Charlotte Smith, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0313

Charlotte Smith,
Relator,

vs.

Health Partners, Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed September 5, 2017
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 34791220-5

Charlotte M. Smith, Burnsville, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Health Partners, Inc., Minneapolis, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Lee B. Nelson, Keri A. Phillips, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
In this certiorari appeal, relator challenges the decision of an unemployment -law
judge (ULJ) that she is ineligible for unemployment benefits, arguing that the ULJ erred in
concluding that she did not quit for a good reason caused by respondent employer and she
did not receive a fair hearing. We affirm.
FACTS
In July 2015, relator Charlotte Smith began working as a senior IT project manager
for respondent Health Partners, Inc. earning $90,000 per year. She immediately had
concerns that the work on some of her assigned projects was not being done properly. She
raised her concerns to her supervisors but was told that the team lacked the time to address
them. Smith’s concerns increased based on her belief that certain vendors did not have the
appropriate intellectual-property rights to access Health Partners’ proprietary information.
Because she believed some of her coworkers were acting in bad faith, she filed a
whistleblower complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
Smith was taken off her project and reassigned to a position with reduced responsibilities,
but her compensation did not change.
In October 2015, Smith’s supervisor asked her to go on pai d leave while Health
Partners investigated her concerns . Smith agreed to do so. Following its investigation,
Health Partners concluded that Smith’s concerns were unsubstantiated. On December 16,
2015, Health Partners offered Smith a severance package that included a one-time payment

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of $45,000 if she agreed to resign and withdraw her EEOC complaint. On December 29,
2015, she accepted the offer and resigned effective December 31, 2015.
Smith applied for unemployment benefits , and r espondent Minnesota De partment
of Employment and Economic Development (DEED) determined that she is ineligible to
receive unemployment benefits. Smith appealed this determination, arguing that DEED
ignored the material facts she submitted with her application. The ULJ held an evidentiary
hearing and concluded that Smith is not eligible to receive unemployment benefits because
she voluntarily quit to accept a severance package.
After Smith requested reconsideration of the decision, the ULJ set aside its findings
of fact and ordered another evidentiary hearing. Smith and two Health Partners employees,
D.Z. and S.R., testified at the second evidentiary hearing. The ULJ again found that Smith
quit to accept a severance package and concluded that she is ineligible to receive
unemployment benefits because she did not quit for a good reason caused by her employer.
Smith again requested reconsideration, and the ULJ affirmed its decision. This appeal
follows.
D E C I S I O N
Upon review of an unemployment -benefits decision, we may affirm or remand for
further proceedings, or we may reverse the ULJ’s decision if its “findings, inferences,
conclusion, or decision are: . . . made upon unlawful procedure . . . [or] unsupported by
substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted .” Minn. Stat. § 268.105,
subd. 7 (2016).

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I.
Smith argues that the ULJ erred by determining that she did not quit for a good
reason caused by her employer. The ULJ found that Smith quit her employment for two
reasons: (1) “to accept a severance package” and (2) “because she feared if she did not do
so, she would be discharged .”1 The ULJ also found that “[b]oth parties concede that the
decision to end the employment was Smith’s.”
Smith first argues that the ULJ erred in its determination of the reason she quit. She
contends that her employer’s failure to give her “reasonable assistance given the long term
impact of completing an unethical direction” caused her to quit. An individual’s reason to
quit employment is a question of fact. See Beyer v. Heavy Duty Air, Inc., 393 N.W.2d 380,
382 (Minn. App. 1986). We view “the ULJ’s factual findings in the light most favorable
to the decision and [will] not disturb those findings as long as there is evidence in the record
that reasonably tends to sustain them.” Stagg v. Vintage Place Inc., 796 N.W.2d 312, 315
(Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).
During the first evidentiary hearing, the ULJ questioned Smith about the
circumstances under which she quit:
Q Did you resign the position on December 31 of ’15[?]
A Yes I did.
Q Was that your choice[?]
A It was mutually agreed upon. I was offered a separation
agreement and I accepted the agreement.

1 Because Smith and DEED both agree that the record lacks support for the ULJ’s finding
that Smith quit because she feared that she would be discharged and because it is not
essential to resolve this matter, we do not further address it.

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In the second evidentiary hearing, Smith testified that she “accepted the offer to leave.”
Viewing the ULJ’s factual findings in the light most favorable to its decision, we conclude
that the record supports the finding that Smith quit in order to accept a severance package.
Next, we turn to whether the ULJ erred by concluding that Smith did not quit for a
good reason caused by her employer. “The issue of whether an employee had good reason
to quit is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Peppi v. Phyllis Wheatley Cmty. Ctr., 614
N.W.2d 750, 752 (Minn. App. 2000).
An individual who quits employment is ineligible to receive unemployment benefits
unless a statutory exception applies. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1 (2016). One exception
permits an individual who quit “because of a good reason caused by the employer” to
receive unemployment benefits. Id., subd. 1(1).
A good reason caused by the employ er for quitting is a
reason:
(1) that is directly related to the employment and for
which the employer is responsible;
(2) that is adverse to the worker; and
(3) that would compel an average, reasonable worker to
quit and become unemployed rather than r emaining in the
employment.

