In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: G. M. and J. H., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0219

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
G. M. and J. H., Parents.

Filed June 12, 2017
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-JV-16-2072

Renee A. Michalow, Michalow Law Office, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant
G.M.)

J.H., Brooklyn Park, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Kathryn Eilers, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for Ramsey County Community Human Services Department)

Chad A. Snyder, Snyder Gislason Frasier, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for child N.H.)

Kathleen A. Junek, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for children B.H., J.H., C.H., A.H.)

Cheryl Toenjes, St. Paul, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
On appeal from the a djudication that her children need protection or services,
appellant-mother argues that the district court lacked subject -matter jurisdiction because
the children are safe in the care of respondent-father and that the record does not support
the district c ourt’s findings with respect to the statutory grounds for adjudication . We
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-mother G.M. and respondent -father J.H. have five children: daughter
N.H. (born 2001), twin daughters B.H. and J.H. (born 2002), son C.H. (born 2004), and
son A.H (born 2006). In July 2015, mother obtained an order for protection against father,
at which time mother had sole legal and sole physical custody of the children. Father had
visitation every other weekend.
In February 2016, mother reported to the police that her boyfriend choked her,
threatened to break her neck, threatened her with a kitchen knife, and stated that he was
going to kill h er. Mother subsequently admitted to a child -protection worker that she
fabricated the incident out of anger at her boyfriend, and that she asked her children to lie
to the police about it. She also reported that she did not plan to reunite with her boyfriend.
Child-protection workers interviewed the three oldest children . B.H. and J.H.
reported that they felt unsafe with mother’s boyfriend . All three said that mother had
reunited with her boyfriend. Child -protection workers also interviewed father, wh o
described mother’s boyfriend as “a drug addict and alcoholic ,” and expressed concern

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about mother’s possible drug use. Father reported that J.H. and B.H. had taken a photo of
drug paraphernalia they found in mother’s bedroom.
In the summer of 2016, t he children visited their paternal grandmother in Iowa.
During the visit, father asked his mother to have the children “write their feelings about
what’s going on at home.” The resulting letters express concern about mother’s drug use
and describe feelin g unloved. One states that mother often left them home alone,
sometimes without food. When the children returned from Iowa, they moved in with father
because mother was homeless.
Father moved the district court in a family court proceeding1 for sole legal and sole
physical custody of the children . After issuing an e x parte order in father’s favor on July
28, 2016, the family court conducted a hearing. On August 8, the court granted the parties
joint legal and joint physical custody on a temporary basis.2 The order designates mother’s
home as the children’s primary residence.
On August 12, respondent Ramsey County Community Human Services
Department (the county) filed a child -in-need-of-protection-or-services (CHIPS) petition
in district court, all eging the children were CHIPS because (1) they were “without
necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, or other required care for the child [ren]’s

1 In Ramsey County, family -law and child -protection proceedings involving the same
family are assigned to a single judge. That is the case here. In this opinion, we use “family
court” and “district court” to refer to the separate proceedings.

2 The county included a copy of this order in its addendum . Mother moved to strike it on
the ground that it was not in the record before the district court. Mother withdrew her
motion to strike at oral argument.

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physical or mental health or morals because the child[ren]’s parent, guardian, or custodian
is unable or unwilling to provide that care”; (2) they were “without proper parental care
because of the emotional, mental, or physical disability, or state of immaturity of the
child[ren]’s parent, guardian, or other custodian”; and (3) their “behavior, condition, or
environment is such as to be injurious or dangerous to the child[ren] or others.” See Minn.
Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(3), (8), (9) (2016) (providing the bases for the petition’s
allegations). Mother denied the CHIPS allegations. Following an emergency-protective-
care hearing, the district court ordered the children placed in father’s home.
In January 2017, the district court conducted a CHIPS trial. The district court heard
testimony from both parents, J.H., A.H., N.H., a child-protection worker, and the guardian
ad litem. The district court expressly found the testimony of the children more credible
than mother’s contradictory testimony. And the district court found clear and convincing
evidence that the children need protection or services “by virtue of being without necessary
food and parental supervision while in the care of [mother] because she is unwilling to
provide that care”; “by virtue of being without proper parental care by virtue of being left
alone for a long period of time unsupervis ed, left without adequate food, and being
subjected to an environment of domestic abuse because of the emotional and mental state
of their mother”; and “because the home in which they lived with [mother] was dangerous
to themselves or others and [mother] i s homeless.” Finally, t he district court found a
CHIPS adjudication was in the children’s best interests. Mother appeals.

