A17-0352 A17-0353

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0348
A17-0352
A17-0353

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
C. A. G. and J. E. C., Parents (A17-0348),

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
C. A. G. and D. M., Parents (A17-0352),

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
C. A. G. and T. J. P., Parents (A17-0353).

Filed August 21, 2017
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File Nos. 55-JV-16-1584, 55-JV-16-1586, 55-JV-16-1591

Michael D. Schatz, Donnelly Law Office, Rochester, Minnesota (fo r appellant mother
C.A.G.)

Frederick S. Suhler, Jr., Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent father J.E.C.)

Kimbal G. Orwoll, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent father D.M.)

Janet Hulsizer Krueger, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent children C.C., J.C., C.A.M.
and W.C.)

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, Michael E. Davis, Associate County Attorney,
Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent Olmsted Community Services)

T.J.P., Red Wing, Minnesota (pro se respondent father)

Vicki Duncan, Rochester, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

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Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In these consolidated appeals, appellant -mother C.A.G. challenges the termination
of her parental rights (TPR) to four of her ch ildren. With respect to all four children,
C.A.G. argues that the district court violated her statutory right to counsel by not appointing
replacement counsel and granting a continua nce after her court-appointed attorney
withdrew based on C.A.G.’s complaints about his representation days before trial. In
addition, with respect to her son W.C., C.A.G. argues that th e district court abused its
discretion in determining that a statutory basis for termination exists and that termination
is in W.C.’s best interests. Because the di strict court did not violate C.A.G.’s statutory
right to counsel by proceeding with trial as scheduled without appointing new counsel, and
because the district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating C.A.G.’s parental rights
to W.C., we affirm.
FACTS
C.A.G. is the mother of th e four children involved in this TPR case. The children
have different fathers: J.C. (age 15) and C.C. (age 14) are the sons of J.E.C.; C.M. (age
12) is the daughter of D.M.; and W.C. (age 7) is the son of T.J.P.
In November 2015, respondent Olmsted County Community Services (the county)
filed a petition to determine J.C., C.C., C.M., and W.C. to be children in need of protection
or services. The children were removed from C.A.G.’s custody on January 27, 2016, after

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J.C. told a social worker at school that C.A. G. had choked him. W.C. was placed in the
care of J.E.C., along with his half-brothers, J.C. and C.C. The county filed a TPR petition
and began permanency proceedings. The one- year deadline to complete the permanency
proceedings was January 28, 2017. See Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 4.03, subd. 2(b).
The district court appointed counsel fo r C.A.G. in January 2016. C.A.G.
complained about her initial counsel and, in April 2016, wrote a letter to the district court
requesting a new lawyer and suggesting that she intended to report counsel for violation of
professional rules. Responding to C.A.G.’s request, the district court discharged her court-
appointed counsel because he was not on the roster of qualified attorneys to represent
parents in juvenile-protection matters. On April 26, the district court appointed a new
attorney to represent C.A.G. In June, the di strict court granted this second attorney’s
request for a continuance to prepare for trial. Trial was scheduled for October, but, after
T.J.P.’s counsel’s request for a continuance, was rescheduled for December 12.
On December 6—six days be fore trial—C.A.G. e-mailed her attorney, complaining
about the quality of his representation:
I 100% believe you cannot repres ent me diligently in this
matter. You have not pursued matters brought to your attention
despite your opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience
to date (Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 1.3 Diligence).
You have not dealt with any situ ation over the course of your
appointment . . . . [Y]our preparation and thoroughness is
questionable.

C.A.G. asserted that counsel had violated pr ofessional rules and stated that she would be
writing to the district court and was in cont act with the Department of Human Services
Inspector General.

