State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0235

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ahmed Abdirahim Abdi,
Appellant.

Filed February 20, 2018
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-20688

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean Burdorf, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief A ppellate Public Defender, Melissa Sheridan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Kirk , Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Schellhas,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KIRK, Judge
Appellant challenges his second-degree murder conviction, arguing that he is entitled
to a new trial because (1) the district court prejudicially erred when the trial judge

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reconsidered the pretrial judge’s Spreigl ruling, (2) the district court abused its discretion by
admitting a statement appellant made about getting away with murder, and (3) the cumulative
effect of these errors denied him a fair trial. We affirm.
FACTS
On July 29, 2015, appellant Ahmed Abdirahim Abdi was charged with second-degree
murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2014). It was alleged that appellant killed his
girlfriend, A.A., in his bedroom by shooting her in the head o n April 11, 2015. On April 4,
2016, the state filed a Spreigl notice indicating that it intended to intr oduce at trial evidence
of two prior bad acts attributed to appellant: (1) that appellant was charged with participating
in an April 10, 2015 first-degree aggravated robbery , and (2) that appellant brandished a
firearm in a public place on or about April 8, 2015.
At an April 12, 2016 motion hearing, a pretrial judge denied the state’s Spreigl motion.
Regarding the second incident, the pretrial judge found that there was not clear and convincing
evidence that appellant brandished a firearm and that the probative value of the incident did
not outweigh the potential for unfair prejudice to appellant. On June 7, the same pretrial judge
filed an inconsistent written Spreigl order admitting the brandishing-a-firearm incident. In
the written order, t he pretrial judge found that there was clear and convincing evidence of
appellant’s participation in the incident and that the probative value of the evidence
outweighed its potential for unfair prejudice to appellant. On June 20, after the discrepancy
between his Spreigl rulings was noted, the pretrial judge stated on the record that his written
order was issued in error and that neither Spreigl incident would be admitted at trial , as he
originally ruled on the record.

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On June 30, appellant’s case was reassigned to a different judge. On July 7, the state
filed a motion to reconsider the pretrial judge’s Spreigl ruling. On July 12, when the parties
appeared for trial, the trial judge agreed to review the state’s motion to reconsider. On July
13, the trial judge granted the state’s mo tion to reconsider because it was unclear which one
of the pretrial judge’s Spreigl rulings was final. On July 14, the trial judge agreed with the
pretrial judge’s written Spreigl order and ruled that the brandishing-a-firearm incident was
admissible. The case proceeded to a trial by jury. The jury found appellant guilty of second-
degree murder, and the district court sentenced him to 306 months in prison.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The trial judge did not err in reconsidering the pretrial judge’s Spreigl ruling.

The district court has the inherent authority to reconsider pretrial or omnibus rulings.
State v. Papadakis, 643 N.W.2d 349, 356-57 (Minn. App. 2002) (citing State v. Montjoy, 366
N.W.2d 103, 107-08 (Minn. 1985)). In fact, “a motion for reconsideration may be the most
efficient and preferable course of action, and it can spare parties the time, trouble, and expense
of an appeal.” Id. at 357 (citing Montjoy, 366 N.W.2d at 107-08).
“The state m ay request that the [district] court reconsider the [omnibus] order upon
proper application of the parties made at an appropriate time during the course of the trial.”
State v. Lyons , 423 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Minn. App. 1988) (quotation omitted), review denied
(Minn. July 6, 1988). But, a n omnibus order may only be reconsidered by a nother judge
where there are “extraordinary circumstances” present to justify reconsideration. Id.; see also
Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.07 cmt. (“The intent of the Omnibus Hearing rule is that all issues that

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can be determined before trial must be heard at the Omnibus Hearing and decided before trial.
Consequently, when the Omnibus Hearing is held before a judge other than the trial judge,
the trial judge, except in extraordinary circumst ances will adhere to the findings and
determinations of the Omnibus Hearing judge.”). “Extraordinary circumstances” have not
been defined in our caselaw. Lyons, 423 N.W.2d at 99.
Appellant argues that the trial judge erred in reconsidering the pretrial judge’s Spreigl
ruling because there were no extraordinary circumstances to justify reconsideration.
Appellant asserts that the error was prejudicial and warrants a new trial. The state argues that
this case did involve extraordinary circumstances to justify reconsideration because the
pretrial judge’s contradictory Spreigl rulings were “confusing and unusual.” The state asserts
that, because the pretrial judge gave no explanation f or his decision to disregard his written
order, the trial judge could not determine the legal basis of that decision with any certainty.
The state also argues that this case is similar to State v. Hamling, where a trial judge wanted
to follow the pretrial judge’s omnibus ruling but could not determine “with certainty what that
ruling was.” 314 N.W.2d 224, 225 (Minn. 1982). Because the evidence ultimately admitted
by the trial judge in Hamling was reliable, the supreme court concluded that the trial judge
did not prejudicially err in admitting it. Id.
Here, we need not consider whether there were extraordinary circumstances to justify
reconsideration of the pretrial judge’s Spreigl ruling because any procedural error made did
not unfairly prejudice appellant. Id. (holding that the defendant was not prejudiced by a trial
judge’s reconsideration of a prior judge’s omnibus order where the identification evidence
challenged was reliable and therefore admissible at trial); State v. Coe, 298 N.W.2d 770, 772

