Jeremiah John Palmquist, petitioner, Appellant,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0268

Jeremiah John Palmquist, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Stephanie Elizabeth Devens,
Respondent,

Joanne Mary Devens,
Respondent.

Filed December 26, 2017
Reversed and remanded
Halbrooks, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-FA-14-3679

Jacob M. Birkholz, Birkholz & Associates, LLC, Mankato, Minnesota (for appellant)

Stephanie Elizabeth Devens, Rock Hill, South Carolina (pro se respondent)

Meghan Maes, Julia Craig, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc., Mankato,
Minnesota (for respondent Joanne Mary Devens)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
When a district court awards a father, mother, and grandmother joint physical
custody of a child, the presumptively appropriate guideline basic suppor t obligation is
calculated based on the parents’ combined parental income for child support (PICS) under

2
Minn. Stat. § 518A.35, subd. 1(b) (2016), and not the parents’ individual PICS under Minn.
Stat. § 518A.35, subd. 1(c) (2016).
O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant-father challenges the district court’s decision to deny his motion t o
modify child support, arguing that the district court erred as a matter of law by concluding
that father’s child is not “in the custody of ” father for purposes of Minn. Stat. § 518A.35,
subd. 1(c). We reverse and remand for recalculation of father’s child -support obligation
using father and mother’s combined parental incomes under Minn. Stat. § 518A.35, subd.
1(b).
FACTS
Appellant Jeremiah John Palmquist (father) and respondent Stephanie Elizabeth
Devens (mother) have one child together, L.D.P. Father and mother never married, but
father established paternity through genetic testing. L.D.P. lives with respondent maternal
grandmother Joanne Mary Devens (grandmother) . Father and grandmother live in
Minnesota. Mother, who has a nonjoint child also living with grandmother, lives in another
state. Father and mother pay child support to grandmother.
In 201 4, father, mother, and grandmother reached an agreement on custody and
parenting time. Father prepared a proposed stipulated order incorporating the facts and
terms of the parties’ agreement. In 2015, the district court adopted this stipulated order.
The stipulated order provides t hat it is in L.D.P.’s best interests that father, mother, and
grandmother “be granted joint legal custody ” and that it is in L.D.P.’s best interests that

3
father, mother, and grandmother “be granted joint physical custody, subject to the parties’
rights to reasonable parenting time.” The stipulated order provides that father, mother, and
grandmother are awarded joint legal and joint physical custody of L.D.P. and that L.D.P.’s
“primary residence” is with grandmother. The stipulated order also includes father’s
current child-support obligation, which was calculated using father and mother’s combined
parental incomes and by applying a parenting-expense adjustment.
In 2016, f ather moved to modify parenting time, primary residence, a nd child
support. The parties stipulated to increasing father’s parenting time to at least 45.1% for
purposes of calculating child support and to keeping L.D.P.’s primary residence with
grandmother, but disagreed on father’s new child-support obligation, given the increase in
his parenting time. The district court adopted the stipulation to increase father’s parenting
time but reserved father’s motion to modify child support.
At the hearing on father’s motion, father argued that he is entitled to a reduction in
his child -support obligation due to the increase in his parenting time. Grandmother
opposed the motion. The district court denied father’s motion, concluding that father’s
current child-support obligation is not unreasonable and unfair . The district court
explained that father’s current child-support obligation should have been calculated using
father’s individual parental income under Minn. Stat. § 518A.35, subd. 1(c) , rather than
combined incomes under Minn. Stat. § 518A.35, subd. 1(b), because L.D.P. is not “in the
custody of” father. The district court reasoned that L.D.P. is not in the custody of father
because “[L.D.P.’s] primary residence is with Grandmother and Father has parenting time
with the child less than 50 percent of the time.” The district court calculated father’s child-

4
support obligation based on his increased parenting time using father’s individual parental
income and determined that it did not result in “a calculated support obligation . . . that is
at least 20 percent and at least $75 per month lower than the current support order .” The
district court concluded on that basis that there had not been a substantial change in
circumstances making the terms of father’s current support order unreasonable and unfair
and denied father’s motion to modify child support. This appeal follows.
ISSUE
Did the district court err as a matter of law by applying Minn. Stat. § 518A.35,
subd. 1(c), instead of Minn. Stat. § 518A.35, subd. 1(b), to determine father’s child-support
obligation when father has court-awarded joint physical custody of L.D.P.?