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C.A.G.’s attorney moved to withdraw as counsel on December 7. At a hearing on
the motion that same day, the a ttorney told the district court that he believed that C.A.G.
wanted him to withdraw and that he could not continue to represent her as a result of the
allegations against him. The district court asked C.A.G. three times what her plan was for
trial and what she wanted the court to do. C.A.G. responded with phrases such as “I don’t
know what to say” and “I have no idea.” The court granted the a ttorney’s withdrawal
motion and gave C.A.G. the option to either represent herself or retain counsel before trial
started.
C.A.G. e-mailed the court on December 8, claiming that she had found an attorney
who agreed to represent her and seeking a con tinuance to provide this third attorney time
to prepare. The district court denied her request. C.A.G. again e-mailed the district court
on December 11, requesting a continuance. The district court denied this request on
December 12 because the one-year permanency deadline was approaching and it believed
that no new attorney could prepare for trial w ith even a two-week continuance. C.A.G.’s
new attorney did not appear on December 12 for the start of trial. C.A.G. represented
herself throughout the remainder of the proceedings.
Relevant to this appeal, the district court terminated C.A.G.’s parental rights to W.C.
after determining that four stat utory bases for termination exis t and that termination is in
the child’s best interests. The four statutory bases are that (1) C.A.G. failed to satisfy the
duties of the parent-child relationship, (2) she is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent-
child relationship, (3) the children are neglect ed and in foster care, and (4) one of the

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children suffered egregious harm in her care. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subds. 1(b)(2),
(4), (6), (8) (2016).
C.A.G. appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not violate C.A.G.’s statutory right to counsel.

C.A.G. argues that the district court viol ated her statutory right to counsel by not
appointing a third attorney a nd not granting a continuance to allow the new attorney to
prepare for trial. The county argues that the district court’s decision not to grant a
continuance for the ap pointment of a third attorney wa s appropriate in light of the
procedural deadlines and the best intere sts of the children in timely determining
permanency.
A parent in a juvenile-protection proceedi ng has a statutory right to the effective
assistance of counsel. Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 3(a) (2016). But a parent’s right to
counsel in juvenile-protection proceedings is not the equivalent of the constitutional right
to counsel in criminal proceedings. In re Welfare of G.L.H., 614 N.W.2d 718, 722 (Minn.
2000).1
In juvenile-protection proceedings, “the best interests of the child must be the
paramount consideration.” Minn. Stat. § 260C. 301, subd. 7 (2016). The statutes and the
Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Pr oceedings provide strict deadlines for

1 C.A.G. argued to the district court that it had violated her Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, but the Sixth Amendm ent does not apply to juven ile-protection proceedings.
G.L.H., 614 N.W.2d at 722.

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commencing and completing permanency pro ceedings. Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.503, .509
(2016); Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 4.03. Permanency proceedings must be completed within
12 months after the child is pl aced in the home of a noncust odial parent. Minn. R. Juv.
Prot. P. 4.03, subd. 2(b). Th e Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that the timelines in
permanency proceedings are “maximum.” In re Welfare of Child of T.T.B. , 724 N.W.2d
300, 307 (Minn. 2006). The supreme court ha s also emphasized that “[e]ach delay in the
termination of a parent’s rights equates to delay in a child’s o pportunity to have a
permanent home and can seriously affect a child’s chance for permanent placement.” In
re Welfare of J.R., Jr. , 655 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Mi nn. 2003). The supreme court has further
stated, “While we recognize a nd support due process rights of all parties, we decline the
invitation to elevate the parents’ rights at the expense of the child’s.” Id.
C.A.G. argues that this cas e turns on whether she waived the right to counsel and
that she did not do so. Cf. G.L.H., 614 N.W.2d at 721 (analyzing waiver of the right to
counsel in juvenile-protection proceedings). The county does not argue that C.A.G. waived
her right to counsel. Rather, it argues that C.A.G’s right to counsel did not require the
appointment of a third attorney and postponement of the trial. We agree with the county.
C.A.G. was timely appointed counsel an d was given substitute counsel upon her
request in April. In December, just days before trial, C.A.G. sent her second attorney an
e-mail informing him that she was sure he could not represent her diligently. C.A.G. had
raised no complaints about him previously. C.A.G. did not oppose her lawyer’s subsequent
motion to withdraw and does not argue on appeal that the district court erred in granting it.
C.A.G. insisted that she had found an attorney to represent her and sought a continuance.