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(Minn. 1980) (holding that the defendant was not prejudiced by a trial judge’s reconsideration
of a prior judge’s omnibus order where the other-crimes evidence challenged was admissible
at trial).
Other-crimes evidence under Minn. R . Evid. 404(b), also known as Spreigl evidence
under State v. Spreigl , 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965), is admissible when the
following five conditions are met:
(1) the state must give notice of its intent to admit the evidence;
(2) t he state must clearly indicate what the evidence will be
offered to prove; (3) there must be clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant participated in the prior act; (4) t he evidence
must be relevant and material to the state’s case; and (5) the
probative value o f the evidence must not be outweighed by its
potential prejudice to the defendant.

State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 686 (Minn. 2006).
Here, appellant does not dispute that the state gave notice along with an explanation of
what the brandishing-a-firearm incident would be offered to prove, that there was clear and
convincing evidence of his participation in the incident, or that the incident was relevant and
material to the state’s case. Rather, appellant asserts that the probative value of the evidence
was not outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice. In the final Spreigl ruling, the trial
judge admitted the brandishing-a-firearm incident after finding that the probative value of the
evidence was not outweighed by the risk for potential prejudice to appellant.
When evaluating a district court’s admission of Spreigl evidence, this court applies an
abuse of discretion standard. State v. Sc ruggs, 421 N.W.2d 707, 715 (Minn. 1988). “To
warrant a new trial, the erroneous admission of Spreigl evidence must create a reasonable
possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” State v.

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Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 320 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). To prevail, an appellant
must show “error and the prejudice resulting from the error.” State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d
58, 64 (Minn. 1981).
Appellant argues that admission of the Spreigl evidence was unfairly prejudicial
because without it the jury would not have heard that he had access to a firearm a few days
before the murder. Appellant argues that he is entitled to a new trial, because without the
Spreigl evidence it is possible that he would have been acquitted. The state argues that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in reconsidering the pretrial judge’ s ruling and in
admitting the Spreigl evidence because appellant was not unfairly prejudiced by its admission.
The state argues that the brandishing-a-firearm incident was highly probativ e and necessary
to the state’s case because the murder weapon was never recovered. See Angus v. State, 695
N.W.2d 109, 120 (Minn. 2005) (“‘Need’ for other -crime evidence is not necessarily the
absence of sufficient other evidence to convict . . . . [E]vidence of other offenses may be
needed because, as a practical matter, it is not clear that the jury will believe the state’s other
evidence bearing on the disputed issue.” (quoting State v. Bolte , 530 N.W.2d 191, 197 n.2
(Minn. 1995)). The state also notes that the district court provided a cautio nary instruction
before the Spreigl evidence was presented. See State v. Kennedy , 585 N.W.2d 385, 392
(Minn. 1998) (noting that providing cautionary instructions “lessened the probability of undue
weight being given by the jury to the [Spreigl] evidence”).
“In assessing the probative value and need for the evidence, the district court must
identify the precise disputed fact to which the Spreigl evidence would be relevant.” Ness, 707
N.W.2d at 686 (quotation omitted). “This entails isolating the conseq uential fact for which

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the evidence is offered, and then determining the relationship of the offered evidence to that
fact and the relationship of the consequential fact to the disputed issues in the case.” Id. Here,
the trial judge found that the Spreigl evidence was relevant to prove opportunity and that
appellant had possession of a firearm. In order to prove that appellant caused A.A.’s death,
the state was required to prove that appellant shot her with a firearm intending to cause death.
In this case, the Spreigl evidence was highly probative because the state had no other evidence
that appellant had possession of a firearm.
The trial judge also concluded that the probative value of the Spreigl evidence
outweighed its potential for unfair prejudice, especially in light of the cautionary instruction.
To determine prejudice, this court consider s the entire record, including such factors as the
manner in which the evidence was presented, whether the evidence was a significant part of
the trial, whether the district cour t gave a cautionary instruction, whether the eviden ce was
used in closing argument, and the strength of the other evidence against appellant. State v.
Clark, 738 N.W.2d 316, 347-48 (Minn. 2007).
Here, the record shows that Spreigl evidence was not presented in such a way as to
create prejudice, and it was not a significant part of the five-day trial. Although the evidence
was presented through the state’s final witness , his testimony was brief, he was subject to
cross-examination, and a witness for the defense later disputed his perception of the Spreigl
incident. The district court also gave an appropriate cautionary instruction when the evidence
was admitted, and the state only mentioned the incident briefly during its closing argument.
The state’s o ther evidence against appellant was also strong and identified him as the only
person fleeing the scene of A.A.’s murder, and established that he fled the state and altered

