In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: J. G.-A. and Unknown Father, Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0217

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
J. G.-A. and Unknown Father, Parents.

Filed June 19, 2017
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Benton County District Court
File No. 05-JV-16-979

Philip Miller, Benton County Attorney, William V. Faerber, Assistant County Attorney,
Foley, Minnesota (for respondent Benton County Human Services)

Cathleen Gabriel, Annandale, Minnesota (for appellant mother)

Tylor Cummings, Waite Park, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Jesson , Presiding Judge; Rodenberg , Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Appellant J.G.-A. challenges the district court’s order terminating her parental rights
to her youngest child after previous involuntary terminations and an involuntary transfer
of custody with respect to other children. Because clear and convincing evidence supports
the district court’s determination that she is palpably unfit to parent the child, and because
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the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination of parental
rights is in the child’s best interests, we affirm.
FACTS
J.G.-A. (mother) gave birth to C.W.C., the child who is the subject of the
proceedings, in St. Cloud in 2016. In 2014 and 2015, mother’s rights to three previous
children had been involuntarily terminated, and there was an involuntary transfer of
custody with respect to another child. In November 2015, Benton County Human Services
(the county) learned that mother was incarcerated in the Benton County jail and was
expecting another child. Because the county was aware that mother had chemical -
dependency issues, a social worker met with her to discuss those issues. At that time,
mother agreed to undergo a chemical -dependency evaluation and drug testing as soon as
she was released from jail. The county contacted her further in February 2016, when she
was again incarcerated; she then informed the social worker that she had not yet obtained
prenatal care or received the chemical-dependency evaluation to which she had previously
agreed. In April 2016, a county social worker again spoke with mother to discuss what
would happen when the child was born and how she could show that she was fit to raise
the child. Mother was again advised to complete a chemical -dependency evaluation and
to comply with any probationary requirements of her criminal sentences. Alth ough an
assessor attempted several times to contact her by phone to schedule an evaluation, at least
three phone messages went unanswered.
When the child was born, the hospital notified the county, and the district court
ordered the child placed in emer gency protective care in the custody of the county, with
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placement in foster care.1 The district court also ordered mother to submit to random drug
testing. On June 20, she completed a hair follicle test, which showed the presence of a
level of methamphetamine 15 times higher than the threshold used by the testing company
as well as amphetamine. A urine test at the same time was positive for those substances.
On June 28, mother completed a rule 25 chemical -dependency evaluation, which
recommended that she enter residential treatment, abstain from chemical use, attend AA or
similar support meetings, submit to random drug testing, follow discharge
recommendations and conditions of probation, and remain law abiding.
On June 6, f ive days after the child’ s birth, the county filed an initial petition to
terminate mother’s parental rights to the child. When that petition was heard in July,
mother had pending criminal cases in three counties. The district court denied the petition
due to an incorrect citati on in the petition that implicated due -process concerns, but
adjudicated the child in need of protection or services.
On August 19, the county filed an out -of-home placement plan, which required
mother to comply with drug testing and follow through with recommended services. Five
days later, she was committed to prison for 48 months after violating probation on a
conviction of second -degree controlled -substance crime. While incarcerated, she
completed a day -treatment mental-health program and attended a support group for new
mothers, but she did not participate in a chemical-dependency program.