ANALYSIS
Father argues that the district court erred as a matter of law in denying his motion
to modify his child -support obligation. We review a district court’s decision w hether to
modify child support for abuse of discretion. Haefele v. Haefele , 837 N.W.2d 703, 708
(Minn. 2013); Shearer v. Shearer, 891 N.W.2d 72, 77 (Minn. App. 2017). We will reverse
only if the district court “abused its broad discreti on by reaching a clearly erroneous
conclusion that is against logic and the facts on record.” Haefele, 837 N.W.2d at 708. We
review questions interpreting Minnesota child-support statutes de novo. Id. “The purpose
of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the Legislature.”
Id.
A child-support order may be modified upon a showing of a substantial change in
circumstances that makes the order unreasonable and unfair. Minn. Stat. § 518A.39,
subd. 2(a) (2016) ; Rose v . Rose , 765 N. W.2d 142, 145 (Minn. App. 2009) . If the

5
application of the child -support guidelines to the current circumstances of the parties
results in a calculated obligation that is at least 20% and $75 different from the existing
order, then a rebutta ble presumption exists that the existing support obligation is
unreasonable and unfair, and an irrebuttable presumption exists that there has been a
substantial change in circumstances. Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(b)(1) (2016); Rose,
765 N.W.2d at 145.
Father argues that the district court applied the wrong statute in determining whether
there had been a substantial change in circumstances making father’s current child-support
order unreasonable and unfair. Father maintains that the district court im properly used
father’s individual parental income under Minn. Stat. § 518A.35, subd. 1(c), rather than
father and mother’s combined incomes under Minn. Stat. § 518A.35, subd. 1(b), for
calculating father’s new child-support obligation.
Minn. Stat. § 518A.35 (2016) provides the guideline for determining a parent’s
applicable total child -support figure. Haefele, 837 N.W.2d at 708. Under Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.35, subd. 1(b), “The basic child support obligation shall be determined by
referencing the guideline fo r the appropriate number of joint children and the combined
parental income for determining child support of the parents.” But under Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.35, subd. 1(c):
If a child is not in the custody of either parent and a support
order is sought agains t one or both parents, the basic child
support obligation shall be determined by referencing the
guideline for the appropriate number of joint children, and the
parent’s individual parental income for determining child
support, not the combined parental in comes for determining
child support of the parents.

6

Father contends that Minn. Stat. § 518A.35, subd. 1(c), does not apply here because
he has court -ordered joint physical custody of L.D.P., reasoning that “custody”
unambiguously refers to physical custody.
When interpreting a statute, we first determine “whether the statute’s language, on
its face, is clear or ambiguous.” Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl , 616 N.W.2d 273, 277
(Minn. 2000). A statute is ambiguous if its language is subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation. Id. But if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we “will look
only to that language in ascertaining legislative intent.” Haefele, 837 N.W.2d at 708.
Neither Minn. Stat. § 518A.35 nor the definitions sect ion of chapter 518A defines
“custody.” The definitions section of chapter 518A defines “ [p]rimary physical custody”
as “the parent who provides the primary residence for a child and is responsible for the
majority of the day-to-day decisions concerning a child.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.26, subd. 17
(2016). Minnesota Statutes chapter 518, which applies to chapter 518A, defines different
custody types, including legal custody, joint legal custody, custodial parent, c ustodian,
physical custody and residence, and joint physical custody. Minn. Stat. § 518.003 (2016).
“[C]ustodial parent” and “custodian” are both defined as the “person who has the physical
custody of the child at any particular time .” Id., subd. 3(e) (emphasis added). “Physical
custody and residence” is defined as “the routine daily care and control and the residence
of the child.” Id., subd. 3(c). “Joint physical custody” is defined as “the routine daily care
and control and the residence of the child is structured between the parties.” Id., subd. 3(d).

