State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0365

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jesse Lamee Motley,
Appellant.

Filed January 22, 2018
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Martin County District Court
File No. 46-CR-16-123

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Karen B. McGillic, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Terry Viesselman, Martin County Attorney, Fairmont, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appe llate Public Defender, Adam Lozeau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Appellant Jesse Lamee Motley challenge s the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his convictions of second-degree criminal sexual conduct—fear of imminent

2
great bodily harm and second-degree criminal sexual conduct—force or coercion. Because
there is sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions be yond a reasonable doubt and
appellant’s pro se arguments are without merit, we affirm.
D E C I S I O N
I.
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of th e evidence underlying his conviction of
second-degree criminal sexual conduct—fear of imminent great bodily harm, under Minn.
Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(c) (2014). Our review of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge
is “limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when
viewed in a light most favorab le to the conviction, was suffi cient to permit the jurors to
reach the verdict wh ich they did.” State v. DeRosier, 695 N.W.2d 97, 108 (Minn. 2005)
(quotation omitted). When an element of the offense, such as one’s state of mind, has been
proven circumstantially, appellate courts apply a heightened standard of review. Loving v.
State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017) (applyi ng circumstantial-evidence test when
there is no direct evidence of individual’s state of mind); State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d
469, 474 (Minn. 2010) (holding that a conviction based on circumstantial evidence
warrants heightened scrutiny). We first identify the circumstances proved and defer to the
jury’s “acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and re jection of evidence in the
record that conflicted with ” those circumstances. State v. Porte , 832 N.W.2d 303, 310
(Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted). Second, we “examine independently the
reasonableness of all inferences that migh t be drawn from the circumstances proved,

3
including inferences consistent w ith a hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. (quotations
omitted).
To convict appellant of second-degree cr iminal sexual conduct—fear of imminent
great bodily harm, the state must prove that appellant “engage[d] in sexual contact with
another person” and that “circumstances exis ting at the time of the act cause[d] the
complainant to have a reasonable fear of imminent great bodily harm to the complainant.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(c). “Great bod ily harm” is “bodily in jury which creates a
high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which
causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member
or organ or other serious bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 8 (2014).
With respect to the first prong of the circumstantial-evidence test, the circumstances
proved are as follows: appellant entered his next-door neighbor’s apartment at night while
she was sleeping, crawled into bed next to he r, and put his finger into her vagina as she
slept. When the victim awoke, appellant pulled the victim’s pants down and tried to force
his penis into her vagina. The victim attempted to plug in a light, at which point he stabbed
her in the neck with a knife from her kitchen. The victim began screaming and fighting
and attempted to run away, but appellant ch oked her, punched her, threw her into a
bookcase, threw her to the gro und, and attempted to choke her again. The victim stated
that she feared that she was going to die.
The second step requires us to consid er whether the circumstances proved are
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than guilt. Al-
Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 473-74. At this step, we do not defer to the jury’s “choice between

4
reasonable inferences.” Id. at 474 (quotations omitted). To successfully challenge a
conviction based upon circumstantial evidence, appellant bears the burden of “point[ing]
to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than guilt.” State v.
Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 206 (Minn. 2002). Th e possibility of a defendant’s innocence
does not require reversal if “the evidence ta ken as a whole makes such theories seem
unreasonable.” Id. Appellant argues that the evidence supports a determination that he
was innocent because the victim left her apartment door unlocked, expecting her boyfriend
to arrive later, and thus she could not have feared imminent great bodily harm at the time
of the sexual contact because she could have thought appellant was her boyfriend.
This is not a reasonable inference based on the circumstances proved. Appellant
put his finger into the victim’s vagina while she was asleep. Then , when she awoke, he
crawled on top of her, pulled her pants down, and attempted to force his penis into her
vagina. When she tried to roll away from hi m to turn on a light, appellant stabbed the
victim in the neck with a steak knife. The on ly reasonable inference, given the totality of
the circumstances, is that appellant caused the victim to fear imminent great bodily harm.
See, e.g., State v. Zernechel , 304 N.W.2d 365, 366 (Minn. 1981) (holding that evidence
was sufficient to sustain second-degree cr iminal-sexual-conduct conviction—fear of
imminent great bodily harm, when female tenant awoke during sexual assault by neighbor).
The jury was justified in finding that the victim experienced fear of imminent great bodily
harm at the time of the sexual assault and that, under the circumstances, her fear was
reasonable. See id. Sufficient evidence ex ists to permit the jury to conclude beyond a

5
reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(c).
II.
Appellant argues that the evidence was in sufficient to support his conviction of
second-degree criminal sexual conduct—force or coercion, under Mi nn. Stat. § 609.343,
subd. 1(e)(i) (2014). Because the force-or-coercion charge ex ists within the same multi-
tier statutory scheme as appellant’s fear-of-imminent-great-bodily-harm charge, the district
court did not enter judgment or prono unce a sentence on the former charge. See Minn.
Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (2016) (forbidding tw o convictions on both the crime charged and
an “included offense”); State v. Hackler, 532 N.W.2d 559, 559 (Minn. 1995) (“If the lesser
offense is a lesser degree . . . of a multi-tier statutory scheme dealing with a particular
subject, then it is an ‘included offense’ under section 609.04.”); see also State v. Spears ,
560 N.W.2d 723, 726-27 (Minn. App. 1997) (holding that defendant cannot be convicted
of violations of both section 609.342, subdivisions 1(c) and 1(e)(i) because they constitute
“duplicative convictions” under two different su bdivisions of the first-degree criminal-
sexual-conduct statute), review denied (Minn. May 28, 1997).
Appellate courts do not consider sufficien cy-of-the-evidence challenges to counts
on which a defendant was found guilty but neither formally adjudicated nor sentenced. See
State v. Ashland, 287 N.W.2d 649, 650 (Minn. 1979); see also State v. Hoelzel, 639 N.W.2d
605, 609 (Minn. 2002) (concluding that verdic t of guilt, without recorded judgment of
conviction, is not final, appealable judgment). And if the district court imposed a sentence
on this charge in the future, appellant would have an opportunity to pursue a direct appeal