1 There has been no adjudication of paternity regarding the child’s father.
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The county filed another petition to terminate mother’s parental rights in October
2016, alleging that she had substantially, repeatedly, or continuously refused to comply
with the duties of the parent-child relationship and that she was palpably unfit to parent the
child, based on the prior involuntary terminations as to other children. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4) (2016). The district court held a trial in January 2017.
At trial, mother’s social worker testified that after the June 28 chemical-dependency
evaluation, mother did not take any additional steps to address her chemical issues and did
not submit to further drug testing. The social worker testified that mother ha d applied for
a prison boot-camp program, but she would be ineligible for 60 days based on disciplinary
infractions while incarcerated and is not guaranteed a spot in that program.
The child’s guardian ad litem testified that the child has had no interaction with
mother since birth, due to the prior terminations o f her parental rights to other children.
The child is currently placed with his half -sibling and has developed an attachment to his
caretakers. The guardian ad litem testified that it was in the child’s best interests that
mother’s parental rights be terminated.
Mother testified that when she was pregnant, she used methamphetamine, but that
she did perform a rule 25 evaluation near the end of her pregnancy and received prenatal
care. She stated that she had been fired from one prison job for a minor infraction and had
a new prison job. She stated that she was not allowed to participate in a lot of prison
programming, but that she had been applying anyhow because “if you’re not in
programming, basically, you’re in your room.” She was optimistic about g etting into the
boot-camp program within a few months, but acknowledged there was no guarantee. She
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stated that she was trying to address her mental health, that she was on a waiting list for
chemical-dependency treatment, and that she had “messed up in t he beginning,” but was
trying hard to show her fitness as a parent.
The district court filed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order terminating
mother’s parental rights to C.W.C. on two grounds: repeated refusal or neglect to comply
with the duties of the parent -child relationship and palpable unfitness to parent the child.
See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4). A presumption of palpable unfitness
applied based on the previous involuntary terminations and change of custody, and she had
failed to rebut that presumption. The district court found that, although the county was not
required to provide reasonable efforts to reunite the child with mother, based on the
previous terminations and custody change, the county had engaged in re asonable efforts.
It found, however, that mother was essentially homeless, without transportation, and
suffering from mental illness and chemical addition, and that her failure to address these
issues as directed by social services made her palpably unfit to parent now and in the
foreseeable future. The district court further determined that the child’s best interests
supported termination of parental rights. Mother appeals.
D E C I S I O N
A parent’s rights to a child may be terminated “only for grave and weighty reasons.”
In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted).
But a district court may terminate parental rights when at least one statutory ground for
termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence and the court determines that
termination is in the child’s best interest. In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L. , 853 N.W.2d
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127, 137 (Minn. 2014). We review the district court’s findings for clear error, In re Welfare
of Children of T.R. , 750 N.W.2d 656, 660 (Minn. 2008), and its decision to terminate
parental rights for an abuse of discretion. J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 93.
I. Clear and convincing evidence supports the district court’s termination of
parental rights on the ground of palpable unfitness.