Id., subd. 3(a) (2016). Whether the reason would compel an average, reasonable worker
to quit is an objective standard. Werner v. Med. Prof’ls LLC, 782 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn.
App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Aug. 10, 2010). But quitting in order to accept a
severance package is not a good reason caused by the employer. See Edward v. Sentinel
Mgmt. Co., 611 N.W.2d 366, 368 (Minn. App. 2000) (“A good personal reason does not

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equate with good cause.”), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 2000). Thus, Smith did not quit
for a good reason caused by her employer.
Smith argues that had she complied with her employer’s requests, she risked the
possibility of incarceration and asset forfeiture, and no reasonable worker would have
engaged in that type of risk. But because the ULJ found that she quit to accept a severance
package and because there is no support in the record for the allegations, we reject this
argument.
Because Smith did not quit for a good reason caused by the employer, we conclude
that the ULJ did not err by determining that she is ineligible to receive unemployment
benefits.
II.
Citing multiple alleged procedural errors and arguing that the ULJ was extremely
biased against her, Smith contends that she did not receive a fair hearing. We disagree.
A ULJ has “a duty to reasonably assist pro se parties with the presentation of the
evidence and the proper development of the record.” White v. Univ. of Minn. Physicians
Corp., 875 N.W.2d 351, 355 -56 (Minn. App. 2016). “This is not to say that a ULJ is the
unrepresented party’s advocate; the evidentiary hearing is a fact -gathering endeavor, and,
like all judicial and quasi -judicial fact -gathering endeavors, it is still adversarial and
requires the judicial officer to maintain neutrality to assure fairness to all parties.” Stassen
v. Lone Mountain Truck Leasing, LLC , 814 N.W.2d 25, 32 (Minn. App. 2012) (citation
omitted). “[P]ro se litigants are generally held to the same standards as attorneys and must
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comply with cou rt rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald , 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App.
2001).
The record here demonstrates that the ULJ was patient and thorough at both
evidentiary hearings. The ULJ granted Smith’s first request for reconsideration because,
although Smith refused to answer many questions during the first hearing, her request for
reconsideration provided details that, if found to be true, might have changed the decision
from the first hearing. The ULJ asked open-ended questions to elicit a specific explanation
about what influenced Smith’s decision to quit and ended by asking her, “Is there anything
I didn’t ask you that you wanted to let me know here[?]”
Smith first argues that the ULJ failed to develop the record based on a memorandum
authored by former Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates that contains guidance on how
Department of Justice personnel should handle corporate misconduct matters. See U.S.
Dep’t of Just ., Individual Accountability for Corporate wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015 ),
https://www.justice.gov/dag/individual-accountability. Because Smith never mentioned
the memorandum as an issue during the evidentiary hearing, we do not consider it on
appeal. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (defining the scope of the record on appeal).
Next, Smith contends that the ULJ failed to instruct her “that she may have had the
burden of proof to show harassment.” “An applicant’s entitlement to unemployment
benefits must be determined based upon that information available without regard to a
burden of proof.” Minn. Stat. § 268.069, subd. 2 (2016); see Wilson v. Mortg. Res. Ctr.,
Inc., 888 N.W.2d 452, 461 (Minn. 2016). This argument is meritless because no burden
of proof exists here.

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Smith also argues that the ULJ failed to help her subpoena witnesses and records.
She did not request any subpoenas for either evidentiary hearing, but in her second request
for reconsideration, she stated, “I hereby request that [H.E.], manager of Human Resources,
appear as a witness at the hearing or provide a signed statement attesting to her knowledge
of these facts.”
In a request for reconsideration, the ULJ must not consider new evidence except to
determine whether to order an additional hearing. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 2(c) (2016).
A ULJ must order an additional evidentiary hearing if the applicant demonstrates that the
new evidence:
(1) would likely change the outcome of the decision and
there was good cause for not having previously sub mitted that
evidence; or
(2) would show that the evidence that was submitted at
the hearing was likely false and that the likely false evidence
had an effect on the outcome of the decision.

Id.
The ULJ affirmed its decision. The ULJ found D.Z.’s testi mony credible and
reasoned that Smith was simply challenging its credibility determination. Because we
defer to the ULJ’s credibility determinations, we conclude that the ULJ did not err in
denying Smith’s second request for reconsideration. See Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc. , 721
N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2006) (stating that this court gives “deference to the
credibility determinations made by the ULJ”).
Smith asserts that the ULJ made two oral expressions that are not in the transcript
that demonstrate “extreme prejudice” against her. “If any difference arises as to whether

9
the record truly discloses what occurred [at an evidentiary hearing], the difference shall be
submitted to and determined by the [ULJ] and the record made to conform.” Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 110.05; see Doty v. Doty , 533 N.W.2d 72, 75 (Minn. App. 1995) (“We will not
resolve a factual dispute about the accuracy of the transcript . . . .”). Because Smith did
not ask the ULJ to note her concerns in the transcript, we decline to address it on appeal.
Smith also asserts that the ULJ was racially biased against her because the record
includes references to her EEOC complaint. Based on our thorough review of the record,
we conclude that this argument is without merit . There is no indication that the ULJ was
racially biased against her. We conclude that Smith received a fair hearing, and the ULJ’s
decision was not made upon unlawful procedure.
Affirmed.