Tracie Fegley, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0215

Tracie Fegley,
Relator,

vs.

Trailblazer Joint Powers Board,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed September 5, 2017
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 34985101-3

Tracie Fegley, Stewart, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Trailblazer Joint Powers Board, Glencoe, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Lee B. Nelson, Keri Phillips, Department of Employment and Economic Development, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Ju dge; and
Bratvold, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
Relator challenges the decision of an unemployment law judge on reconsideration
that she is ineligible for unemployment benefits because she wa s discharged for
employment misconduct. Relator asserts that her conduct was caused by her mental illness
of anxiety and thus was not misconduct. We affirm.
FACTS
On August 4, 2016, relator Tracie Fegley, a transit dispatcher for respondent
Trailblazer Joint Powers Board (Trailblazer), left her job approximately five minutes into
her scheduled shift. Fegley’s employment with Trailblazer was formally terminated on
August 15, 2016.
In October 2016, respondent Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development (DEED ) determined that Fegley was eligible to receive unemployment
insurance benefits. Trailblazer appealed, and an unemployment law judge (ULJ ) held a
hearing in November 2016. The ULJ’s decision concluded that Fegley was eligible for
unemployment benefits because she was not terminated for employment misconduct .
Trailblazer filed a r equest for reconsideration and the ULJ issued a modified decision in
January 2017, concluding that Fegley was terminated for employment misconduct. Fegley
appeals.

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D E C I S I O N
Fegley argues that the conduct which led to her termination does not con stitute
employment misconduct because it was due to a medical issue, and therefore she is entitled
to unemployment compensation. We disagree.
“An applicant who was discharged from employment by an employer is ineligible
for all unemployment benefits . . . only if . . . the applicant was discharged becaus e of
employment misconduct.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4 (2016). Employment
misconduct is defined as “any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct . . . that displays
clearly: (1) a serious viol ation of the standards of behavior the employer has the right to
reasonably expect of the employee; or (2) a substantial lack of concern for the
employment.” Id., subd. 6(a) (2016). The definition of employment misconduct
specifically excludes conduct th at is a direct result of an employee’s “mental illness or
impairment.” Id., subd. 6(b)(1) (2016).
“Whether an employee committed employment misconduct is a mixed question of
fact and law. Whether the employee committed a particular act is a question of f act.”
Peterson v. Nw. Airlines Inc., 753 N.W.2d 771, 774 (Minn. App. 2008) (citation omitted),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 1, 2008). “In unemployment benefits cases, [appellate courts]
review the ULJ’s findings of fact in the light most favorable to the de cision and will not
disturb those findings as long as there is evidence in the record that reasonably tends to
sustain them.” Wilson v. Mortg. Res. Ctr., 888 N.W.2d 452, 460 (Minn. 2016) (quotations
omitted). “But whether the act committed by the employe e constitutes employment
misconduct is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Peterson, 753 N.W.2d at 774.
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In his modified decision, the ULJ made extensive findings of fact regarding Fegley’s
conduct on the day in question, all of which are supported by testimony in the record. The
ULJ found that it was stormy on the morning of August 4, and the dispatchers were short-
staffed and busier than usual dealing with a bus accident, rerouting, and other tasks. Fegley
began her shift by making calls and decisions that were duplicative of previous actions by
her coworkers. When one of her coworkers criticized her for these actions, Fegley
“immediately threw her hands into the air and said, ‘I can’t do this anymore.’” Fegley left
work approximately five minutes into her shift, leaving her coworkers “short -handed
during a critical time.”
Specific to Fegley’s mental condition, the ULJ found that Fegley takes medication
for anxiety, but that “she felt fine” on the morning of August 4 when beginning work. After
leaving the building but while still in the parking lot, Fegley called her supervisor to request
a meeting to discuss what had happened. This meeting between Fegley and her supervisors
took place the next day, and Fegley did not mention anxiety as the reason for leaving work
the previous day, but instead criticized Trailblazer management for not providing enough
support to the dispatchers.
On August 8, 2016, Trailblazer sent Fegley a notice of its intent to t erminate her
employment and provided a meeting time to allow Fegley to “presen t information
regarding why [her] employment should not be terminated.” During this meeting, Fegley
again did not mention anxiety as the reason for her leaving work early on August 4.
We agree with the ULJ’s conclusion that Fegley’s actions on Augu st 4 were
employment misconduct . In sum, substantial evidence supports the ULJ’s finding that
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Fegley was not discharged because of a medical condition. Fegley walked off the job in
the midst of a crisis, saying “I can’t do this anymore.” This conduct was intentional, was
“a serious violation of the standa rds of behavior” Trailblazer should reasonably expect of
its employees, and clearly demonstrated “ a substantial lack of concern for [her]
employment” by Fegley. Further, Fegley met with management twice after the incident
but before her termination, and did not claim her actions were due to a medical condition
until after she was terminated.
Affirmed.