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D E C I S I O N
I. The district court had subject -matter jurisdiction and did not commit legal
error by considering the merits of the CHIPS petition.

“Whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists presents a question of law, which we
review de novo.” In re Welfare of Children of D.M.T. -R., 802 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Minn.
App. 2011). In Minnesota, “[t]he juvenile court has original and exclu sive jurisdiction in
proceedings concerning any child who is alleged to be in need of protection or services.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.101, subd. 1 (2016).
Mother argues that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and otherwise
committed legal error by considering the CHIPS petition because the children were safe in
father’s care at the time of the trial and because of the pending family court proceeding.
We address each argument in turn.
First, mother contends that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
because the CHIPS petition contains no allegations involving father and the children were
safe in his home. We disagree. “The county need not prove its prima facie case to establish
subject matter jurisdiction, but must simpl y set forth allegations that a child is in need of
protection or services to demonstrate that the case is within the class of cases the court has
authority to hear.” In re Welfare of Child of T.T.B. , 710 N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn. App.
2006), rev’d on other grounds, 724 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. 2006). The CHIPS petition here
did just that. Moreover, t he statutory grounds on which the CHIPS petition is based
reference the children’s needs ; a CHIPS petition serves to adjudicate children, not their
parents. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6 (2016) (discussing the circumstances in

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which a child may find himself or herself and therefore be in need of services). Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.007, subd . 6(3), (8), refer to the child’s singular parent, guardian, or custodian,
while subdivision 6(9) refers only to the child’s “behavior, condition, or environment.”
Nor are we persuaded by mother’s citation to In re Welfare of T.L.L. as support for
the proposition that a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction where the children are
in the care of a custodial parent who adequately meets their needs. 453 N.W.2d 355, 357
(Minn. App. 1990). In T.L.L., the mother initiated an action to terminate the parental rights
of the father, who was serving a pri son sentence for murder. Id. at 356. The par ents
reached a settlement that required the county to provide services to the father. Id. The
county appealed, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter a dispositional order
because T.L.L. did not need protection or services. Id. This court agreed, holding that
because “[t]he record shows that [the custodial parent] is adequately meeting all of the
child’s identified needs[,] . . . no evidence supports the court’s determination that . . . the
child is in need of protection or services.” Id. at 357 . This case presents different
circumstances. Mother has legal and physical custody of the children under the family
court order. And the CHIPS petition clearly alleges that the children need protectio n or
services based on mother’s conduct.
Second, mother contends that the district court “should not have allowed the CHIPS
petition to proceed as a matter of law” because of the pending family court proceeding and
the fact that a court “‘may not allow a petition to proceed’ if it appears that the sole purpose
is to modify custody between the parents.” See Minn. Stat. § 260C.141, subd. 1(b) (2016).
We are not persuaded. Mother cites no legal authority for the assertion that an existing

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custody dispute in family court invalidates a CHIPS petition filed by a county human
services agency, and provides no factual support for the argument that the petition’s sole
purpose is to modify custody. The existing family court order provides for joint legal and
joint physical custody and designates mother’s home as the children’s primary residence.
Absent district court involvement in the CHIPS context, the numerous conditions
implicating the children’s welfare alleged in the petition would not be addressed. On this
record, we conclude that the district court had subject -matter jurisdiction and properly
considered the merits of the petition.
II. Clear and convincing evidence supports a CHIPS adjudication under Minn.
Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(9).