6
and challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at that time. See, e.g., State v. LaTourelle ,
343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1984).
However, even if we were to address appellant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence
challenge, it fails on the merits. Because the victim provided direct evidence of sexual
assault, the circumstantial-evidence standard does not apply and our review is limited to a
“painstaking analysis of the record” to determine whether the evidence supports the verdict.
DeRosier, 695 N.W.2d at 108 (quo tation omitted). We assume “the jury believed the
state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Moore , 438
N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). “This is espe cially true whe[n] re solution of the case
depends on conflicting testimony, because weighing the credibility of witnesses is the
exclusive function of the jury.” State v. Pieschke , 295 N.W.2d 580, 5 84 (Minn. 1980).
Inconsistencies in testimony go to witness cr edibility, which is an i ssue reserved for the
jury. State v. Pendleton, 706 N.W.2d 500, 511-12 (Minn. 2005). Appellate courts will not
disturb the verdict “if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence
and the requirement of proof beyond a reasona ble doubt, could reasonably conclude that
the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” State v. Ortega , 813 N.W.2d 86, 100
(Minn. 2012).
A person is guilty of second-degree crimin al sexual conduct if “the actor causes
personal injury to the complainant, and . . . the actor uses force or coercion to accomplish
the sexual contact.” Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(e)(i) (2014). “Force” is
the infliction, attempted inflictio n, or threatened infliction by
the actor of bodily harm or co mmission or threat of any other
crime by the actor against the co mplainant or another, which

7
(a) causes the complainant to reasonably believe that the actor
has the present ability to execute the threat and (b) if the actor
does not have a significant relationship to the complainant, also
causes the complainant to submit.
Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 3 (2014). “Coercion” is “the use by the actor of confinement,
or superior size or strength, against the complainant that causes the complainant to submit
to sexual penetration or contact against the complainant’s will.” Id., subd. 14 (2014).
Appellant argues that “the evidence does not show that sexual contact was
accomplished by, or even accompa nied by, the use of force.” Appellant claims that the
victim did not testify that it hu rt when appellant put his finge r in her vagina or attempted
to put his penis in her vagina. Appellant also argues that he did not use coercion to
accomplish the sexual contact because he “used no words or threats to accomplish sexual
contact,” and merely “lay[] down next to an intoxicated, sleeping woman and touch[ed]
her while she was waking.”
We reject this argument. First, it is undisputed that appellant engaged in sexual
contact with the victim by putting his finger in her vagina and by a ttempting to force his
penis in her vagina. Second, the victim presented direct evidence that she suffered personal
injuries when appellant crawled on top of her, stabbed her in the neck with a steak knife,
choked her, punched her, and threw her into a bookcase and onto the floor. The doctor,
the sexual-assault nurse, the victim’s dow nstairs neighbor, and the responding police
officers all testified that the victim sustaine d physical injuries and was emotionally upset
following the attack. Third, the record supports a determination that appellant used force

8
or coercion during the sexual contact by pulling down the victim’s pants, crawling on top
of her, stabbing her with a knife, and physically assaulting her.
When viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, Pieschke, 295 N.W.2d
at 584, the evidence in the record sustains the jury’s verdict that appellant used force or
coercion to accomplish the sexual contact. See, e.g., State v. Solberg , 882 N.W.2d 618,
627 (Minn. 2016) (recognizing that defendant’s “use of his overwhelming physical size
and strength” to cause victim to submit to un wanted sexual contact “f its squarely within
the statute’s prohibition of sexual assault by coercion”); State v. Carter, 289 N.W.2d 454,
455 (Minn. 1979) (affirming criminal-sex ual-conduct conviction where defendant,
“although neither using actual force nor verbaliz ed threats of force, intentionally created
an atmosphere of fear” during sexual assault); see also State v. Grampre, 766 N.W.2d 347,
352 (Minn. App. 2009) (holding that defendant’s use of a knife during sexual assault
“easily fits within th[e] definition of ‘force’” employed in criminal code related to criminal-
sexual-conduct crimes), review denied (Minn. Aug. 26, 2009); State v. Gamez, 494 N.W.2d
84, 87 (Minn. App. 1992) (noting that, for purpose of third-degree criminal sexual conduct,
“[t]here is evidence of coerci on where an abuser intentionally creates an atmosphere of
fear”), review denied (Minn. Feb. 23, 1993). In sum, we conclude that the evidence
sufficiently supports the jury ’s determination that appe llant committed second-degree
criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(e)(i).
III.
Appellant raises additional pro se argumen ts, asserting that his convictions should
be overturned because (1) the jury was not fair and impartial; (2) the evidence was

9
insufficient; (3) the jury instructions were erroneous; (4) discovery was incomplete; (5) the
judge was biased; (6) trial counsel was ineffective; (7) due process was violated; (8) venue
was improper; (9) the DNA evidence was insu fficient; and (10) the sentencing decision
was erroneous. Because appellant failed to support these arguments with citations to
relevant facts or legal authority, we deem them forfeited. See State v. Manley, 664 N.W.2d
275, 286 (Minn. 2003) (consi dering arguments forfeited when they are unsupported by
facts in the record and contain no citation to relevant legal authority).
Affirmed.