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A district court’s ruling on a motion for a continuance will not be reversed absent a
showing of an abuse of discretion. Dunshee v. Douglas, 255 N.W.2d 42, 45 (Minn. 1977).
C.A.G. first sought a continuance on December 8—four days before trial was set to
begin. The deadline to complete the permanency proceedings was January 28, 2017. See
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 4.03, subd. 2(b). The district court concluded that, even if it granted
a two-week continuance, no new attorney coul d be prepared within two weeks given the
voluminous discovery in this case. The district court also cited the availability of experts
and the schedules of the other parties as an additional reason to deny the continuance. The
district court thus denied the continuance and appointment of a third attorney. The district
court’s decision to deny the continuance to ensure compliance w ith the procedural
deadlines is consistent with Minnesota Supr eme Court cases holding that these deadlines
are maximum. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 307. In light of th is case law, we cannot say that
C.A.G.’s statutory right to counsel takes pr ecedence over the dead lines in permanency
proceedings for purposes of deciding whether to grant or deny a continuance.
C.A.G. was appointed counsel and given substitute counsel once. She waited until
nearly the eve of trial to co mplain about her second attorney and did not object to his
withdrawal. The district court decided, and C.A.G. does not disagree, that a continuance
would have been necessary for any new lawyer to prepare for trial. The best interests of
the children weighed heav ily against delay. We conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying C.A.G.’s request for a continuance and did not deny C.A.G.
her statutory right to counsel by not appo inting another substitute counsel in these
circumstances.

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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating C.A.G.’s parental
rights to W.C.

C.A.G. argues that the district court abus ed its discretion in terminating C.A.G.’s
parental rights to W.C. The district court concluded that termination of C.A.G.’s parental
rights was warranted under section 260C.301, subdivisions 1(b)(2), (4), (6), and (8), and in
W.C.’s best interests.
A natural parent is presumptively a “fit and suitable person to be entrusted with the
care of his or her child,” and “[o]rdinarily, it is in the best interest of a child to be in the
custody of his or her natural parents.” In re Welfare of A.D., 535 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn.
1995). As a result, parental rights may be terminated “only for grave and weighty reasons.”
In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990).
A decision to involuntarily te rminate a person’s parental rights is discretionary with
the district court. In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 136-37 (Minn. 2014).
To terminate parental rights, a district court must determine both that at least one statutory
basis for termination exists and that termination is in the best interests of the child. Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subds. 1, 7 (2016); R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 137. Determinations of
whether a statutory basis for involuntarily term inating parental rights is present, whether
termination is in the best of interest of th e child, and whether pare ntal rights should be
terminated are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. ,
805 N.W.2d 895, 901-02, 905 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2012). A
district court abuses its discretion if its underlying findings of fact are clearly erroneous, if
it misapplies the law, or if it resolves the ma tter in a manner that is against logic and the

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facts on the record. Dobrin v. Dobrin , 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997); Rutten v.
Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984). In termination pro ceedings, appellate courts
review the district court’s underlying findings of fact for clear erro r, taking into account
the clear-and-convinci ng evidence standard of proof used in juvenile-protection
proceedings. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 900-02. A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it is
“manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Minn.
2008) (quotation omitted).
Egregious Harm
A person’s parental rights may be terminated if the district court finds that
a child has experienced egregious harm in the parent’s care
which is of a nature, duration, or chronicity that indicates a lack
of regard for the child’s well- being, such that a reasonable
person would believe it contrary to the best interest of the child
or of any child to be in the parent’s care.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(6). Egregious harm to another child can be grounds for
terminating parental rights to a child. In re the Welfare of A.L.F. , 579 N.W.2d 152, 155-
56 (Minn. App. 1998) (holding that egregious harm experienced by child’s half-sister while
in father’s care was sufficient grounds for terminating father’s parental rights to child).
C.A.G. argues that the district court’s fi nding that W.C.’s half-brother, J.C., suffered
egregious harm is erroneous, but she does not explain why this finding is erroneous.
Nevertheless, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that J.C. suffered egregious harm.

