State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0327

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Robera Abdella Ganamo,
Appellant.

Filed June 26, 2017
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-12-5853

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
Joshua L. Weichsel (certified student attorney), St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, Samantha Alsadi (certified student attorney), St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s denial of appellant’s request for sentence
clarification, appellant contends that the district court erred in not allo wing custody credit
for time spent in a juvenile placement at Glen Mills Schools. Because appellant did not
meet his burden of establishing that he was entitled to credit, and because the district court
did not clearly err in its factual findings or misapply the law, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Robera Abdella Ganamo pleaded guilty to first -degree aggravated
robbery in 2008 after being charged by respondent State of Minnesota by juvenile petition.
Appellant was “designated as an Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile” (EJJ), and received a
stayed 48-month prison sentence requiring his compliance with probation conditions. The
district court ordered placement at Glen Mills Schools in Pennsylvania for nine to twelve
months. Appellant successfully completed his time at Glen Mills and returned to
Minnesota in 2010.
Appellant then violated his EJJ and subsequent adult probation three times after his
return to Minnesota. After the first violation, the district court revoked appellant’s EJJ
status and sentenced him to prison for 48 months stayed for 20 years. Appellant served
local jail time as a sanction for the second probation violation. And after the third violation,
appellant requested execution of his prison sentence. The district court granted his request,
giving him credit for 228 days in custody. Appellant thereafter filed a request for sentence
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clarification, in part seeking credit for 471 days spent at Glen Mills. The district court
denied the request. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
“A cri minal defendant is entitled to jail credit for time spent in custody ‘in
connection with the offense or behavioral incident being sentenced.’” State v. Clarkin, 817
N.W.2d 678, 687 (Minn. 2012) (citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4(B)). A defendant
is entitled to custody credit for time spent in a treatment facility if the placement’s “level
of confinement and limitations imposed are the functional equivalent of a placement in a
jail, workhouse, or regional correctional facility.” Asfaha v. State, 665 N.W.2d 523, 523-
24 (Minn. 2003). “Awards of jail credit are governed by principles of fairness and equity
and must be determined on a case -by-case basis. A defendant has the burden of
establishing that he is entitled to jail credit for a specific period of time.” State v. Arend,
648 N.W.2d 746, 748 (Minn. App. 2002) (quotation omitted). “The decision whether to
award credit is a mixed question of fact and law.” Clarkin, 817 N.W.2d at 687 (quotation
omitted). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and review de novo
the district court’s application of the rules of law. Id. The district court does not have
discretion to award jail credit. Id.
The district court’s order denying appellant’s request for custody credit for the time
spent at Glen Mills was supported by a memorandum, which reads in relevant part:
In State v. Fields , the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that a district court’s denial of jail credit for time spent at Glen
Mills was not clearly erroneous. State v. Fields, 679 N.W.2d
341[, 349] (Minn. 2004). Specifically, the Supreme Court
indicated that it agreed with the district court which had noted
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that it was “familiar with” the Glen Mills program, which “is
an excellent program, but it is a structured residential treatment
program and is not incarceration.” [ Id. (quotation omitted)].
Such is the case here. [Appellant’s] time at Glen Mills Schools
provided him with educational and behavioral programs and
resulted in his acquiring his high school diploma. Accordingly,
the request for additional custody credit is denied as the Glen
Mills School[s] program was not incarceration for purposes of
jail credit.

Appellant argues that the district court’s reliance on Fields alone is insufficient to satisfy
the close-look requirement of Asfaha, which suggests that “district courts must look closely
at the facts of the case presented” to determine whether a particular placement is the
functional equivalent of a jail placement. Asfaha, 665 N.W.2d at 528. He contends that
Minnesota correctional facilities also provide treatment and education, so these
considerations should not weigh in favor of a determination that Glen Mills is not a
functional equivalent of jail placement.
Though the district court’s factual findings were minimal, they can be analogized to
those in Fields. The district court in Fields relied only on its familiarity with Glen Mills,
and the supreme court found that sufficient to affirm. State v. Fields, 679 N.W.2d 341, 349
(Minn. 2004). In the instant matter, the district court considered Fields and wrote, “Such
is the case here.” While this is not an in -depth analysis of the sort likely contemplated by
Asfaha, it does indicate a consideration of appellant’s circumstances. Appellant bore the
burden to show entitlement to custody credit and did not argue that Fields is inapplicable
or that the circumstances at Glen Mills had changed to render it a functional equivalent.
See Arend, 648 N.W.2d at 748 (“A defendant has the burden of establishing that he is
entitled to jail credit for a specific period of time.”). The only documents appellant relies
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on to demonstrate the functional equivalence of Glen Mills to a jail, workhouse, or other
correctional facility included his affidavit containing his personal observations and his
school records. The latter did not contain any indication of the level of confinement or
limitations imposed. And nothing in appellant’s affidavit would suggest that Glen Mills is
anything other than “a structured residential treatment program.” Fields, 679 N.W.2d at
349.
Appellant’s affidavit describes transport to Glen Mills as similar to transport to jail
in that he was escorted to and from the airport. Glen Mills attendees follow a strict daily
schedule, use a buddy system, must ask for permission to go certain places on the campus,
and are monitored by way of counts and cameras throughout the day. Attendees are unable
to leave the campus during their first year if they are not from the state, cannot have
personal electronic devices, are limited to one phone call per w eek, and can only have
visitors under certain conditions. Their mail is opened and inspected. Finally, Glen Mills
staff have access to physical restraints and isolating rooms if attendees act out.
Although appellant compares intake at Glen Mills to intake at a jail, it is also similar
to the registration process at many schools: he had a photograph taken for identification
purposes, provided health and personal information on a questionnaire, and received a
uniform. While at Glen Mills, appellant’s be droom was not locked. Appellant did have
an opportunity to leave campus after the one -year limitation expired, and he “never acted
up so he never spent any time in isolation.”
We conclude, based on the record before us , that Glen Mills does not rise to the
level of functional equivalence when compared to the circumstances at facilities for which
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courts have granted custody credit in the past. The supreme court affirmed a district court’s
grant of jail credit for time spent in a residential treatment facility in Asfaha. 665 N.W.2d
at 527-28. That case involved a living unit located within a treatment facility, and one
could not enter or leave the building without a control -booth operator electronically
opening three separately locked doors. Id. at 527. The facility had a secure, fenced exercise
area behind the building and a gym that also had to be electronically opened by the control-
booth operator. Id. Residents’ cells would be locked at night and during crises. Id. All
of Asfaha’s daily life occurred in that locked living unit. Id. Residents who had medical
appointments or court hearings were transported in physical restraints. Id.
This court reversed a denial of jail credit for a residential treatment facility in State
v. Razmyslowski. 668 N.W.2d 681, 684 (Minn. App. 2003). The facility was surrounded
by a security fence and access was controlled electronically through multiple locked ports.
Id. Similar to Glen Mills, counts were performed regularly, and patients were monitored
continuously, followed a strict daily schedule, and used a buddy system. Id. But patients
at the Razmyslowski facility were also subject to pat searches and room searches, and were
physically restrained for transportation and accompanied by armed guards. Id.
Both Asfaha and Razmyslowski involved a higher level of confinement and degree
of limitations than Glen Mills. And appellant has not met his burden of showing that he
should receive custody credit for Glen Mills where the supreme court has affirmed the
opposite determination and where appellant presents no evidence suggesting Glen Mills is

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anything other than a “a structured residential treatment program.” Fields, 679 N.W.2d at
349. The district court did not clearly err in its factual findings or misapply the law.
Affirmed.