A district court has broad discretion in child -protection matters. In re Welfare of
Child of S.S.W. , 767 N.W.2d 723, 733 (Minn. App. 2009). “Findings in a CHIPS
proceeding will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial
evidence.” In re Welfare of B.A.B., 572 N.W.2d 776, 778 (Minn. App. 1998). A district
court’s findings are clearly erroneous when “the review of the entire record leaves [this]
court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation
omitted). And because “a district court is in a superior position to assess the credibility of
witnesses,” we defer to those findings. S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d at 733.
Mother argues that the district court “erred in its findings of fact because the record
as a whole does not support substantial evidence that the children were exposed to domestic
violence, drugs, or lack of food or parental supervision.” S he does not directly challenge
the district court’s determination that a CHIPS adjudication serve s the children’s best

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interests. Accordingly, we focus our analysis on whether clear and convincing evidence
supports any of the alleged statutory grounds.
A child needs protection or services pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(9),
when the child ’s “behavior, condition, or environment is such as to be injurious or
dangerous to the child or others. An injurious or dangerous environment may include, but
is not limited to, the exposure of a child to criminal activity in the child’s home.” To prevail
on a CHIPS petition, the county must establish both the statutory ground and the child’s
resulting need for protection or services. Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.007, subd. 6, .163, subd.
1(a) (“To be proved at trial, allegations of a petition alleging a child to b e in need of
protection or services must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.”) (2016).
J.H. testified that, before mother’s current homelessness, the children lived with her
in a bad neighborhood. A.H., C.H., J.H., and B.H. told child-protection workers that they
did not feel safe when mother left them at home because of the neighborhood, and that they
were frequently left without supervision for long periods of time. A.H. mentioned similar
concerns in his letter. B.H. and J.H. told a child -protection worker that they did not feel
safe with mother’s boyfriend. A.H. and J.H. testified that they were often left alone without
sufficient food. J.H. said she did not know how to cook, that they usually had bread but it
was sometimes moldy, and that they rarely had peanut butter. Mother contradicted the
children’s testimony, and stated that they never went hungry. But the district court did not
find mother’s testimony consistent or credible. The district court instead credited the
children’s testimony. We defer to the district court’s credibility determinations. S.S.W.,
767 N.W.2d at 733.

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The evidence also supports the district court’s determination that mother exposed
the children to criminal activity when they were in her care. The children’s testimony and
letters support the district court’s finding that mother used drugs while the children were
in her care. J.H. testified that she saw her mother dip a metal object into bags and smoke
it, “[a]nd it smells disgusting.” She noted that this happened in front of her siblings,
“mainly in the house” and “[s]ometimes in the car.” The letters from J.H. and N.H. both
include similar information, with reference s to a “skunky smell.” Mother testified to the
contrary, and opined that father must have encouraged the children to lie about her drug
use. Again, the district court expressly credited the children’s testimony over mother’s
testimony and we defer to that determination. See id.
At trial, the guardian ad litem also described the environme nt mother provided to
the children as dangerous:
Q: As it relates to the environment that [the children] reside
in, do you have an opinion as to whether or not while in their
mother’s care they were in an environment or condition such
as to be injurious or dangerous to themselves or others?
A: I believe that their health and safety were at risk.
Q: Why do you say that?
A: My understanding is that the five children that you
mentioned were exposed to potentially maternal drug and
alcohol use . . . . And they had reason to fear for their own and
for their mother’s safety. And that they experienced basic
needs being unmet when they were left unsupervised for
periods of time.

In sum, mother’s current homelessness, the children’s fear when in her care, mother’s lack
of supervision, and mother’s drug use in the children’s presence amply support the district
court’s finding under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(9). The record also demonstrates

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that the children need protection or services while in mother’ s care. Mother’s ongoing
housing instability requires assistance from the county. And mother’s case plan—which
she has not embraced —highlights mother’s unmet needs for a chemical-dependency
evaluation and treatment and domestic-abuse victim programming.
The district court need only find one proven statutory ground to support a CHIPS
adjudication. S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d at 728 (“[W] e conclude that section 260C.007,
subdivision 6, requires proof that one of the enumerated child -protection grounds exists
and that the subject child needs protection or services as a result .”). Because clear and
convincing evidence supports the district court’s finding that the children need protection
or services under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(9), we do not reach the ot her statutory
grounds.
Affirmed.