can provide a proper statutory basis for the CH IPS adjudication only if, at the time of the
adjudication, F.W. needed protection or services because he was currently at risk of abuse.
See S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d at 733 (stating that the key inquiry is “whether the child in question
is being abused or neglected or appears to be presently at risk”). Here, it is unclear whether
F.W. was currently at risk of abuse and in need of protection or services at the time of the
CHIPS adjudication because it is unclear who abused F.W. Because other statutory bases
support the CHIPS adjudication, we need not determine whether the adjudication was
supported by section 260C.007, subdivision 6(2).
The district court also found that F.W. ne eded protection or services under the bases
enumerated in section 260C.007, subdivision 6(3), (8), and (9), because appellant failed to
protect F.W. These provisions provide that a CHIPS petition may be granted if a child
requires protection or services because the child:
(3) is without necessary food, clothing, shelter,
education, or other required care for the child’s physical or
15
mental health or morals because the child’s parent . . . is unable
or unwilling to provide that care; . . .
(8) is without proper parental care because of the
emotional, mental, or physical disability, or state of immaturity
of the child’s parent . . . ; [or]
(9) is one whose behavior, condition, or environment is
such as to be injurious or dangerous to the child or others.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6.
The district court’s determination that F.W. needed protection or services under
section 260C.007, subdivision 6(3), (8), a nd (9), was based on an implicit finding that
appellant should have known that F.W. was be ing abused. The district court found that:
(1) appellant failed to recognize F.W.’s visible injuries as a product of physical abuse and
failed to intervene; (2) a daycare provider fro m New Horizons testified that she observed
a bruise on F.W.’s face about ten times; and (3) appellant refused to accept the conclusions
of highly trained medical professionals that F.W.’s injuries were not caused by a medical
condition. When read as a whole, the second amended order indicates that the district court
found that appellant should have known about the abuse.
The district court found that appellant wa s unable or unwilling to provide required
care for F.W. because she failed to protect F.W. Clear and convincing evidence shows that
appellant was unable or unwilling to provide required care for F.W. because: (1) appellant
should have known of the abuse; and (2) appellant failed to recognize F.W.’s injuries as a
product of abuse and to intervene to prevent further abuse. Becaus e the child-protection
grounds of section 260C.007, subdivision 6(3), have been established, we must determine
whether F.W. required protection or services because appellant was unable or unwilling to
provide required care. The key inquiry is whether the child in question is presently at risk.
16
S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d at 733. Appellant asserts that F.W. did not need protection or services
at the time of the CHIPS adjudication because J.W., his abuser, was dead. In its order, the
district court explicitly acknowledged J.W.’s death and concluded that F.W. was in need
of protection or services under section 260C.007, subdivision 6(3). In doing so, the district
court implicitly found that appellant’s failure to protect F.W. was not merely a failure to
protect F.W. from J.W., but rather a general failure to protect F.W. from others. Clear and
convincing evidence sh ows that, at the time of the CH IPS adjudication, F.W. needed
protection or services because appellant was unable or unwilling to provide required care
because she failed to protect F.W. The CHIPS adjudication was supported by section
260C.007, subdivision 6(3).
The district court also found that F.W. was without proper parental care because of
appellant’s emotional, mental, or physical disability, or immaturity. To support its finding
that F.W. needed protection or services under section 260C.007, subdivision 6(8), the
district court cited In re Welfare of S.A.V. , 392 N.W.2d 260, 263 (M inn. App. 1986). In
S.A.V., this court held that “[a]buse by a parent, or knowledge of abuse by another without
taking corrective action is clear evidence of emotional disability or immaturity of a parent.”
392 N.W.2d at 263. Here, the district court implicitly found that appellant should have
known that F.W.’s injuries were caused by abuse. Because S.A.V. did not address whether
a parent’s unreasonable failure to recogniz e abuse and take corrective action is clear
evidence of the parent’s emotional disability or immaturity, S.A.V. is not dispositive. Other
statutory bases support the CHIPS adjudication at issue here. As a result, we need not
determine whether the adjudication was supported by section 260C.007, subdivision 6(8).
17
Finally, the district court found that F.W. was in need of protection or services
because his condition or environment was injurious or dangerous to F.W. or others. Here,
there is clear and convincing ev idence that F.W. was in need of protection or services at
the time of the CHIPS adjudication because F.W.’s condition or environment was injurious
or dangerous to him. Clear and convincing evid ence shows that: (1 ) F.W. was injured
while in the care of appellant, J.W., or both; (2) appellant should have known of the abuse;
and (3) appellant failed to recognize F.W.’s injuries as a product of abuse and to intervene
to prevent further abuse. And clear and convincing evidence shows that F.W. was presently
at risk because appellant was unable to recognize and intervene to prevent abuse at the time
of the CHIPS adjudication. The CHIPS adjudication was supported by section 260C.007,
subdivision 6(9).
Because the statutory bases of section 260 C.007, subdivision 6(3) and (9), supported
the CHIPS adjudication, the district court did not err by adjudicating F.W. as a CHIPS.
II. Evidentiary Rulings
Appellant argues that the district court erred by admitting the testimony and records
of H.C., Olson, and Shore. She argues that this evidence was irrelevant character evidence
and confused the issues to be determined in the CHIPS proceeding. The district court has
discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude evidence. In re Welfare of Child of
D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 320 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. July 21, 2015). A
court abuses its discretion if it improperly applies the law. In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T.,
814 N.W.2d 76, 93 (Minn. App. 2012).
18
Except as otherwise provided by statut e or by the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile
Protection Procedure, in a juvenile-protection matter, a court shall only admit evidence that
would be admissible in a civil trial pursuant to the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. Minn.
R. Juv. Prot. P. 3.02, subd. 1; see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 3. 02, subds. 2, 3 (addressing
exceptions to this rule); see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.165 (2016 ) (addressing evidence
admissible in addition to that admissible under the rules of evidence). Relevant evidence
is generally admissible. Minn. R. Evid. 402. But relevant evidence “may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury.” Minn. R. Evid. 403. And character evidence “is not
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith,” but may be admitted
to establish a pattern of behavior. Minn. R. Evid. 404; see D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d at 321
(concluding that a district court did not err by admitting evidence that was used to establish
a parent’s pattern of action).
Here, the district court admitted H.C.’s testimony, as well as the testimony and
reports of Shore and Olson. This eviden ce included information about appellant’s
parenting of the two children she shares with H.C. Becau se the evidence concerning
appellant’s parenting of her ch ildren with H.C. appears to have been admitted for the
purpose of establishing the manner in which appellant parented F.W., it is inadmissible
character evidence.
This court will grant a new trial on the basis of an improper evidentiary ruling only
if the appellant demonstrates prejudicial error. J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 93. “An evidentiary
error is not prejudicial if the record contains other evidence that is sufficient to support the
19
findings.” Id. Here, the district court did not substantially rely on the erroneously admitted
evidence.
The district court made several findings based upon the testimony and reports of
H.C., Shore, and Olson. First, the district court found:
1. [Appellant] and [H.C.] were married in 2002 and
were divorced in 2012. The di vorce decree provided that
[appellant] and H.C. would have joint le gal and physical
custody of their two children . . . with equal parenting time.

