Jill Dusterhoft, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0354

Jill Dusterhoft,
Relator,

vs.

Department of Employment and
Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed September 5, 2017
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge*

Department of Employment and
Economic Development
File No. 35055658-3

Jill Dusterhoft, White Bear Lake, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Lee B. Nelson, Keri A. Phillips, Department of Employment and Economic Development,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Relator challenges the unemployment-law judge’s decision that she is ineligible for
unemployment benefits because she was not available for suitable employment. We
affirm.
D E C I S I O N
When reviewing the decision of an unemployment-law judge (ULJ ), we affirm the
decision unless the substantial rights of the relator hav e been prejudiced because, among
other reasons, the decision is “affected by [an] error of law” or is “unsupported by
substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105,
subd. 7(d) (2016). We review the ULJ’s factual findings “in the light most favorable to the
decision” and “give[] deference to the credibility d eterminations made by the ULJ.”
McNeilly v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Econ. Dev., 778 N.W.2d 707, 710 (Minn. App. 2010)
(quotation omitted). “As a result, this court will not disturb the ULJ’s factual findings
when the evidence substantially sustains them.” Id. But we review the ULJ’s ineligibility
determination de novo, construing narrowly statutory bases to disqualify applicants. Ress
v. Abbott Nw. Hosp. Inc. , 448 N.W.2d 519, 523 (Minn. 1989); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 268.031, subd. 2 (2016) (“[A]ny statutory provision that would preclude an applicant
from receiving [unemployment] benefits must be narrowly construed.”).
Here, the ULJ concluded that Dusterhoft is ineligible to receive unemployment
benefits because she was not available for suitable employment. A person may be eligible
for unemployment benefits for any week when she was (1) “available for suitable
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employment,” and (2) “actively seeking suitable employment.” Minn. Stat. § 268.085,
subd. 1(4), (5) (2016). “‘Available for suitable employment’ means an applicant is ready,
willing, and able to accept suitable employment,” and “[t]he attachment to the work force
must be genuine.” Id., subd. 15(a). “An applicant may restrict availability to suitable
employment, but there must be no other restrictions, either self -imposed or created by
circumstances, temporary or permanent, that prevent accepting suitable employment.” Id.
“Actively seeking suitable emplo yment” means those
reasonable, diligent efforts an individual in similar
circumstances would make if genuinely interested in obtaining
suitable employment under the existing conditions in the labor
market area. Limiting the search to positions that are not
available or are above the applicant’s training, experience, and
qualifications is not “actively seeking suitable employment.”

Id. at subd. 16(a). Whether an applicant is available for and actively seeking suitable
employment, and whether the applicant’s attachment to the work force is genuine, are
factual determinations. Goodman v. Minn. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 312 Minn. 551, 552-53,
255 N.W.2d 222, 223 (1977).
The ULJ found that Dusterhoft was a university student with regularly scheduled
classes, and was one month away from graduating. Dusterhoft originally stated that she
was not willing to quit school to accept suitable employment. She later stated she would
quit school “[i]f it came down to it.” After she had graduated and filed a request for
reconsideration, she stated that she “would have quit school” in order to accept suitable
employment. The ULJ specifically found that Dusterhoft’s testimony that she “was willing
to quit school one month prior to graduating and obtaining a degree in Applied Economics
was not convincing.” “[C]redibility determinations are the exclusive province of the ULJ
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and will not be disturbed on appeal.” Bangston v. Allina Med. Grp., 766 N.W.2d 328, 332
(Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted). Overall, the ULJ concluded that “the greater
weight of the evidence shows that [Dusterhoft] was not willing to quit school or rearrange
her classes in order to accept suitable employment.” The ULJ therefore correctly
determined that Dusterhoft is not entitled to receive unemployment benefits because she
was not available for suitable employment.
Affirmed.