7
While chapters 518 and 518A define different custody types, neither define s “custody”
alone. See Minn. Stat. §§ 518.003, 518A.26 (2016).
When a word is undefined, we look to the word’s plain meaning. In re Welfare of
A.S., 882 N.W.2d 633, 639 (Minn. App. 2016). “To determine the plain meaning of a word,
[courts] often consider dictionary definitions.” Shire v. Rosemount, Inc., 875 N.W.2d 289,
292 (Minn. 2016). Custody is defined as the “care and control of a thing or person for
inspection, preservation, or security.” Black’s Law Dictionary 467 (10th ed. 2009).
Custody is also defined as the “control and care of a person or property, especially when
granted by a court.” The American Heritage Dictionary 449 (5th ed. 2011).
We agree with father that the word “custody” in Minn. Stat. § 518A.35, subd. 1(c),
is unambiguous. The plain meaning of custody in the child-support context refers to the
care and control of a person granted by a court. Black’s Law Dictionary 467 (10th ed.
2009); The American Heritage Dictionary 449 (5th ed. 2011) . “‘Joint physical custody ’
means that the routine daily care and control and the residence of the child is structured
between the parties.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(d) (emphasis added). “When a word
or phrase has a plain meaning, we presume that the plain meaning is consistent with
legislative intent and engage in no further statutory construction.” Shire, 875 N.W.2d at
292.
Under their stipulated custody order, father, mother, and grand mother have joint
physical custody of L.D.P., meaning the routine daily “care and control” and the residence
of L.D.P. is structured between father, mother, and grandmother. Minn. Stat. § 518.003,
subd. 3(d). Parties are bound by their stipulated custody arrangement s. See Nolte v.

8
Mehrens, 648 N.W.2d 727, 730 (Minn. App. 2002) (“[T]he label the parties place on their
stipulated custodial arrangement is binding.”). We therefore conclude that L.D.P. is in the
custody of father because father has a court-awarded role in L.D.P.’s care and control.
We decline to read into the statute a requirement that father have at least 50%
parenting time or provide L.D.P.’s primary residence for L.D.P. to be “in the custody of”
father. First, parenting time is defined as “the time a parent spends with a child regardless
of the custodial designation regarding the child.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 5 (emphasis
added). Second, grandmother contends that the legislature intended “custody” under Minn.
Stat. § 518A.35, subd. 1(c), to mean “primary physical custody,” and because she provides
L.D.P.’s primary residence, L.D.P. is not in the custody of either parent. Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.26, subd. 17. But we need not engage in further s tatutory construction because
custody under Minn. Stat. § 518A.35, subd. 1(c) , unambiguously refers to court -ordered
care and control. See Engfer v. Gen. Dynamics Advanced Info. Sys., Inc., 869 N.W.2d 295,
300 (Minn. 2015) (“If the statutory language is u nambiguous, [appellate courts] must
enforce the plain meaning of the statute and not explore the spirit or purpose of the law.”).
L.D.P. is “in the custody of” father because the district court granted father joint physical
custody of L.D.P.
D E C I S I O N
Minn. Stat. § 518A.35, subd. 1(c), applies only when a child is not in the custody of
either parent. Because father has joint physical custody of L.D.P. granted by the district
court, t he district court erred as a matter of law by applyi ng Minn. Sta t. § 518A.35,
subd. 1(c), to determine father’s child-support obligation . On remand, to determine

9
whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances making the terms of father’s
current child-support obligation unreasonable and unfair, the district court shall calculate
father’s new child-support obligation using father and mother’s combined parental incomes
under Minn. Stat. § 518A.35, subd. 1(b), and apply the applicable parenting expense
adjustment for father having at least 45.1% parenting time.
Reversed and remanded.