Although a parent is generally presumed to be a suitable person to be entrusted with
his or her child’s care, In re Welfare of A.D. , 535 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 1995), if the
parent’s rights to another child have been involuntarily terminated, a presumpti on arises
that the parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent -child relationship. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). Termination of parental rights on the ground of palpable
unfitness requires “a consistent pattern of specific conduct befor e the child,” or “specific
conditions directly relating to the parent-child relationship,” which render the parent unable
to care appropriately for the child’s needs “for the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. If
the presumption of palpable unfitness ap plies, the parent then has the burden to introduce
evidence that would justify a finding that he or she is not palpably unfit. In re Welfare of
Child of J.W. , 807 N.W.2d 441, 445 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6,
2012). To sustain this burd en, the parent must produce evidence showing that he or she
“is suitable to be entrusted with the care of the child.” R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 137
(quotation omitted). We review de novo the district court’s determination of whether a
parent’s evidence would justify a finding that the parent is not palpably unfit. J.W., 807
N.W.2d at 446. And we examine the district court’s underlying decision to terminate
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parental rights to ensure that it is supported by clear and convincing evidence. See R.D.L.,
853 N.W.2d at 136.
Here, the district court found that clear and convincing evidence supported the
termination of mother’s parental rights on the ground that she was palpably unfit to parent
the child. Because mother’s parental rights to three other children were involuntarily
terminated, and custody of another child was involuntarily transferred, the presumption of
palpable unfitness applies. See Minn. Stat. § 260C. 301, subd. 1(b)(4). The district court
determined that mother failed to rebut that presumption, finding that her chemical -
dependency and mental-health issues created an unstable lifestyle for herself and the child.
The district court found that, since the child’s birth, mother had not been employed or had
a stable residence and had been convicted of several felony offenses, which resulted in her
incarceration. The district court further found that she had failed to avail herself of
opportunities for drug testing and that she did not complete a chemical -dependency
evaluation until well after the child’s birth. The district court determined, based on its
findings, that her failure to effectively and promptly address those issues rendered he r a
palpably unfit parent for the foreseeable future.
The parties do not dispute that the presumption of palpable unfitness applies in this
case. But mother argues that she produced evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption.
She maintains that the district court disregarded evidence that she had completed a rule 25
evaluation and was transported to the doctor for prenatal care while she was incarcerated.
She also argues that the district court improperly referenced mental -health issues when
county did not present evidence as to those issues. But in order to rebut the presumption
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of palpable unfitness, mother was required to produce evidence sufficient to support a
finding that she was suitable to be entrusted with the child’s care. R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at
136. Yet here, the record shows that mother rejected county assistance with her chemical-
dependency issues during her pregnancy. Shortly after the child was born, she tested
positive for a very high level of methamphetamine and amphetamine. Altho ugh she
eventually completed a rule 25 evaluation, she failed either to follow recommendations for
residential treatment or to submit to additional drug testing. And although mother is correct
that the county did not present evidence of her mental illness , the district court’s findings
on her chronic drug use sufficiently support its determination that she failed to rebut the
presumption of palpable unfitness.
Mother notes that, standing alone, chemical -dependency issues cannot justify a
termination of parental rights absent a causal connection between substance use and the
parent’s ability to care for the child. In re Welfare of Children of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703,
710 (Minn. 2005). Stated another way, to provide a basis for termination on the ground of
palpable unfitness, a parent’s substance abuse must be “of a nature and duration that
renders the parent unable, for the reasonably foreseeable future, to care appropriately for
the child’s ongoing needs.” T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 663. Here, the district court appropriately
considered mother’s failure to follow recommendations to address untreated chemical -
dependency issues as affecting her ability to parent. She t estified that she attempted to
address her parenting skills while in prison, attending a wellness program, a new parents’
program, and a cognitive skills program. She also testified that she was on a waiting list
for a prison chemical -dependency program. But evidence of her participation in
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programming in a structured prison environment does not compel a determination that she
rebutted the presumption that she was a palpably unfit parent. See In re Welfare of Child
of W.L.P., 678 N.W.2d 703, 710 (Minn. App. 2004) (rejecting assertion that after a 30-year
history of substance abuse, a parent’s ability to stay drug -free for a three-month period in
a structured environment was sufficient to rebut presumption of unfitness). Further, the
district court was en titled to place only limited weight on her future intentions because it
was required to address her parenting capabilities at the time of the trial. See J.W., 807
N.W.2d at 446 (stating that “[the] evidence was appropriately focused on . . . skills and
behavioral tendencies at the time of the trial.”).
Mother has longstanding, unaddressed chemical -dependency issues that have
rendered her unable to maintain a safe and stable home for the child. While the
presumption of parental unfitness is easily rebut table, good intentions and prison
programming do not clear this low bar. See R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 137. The district court
did not err by determining that mother failed to rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness
and that clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of her parental rights on
that ground. Because the record establishes palpable unfitness as a ground for termination
under Minnesota Statutes § 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4), we need not review the other
statutory ground on which the district court relied. See T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d at 708 (“Only
one ground must be proven for termination to be ordered.”).
II. The child’s best interests support termination of parental rights.
Mother also challenges the district court’s concl usion that termination of her
parental rights is in the child’s best interests. The child’s best interests are the paramount
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consideration in a termination proceeding. Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.001, subd. 2(a) (2016),
.301, subd. 7. Even if a statutory basis for termination has been proved, if termination is
not in a child’s best interests, termination of parental rights is not appropriate. D.L.D., 771
N.W.2d at 545.
The district court must analyze the best interests of the child by balancing three
factors: “(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s
interest in preserving the parent -child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the
child.” W.L.P., 678 N.W.2d at 711 (quotation omitted). Competing interests may include
“a stable environment [and] health considerations.” In re Welfare of R.T.B. , 492 N.W.2d
1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992). We review the district court’s ultimate determination that
termination is in a child’s best interests for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Children
of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
Here, the district court determined that the child’s best interests and safety were
served by the termination of mother’s parental rights. The district court found that mother
had a history of chronic drug use, was unable to adequately care for her child while using
controlled substances, and had failed to provide the child with stable housing,
transportation to medical care, or other nece ssities. It found that, by the time of mother’s
anticipated release from prison, the child would have been placed outside of her home for
over two years. The district court therefore determined that the child’s interest in a safe,
stable, and drug-free environment outweighed mother’s interest in preserving the parent -
child relationship.
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Mother argues that the district court improperly based its best -interests findings on
her incarceration. Incarceration by itself does not necessarily render a person un able to
parent a child. See In re Welfare of M.D.O. , 462 N.W.2d 370, 378 -79 (Minn. 1990)
(affirming district court’s denial of termination for mother incarcerated for murdering a
child, based on her continuing relationship with child and amenability to se rvices while
incarcerated). But incarceration does create challenges and necessarily decreases the
incarcerated person’s ability to provide for a child’s needs. In re Welfare of Children of
A.I., 779 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn. App. 2010), review dismissed (Minn. Apr. 20, 2010).
Mother challenges the district court’s finding that the child would have been in out-
of-home placement for two years by the time of her release from prison, arguing that her
possible acceptance into a boot -camp program would result in an earlier release. But the
district court’s concern for the child’s stability is consistent with permanency deadlines.
See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 260C.503 (2016) (providing that the district court must commence
permanency proceedings no later than 12 months after a child is placed in foster care). And
more importantly, mother’s incarceration was not the sole reason for terminating her
parental rights. The district court found that J.G.-A. has not shown that she is able to care
for her child while she is using controlled substances and has failed to show any permanent
or meaningful change in her lifestyle that would render her an adequate caretaker once she
is released from prison. Given these findings, the district court determined that the child’s
best interests support termination of mother’s parental rights. We agree.
Affirmed.