State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0213

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Michael Brett Judy,
Appellant.

Filed December 18, 2017
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69 DU-CR-16-3272

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Gary W. Bjorklund, Assistant County Attorney,
Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael W. Kunkel, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of fe lony domestic assault, arguing that the
evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm.

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FACTS
On August, 21, 2016, while appellant Mi chael Judy and K.H. were living together,
the two of them, along with Judy’s mother, stepfather, uncle, and sister, traveled to northern
Minnesota. That evening they stayed together in a two-room motel suite. They planned for
Judy to sleep on a cot in the main room, K.H. and Judy’s sister to sleep on a sofa bed next
to Judy’s cot, and Judy’s mother, stepfather, and uncle to sleep in the other room.
Late in the evening, K.H. obtained Wi-F i access on her cellphone. This upset Judy,
who suspected K.H. was communicating with other individuals on her phone. After briefly
leaving the motel room, Judy returned and laid down on his cot. He then grabbed at K.H.
in an attempt to pull her toward the cot. Judy’s sister grabbed K.H. to prevent her from
being pulled onto Judy’s cot or falling off the sofa bed. Judy told K.H., “You need to come
talk to me,” and told his sister to “get away.”
Judy’s sister was able to get between Judy and K.H., at which point Judy began
wrestling his sister in an attempt to get to K.H. After Judy released his sister from his grip,
he used a knife to cut K.H.’s spare clothing. While cutting the clothing, Judy continued to
say to K.H., “You better come talk to me. Better get up, come talk to me now. . . . Give me
your phone.” Judy’s sister told him that she had K.H.’s phone and that he needed to leave,
and told K.H. to get Judy’s stepfather. As K.H. and Judy’s sister moved toward the
bedroom door, K.H.’s cellphone fell out of Judy’s sister’s pocket. Judy’s sister reached for
the phone, but Judy stabbed it with his knife. At this point, K.H. was able to leave the room
to seek assistance from Judy’s stepfather. Judy left the motel room but eventually returned.
Someone called the police, and they arrested Judy.

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Respondent State of Minnesota charged Judy with felony dom estic assault and
fourth-degree criminal-damage to property. After a court trial, the district court found Judy
guilty as charged and sentenced him on both counts.
This appeal of Judy’s conviction of felony domestic assault follows.
D E C I S I O N
A person commits felony domestic assault when he or she commits an act with intent
to cause fear in another of immediate bodily ha rm or death within ten years of the first of
any combination of two or more previous qualified domes tic violence-related offense
convictions. Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subds. 1, 4 (2016). “A person commits the offense of
assault-fear through ‘an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily
harm or death.’” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012) (quoting Minn. Stat.
§ 609.02, subd. 10(1) (2010)). “[T]he assault-fear statute is violated when one engages in
an act “with the intent” to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death.” Id.
“In an assault-fear crime, the intent of th e defendant, as contrasted with the effect
upon the victim, becomes the focal point for inquiry.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Although
specific intent is sometimes used to refer to the ‘mental state of intent,’ the most common
usage of specific intent is to designate a sp ecial mental element which is required above
and beyond any mental state re quired with respect to the actus reus of the crime.” Id.
(quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). An assault-fear offense is a specific-intent
crime. Id. at 309.
The district court found Judy guilty of felony domestic assault based on Judy’s
display of a knife while maki ng physical demands on K.H ., his destruction of K.H.’s

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articles of clothing by cutting them in her presence, and his destruction of K.H.’s cellphone
with the knife. Judy argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he acted with the specific intent to cause K.H. fear of immediate bodily harm or
death. We disagree.
When considering an insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, appellate courts “make a
painstaking review of the r ecord to determine whether the evidence and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient
to allow the jury to reach its verdict.” State v. Brown, 732 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Minn. 2007).
The reviewing court must assume that “the [fact-finder] believed the state’s witnesses and
disbelieved any eviden ce to the contrary.” State v. Moore , 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn.
1989). The reviewing court will not disturb a verdict “if the jury, acting with due regard
for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, could reason ably conclude that a defendant was proven guilty.”
Bernhardt v. State , 684 N.W.2d 465, 4 76–77 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). This
standard of review applies to both bench trials and jury trials. State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d
727, 733 (Minn. 2011).
The state must prove every element of a charged offense. See State v. Struzyk, 869
N.W.2d 280, 289 (Minn. 2015) (“It is axiomatic that it is the State’s burden to prove every
element of the charged offense.”). “Intent is generally proved by inferences drawn from a
person’s words or actions in light of all the surrounding circumstances.” Nelson v. State,
880 N.W.2d 852, 860 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts apply “a separate
standard of review to challenges to the sufficiency of circum stantial evidence.” State v.

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Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 598 (Minn. 2017). “ Under that standard, we identify the
circumstances proved and indepe ndently consider the reasonabl e inferences that can be
drawn from those circumstances, when viewed as a whole.” Id. “As the fact finder, the
[court] is in a unique position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the
evidence before it.” Id. at 600. “[The fact-finder] is free to accept part and reject part of a
witness’s testimony.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“[T]he first step of [the] circumstantial-evidence test . . . requires an appellate court
to winnow down the evidence presented at trial by resolving all questions of fact in favor
of the [fact-finder]’s verdict, resulting in a subset of facts that constitute the circumstances
proved.” Id. (quotation omitted). “In determining the circumstances proved, we disregard
evidence that is inconsistent w ith the [fact-finder]’s verdict.” Id. “The second step is to
independently consider the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances
proved, when viewed as a whole.” Id. “We give no deference to the [fact-finder]’s choice
between reasonable inferences at this second step.” Id. “To sustain the conviction, the
circumstances proved, when vi ewed as a whole, must be consistent with a reasonable
inference that the accused is guilty and inconsiste nt with any rational hypothesis except
that of guilt.” Id.
In this case, the circumstances prove d are as follows: Judy has a history of
assaultive behavior, including an assault against his sister that involved the use of a knife;
Judy raised his voice throughout the subject incident; Judy grabbed K.H. and attempted to
pull her over to his cot; when Judy’s sister intervened, Judy wrestled with her, while trying
to reach K.H.; Judy wielded a knife in close proximity to K.H.; Judy used the knife in

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K.H.’s presence to damage her clothing and cellphone; and while damaging K.H.’s
cellphone, Judy continued to demand that K.H. obey his commands.
When viewed as a whole, the circumstances proved are consistent with a reasonable
inference that Judy intended to cause K.H. f ear of immediate bodily harm, and they are
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt. We therefore conclude that
the evidence was sufficient to convict Judy of felony domestic assault.
Affirmed.