. . . .

5. On August 13, 2015, [a] Referee . . . issued a
temporary order in the fami ly court matter involving
[appellant] and [H.C.]. The Or der awards [H.C.] temporary
sole legal and physical custody of [their children]. The Order
provides [appellant] with parenting time twice a week,
supervised at a visitation cente r, plus twice weekly fifteen
minute Skype calls with each child.

Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Pr otection Procedure 3.02, subdiv ision 3, permits a court to
take judicial notice of findings of fact and court orders in any proceeding in any other court
file involving the child or the child’s parent or legal guardian. Because the district court
was authorized to take judicial notice of th is evidence, appellant could not have been
unduly prejudiced by these findings.
The district court also found:
6. . . . [T]he reports of Matthew Shore, parenting time
evaluator, and Ramona Olson, Guardian ad Litem appointed to
the family court custody matter . . . largely serve as the basis
for [the] Referee[’s] . . . Order. Both reports are highly critical
of [appellant’s] actions as a co-p arent . . . . Both reports offer
lengthy and detailed examples of appellant’s extreme actions
in alienating [the children] from their father, contrary to their
best interests. Importantly for this case, both reports describe
20
a pattern of behavior on [appellant’s] part whereby she actively
and aggressively distorts reality, particularly to third party
professionals whose job it is to support both herself and her
children and to keep them safe and healthy.

Because character evidence may be admitted to establish a pattern of action, Shore’s and
Olson’s reports were admissible for the pur pose of establishing a ppellant’s pattern of
distorting reality. See D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d at 321 (concluding that a district court did not
err by admitting evidence used to establish a parent’s pattern of action). However, the
district court’s finding that the reports were highly critical of appellant’s actions as a co-
parent and that they detailed how appellant alienated the children from their father is based
on inadmissible character evidence.
The remainder of the district court’s fi ndings are supported by other evidence.
Because the properly admitted evidence clearly and convincingly shows that F.W. was in
need of protection or services, the error in admitting the character evidence was not
prejudicial. Appellant is not entitled to a new trial.
III. Reunification

Appellant argues that the district court erred by denyin g her requests for
reunification. “Once a child alle ged to be in need of protec tion or services is under the
court’s jurisdiction, the court shall ensure that reasonable efforts . . . by the social services
agency are made to . . . reunite the child with the child’s family at the earliest possible
time.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2016). F.W. was under the district court’s jurisdiction in
December 2015. From this tim e, the district court had an obligation to ensure that
reasonable efforts were made to reunite F.W. with appellant at the earliest time possible.
21
Appellant argues that the district court faile d to reunite F.W. with her “at the earliest
possible time” and asks us to interpret this statutory phrase. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a). “In
determining reasonable efforts to be made w ith respect to a child and in making those
reasonable efforts, the child’s best interests, health, and sa fety must be of paramount
concern.” Id.; see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 2 (2016) (providing that the health,
safety, and best interests of the child are pa ramount). Although a child is to be reunited
with his family “at the earliest possible time,” it is proper to continue a child’s out-of-home
placement for the child’s best interests, health, and safety.
The district court ordered RCCHSD to a ssume emergency protective care of F.W.
because of the risk of imminent physical dama ge or harm to F.W. and denied appellant’s
motion for reunification in Nove mber 2016 because it determin ed that appellant’s ability
to protect F.W. remained an issue to be determined at trial. By November 2016, the district
court had received evidence showing that F.W. suffered abuse and that appellant failed to
recognize the abuse and take corrective action. We cannot say that the district court erred
by failing to reunify F.W. with appellant by October 2016 because appellant’s possible
failure to protect F.W. presented a serious risk to F.W.’s best interests, health, and safety.
Affirmed.