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his appearance after A.A. was shot. On this record, the Spreigl evidence was not unfairly
prejudicial.
Because the brandishing-a-firearm incident was properly admitted as Spreigl evidence,
appellant was not unfairly prejudiced by the trial judge ’s reconsideration of the pretrial
judge’s Spreigl ruling, and appellant is not entitled to a new trial. Because appellant was not
unfairly prejudiced, we decline to address whether extraordinary circumstances were present
to justify reconsideration on this record. However, we note that the materiality of Spreigl
evidence to the state’s case will not always be apparent at the time of the pretrial. S o
reconsideration of a pretrial Spreigl ruling may become necessary during the pendency of a
criminal case regardless of whether the case has undergone judicial reassignment.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a prior statement that
appellant made about getting away with a murder.

“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the [district] court and will not
be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. On appeal, the appellant has the burden of
establishing that the [district] court abused its discretion and that app ellant was thereby
prejudiced.” State v. Amos , 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003) (citations omitted). “If no
constitutional right was implicated, we will reverse only if the district court’s error
substantially influenced the jury’s decision.” State v. V ang, 774 N.W.2d 566, 576 (Minn.
2009) (quotation omitted). In deciding what effect erroneously admitted evidence had on the
verdict, the reviewing court considers “the manner in which the evidence was presented,
whether it was highly persuasive, whether i t was used in closing argument, and whether the
defense effectively countered it.” Townsend v. State, 646 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn. 2002).

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Under Minn. R. Evid. 401, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Although generally admissible,
relevant evidence may be exclu ded under Minn. R. Evid. 403 if “its probative value is
substantially outweig hed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” At trial, the state present ed
evidence that, sometime before A.A.’s death, appellant told one of his high school teachers
that he could kill someone with a vehicle and get away with it. Defense counsel objected, and
the district court found that the statement’s probative value outweighed its prejudicial impact
and the statement was admissible. See Minn. R. Evid. 403. The state also argued that the
statement was admissible as a non-hearsay admission of a party opponent. See Minn. R. Evid.
801(d)(2).
Appellant argues that his prior statement was admitted in error because it was not
relevant to a shooting homicide and was unfairly prejudicial. Appellant asserts that the
statement substantially influenced the jury’ s verdict and that he is entitled to a new trial.
Appellant argues that the state highlighted the evidence in closing by arguing that appellant’s
motive may have been to try to get away with murder. Appellant asserts that this evidence of
a possible motive was compelling and highly persuasive because the state had no other
evidence related to motive and because, although the defense attempted to downplay the
statement, there was no evidence to prove appellant did not make the statement.
Here, regardless of whether appellant’s prior statement was relevant under Minn. R.
Evid. 401, presentation of the statement to the jury was not prejudicial. In addition to this
statement, the jury also heard testimony from a jailhouse informant that appellant boasted in

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jail that he had killed someone and was going to get away with it. Additionally, there was no
evidence presented that anyone else was in appellant’s bedroom with A.A. at the time of the
shooting. The state reference d appellant’s statement once in cl osing to suggest a possible
motive, but a review of the record reveals that the defense was able to effectively minimize
its impact by characterizing the statement as an irrelevant distraction.
On this record, regardless of whether admission of appellant’s prior statement was an
abuse of discretion, we cannot conclude that admission of the statement prejudiced appellant
by substantially impacting the jury’s verdict.
III. Appellant was not denied a fair trial.
A criminal defendant has the constitutional right to a fair trial. State v. Mayhorn, 720
N.W.2d 776, 791 (Minn. 2006). A defendant is entitled to a new trial if the cumulative effect
of the errors at trial deprived him of a fair trial. State v. Keeton, 589 N.W.2d 85, 91 (Minn.
1998). Appellant argues that the cumulative effect of the erroneous admission of the Spreigl
evidence and the vehicular -homicide statement deprived him of a fair trial. Because we
conclude that the Spreigl evidence was properly admitted, and because admission of
appellant’s statement about getting away with murder was not unfairly prejudicial, there are
no grounds on this record to order a new trial.
Affirmed.