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The district court concluded that J.C. suffered egregious harm because C.A.G.
temporarily impaired J.C.’s ability to breathe by choking hi m. Whether the temporary
impairment of the ability to breathe constitutes egregious harm is a question of statutory
interpretation reviewed de novo. In re Welfare Child of R.S., 805 N.W.2d 44, 48-49 (Minn.
2011). “Egregious harm” is defined as “infliction of bodily harm to a child or neglect of a
child which demonstrates a grossly inadequa te ability to provide minimally adequate
parental care.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, su bd. 14 (2016). “Substantial bodily harm”
includes bodily injury which “causes a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ.” Id., subd. 14(2); Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7a
(2016).
We may examine dictionary definitions of relevant terms to determine whether
C.A.G.’s choking of J.C. rises to the level of “substantial bodily harm”. State v. Larkin,
620 N.W.2d 335, 337-38 (Mi nn. App. 2001) (examining dictionary definitions of
“consciousness,” “unconsciousness,” and “brain” to determin e that loss of consciousness
is substantial bodily harm). “Choking” means “[t]o interfere with the respiration of by
compression or obstruction of the larynx or trachea.” American Heritage Dictionary 337
(3d ed. 1992). The “trachea” is a tube that “carr[ies] air to the lungs.” Id. at 1896. J.C.’s
breathing was impaired to such an extent that he coughed, had trouble breathing, and his
face turned purple. Th e choking in this case meets th e definition of “substantial bodily
harm” because it impaired the ability of J.C.’s trachea to carry air to the lungs and caused
J.C. to lose the ability to breathe.

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We review whether clear and convincing evidence supports the district court’s
finding that J.C. suffered egre gious harm for clear error. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 900-02.
The social worker testified that she intervie wed J.C. shortly after C.A.G. choked him and
that J.C. had bruising on his ne ck and beneath his eyes. The social worker also testified
that J.C. initially claimed that the marks were a rash but eventually stated that C.A.G. had
choked him. In this interview, J.C. stated that he coughed, had trouble breathing, and his
face turned purple. An expert testified that J.C.’s injuries were consistent with choking
and were not the result of a rash. Clear a nd convincing evidence supports the district
court’s finding that J.C. suffered egregious harm as a result of choking.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that C.A.G. caused J.C.
egregious harm. See id. Because one statutory basis for terminating parental rights is
affirmable, other bases invoked by the district court to terminate parental rights need not
be addressed. See In re Welfare of Children of R.W. , 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004)
(“Termination of parental right s will be affirmed as long as at least one statutory ground
for termination is supported by clear and co nvincing evidence and termination is in the
child’s best interests.”).
Best Interests of W.C.
The district court concluded after weighing the relevant factors that it is in W.C.’s
best interests that C.A.G.’s parental rights be terminated. We review the district court’s
determination that termination is in a child’s best interests for an abuse of discretion.
J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 900-02. In determining th e best interests of th e child, the district
court must balance the child’s interests in preserving the pa rent-child relationship, the

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parent’s interests in preservi ng the parent-child relationship, and any competing interests
of the child. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.05, subd. 3(b)(3). The district court acknowledged
that C.A.G. “expressed a strong desire[] to maintain a relationship with W.C.” But the
district court found that C.A.G.’s interest wa s outweighed by the best interests of W.C.
The district court found that W.C. is “happy ,” “thriving with his brothers,” and attending
school and improving his speech and reading. The district court also found that C.A.G.
cannot provide W.C. with a stable environment. The district court’s findings are supported
by the record. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that termination of
C.A.G.’s parental rights was in W.C.’s best interests.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
terminating C.A.G.’s parental rights to W.C. See J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 900-02.
Affirmed.